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https://git.postgresql.org/git/postgresql.git
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7559d8ebfa
Backpatch-through: update all files in master, backpatch legal files through 9.4
939 lines
24 KiB
C
939 lines
24 KiB
C
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* contrib/sepgsql/label.c
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*
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* Routines to support SELinux labels (security context)
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2010-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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*
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* -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include <selinux/label.h>
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#include "access/genam.h"
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#include "access/htup_details.h"
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#include "access/table.h"
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#include "access/xact.h"
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#include "catalog/catalog.h"
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#include "catalog/dependency.h"
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#include "catalog/indexing.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_attribute.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_class.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_database.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_namespace.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_proc.h"
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#include "commands/dbcommands.h"
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#include "commands/seclabel.h"
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#include "libpq/auth.h"
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#include "libpq/libpq-be.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "sepgsql.h"
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#include "utils/builtins.h"
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#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
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#include "utils/guc.h"
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#include "utils/lsyscache.h"
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#include "utils/memutils.h"
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#include "utils/rel.h"
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/*
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* Saved hook entries (if stacked)
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*/
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static ClientAuthentication_hook_type next_client_auth_hook = NULL;
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static needs_fmgr_hook_type next_needs_fmgr_hook = NULL;
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static fmgr_hook_type next_fmgr_hook = NULL;
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/*
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* client_label_*
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*
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* security label of the database client. Initially the client security label
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* is equal to client_label_peer, and can be changed by one or more calls to
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* sepgsql_setcon(), and also be temporarily overridden during execution of a
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* trusted-procedure.
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*
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* sepgsql_setcon() is a transaction-aware operation; a (sub-)transaction
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* rollback should also rollback the current client security label. Therefore
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* we use the list client_label_pending of pending_label to keep track of which
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* labels were set during the (sub-)transactions.
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*/
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static char *client_label_peer = NULL; /* set by getpeercon(3) */
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static List *client_label_pending = NIL; /* pending list being set by
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* sepgsql_setcon() */
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static char *client_label_committed = NULL; /* set by sepgsql_setcon(), and
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* already committed */
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static char *client_label_func = NULL; /* set by trusted procedure */
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typedef struct
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{
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SubTransactionId subid;
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char *label;
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} pending_label;
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/*
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* sepgsql_get_client_label
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*
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* Returns the current security label of the client. All code should use this
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* routine to get the current label, instead of referring to the client_label_*
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* variables above.
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*/
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char *
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sepgsql_get_client_label(void)
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{
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/* trusted procedure client label override */
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if (client_label_func)
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return client_label_func;
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/* uncommitted sepgsql_setcon() value */
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if (client_label_pending)
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{
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pending_label *plabel = llast(client_label_pending);
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if (plabel->label)
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return plabel->label;
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}
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else if (client_label_committed)
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return client_label_committed; /* set by sepgsql_setcon() committed */
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/* default label */
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Assert(client_label_peer != NULL);
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return client_label_peer;
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_set_client_label
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*
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* This routine tries to switch the current security label of the client, and
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* checks related permissions. The supplied new label shall be added to the
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* client_label_pending list, then saved at transaction-commit time to ensure
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* transaction-awareness.
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*/
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static void
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sepgsql_set_client_label(const char *new_label)
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{
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const char *tcontext;
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MemoryContext oldcxt;
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pending_label *plabel;
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/* Reset to the initial client label, if NULL */
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if (!new_label)
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tcontext = client_label_peer;
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else
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{
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if (security_check_context_raw((security_context_t) new_label) < 0)
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ereport(ERROR,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_NAME),
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errmsg("SELinux: invalid security label: \"%s\"",
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new_label)));
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tcontext = new_label;
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}
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/* Check process:{setcurrent} permission. */
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sepgsql_avc_check_perms_label(sepgsql_get_client_label(),
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SEPG_CLASS_PROCESS,
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SEPG_PROCESS__SETCURRENT,
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NULL,
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true);
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/* Check process:{dyntransition} permission. */
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sepgsql_avc_check_perms_label(tcontext,
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SEPG_CLASS_PROCESS,
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SEPG_PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION,
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NULL,
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true);
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/*
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* Append the supplied new_label on the pending list until the current
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* transaction is committed.
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*/
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oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(CurTransactionContext);
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plabel = palloc0(sizeof(pending_label));
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plabel->subid = GetCurrentSubTransactionId();
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if (new_label)
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plabel->label = pstrdup(new_label);
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client_label_pending = lappend(client_label_pending, plabel);
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MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_xact_callback
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*
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* A callback routine of transaction commit/abort/prepare. Commit or abort
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* changes in the client_label_pending list.
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*/
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static void
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sepgsql_xact_callback(XactEvent event, void *arg)
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{
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if (event == XACT_EVENT_COMMIT)
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{
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if (client_label_pending != NIL)
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{
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pending_label *plabel = llast(client_label_pending);
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char *new_label;
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if (plabel->label)
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new_label = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext,
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plabel->label);
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else
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new_label = NULL;
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if (client_label_committed)
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pfree(client_label_committed);
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client_label_committed = new_label;
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/*
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* XXX - Note that items of client_label_pending are allocated on
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* CurTransactionContext, thus, all acquired memory region shall
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* be released implicitly.
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*/
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client_label_pending = NIL;
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}
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}
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else if (event == XACT_EVENT_ABORT)
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client_label_pending = NIL;
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_subxact_callback
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*
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* A callback routine of sub-transaction start/abort/commit. Releases all
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* security labels that are set within the sub-transaction that is aborted.
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*/
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static void
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sepgsql_subxact_callback(SubXactEvent event, SubTransactionId mySubid,
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SubTransactionId parentSubid, void *arg)
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{
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ListCell *cell;
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if (event == SUBXACT_EVENT_ABORT_SUB)
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{
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foreach(cell, client_label_pending)
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{
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pending_label *plabel = lfirst(cell);
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if (plabel->subid == mySubid)
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client_label_pending
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= foreach_delete_current(client_label_pending, cell);
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_client_auth
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*
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* Entrypoint of the client authentication hook.
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* It switches the client label according to getpeercon(), and the current
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* performing mode according to the GUC setting.
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*/
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static void
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sepgsql_client_auth(Port *port, int status)
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{
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if (next_client_auth_hook)
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(*next_client_auth_hook) (port, status);
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/*
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* In the case when authentication failed, the supplied socket shall be
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* closed soon, so we don't need to do anything here.
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*/
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if (status != STATUS_OK)
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return;
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/*
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* Getting security label of the peer process using API of libselinux.
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*/
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if (getpeercon_raw(port->sock, &client_label_peer) < 0)
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
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errmsg("SELinux: unable to get peer label: %m")));
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/*
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* Switch the current performing mode from INTERNAL to either DEFAULT or
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* PERMISSIVE.
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*/
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if (sepgsql_get_permissive())
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sepgsql_set_mode(SEPGSQL_MODE_PERMISSIVE);
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else
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sepgsql_set_mode(SEPGSQL_MODE_DEFAULT);
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_needs_fmgr_hook
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*
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* It informs the core whether the supplied function is trusted procedure,
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* or not. If true, sepgsql_fmgr_hook shall be invoked at start, end, and
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* abort time of function invocation.
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*/
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static bool
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sepgsql_needs_fmgr_hook(Oid functionId)
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{
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ObjectAddress object;
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if (next_needs_fmgr_hook &&
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(*next_needs_fmgr_hook) (functionId))
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return true;
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/*
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* SELinux needs the function to be called via security_definer wrapper,
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* if this invocation will take a domain-transition. We call these
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* functions as trusted-procedure, if the security policy has a rule that
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* switches security label of the client on execution.
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*/
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if (sepgsql_avc_trusted_proc(functionId) != NULL)
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return true;
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/*
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* Even if not a trusted-procedure, this function should not be inlined
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* unless the client has db_procedure:{execute} permission. Please note
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* that it shall be actually failed later because of same reason with
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* ACL_EXECUTE.
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*/
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object.classId = ProcedureRelationId;
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object.objectId = functionId;
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object.objectSubId = 0;
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if (!sepgsql_avc_check_perms(&object,
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SEPG_CLASS_DB_PROCEDURE,
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SEPG_DB_PROCEDURE__EXECUTE |
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SEPG_DB_PROCEDURE__ENTRYPOINT,
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SEPGSQL_AVC_NOAUDIT, false))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_fmgr_hook
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*
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* It switches security label of the client on execution of trusted
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* procedures.
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*/
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static void
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sepgsql_fmgr_hook(FmgrHookEventType event,
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FmgrInfo *flinfo, Datum *private)
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{
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struct
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{
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char *old_label;
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char *new_label;
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Datum next_private;
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} *stack;
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switch (event)
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{
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case FHET_START:
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stack = (void *) DatumGetPointer(*private);
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if (!stack)
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{
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MemoryContext oldcxt;
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oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(flinfo->fn_mcxt);
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stack = palloc(sizeof(*stack));
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stack->old_label = NULL;
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stack->new_label = sepgsql_avc_trusted_proc(flinfo->fn_oid);
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stack->next_private = 0;
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MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
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/*
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* process:transition permission between old and new label,
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* when user tries to switch security label of the client on
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* execution of trusted procedure.
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*
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* Also, db_procedure:entrypoint permission should be checked
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* whether this procedure can perform as an entrypoint of the
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* trusted procedure, or not. Note that db_procedure:execute
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* permission shall be checked individually.
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*/
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if (stack->new_label)
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{
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ObjectAddress object;
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object.classId = ProcedureRelationId;
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object.objectId = flinfo->fn_oid;
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object.objectSubId = 0;
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sepgsql_avc_check_perms(&object,
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SEPG_CLASS_DB_PROCEDURE,
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SEPG_DB_PROCEDURE__ENTRYPOINT,
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getObjectDescription(&object),
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true);
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sepgsql_avc_check_perms_label(stack->new_label,
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SEPG_CLASS_PROCESS,
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SEPG_PROCESS__TRANSITION,
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NULL, true);
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}
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*private = PointerGetDatum(stack);
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}
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Assert(!stack->old_label);
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if (stack->new_label)
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{
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stack->old_label = client_label_func;
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client_label_func = stack->new_label;
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}
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if (next_fmgr_hook)
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(*next_fmgr_hook) (event, flinfo, &stack->next_private);
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break;
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case FHET_END:
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case FHET_ABORT:
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stack = (void *) DatumGetPointer(*private);
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if (next_fmgr_hook)
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(*next_fmgr_hook) (event, flinfo, &stack->next_private);
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if (stack->new_label)
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{
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client_label_func = stack->old_label;
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stack->old_label = NULL;
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}
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break;
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default:
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elog(ERROR, "unexpected event type: %d", (int) event);
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break;
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}
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}
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/*
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* sepgsql_init_client_label
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*
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* Initializes the client security label and sets up related hooks for client
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* label management.
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*/
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void
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sepgsql_init_client_label(void)
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{
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/*
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* Set up dummy client label.
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*
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* XXX - note that PostgreSQL launches background worker process like
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* autovacuum without authentication steps. So, we initialize sepgsql_mode
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* with SEPGSQL_MODE_INTERNAL, and client_label with the security context
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* of server process. Later, it also launches background of user session.
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* In this case, the process is always hooked on post-authentication, and
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* we can initialize the sepgsql_mode and client_label correctly.
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*/
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if (getcon_raw(&client_label_peer) < 0)
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ereport(ERROR,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
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errmsg("SELinux: failed to get server security label: %m")));
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/* Client authentication hook */
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next_client_auth_hook = ClientAuthentication_hook;
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ClientAuthentication_hook = sepgsql_client_auth;
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/* Trusted procedure hooks */
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next_needs_fmgr_hook = needs_fmgr_hook;
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needs_fmgr_hook = sepgsql_needs_fmgr_hook;
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next_fmgr_hook = fmgr_hook;
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fmgr_hook = sepgsql_fmgr_hook;
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/* Transaction/Sub-transaction callbacks */
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RegisterXactCallback(sepgsql_xact_callback, NULL);
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RegisterSubXactCallback(sepgsql_subxact_callback, NULL);
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}
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|
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/*
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* sepgsql_get_label
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*
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* It returns a security context of the specified database object.
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* If unlabeled or incorrectly labeled, the system "unlabeled" label
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* shall be returned.
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*/
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char *
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sepgsql_get_label(Oid classId, Oid objectId, int32 subId)
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{
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ObjectAddress object;
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char *label;
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object.classId = classId;
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object.objectId = objectId;
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object.objectSubId = subId;
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label = GetSecurityLabel(&object, SEPGSQL_LABEL_TAG);
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if (!label || security_check_context_raw((security_context_t) label))
|
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{
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security_context_t unlabeled;
|
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|
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if (security_get_initial_context_raw("unlabeled", &unlabeled) < 0)
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ereport(ERROR,
|
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
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errmsg("SELinux: failed to get initial security label: %m")));
|
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PG_TRY();
|
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{
|
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label = pstrdup(unlabeled);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_FINALLY();
|
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{
|
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freecon(unlabeled);
|
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}
|
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PG_END_TRY();
|
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}
|
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return label;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* sepgsql_object_relabel
|
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*
|
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* An entrypoint of SECURITY LABEL statement
|
|
*/
|
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void
|
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sepgsql_object_relabel(const ObjectAddress *object, const char *seclabel)
|
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{
|
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/*
|
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* validate format of the supplied security label, if it is security
|
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* context of selinux.
|
|
*/
|
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if (seclabel &&
|
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security_check_context_raw((security_context_t) seclabel) < 0)
|
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ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_NAME),
|
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errmsg("SELinux: invalid security label: \"%s\"", seclabel)));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do actual permission checks for each object classes
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (object->classId)
|
|
{
|
|
case DatabaseRelationId:
|
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sepgsql_database_relabel(object->objectId, seclabel);
|
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break;
|
|
|
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case NamespaceRelationId:
|
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sepgsql_schema_relabel(object->objectId, seclabel);
|
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break;
|
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|
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case RelationRelationId:
|
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if (object->objectSubId == 0)
|
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sepgsql_relation_relabel(object->objectId,
|
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seclabel);
|
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else
|
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sepgsql_attribute_relabel(object->objectId,
|
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object->objectSubId,
|
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seclabel);
|
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break;
|
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|
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case ProcedureRelationId:
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sepgsql_proc_relabel(object->objectId, seclabel);
|
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break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
|
errmsg("sepgsql provider does not support labels on %s",
|
|
getObjectTypeDescription(object))));
|
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break;
|
|
}
|
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TEXT sepgsql_getcon(VOID)
|
|
*
|
|
* It returns the security label of the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(sepgsql_getcon);
|
|
Datum
|
|
sepgsql_getcon(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
char *client_label;
|
|
|
|
if (!sepgsql_is_enabled())
|
|
PG_RETURN_NULL();
|
|
|
|
client_label = sepgsql_get_client_label();
|
|
|
|
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(client_label));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* BOOL sepgsql_setcon(TEXT)
|
|
*
|
|
* It switches the security label of the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(sepgsql_setcon);
|
|
Datum
|
|
sepgsql_setcon(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *new_label;
|
|
|
|
if (PG_ARGISNULL(0))
|
|
new_label = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
new_label = TextDatumGetCString(PG_GETARG_DATUM(0));
|
|
|
|
sepgsql_set_client_label(new_label);
|
|
|
|
PG_RETURN_BOOL(true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TEXT sepgsql_mcstrans_in(TEXT)
|
|
*
|
|
* It translate the given qualified MLS/MCS range into raw format
|
|
* when mcstrans daemon is working.
|
|
*/
|
|
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(sepgsql_mcstrans_in);
|
|
Datum
|
|
sepgsql_mcstrans_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
text *label = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
|
|
char *raw_label;
|
|
char *result;
|
|
|
|
if (!sepgsql_is_enabled())
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
|
|
errmsg("sepgsql is not enabled")));
|
|
|
|
if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(text_to_cstring(label),
|
|
&raw_label) < 0)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
|
errmsg("SELinux: could not translate security label: %m")));
|
|
|
|
PG_TRY();
|
|
{
|
|
result = pstrdup(raw_label);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_FINALLY();
|
|
{
|
|
freecon(raw_label);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_END_TRY();
|
|
|
|
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(result));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TEXT sepgsql_mcstrans_out(TEXT)
|
|
*
|
|
* It translate the given raw MLS/MCS range into qualified format
|
|
* when mcstrans daemon is working.
|
|
*/
|
|
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(sepgsql_mcstrans_out);
|
|
Datum
|
|
sepgsql_mcstrans_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
text *label = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
|
|
char *qual_label;
|
|
char *result;
|
|
|
|
if (!sepgsql_is_enabled())
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
|
|
errmsg("sepgsql is not currently enabled")));
|
|
|
|
if (selinux_raw_to_trans_context(text_to_cstring(label),
|
|
&qual_label) < 0)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
|
errmsg("SELinux: could not translate security label: %m")));
|
|
|
|
PG_TRY();
|
|
{
|
|
result = pstrdup(qual_label);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_FINALLY();
|
|
{
|
|
freecon(qual_label);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_END_TRY();
|
|
|
|
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(result));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* quote_object_name
|
|
*
|
|
* It tries to quote the supplied identifiers
|
|
*/
|
|
static char *
|
|
quote_object_name(const char *src1, const char *src2,
|
|
const char *src3, const char *src4)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData result;
|
|
const char *temp;
|
|
|
|
initStringInfo(&result);
|
|
|
|
if (src1)
|
|
{
|
|
temp = quote_identifier(src1);
|
|
appendStringInfoString(&result, temp);
|
|
if (src1 != temp)
|
|
pfree((void *) temp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (src2)
|
|
{
|
|
temp = quote_identifier(src2);
|
|
appendStringInfo(&result, ".%s", temp);
|
|
if (src2 != temp)
|
|
pfree((void *) temp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (src3)
|
|
{
|
|
temp = quote_identifier(src3);
|
|
appendStringInfo(&result, ".%s", temp);
|
|
if (src3 != temp)
|
|
pfree((void *) temp);
|
|
}
|
|
if (src4)
|
|
{
|
|
temp = quote_identifier(src4);
|
|
appendStringInfo(&result, ".%s", temp);
|
|
if (src4 != temp)
|
|
pfree((void *) temp);
|
|
}
|
|
return result.data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* exec_object_restorecon
|
|
*
|
|
* This routine is a helper called by sepgsql_restorecon; it set up
|
|
* initial security labels of database objects within the supplied
|
|
* catalog OID.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
exec_object_restorecon(struct selabel_handle *sehnd, Oid catalogId)
|
|
{
|
|
Relation rel;
|
|
SysScanDesc sscan;
|
|
HeapTuple tuple;
|
|
char *database_name = get_database_name(MyDatabaseId);
|
|
char *namespace_name;
|
|
Oid namespace_id;
|
|
char *relation_name;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Open the target catalog. We don't want to allow writable accesses by
|
|
* other session during initial labeling.
|
|
*/
|
|
rel = table_open(catalogId, AccessShareLock);
|
|
|
|
sscan = systable_beginscan(rel, InvalidOid, false,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
|
|
{
|
|
Form_pg_database datForm;
|
|
Form_pg_namespace nspForm;
|
|
Form_pg_class relForm;
|
|
Form_pg_attribute attForm;
|
|
Form_pg_proc proForm;
|
|
char *objname;
|
|
int objtype = 1234;
|
|
ObjectAddress object;
|
|
security_context_t context;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The way to determine object name depends on object classes. So, any
|
|
* branches set up `objtype', `objname' and `object' here.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (catalogId)
|
|
{
|
|
case DatabaseRelationId:
|
|
datForm = (Form_pg_database) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
|
|
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_DATABASE;
|
|
|
|
objname = quote_object_name(NameStr(datForm->datname),
|
|
NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
object.classId = DatabaseRelationId;
|
|
object.objectId = datForm->oid;
|
|
object.objectSubId = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NamespaceRelationId:
|
|
nspForm = (Form_pg_namespace) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
|
|
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_SCHEMA;
|
|
|
|
objname = quote_object_name(database_name,
|
|
NameStr(nspForm->nspname),
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
object.classId = NamespaceRelationId;
|
|
object.objectId = nspForm->oid;
|
|
object.objectSubId = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RelationRelationId:
|
|
relForm = (Form_pg_class) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
|
|
|
|
if (relForm->relkind == RELKIND_RELATION ||
|
|
relForm->relkind == RELKIND_PARTITIONED_TABLE)
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_TABLE;
|
|
else if (relForm->relkind == RELKIND_SEQUENCE)
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_SEQUENCE;
|
|
else if (relForm->relkind == RELKIND_VIEW)
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_VIEW;
|
|
else
|
|
continue; /* no need to assign security label */
|
|
|
|
namespace_name = get_namespace_name(relForm->relnamespace);
|
|
objname = quote_object_name(database_name,
|
|
namespace_name,
|
|
NameStr(relForm->relname),
|
|
NULL);
|
|
pfree(namespace_name);
|
|
|
|
object.classId = RelationRelationId;
|
|
object.objectId = relForm->oid;
|
|
object.objectSubId = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AttributeRelationId:
|
|
attForm = (Form_pg_attribute) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
|
|
|
|
if (get_rel_relkind(attForm->attrelid) != RELKIND_RELATION &&
|
|
get_rel_relkind(attForm->attrelid) != RELKIND_PARTITIONED_TABLE)
|
|
continue; /* no need to assign security label */
|
|
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_COLUMN;
|
|
|
|
namespace_id = get_rel_namespace(attForm->attrelid);
|
|
namespace_name = get_namespace_name(namespace_id);
|
|
relation_name = get_rel_name(attForm->attrelid);
|
|
objname = quote_object_name(database_name,
|
|
namespace_name,
|
|
relation_name,
|
|
NameStr(attForm->attname));
|
|
pfree(namespace_name);
|
|
pfree(relation_name);
|
|
|
|
object.classId = RelationRelationId;
|
|
object.objectId = attForm->attrelid;
|
|
object.objectSubId = attForm->attnum;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ProcedureRelationId:
|
|
proForm = (Form_pg_proc) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
|
|
|
|
objtype = SELABEL_DB_PROCEDURE;
|
|
|
|
namespace_name = get_namespace_name(proForm->pronamespace);
|
|
objname = quote_object_name(database_name,
|
|
namespace_name,
|
|
NameStr(proForm->proname),
|
|
NULL);
|
|
pfree(namespace_name);
|
|
|
|
object.classId = ProcedureRelationId;
|
|
object.objectId = proForm->oid;
|
|
object.objectSubId = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
elog(ERROR, "unexpected catalog id: %u", catalogId);
|
|
objname = NULL; /* for compiler quiet */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (selabel_lookup_raw(sehnd, &context, objname, objtype) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
PG_TRY();
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check SELinux permission to relabel the fetched object,
|
|
* then do the actual relabeling.
|
|
*/
|
|
sepgsql_object_relabel(&object, context);
|
|
|
|
SetSecurityLabel(&object, SEPGSQL_LABEL_TAG, context);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_FINALLY();
|
|
{
|
|
freecon(context);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_END_TRY();
|
|
}
|
|
else if (errno == ENOENT)
|
|
ereport(WARNING,
|
|
(errmsg("SELinux: no initial label assigned for %s (type=%d), skipping",
|
|
objname, objtype)));
|
|
else
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
|
errmsg("SELinux: could not determine initial security label for %s (type=%d): %m", objname, objtype)));
|
|
|
|
pfree(objname);
|
|
}
|
|
systable_endscan(sscan);
|
|
|
|
table_close(rel, NoLock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* BOOL sepgsql_restorecon(TEXT specfile)
|
|
*
|
|
* This function tries to assign initial security labels on all the object
|
|
* within the current database, according to the system setting.
|
|
* It is typically invoked by sepgsql-install script just after initdb, to
|
|
* assign initial security labels.
|
|
*
|
|
* If @specfile is not NULL, it uses explicitly specified specfile, instead
|
|
* of the system default.
|
|
*/
|
|
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(sepgsql_restorecon);
|
|
Datum
|
|
sepgsql_restorecon(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
struct selabel_handle *sehnd;
|
|
struct selinux_opt seopts;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux has to be enabled on the running platform.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!sepgsql_is_enabled())
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
|
|
errmsg("sepgsql is not currently enabled")));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check DAC permission. Only superuser can set up initial security
|
|
* labels, like root-user in filesystems
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!superuser())
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
errmsg("SELinux: must be superuser to restore initial contexts")));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Open selabel_lookup(3) stuff. It provides a set of mapping between an
|
|
* initial security label and object class/name due to the system setting.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (PG_ARGISNULL(0))
|
|
{
|
|
seopts.type = SELABEL_OPT_UNUSED;
|
|
seopts.value = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
seopts.type = SELABEL_OPT_PATH;
|
|
seopts.value = TextDatumGetCString(PG_GETARG_DATUM(0));
|
|
}
|
|
sehnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_DB, &seopts, 1);
|
|
if (!sehnd)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
|
errmsg("SELinux: failed to initialize labeling handle: %m")));
|
|
PG_TRY();
|
|
{
|
|
exec_object_restorecon(sehnd, DatabaseRelationId);
|
|
exec_object_restorecon(sehnd, NamespaceRelationId);
|
|
exec_object_restorecon(sehnd, RelationRelationId);
|
|
exec_object_restorecon(sehnd, AttributeRelationId);
|
|
exec_object_restorecon(sehnd, ProcedureRelationId);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_FINALLY();
|
|
{
|
|
selabel_close(sehnd);
|
|
}
|
|
PG_END_TRY();
|
|
|
|
PG_RETURN_BOOL(true);
|
|
}
|