Noah Misch e530835c6c Block environment variable mutations from trusted PL/Perl. ... Many process environment variables (e.g. PATH), bypass the containment expected of a trusted PL. Hence, trusted PLs must not offer features that achieve setenv(). Otherwise, an attacker having USAGE privilege on the language often can achieve arbitrary code execution, even if the attacker lacks a database server operating system user. To fix PL/Perl, replace trusted PL/Perl %ENV with a tied hash that just replaces each modification attempt with a warning. Sites that reach these warnings should evaluate the application-specific implications of proceeding without the environment modification: Can the application reasonably proceed without the modification? If no, switch to plperlu or another approach. If yes, the application should change the code to stop attempting environment modifications. If that's too difficult, add "untie %main::ENV" in any code executed before the warning. For example, one might add it to the start of the affected function or even to the plperl.on_plperl_init setting. In passing, link to Perl's guidance about the Perl features behind the security posture of PL/Perl. Back-patch to v12 (all supported versions). Andrew Dunstan and Noah Misch Security: CVE-2024-10979		2024-11-11 06:23:47 -08:00
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src	Block environment variable mutations from trusted PL/Perl.	2024-11-11 06:23:47 -08:00
KNOWN_BUGS
Makefile
MISSING_FEATURES
TODO