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Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt.

Browse Source 
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.

pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:

- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom

Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure.
That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that
we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the
primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be
pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing
hard.

If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(),
seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't
cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that
don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure,
the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with
--disable-strong-random.

This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in
pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom,
so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto
functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with
--disable-strong-random.

Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier
and me.

Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
This commit is contained in:
Heikki Linnakangas 2016-12-05 13:42:59 +02:00
parent 5dc851afde
commit fe0a0b5993
42 changed files with 1473 additions and 1105 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

109
configure vendored
View File

@ -739,6 +739,7 @@ GENHTML
LCOV
GCOV
enable_debug
enable_strong_random
enable_rpath
default_port
WANTED_LANGUAGES
@ -806,6 +807,7 @@ with_pgport
enable_rpath
enable_spinlocks
enable_atomics
enable_strong_random
enable_debug
enable_profiling
enable_coverage
@ -1478,6 +1480,7 @@ Optional Features:
executables
--disable-spinlocks do not use spinlocks
--disable-atomics do not use atomic operations
--disable-strong-random do not use a strong random number source
--enable-debug build with debugging symbols (-g)
--enable-profiling build with profiling enabled
--enable-coverage build with coverage testing instrumentation
@ -3192,6 +3195,34 @@ fi
#
# Random number generation
#
# Check whether --enable-strong-random was given.
if test "${enable_strong_random+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_strong_random;
case $enableval in
yes)
:
;;
no)
:
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --enable-strong-random option" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
else
enable_strong_random=yes
fi
#
# --enable-debug adds -g to compiler flags
#
@ -14982,6 +15013,84 @@ $as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_SHARED_MEMORY 1" >>confdefs.h
SHMEM_IMPLEMENTATION="src/backend/port/win32_shmem.c"
fi
# Select random number source
#
# You can override this logic by setting the appropriate USE_*RANDOM flag to 1
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
if test "$enable_strong_random" = "yes" && test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /dev/urandom... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_file__dev_urandom+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r "/dev/urandom"; then
ac_cv_file__dev_urandom=yes
else
ac_cv_file__dev_urandom=no
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = xyes; then :
fi
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"yes" ; then
USE_DEV_URANDOM=1
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking which random number source to use" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking which random number source to use... " >&6; }
if test "$enable_strong_random" = yes ; then
if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: OpenSSL" >&5
$as_echo "OpenSSL" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Windows native" >&5
$as_echo "Windows native" >&6; }
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
$as_echo "#define USE_DEV_URANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: /dev/urandom" >&5
$as_echo "/dev/urandom" >&6; }
else
as_fn_error $? "
no source of strong random numbers was found
PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers,
for authentication protocols. You can use --disable-strong-random to use of a built-in
pseudo random number generator, but that may be insecure." "$LINENO" 5
fi
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: weak builtin PRNG" >&5
$as_echo "weak builtin PRNG" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
*** Not using a strong random number source may be insecure." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
*** Not using a strong random number source may be insecure." >&2;}
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
if test x"$MEMSET_LOOP_LIMIT" = x"" ; then
MEMSET_LOOP_LIMIT=1024

52
configure.in
View File

@ -193,6 +193,13 @@ PGAC_ARG_BOOL(enable, spinlocks, yes,
PGAC_ARG_BOOL(enable, atomics, yes,
[do not use atomic operations])
#
# Random number generation
#
PGAC_ARG_BOOL(enable, strong-random, yes,
[do not use a strong random number source])
AC_SUBST(enable_strong_random)
#
# --enable-debug adds -g to compiler flags
#
@ -1965,6 +1972,51 @@ else
SHMEM_IMPLEMENTATION="src/backend/port/win32_shmem.c"
fi
# Select random number source
#
# You can override this logic by setting the appropriate USE_*RANDOM flag to 1
# in the template or configure command line.
# If not selected manually, try to select a source automatically.
if test "$enable_strong_random" = "yes" && test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"" && test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"" ; then
if test x"$with_openssl" = x"yes" ; then
USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM=1
elif test "$PORTNAME" = x"win32" ; then
USE_WIN32_RANDOM=1
else
AC_CHECK_FILE([/dev/urandom], [], [])
if test x"$ac_cv_file__dev_urandom" = x"yes" ; then
USE_DEV_URANDOM=1
fi
fi
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([which random number source to use])
if test "$enable_strong_random" = yes ; then
if test x"$USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use OpenSSL for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([OpenSSL])
elif test x"$USE_WIN32_RANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_WIN32_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use native Windows API for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([Windows native])
elif test x"$USE_DEV_URANDOM" = x"1" ; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_DEV_URANDOM, 1, [Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation])
AC_MSG_RESULT([/dev/urandom])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([
no source of strong random numbers was found
PostgreSQL can use OpenSSL or /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers,
for authentication protocols. You can use --disable-strong-random to use of a built-in
pseudo random number generator, but that may be insecure.])
fi
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM, 1, [Define to use have a strong random number source])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([weak builtin PRNG])
AC_MSG_WARN([
*** Not using a strong random number source may be insecure.])
fi
# If not set in template file, set bytes to use libc memset()
if test x"$MEMSET_LOOP_LIMIT" = x"" ; then
MEMSET_LOOP_LIMIT=1024

2
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
INT_SRCS = md5.c sha1.c sha2.c internal.c internal-sha2.c blf.c rijndael.c \
fortuna.c random.c pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c
pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c
INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c

42
contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-compression_1.out Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
--
-- PGP compression support
--
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
ww0ECQMCsci6AdHnELlh0kQB4jFcVwHMJg0Bulop7m3Mi36s15TAhBo0AnzIrRFrdLVCkKohsS6+
DMcmR53SXfLoDJOv/M8uKj3QSq7oWNIp95pxfA==
=tbSn
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key', 'compress-algo=0'),
'key', 'expect-compress-algo=0');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key', 'compress-algo=1'),
'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key', 'compress-algo=2'),
'key', 'expect-compress-algo=2');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- level=0 should turn compression off
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key',
'compress-algo=2, compress-level=0'),
'key', 'expect-compress-algo=0');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random

424
contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-decrypt_1.out Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
--
-- pgp_descrypt tests
--
-- Checking ciphers
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.blowfish.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBAMCfFNwxnvodX9g0jwB4n4s26/g5VmKzVab1bX1SmwY7gvgvlWdF3jKisvS
yA6Ce1QTMK3KdL2MPfamsTUSAML8huCJMwYQFfE=
=JcP+
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCci97v0Q6Z0Zg0kQBsVf5Oe3iC+FBzUmuMV9KxmAyOMyjCc/5i8f1Eest
UTAsG35A1vYs02VARKzGz6xI2UHwFUirP+brPBg3Ee7muOx8pA==
=XtrP
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes192.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0ECAMCI7YQpWqp3D1g0kQBCjB7GlX7+SQeXNleXeXQ78ZAPNliquGDq9u378zI
5FPTqAhIB2/2fjY8QEIs1ai00qphjX2NitxV/3Wn+6dufB4Q4g==
=rCZt
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes256.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0ECQMC4f/5djqCC1Rg0kQBTHEPsD+Sw7biBsM2er3vKyGPAQkuTBGKC5ie7hT/
lceMfQdbAg6oTFyJpk/wH18GzRDphCofg0X8uLgkAKMrpcmgog==
=fB6S
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
-- Checking MDC modes
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.nomdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCnv07rlXqWctgyS2Dm2JfOKCRL4sLSLJUC8RS2cH7cIhKSuLitOtyquB+
u9YkgfJfsuRJmgQ9tmo=
=60ui
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCEeP3idNjQ1Bg0kQBf4G0wX+2QNzLh2YNwYkQgQkfYhn/hLXjV4nK9nsE
8Ex1Dsdt5UPvOz8W8VKQRS6loOfOe+yyXil8W3IYFwUpdDUi+Q==
=moGf
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
-- Checking hashes
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.md5.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMClrXXtOXetohg0kQBn0Kl1ymevQZRHkdoYRHgzCwSQEiss7zYff2UNzgO
KyRrHf7zEBuZiZ2AG34jNVMOLToj1jJUg5zTSdecUzQVCykWTA==
=NyLk
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCApbdlrURoWJg0kQBzHM/E0o7djY82bNuspjxjAcPFrrtp0uvDdMQ4z2m
/PM8jhgI5vxFYfNQjLl8y3fHYIomk9YflN9K/Q13iq8A8sjeTw==
=FxbQ
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
-- Checking S2K modes
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k0.z0
jAQEBwAC0kQBKTaLAKE3xzps+QIZowqRNb2eAdzBw2LxEW2YD5PgNlbhJdGg+dvw
Ah9GXjGS1TVALzTImJbz1uHUZRfhJlFbc5yGQw==
=YvkV
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k1.z0
jAwEBwEC/QTByBLI3b/SRAHPxKzI6SZBo5lAEOD+EsvKQWO4adL9tDY+++Iqy1xK
4IaWXVKEj9R2Lr2xntWWMGZtcKtjD2lFFRXXd9dZp1ZThNDz
=dbXm
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCEq4Su3ZqNEJg0kQB4QG5jBTKF0i04xtH+avzmLhstBNRxvV3nsmB3cwl
z+9ZaA/XdSx5ZiFnMym8P6r8uY9rLjjNptvvRHlxIReF+p9MNg==
=VJKg
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes192.sha1.mdc.s2k0.z0
jAQECAAC0kQBBDnQWkgsx9YFaqDfWmpsiyAJ6y2xG/sBvap1dySYEMuZ+wJTXQ9E
Cr3i2M7TgVZ0M4jp4QL0adG1lpN5iK7aQeOwMw==
=cg+i
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes192.sha1.mdc.s2k1.z0
jAwECAECruOfyNDFiTnSRAEVoGXm4A9UZKkWljdzjEO/iaE7mIraltIpQMkiqCh9
7h8uZ2u9uRBOv222fZodGvc6bvq/4R4hAa/6qSHtm8mdmvGt
=aHmC
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes192.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0ECAMCjFn6SRi3SONg0kQBqtSHPaD0m7rXfDAhCWU/ypAsI93GuHGRyM99cvMv
q6eF6859ZVnli3BFSDSk3a4e/pXhglxmDYCfjAXkozKNYLo6yw==
=K0LS
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes256.sha1.mdc.s2k0.z0
jAQECQAC0kQB4L1eMbani07XF2ZYiXNK9LW3v8w41oUPl7dStmrJPQFwsdxmrDHu
rQr3WbdKdY9ufjOE5+mXI+EFkSPrF9rL9NCq6w==
=RGts
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes256.sha1.mdc.s2k1.z0
jAwECQECKHhrou7ZOIXSRAHWIVP+xjVQcjAVBTt+qh9SNzYe248xFTwozkwev3mO
+KVJW0qhk0An+Y2KF99/bYFl9cL5D3Tl43fC8fXGl3x3m7pR
=SUrU
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes256.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0ECQMCjc8lwZu8Fz1g0kQBkEzjImi21liep5jj+3dAJ2aZFfUkohi8b3n9z+7+
4+NRzL7cMW2RLAFnJbiqXDlRHMwleeuLN1up2WIxsxtYYuaBjA==
=XZrG
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'foobar');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
-- Checking longer passwords
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCx6dBiuqrYNRg0kQBEo63AvA1SCslxP7ayanLf1H0/hlk2nONVhTwVEWi
tTGup1mMz6Cfh1uDRErUuXpx9A0gdMu7zX0o5XjrL7WGDAZdSw==
=XKKG
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), '0123456789abcdefghij');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCBDvYuS990iFg0kQBW31UK5OiCjWf5x6KJ8qNNT2HZWQCjCBZMU0XsOC6
CMxFKadf144H/vpoV9GA0f22keQgCl0EsTE4V4lweVOPTKCMJg==
=gWDh
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), '0123456789abcdefghij2jk4h5g2j54khg23h54g2kh54g2khj54g23hj54');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCqXbFafC+ofVg0kQBejyiPqH0QMERVGfmPOjtAxvyG5KDIJPYojTgVSDt
FwsDabdQUz5O7bgNSnxfmyw1OifGF+W2bIn/8W+0rDf8u3+O+Q==
=OxOF
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'x');
pgp_sym_decrypt
-----------------
Secret message.
(1 row)
-- Checking various data
select encode(digest(pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat1.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCGJ+SpuOysINg0kQBJfSjzsW0x4OVcAyr17O7FBvMTwIGeGcJd99oTQU8
Xtx3kDqnhUq9Z1fS3qPbi5iNP2A9NxOBxPWz2JzxhydANlgbxg==
=W/ik
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), '0123456789abcdefghij'), 'sha1'), 'hex');
encode
------------------------------------------
0225e3ede6f2587b076d021a189ff60aad67e066
(1 row)
-- expected: 0225e3ede6f2587b076d021a189ff60aad67e066
select encode(digest(pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat2.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCvdpDvidNzMxg0jUBvj8eS2+1t/9/zgemxvhtc0fvdKGGbjH7dleaTJRB
SaV9L04ky1qECNDx3XjnoKLC+H7IOQ==
=Fxen
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), '0123456789abcdefghij'), 'sha1'), 'hex');
encode
------------------------------------------
da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
(1 row)
-- expected: da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
select encode(digest(pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: dat3.aes.sha1.mdc.s2k3.z0
jA0EBwMCxQvxJZ3G/HRg0lgBeYmTa7/uDAjPyFwSX4CYBgpZWVn/JS8JzILrcWF8
gFnkUKIE0PSaYFp+Yi1VlRfUtRQ/X/LYNGa7tWZS+4VQajz2Xtz4vUeAEiYFYPXk
73Hb8m1yRhQK
=ivrD
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), '0123456789abcdefghij'), 'sha1'), 'hex');
encode
------------------------------------------
5e5c135efc0dd00633efc6dfd6e731ea408a5b4c
(1 row)
-- expected: 5e5c135efc0dd00633efc6dfd6e731ea408a5b4c
-- Checking CRLF
select encode(digest(pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: crlf mess
ww0ECQMCt7VAtby6l4Bi0lgB5KMIZiiF/b3CfMfUyY0eDncsGXtkbu1X+l9brjpMP8eJnY79Amms
a3nsOzKTXUfS9VyaXo8IrncM6n7fdaXpwba/3tNsAhJG4lDv1k4g9v8Ix2dfv6Rs
=mBP9
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'key', 'convert-crlf=0'), 'sha1'), 'hex');
encode
------------------------------------------
9353062be7720f1446d30b9e75573a4833886784
(1 row)
-- expected: 9353062be7720f1446d30b9e75573a4833886784
select encode(digest(pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Comment: crlf mess
ww0ECQMCt7VAtby6l4Bi0lgB5KMIZiiF/b3CfMfUyY0eDncsGXtkbu1X+l9brjpMP8eJnY79Amms
a3nsOzKTXUfS9VyaXo8IrncM6n7fdaXpwba/3tNsAhJG4lDv1k4g9v8Ix2dfv6Rs
=mBP9
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'key', 'convert-crlf=1'), 'sha1'), 'hex');
encode
------------------------------------------
7efefcab38467f7484d6fa43dc86cf5281bd78e2
(1 row)
-- expected: 7efefcab38467f7484d6fa43dc86cf5281bd78e2
-- check BUG #11905, problem with messages 6 less than a power of 2.
select pgp_sym_decrypt(pgp_sym_encrypt(repeat('x',65530),'1'),'1') = repeat('x',65530);
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- expected: true
-- Negative tests
-- Decryption with a certain incorrect key yields an apparent Literal Data
-- packet reporting its content to be binary data. Ciphertext source:
-- iterative pgp_sym_encrypt('secret', 'key') until the random prefix gave
-- rise to that property.
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
ww0EBwMCxf8PTrQBmJdl0jcB6y2joE7GSLKRv7trbNsF5Z8ou5NISLUg31llVH/S0B2wl4bvzZjV
VsxxqLSPzNLAeIspJk5G
=mSd/
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'wrong-key', 'debug=1');
NOTICE: dbg: prefix_init: corrupt prefix
NOTICE: dbg: parse_literal_data: data type=b
NOTICE: dbg: mdcbuf_finish: bad MDC pkt hdr
ERROR: Wrong key or corrupt data
-- Routine text/binary mismatch.
select pgp_sym_decrypt(pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea('P', 'key'), 'key', 'debug=1');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- Decryption with a certain incorrect key yields an apparent BZip2-compressed
-- plaintext. Ciphertext source: iterative pgp_sym_encrypt('secret', 'key')
-- until the random prefix gave rise to that property.
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
ww0EBwMC9rK/dMkF5Zlt0jcBlzAQ1mQY2qYbKYbw8h3EZ5Jk0K2IiY92R82TRhWzBIF/8cmXDPtP
GXsd65oYJZp3Khz0qfyn
=Nmpq
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'wrong-key', 'debug=1');
NOTICE: dbg: prefix_init: corrupt prefix
NOTICE: dbg: parse_compressed_data: bzip2 unsupported
NOTICE: dbg: mdcbuf_finish: bad MDC pkt hdr
ERROR: Wrong key or corrupt data
-- Routine use of BZip2 compression. Ciphertext source:
-- echo x | gpg --homedir /nonexistent --personal-compress-preferences bzip2 \
-- --personal-cipher-preferences aes --no-emit-version --batch \
-- --symmetric --passphrase key --armor
select pgp_sym_decrypt(dearmor('
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
jA0EBwMCRhFrAKNcLVJg0mMBLJG1cCASNk/x/3dt1zJ+2eo7jHfjgg3N6wpB3XIe
QCwkWJwlBG5pzbO5gu7xuPQN+TbPJ7aQ2sLx3bAHhtYb0i3vV9RO10Gw++yUyd4R
UCAAw2JRIISttRHMfDpDuZJpvYo=
=AZ9M
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
'), 'key', 'debug=1');
NOTICE: dbg: parse_compressed_data: bzip2 unsupported
ERROR: Unsupported compression algorithm

161
contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-encrypt_1.out Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
--
-- PGP encrypt
--
-- ensure consistent test output regardless of the default bytea format
SET bytea_output TO escape;
select pgp_sym_decrypt(pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key'), 'key');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- check whether the defaults are ok
select pgp_sym_decrypt(pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key'),
'key', 'expect-cipher-algo=aes128,
expect-disable-mdc=0,
expect-sess-key=0,
expect-s2k-mode=3,
expect-s2k-digest-algo=sha1,
expect-compress-algo=0
');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- maybe the expect- stuff simply does not work
select pgp_sym_decrypt(pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key'),
'key', 'expect-cipher-algo=bf,
expect-disable-mdc=1,
expect-sess-key=1,
expect-s2k-mode=0,
expect-s2k-digest-algo=md5,
expect-compress-algo=1
');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- bytea as text
select pgp_sym_decrypt(pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea('Binary', 'baz'), 'baz');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- text as bytea
select pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea(pgp_sym_encrypt('Text', 'baz'), 'baz');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- algorithm change
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'cipher-algo=bf'),
'key', 'expect-cipher-algo=bf');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'cipher-algo=aes'),
'key', 'expect-cipher-algo=aes128');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'cipher-algo=aes192'),
'key', 'expect-cipher-algo=aes192');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- s2k change
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-mode=0'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-mode=0');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-mode=1'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-mode=1');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-mode=3'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-mode=3');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- s2k count change
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-count=1024'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-count=1024');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- s2k_count rounds up
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-count=65000000'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-count=65000000');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- s2k digest change
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-digest-algo=md5'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-digest-algo=md5');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 's2k-digest-algo=sha1'),
'key', 'expect-s2k-digest-algo=sha1');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- sess key
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'sess-key=0'),
'key', 'expect-sess-key=0');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'sess-key=1'),
'key', 'expect-sess-key=1');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'sess-key=1, cipher-algo=bf'),
'key', 'expect-sess-key=1, expect-cipher-algo=bf');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'sess-key=1, cipher-algo=aes192'),
'key', 'expect-sess-key=1, expect-cipher-algo=aes192');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'sess-key=1, cipher-algo=aes256'),
'key', 'expect-sess-key=1, expect-cipher-algo=aes256');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- no mdc
select pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret.', 'key', 'disable-mdc=1'),
'key', 'expect-disable-mdc=1');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- crlf
select encode(pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea(
pgp_sym_encrypt(E'1\n2\n3\r\n', 'key', 'convert-crlf=1'),
'key'), 'hex');
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- conversion should be lossless
select encode(digest(pgp_sym_decrypt(
pgp_sym_encrypt(E'\r\n0\n1\r\r\n\n2\r', 'key', 'convert-crlf=1'),
'key', 'convert-crlf=1'), 'sha1'), 'hex') as result,
encode(digest(E'\r\n0\n1\r\r\n\n2\r', 'sha1'), 'hex') as expect;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random

62
contrib/pgcrypto/expected/pgp-pubkey-encrypt_1.out Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
--
-- PGP Public Key Encryption
--
-- ensure consistent test output regardless of the default bytea format
SET bytea_output TO escape;
-- successful encrypt/decrypt
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=1;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=2;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=3;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=6;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- try with rsa-sign only
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=4;
ERROR: No encryption key found
-- try with secret key
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(seckey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=1;
ERROR: Refusing to encrypt with secret key
-- does text-to-bytea works
select pgp_pub_decrypt_bytea(
pgp_pub_encrypt('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=1;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random
-- and bytea-to-text?
select pgp_pub_decrypt(
pgp_pub_encrypt_bytea('Secret msg', dearmor(pubkey)),
dearmor(seckey))
from keytbl where keytbl.id=1;
ERROR: pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build
DETAIL: This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers
HINT: You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random

463
contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
View File

@ -1,463 +0,0 @@
/*
* fortuna.c
* Fortuna-like PRNG.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "px.h"
#include "rijndael.h"
#include "sha2.h"
#include "fortuna.h"
/*
* Why Fortuna-like: There does not seem to be any definitive reference
* on Fortuna in the net. Instead this implementation is based on
* following references:
*
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fortuna_(PRNG)
* - Wikipedia article
* http://jlcooke.ca/random/
* - Jean-Luc Cooke Fortuna-based /dev/random driver for Linux.
*/
/*
* There is some confusion about whether and how to carry forward
* the state of the pools. Seems like original Fortuna does not
* do it, resetting hash after each request. I guess expecting
* feeding to happen more often that requesting. This is absolutely
* unsuitable for pgcrypto, as nothing asynchronous happens here.
*
* J.L. Cooke fixed this by feeding previous hash to new re-initialized
* hash context.
*
* Fortuna predecessor Yarrow requires ability to query intermediate
* 'final result' from hash, without affecting it.
*
* This implementation uses the Yarrow method - asking intermediate
* results, but continuing with old state.
*/
/*
* Algorithm parameters
*/
/*
* How many pools.
*
* Original Fortuna uses 32 pools, that means 32'th pool is
* used not earlier than in 13th year. This is a waste in
* pgcrypto, as we have very low-frequancy seeding. Here
* is preferable to have all entropy usable in reasonable time.
*
* With 23 pools, 23th pool is used after 9 days which seems
* more sane.
*
* In our case the minimal cycle time would be bit longer
* than the system-randomness feeding frequency.
*/
#define NUM_POOLS 23
/* in microseconds */
#define RESEED_INTERVAL 100000 /* 0.1 sec */
/* for one big request, reseed after this many bytes */
#define RESEED_BYTES (1024*1024)
/*
* Skip reseed if pool 0 has less than this many
* bytes added since last reseed.
*/
#define POOL0_FILL (256/8)
/*
* Algorithm constants
*/
/* Both cipher key size and hash result size */
#define BLOCK 32
/* cipher block size */
#define CIPH_BLOCK 16
/* for internal wrappers */
#define MD_CTX SHA256_CTX
#define CIPH_CTX rijndael_ctx
struct fortuna_state
{
uint8 counter[CIPH_BLOCK];
uint8 result[CIPH_BLOCK];
uint8 key[BLOCK];
MD_CTX pool[NUM_POOLS];
CIPH_CTX ciph;
unsigned reseed_count;
struct timeval last_reseed_time;
unsigned pool0_bytes;
unsigned rnd_pos;
int tricks_done;
};
typedef struct fortuna_state FState;
/*
* Use our own wrappers here.
* - Need to get intermediate result from digest, without affecting it.
* - Need re-set key on a cipher context.
* - Algorithms are guaranteed to exist.
* - No memory allocations.
*/
static void
ciph_init(CIPH_CTX * ctx, const uint8 *key, int klen)
{
rijndael_set_key(ctx, (const uint32 *) key, klen, 1);
}
static void
ciph_encrypt(CIPH_CTX * ctx, const uint8 *in, uint8 *out)
{
rijndael_encrypt(ctx, (const uint32 *) in, (uint32 *) out);
}
static void
md_init(MD_CTX * ctx)
{
SHA256_Init(ctx);
}
static void
md_update(MD_CTX * ctx, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
SHA256_Update(ctx, data, len);
}
static void
md_result(MD_CTX * ctx, uint8 *dst)
{
SHA256_CTX tmp;
memcpy(&tmp, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
SHA256_Final(dst, &tmp);
px_memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
}
/*
* initialize state
*/
static void
init_state(FState *st)
{
int i;
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
for (i = 0; i < NUM_POOLS; i++)
md_init(&st->pool[i]);
}
/*
* Endianess does not matter.
* It just needs to change without repeating.
*/
static void
inc_counter(FState *st)
{
uint32 *val = (uint32 *) st->counter;
if (++val[0])
return;
if (++val[1])
return;
if (++val[2])
return;
++val[3];
}
/*
* This is called 'cipher in counter mode'.
*/
static void
encrypt_counter(FState *st, uint8 *dst)
{
ciph_encrypt(&st->ciph, st->counter, dst);
inc_counter(st);
}
/*
* The time between reseed must be at least RESEED_INTERVAL
* microseconds.
*/
static int
enough_time_passed(FState *st)
{
int ok;
struct timeval tv;
struct timeval *last = &st->last_reseed_time;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
/* check how much time has passed */
ok = 0;
if (tv.tv_sec > last->tv_sec + 1)
ok = 1;
else if (tv.tv_sec == last->tv_sec + 1)
{
if (1000000 + tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
ok = 1;
}
else if (tv.tv_usec - last->tv_usec >= RESEED_INTERVAL)
ok = 1;
/* reseed will happen, update last_reseed_time */
if (ok)
memcpy(last, &tv, sizeof(tv));
px_memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(tv));
return ok;
}
/*
* generate new key from all the pools
*/
static void
reseed(FState *st)
{
unsigned k;
unsigned n;
MD_CTX key_md;
uint8 buf[BLOCK];
/* set pool as empty */
st->pool0_bytes = 0;
/*
* Both #0 and #1 reseed would use only pool 0. Just skip #0 then.
*/
n = ++st->reseed_count;
/*
* The goal: use k-th pool only 1/(2^k) of the time.
*/
md_init(&key_md);
for (k = 0; k < NUM_POOLS; k++)
{
md_result(&st->pool[k], buf);
md_update(&key_md, buf, BLOCK);
if (n & 1 || !n)
break;
n >>= 1;
}
/* add old key into mix too */
md_update(&key_md, st->key, BLOCK);
/* now we have new key */
md_result(&key_md, st->key);
/* use new key */
ciph_init(&st->ciph, st->key, BLOCK);
px_memset(&key_md, 0, sizeof(key_md));
px_memset(buf, 0, BLOCK);
}
/*
* Pick a random pool. This uses key bytes as random source.
*/
static unsigned
get_rand_pool(FState *st)
{
unsigned rnd;
/*
* This slightly prefers lower pools - that is OK.
*/
rnd = st->key[st->rnd_pos] % NUM_POOLS;
st->rnd_pos++;
if (st->rnd_pos >= BLOCK)
st->rnd_pos = 0;
return rnd;
}
/*
* update pools
*/
static void
add_entropy(FState *st, const uint8 *data, unsigned len)
{
unsigned pos;
uint8 hash[BLOCK];
MD_CTX md;
/* hash given data */
md_init(&md);
md_update(&md, data, len);
md_result(&md, hash);
/*
* Make sure the pool 0 is initialized, then update randomly.
*/
if (st->reseed_count == 0)
pos = 0;
else
pos = get_rand_pool(st);
md_update(&st->pool[pos], hash, BLOCK);
if (pos == 0)
st->pool0_bytes += len;
px_memset(hash, 0, BLOCK);
px_memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
}
/*
* Just take 2 next blocks as new key
*/
static void
rekey(FState *st)
{
encrypt_counter(st, st->key);
encrypt_counter(st, st->key + CIPH_BLOCK);
ciph_init(&st->ciph, st->key, BLOCK);
}
/*
* Hide public constants. (counter, pools > 0)
*
* This can also be viewed as spreading the startup
* entropy over all of the components.
*/
static void
startup_tricks(FState *st)
{
int i;
uint8 buf[BLOCK];
/* Use next block as counter. */
encrypt_counter(st, st->counter);
/* Now shuffle pools, excluding #0 */
for (i = 1; i < NUM_POOLS; i++)
{
encrypt_counter(st, buf);
encrypt_counter(st, buf + CIPH_BLOCK);
md_update(&st->pool[i], buf, BLOCK);
}
px_memset(buf, 0, BLOCK);
/* Hide the key. */
rekey(st);
/* This can be done only once. */
st->tricks_done = 1;
}
static void
extract_data(FState *st, unsigned count, uint8 *dst)
{
unsigned n;
unsigned block_nr = 0;
/* Should we reseed? */
if (st->pool0_bytes >= POOL0_FILL || st->reseed_count == 0)
if (enough_time_passed(st))
reseed(st);
/* Do some randomization on first call */
if (!st->tricks_done)
startup_tricks(st);
while (count > 0)
{
/* produce bytes */
encrypt_counter(st, st->result);
/* copy result */
if (count > CIPH_BLOCK)
n = CIPH_BLOCK;
else
n = count;
memcpy(dst, st->result, n);
dst += n;
count -= n;
/* must not give out too many bytes with one key */
block_nr++;
if (block_nr > (RESEED_BYTES / CIPH_BLOCK))
{
rekey(st);
block_nr = 0;
}
}
/* Set new key for next request. */
rekey(st);
}
/*
* public interface
*/
static FState main_state;
static int init_done = 0;
void
fortuna_add_entropy(const uint8 *data, unsigned len)
{
if (!init_done)
{
init_state(&main_state);
init_done = 1;
}
if (!data || !len)
return;
add_entropy(&main_state, data, len);
}
void
fortuna_get_bytes(unsigned len, uint8 *dst)
{
if (!init_done)
{
init_state(&main_state);
init_done = 1;
}
if (!dst || !len)
return;
extract_data(&main_state, len, dst);
}

38
contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.h
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
/*
* fortuna.c
* Fortuna PRNG.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.h
*/
#ifndef __FORTUNA_H
#define __FORTUNA_H
void fortuna_get_bytes(unsigned len, uint8 *dst);
void fortuna_add_entropy(const uint8 *data, unsigned len);
#endif

63
contrib/pgcrypto/internal.c
View File

@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
#include "sha1.h"
#include "blf.h"
#include "rijndael.h"
#include "fortuna.h"
/*
* System reseeds should be separated at least this much.
@ -615,65 +614,3 @@ px_find_cipher(const char *name, PX_Cipher **res)
*res = c;
return 0;
}
/*
* Randomness provider
*/
static time_t seed_time = 0;
static time_t check_time = 0;
static void
system_reseed(void)
{
uint8 buf[1024];
int n;
time_t t;
int skip = 1;
t = time(NULL);
if (seed_time == 0)
skip = 0;
else if ((t - seed_time) < SYSTEM_RESEED_MIN)
skip = 1;
else if ((t - seed_time) > SYSTEM_RESEED_MAX)
skip = 0;
else if (check_time == 0 ||
(t - check_time) > SYSTEM_RESEED_CHECK_TIME)
{
check_time = t;
/* roll dice */
px_get_random_bytes(buf, 1);
skip = buf[0] >= SYSTEM_RESEED_CHANCE;
}
/* clear 1 byte */
px_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (skip)
return;
n = px_acquire_system_randomness(buf);
if (n > 0)
fortuna_add_entropy(buf, n);
seed_time = t;
px_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
}
int
px_get_random_bytes(uint8 *dst, unsigned count)
{
system_reseed();
fortuna_get_bytes(count, dst);
return 0;
}
int
px_add_entropy(const uint8 *data, unsigned count)
{
system_reseed();
fortuna_add_entropy(data, count);
return 0;
}

46
contrib/pgcrypto/openssl.c
View File

@ -712,49 +712,3 @@ px_find_cipher(const char *name, PX_Cipher **res)
*res = c;
return 0;
}
static int openssl_random_init = 0;
/*
* OpenSSL random should re-feeded occasionally. From /dev/urandom
* preferably.
*/
static void
init_openssl_rand(void)
{
if (RAND_get_rand_method() == NULL)
{
#ifdef HAVE_RAND_OPENSSL
RAND_set_rand_method(RAND_OpenSSL());
#else
RAND_set_rand_method(RAND_SSLeay());
#endif
}
openssl_random_init = 1;
}
int
px_get_random_bytes(uint8 *dst, unsigned count)
{
int res;
if (!openssl_random_init)
init_openssl_rand();
res = RAND_bytes(dst, count);
if (res == 1)
return count;
return PXE_OSSL_RAND_ERROR;
}
int
px_add_entropy(const uint8 *data, unsigned count)
{
/*
* estimate 0 bits
*/
RAND_add(data, count, 0);
return 0;
}

27
contrib/pgcrypto/pgcrypto.c
View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <ctype.h>
#include "parser/scansup.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/uuid.h"
@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pg_random_bytes);
Datum
pg_random_bytes(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int err;
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
int len = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
bytea *res;
@ -435,13 +436,13 @@ pg_random_bytes(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
SET_VARSIZE(res, VARHDRSZ + len);
/* generate result */
err = px_get_random_bytes((uint8 *) VARDATA(res), len);
if (err < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("Random generator error: %s", px_strerror(err))));
if (!pg_strong_random(VARDATA(res), len))
px_THROW_ERROR(PXE_NO_RANDOM);
PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(res);
#else
px_THROW_ERROR(PXE_NO_RANDOM);
#endif
}
/* SQL function: gen_random_uuid() returns uuid */
@ -451,14 +452,14 @@ Datum
pg_random_uuid(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
uint8 *buf = (uint8 *) palloc(UUID_LEN);
int err;
/* generate random bits */
err = px_get_random_bytes(buf, UUID_LEN);
if (err < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("Random generator error: %s", px_strerror(err))));
/*
* Generate random bits. pg_backend_random() will do here, we don't
* promis UUIDs to be cryptographically random, when built with
* --disable-strong-random.
*/
if (!pg_backend_random((char *) buf, UUID_LEN))
px_THROW_ERROR(PXE_NO_RANDOM);
/*
* Set magic numbers for a "version 4" (pseudorandom) UUID, see

22
contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-encrypt.c
View File

@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
#include "px.h"
#include "pgp.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
#define MDC_DIGEST_LEN 20
#define STREAM_ID 0xE0
@ -477,14 +479,14 @@ init_encdata_packet(PushFilter **pf_res, PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
static int
write_prefix(PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
uint8 prefix[PGP_MAX_BLOCK + 2];
int res,
bs;
bs = pgp_get_cipher_block_size(ctx->cipher_algo);
res = px_get_random_bytes(prefix, bs);
if (res < 0)
return res;
if (!pg_backend_random((char *) prefix, bs))
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
prefix[bs + 0] = prefix[bs - 2];
prefix[bs + 1] = prefix[bs - 1];
@ -492,6 +494,9 @@ write_prefix(PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
res = pushf_write(dst, prefix, bs + 2);
px_memset(prefix, 0, bs + 2);
return res < 0 ? res : 0;
#else
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
#endif
}
/*
@ -578,14 +583,15 @@ init_s2k_key(PGP_Context *ctx)
static int
init_sess_key(PGP_Context *ctx)
{
int res;
if (ctx->use_sess_key || ctx->pub_key)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
ctx->sess_key_len = pgp_get_cipher_key_size(ctx->cipher_algo);
res = px_get_random_bytes(ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len);
if (res < 0)
return res;
if (!pg_strong_random((char *) ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len))
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
#else
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
#endif
}
else
{

10
contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
View File

@ -57,17 +57,16 @@ mp_clear_free(mpz_t *a)
static int
mp_px_rand(uint32 bits, mpz_t *res)
{
int err;
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
unsigned bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
int last_bits = bits & 7;
uint8 *buf;
buf = px_alloc(bytes);
err = px_get_random_bytes(buf, bytes);
if (err < 0)
if (!pg_strong_random((char *) buf, bytes))
{
px_free(buf);
return err;
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
}
/* clear unnecessary bits and set last bit to one */
@ -84,6 +83,9 @@ mp_px_rand(uint32 bits, mpz_t *res)
px_free(buf);
return 0;
#else
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
#endif
}
static void

95
contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pgsql.c
View File

@ -61,65 +61,6 @@ PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pg_armor);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pg_dearmor);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_armor_headers);
/*
* Mix a block of data into RNG.
*/
static void
add_block_entropy(PX_MD *md, text *data)
{
uint8 sha1[20];
px_md_reset(md);
px_md_update(md, (uint8 *) VARDATA(data), VARSIZE(data) - VARHDRSZ);
px_md_finish(md, sha1);
px_add_entropy(sha1, 20);
px_memset(sha1, 0, 20);
}
/*
* Mix user data into RNG. It is for user own interests to have
* RNG state shuffled.
*/
static void
add_entropy(text *data1, text *data2, text *data3)
{
PX_MD *md;
uint8 rnd[3];
if (!data1 && !data2 && !data3)
return;
if (px_get_random_bytes(rnd, 3) < 0)
return;
if (px_find_digest("sha1", &md) < 0)
return;
/*
* Try to make the feeding unpredictable.
*
* Prefer data over keys, as it's rather likely that key is same in
* several calls.
*/
/* chance: 7/8 */
if (data1 && rnd[0] >= 32)
add_block_entropy(md, data1);
/* chance: 5/8 */
if (data2 && rnd[1] >= 160)
add_block_entropy(md, data2);
/* chance: 5/8 */
if (data3 && rnd[2] >= 160)
add_block_entropy(md, data3);
px_md_free(md);
px_memset(rnd, 0, sizeof(rnd));
}
/*
* returns src in case of no conversion or error
*/
@ -432,11 +373,7 @@ init_work(PGP_Context **ctx_p, int is_text,
VARSIZE(args) - VARHDRSZ, ex);
if (err)
{
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(err))));
}
px_THROW_ERROR(err);
if (ex->debug)
px_set_debug_handler(show_debug);
@ -459,11 +396,6 @@ encrypt_internal(int is_pubenc, int is_text,
struct debug_expect ex;
text *tmp_data = NULL;
/*
* Add data and key info RNG.
*/
add_entropy(data, key, NULL);
init_work(&ctx, is_text, args, &ex);
if (is_text && pgp_get_unicode_mode(ctx))
@ -516,9 +448,7 @@ encrypt_internal(int is_pubenc, int is_text,
pgp_free(ctx);
mbuf_free(src);
mbuf_free(dst);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(err))));
px_THROW_ERROR(err);
}
/* res_len includes VARHDRSZ */
@ -605,9 +535,7 @@ decrypt_internal(int is_pubenc, int need_text, text *data,
{
px_set_debug_handler(NULL);
mbuf_free(dst);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(err))));
px_THROW_ERROR(err);
}
res_len = mbuf_steal_data(dst, &restmp);
@ -629,11 +557,6 @@ decrypt_internal(int is_pubenc, int need_text, text *data,
}
px_set_debug_handler(NULL);
/*
* add successful decryptions also into RNG
*/
add_entropy(res, key, keypsw);
return res;
}
@ -985,9 +908,7 @@ pg_dearmor(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
ret = pgp_armor_decode((uint8 *) VARDATA(data), data_len, &buf);
if (ret < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(ret))));
px_THROW_ERROR(ret);
res = palloc(VARHDRSZ + buf.len);
SET_VARSIZE(res, VARHDRSZ + buf.len);
memcpy(VARDATA(res), buf.data, buf.len);
@ -1041,9 +962,7 @@ pgp_armor_headers(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
&state->nheaders, &state->keys,
&state->values);
if (res < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(res))));
px_THROW_ERROR(res);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcontext);
funcctx->user_fctx = state;
@ -1092,9 +1011,7 @@ pgp_key_id_w(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
res_len = pgp_get_keyid(buf, VARDATA(res));
mbuf_free(buf);
if (res_len < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(res_len))));
px_THROW_ERROR(res_len);
SET_VARSIZE(res, VARHDRSZ + res_len);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);

26
contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pubenc.c
View File

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
static int
pad_eme_pkcs1_v15(uint8 *data, int data_len, int res_len, uint8 **res_p)
{
int res;
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
uint8 *buf,
*p;
int pad_len = res_len - 2 - data_len;
@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ pad_eme_pkcs1_v15(uint8 *data, int data_len, int res_len, uint8 **res_p)
buf = px_alloc(res_len);
buf[0] = 0x02;
res = px_get_random_bytes(buf + 1, pad_len);
if (res < 0)
if (!pg_strong_random((char *) buf + 1, pad_len))
{
px_free(buf);
return res;
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
}
/* pad must not contain zero bytes */
@ -62,26 +62,26 @@ pad_eme_pkcs1_v15(uint8 *data, int data_len, int res_len, uint8 **res_p)
{
if (*p == 0)
{
res = px_get_random_bytes(p, 1);
if (res < 0)
if (!pg_strong_random((char *) p, 1))
{
px_memset(buf, 0, res_len);
px_free(buf);
break;
}
}
if (*p != 0)
p++;
}
if (res < 0)
{
px_memset(buf, 0, res_len);
px_free(buf);
return res;
}
buf[pad_len + 1] = 0;
memcpy(buf + pad_len + 2, data, data_len);
*res_p = buf;
return 0;
#else
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
#endif
}
static int

15
contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-s2k.c
View File

@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include "px.h"
#include "pgp.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
static int
calc_s2k_simple(PGP_S2K *s2k, PX_MD *md, const uint8 *key,
unsigned key_len)
@ -233,15 +235,14 @@ pgp_s2k_fill(PGP_S2K *s2k, int mode, int digest_algo, int count)
case PGP_S2K_SIMPLE:
break;
case PGP_S2K_SALTED:
res = px_get_random_bytes(s2k->salt, PGP_S2K_SALT);
if (!pg_backend_random((char *) s2k->salt, PGP_S2K_SALT))
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
break;
case PGP_S2K_ISALTED:
res = px_get_random_bytes(s2k->salt, PGP_S2K_SALT);
if (res < 0)
break;
res = px_get_random_bytes(&tmp, 1);
if (res < 0)
break;
if (!pg_backend_random((char *) s2k->salt, PGP_S2K_SALT))
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
if (!pg_backend_random((char *) &tmp, 1))
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
s2k->iter = decide_s2k_iter(tmp, count);
break;
default:

7
contrib/pgcrypto/px-crypt.c
View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include "px.h"
#include "px-crypt.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
static char *
run_crypt_des(const char *psw, const char *salt,
@ -132,7 +133,6 @@ static struct generator gen_list[] = {
int
px_gen_salt(const char *salt_type, char *buf, int rounds)
{
int res;
struct generator *g;
char *p;
char rbuf[16];
@ -153,9 +153,8 @@ px_gen_salt(const char *salt_type, char *buf, int rounds)
return PXE_BAD_SALT_ROUNDS;
}
res = px_get_random_bytes((uint8 *) rbuf, g->input_len);
if (res < 0)
return res;
if (!pg_backend_random(rbuf, g->input_len))
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
p = g->gen(rounds, rbuf, g->input_len, buf, PX_MAX_SALT_LEN);
px_memset(rbuf, 0, sizeof(rbuf));

34
contrib/pgcrypto/px.c
View File

@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ static const struct error_desc px_err_list[] = {
{PXE_CIPHER_INIT, "Cipher cannot be initialized ?"},
{PXE_HASH_UNUSABLE_FOR_HMAC, "This hash algorithm is unusable for HMAC"},
{PXE_DEV_READ_ERROR, "Error reading from random device"},
{PXE_OSSL_RAND_ERROR, "OpenSSL PRNG error"},
{PXE_BUG, "pgcrypto bug"},
{PXE_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "Illegal argument to function"},
{PXE_UNKNOWN_SALT_ALGO, "Unknown salt algorithm"},
@ -86,6 +85,39 @@ static const struct error_desc px_err_list[] = {
{0, NULL},
};
/*
* Call ereport(ERROR, ...), with an error code and message corresponding to
* the PXE_* error code given as argument.
*
* This is similar to px_strerror(err), but for some errors, we fill in the
* error code and detail fields more appropriately.
*/
void
px_THROW_ERROR(int err)
{
if (err == PXE_NO_RANDOM)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
errmsg("could not generate a random number")));
#else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("pg_random_bytes() is not supported by this build"),
errdetail("This functionality requires a source of strong random numbers"),
errhint("You need to rebuild PostgreSQL using --enable-strong-random")));
#endif
}
else
{
/* For other errors, use the message from the above list. */
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_INVOCATION_EXCEPTION),
errmsg("%s", px_strerror(err))));
}
}
const char *
px_strerror(int err)
{

7
contrib/pgcrypto/px.h
View File

@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ void px_free(void *p);
#define PXE_CIPHER_INIT -8
#define PXE_HASH_UNUSABLE_FOR_HMAC -9
#define PXE_DEV_READ_ERROR -10
#define PXE_OSSL_RAND_ERROR -11
#define PXE_BUG -12
#define PXE_ARGUMENT_ERROR -13
#define PXE_UNKNOWN_SALT_ALGO -14
@ -189,11 +188,7 @@ int px_find_hmac(const char *name, PX_HMAC **res);
int px_find_cipher(const char *name, PX_Cipher **res);
int px_find_combo(const char *name, PX_Combo **res);
int px_get_random_bytes(uint8 *dst, unsigned count);
int px_add_entropy(const uint8 *data, unsigned count);
unsigned px_acquire_system_randomness(uint8 *dst);
void px_THROW_ERROR(int err) pg_attribute_noreturn();
const char *px_strerror(int err);
const char *px_resolve_alias(const PX_Alias *aliases, const char *name);

247
contrib/pgcrypto/random.c
View File

@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
/*
* random.c
* Acquire randomness from system. For seeding RNG.
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* contrib/pgcrypto/random.c
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include "px.h"
#include "utils/memdebug.h"
/* how many bytes to ask from system random provider */
#define RND_BYTES 32
/*
* Try to read from /dev/urandom or /dev/random on these OS'es.
*
* The list can be pretty liberal, as the device not existing
* is expected event.
*/
#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) \
|| defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) \
|| defined(__darwin__) || defined(__SOLARIS__) \
|| defined(__hpux) || defined(__HPUX__) \
|| defined(__CYGWIN__) || defined(_AIX)
#define TRY_DEV_RANDOM
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int
safe_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
{
int done = 0;
char *p = buf;
int res;
while (count)
{
res = read(fd, p, count);
if (res <= 0)
{
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
return PXE_DEV_READ_ERROR;
}
p += res;
done += res;
count -= res;
}
return done;
}
static uint8 *
try_dev_random(uint8 *dst)
{
int fd;
int res;
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
{
fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
return dst;
}
res = safe_read(fd, dst, RND_BYTES);
close(fd);
if (res > 0)
dst += res;
return dst;
}
#endif
/*
* Try to find randomness on Windows
*/
#ifdef WIN32
#define TRY_WIN32_GENRAND
#define TRY_WIN32_PERFC
#include <windows.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
/*
* this function is from libtomcrypt
*
* try to use Microsoft crypto API
*/
static uint8 *
try_win32_genrand(uint8 *dst)
{
int res;
HCRYPTPROV h = 0;
res = CryptAcquireContext(&h, NULL, MS_DEF_PROV, PROV_RSA_FULL,
(CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET));
if (!res)
res = CryptAcquireContext(&h, NULL, MS_DEF_PROV, PROV_RSA_FULL,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET | CRYPT_NEWKEYSET);
if (!res)
return dst;
res = CryptGenRandom(h, RND_BYTES, dst);
if (res == TRUE)
dst += RND_BYTES;
CryptReleaseContext(h, 0);
return dst;
}
static uint8 *
try_win32_perfc(uint8 *dst)
{
int res;
LARGE_INTEGER time;
res = QueryPerformanceCounter(&time);
if (!res)
return dst;
memcpy(dst, &time, sizeof(time));
return dst + sizeof(time);
}
#endif /* WIN32 */
/*
* If we are not on Windows, then hopefully we are
* on a unix-like system. Use the usual suspects
* for randomness.
*/
#ifndef WIN32
#define TRY_UNIXSTD
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/*
* Everything here is predictible, only needs some patience.
*
* But there is a chance that the system-specific functions
* did not work. So keep faith and try to slow the attacker down.
*/
static uint8 *
try_unix_std(uint8 *dst)
{
pid_t pid;
int x;
PX_MD *md;
struct timeval tv;
int res;
/* process id */
pid = getpid();
memcpy(dst, (uint8 *) &pid, sizeof(pid));
dst += sizeof(pid);
/* time */
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
memcpy(dst, (uint8 *) &tv, sizeof(tv));
dst += sizeof(tv);
/* pointless, but should not hurt */
x = random();
memcpy(dst, (uint8 *) &x, sizeof(x));
dst += sizeof(x);
/* hash of uninitialized stack and heap allocations */
res = px_find_digest("sha1", &md);
if (res >= 0)
{
uint8 *ptr;
uint8 stack[8192];
int alloc = 32 * 1024;
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(stack, sizeof(stack));
px_md_update(md, stack, sizeof(stack));
ptr = px_alloc(alloc);
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(ptr, alloc);
px_md_update(md, ptr, alloc);
px_free(ptr);
px_md_finish(md, dst);
px_md_free(md);
dst += 20;
}
return dst;
}
#endif
/*
* try to extract some randomness for initial seeding
*
* dst should have room for 1024 bytes.
*/
unsigned
px_acquire_system_randomness(uint8 *dst)
{
uint8 *p = dst;
#ifdef TRY_DEV_RANDOM
p = try_dev_random(p);
#endif
#ifdef TRY_WIN32_GENRAND
p = try_win32_genrand(p);
#endif
#ifdef TRY_WIN32_PERFC
p = try_win32_perfc(p);
#endif
#ifdef TRY_UNIXSTD
p = try_unix_std(p);
#endif
return p - dst;
}

17
doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml
View File

@ -1096,6 +1096,23 @@ su - postgres
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--disable-strong-random</option></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Allow the build to succeed even if <productname>PostgreSQL</>
has no support for strong random numbers on the platform.
A source of random numbers is needed for some authentication
protocols, as well as some routines in <xref linkend="pgcrypto">
module. --disable-strong-random disables functionality that
requires cryptographically strong random numbers, and substitutes
a weak pseudo-random-number-generator for the generation of
authentication salt values and query cancel keys. It may make
authentication less secure.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--disable-thread-safety</option></term>
<listitem>

1
src/Makefile.global.in
View File

@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ enable_dtrace = @enable_dtrace@
enable_coverage = @enable_coverage@
enable_tap_tests = @enable_tap_tests@
enable_thread_safety = @enable_thread_safety@
enable_strong_random = @enable_strong_random@
python_includespec = @python_includespec@
python_libdir = @python_libdir@

64
src/backend/libpq/auth.c
View File

@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "replication/walsender.h"
#include "storage/ipc.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
@ -43,9 +44,21 @@ static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, char *extradata,
int extralen);
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail);
static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port, char **logdetail);
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MD5 authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Plaintext password authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Ident authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
@ -536,13 +549,11 @@ ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled")));
/* include the salt to use for computing the response */
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, port->md5Salt, 4);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port, &logdetail);
status = CheckMD5Auth(port, &logdetail);
break;
case uaPassword:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port, &logdetail);
status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail);
break;
case uaPAM:
@ -696,23 +707,48 @@ recv_password_packet(Port *port)
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
* Get the response and check it.
* On error, optionally store a detail string at *logdetail.
*/
static int
recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port, char **logdetail)
CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
char md5Salt[4]; /* Password salt */
char *passwd;
int result;
pg_backend_random(md5Salt, 4);
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, md5Salt, 4);
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd, logdetail);
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd, md5Salt, 4, logdetail);
pfree(passwd);
return result;
}
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Plaintext password authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int
CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
char *passwd;
int result;
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd, NULL, 0, logdetail);
pfree(passwd);
@ -920,7 +956,7 @@ pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
}
@ -1166,7 +1202,7 @@ pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
}

10
src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
View File

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass,
char **logdetail)
char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len, char **logdetail)
{
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
char *shadow_pass,
@ -91,13 +91,14 @@ md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass,
switch (port->hba->auth_method)
{
case uaMD5:
Assert(md5_salt != NULL && md5_salt_len > 0);
crypt_pwd = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
port->md5Salt,
sizeof(port->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
@ -118,8 +119,7 @@ md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass,
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"),
port->md5Salt,
sizeof(port->md5Salt),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);

146
src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c
View File

@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
typedef struct bkend
{
pid_t pid; /* process id of backend */
long cancel_key; /* cancel key for cancels for this backend */
int32 cancel_key; /* cancel key for cancels for this backend */
int child_slot; /* PMChildSlot for this backend, if any */
/*
@ -358,13 +358,15 @@ static volatile bool avlauncher_needs_signal = false;
static volatile bool StartWorkerNeeded = true;
static volatile bool HaveCrashedWorker = false;
#ifndef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
/*
* State for assigning random salts and cancel keys.
* State for assigning cancel keys.
* Also, the global MyCancelKey passes the cancel key assigned to a given
* backend from the postmaster to that backend (via fork).
*/
static unsigned int random_seed = 0;
static struct timeval random_start_time;
#endif
#ifdef USE_BONJOUR
static DNSServiceRef bonjour_sdref = NULL;
@ -403,8 +405,7 @@ static void processCancelRequest(Port *port, void *pkt);
static int initMasks(fd_set *rmask);
static void report_fork_failure_to_client(Port *port, int errnum);
static CAC_state canAcceptConnections(void);
static long PostmasterRandom(void);
static void RandomSalt(char *salt, int len);
static bool RandomCancelKey(int32 *cancel_key);
static void signal_child(pid_t pid, int signal);
static bool SignalSomeChildren(int signal, int targets);
static void TerminateChildren(int signal);
@ -471,7 +472,7 @@ typedef struct
InheritableSocket portsocket;
char DataDir[MAXPGPATH];
pgsocket ListenSocket[MAXLISTEN];
long MyCancelKey;
int32 MyCancelKey;
int MyPMChildSlot;
#ifndef WIN32
unsigned long UsedShmemSegID;
@ -1292,8 +1293,10 @@ PostmasterMain(int argc, char *argv[])
* Remember postmaster startup time
*/
PgStartTime = GetCurrentTimestamp();
/* PostmasterRandom wants its own copy */
#ifndef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
/* RandomCancelKey wants its own copy */
gettimeofday(&random_start_time, NULL);
#endif
/*
* We're ready to rock and roll...
@ -2344,15 +2347,6 @@ ConnCreate(int serverFd)
return NULL;
}
/*
* Precompute password salt values to use for this connection. It's
* slightly annoying to do this long in advance of knowing whether we'll
* need 'em or not, but we must do the random() calls before we fork, not
* after. Else the postmaster's random sequence won't get advanced, and
* all backends would end up using the same salt...
*/
RandomSalt(port->md5Salt, sizeof(port->md5Salt));
/*
* Allocate GSSAPI specific state struct
*/
@ -3905,7 +3899,14 @@ BackendStartup(Port *port)
* backend will have its own copy in the forked-off process' value of
* MyCancelKey, so that it can transmit the key to the frontend.
*/
MyCancelKey = PostmasterRandom();
if (!RandomCancelKey(&MyCancelKey))
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
errmsg("could not acquire random number")));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
bn->cancel_key = MyCancelKey;
/* Pass down canAcceptConnections state */
@ -4218,8 +4219,10 @@ BackendRun(Port *port)
* generator state. We have to clobber the static random_seed *and* start
* a new random sequence in the random() library function.
*/
#ifndef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
random_seed = 0;
random_start_time.tv_usec = 0;
#endif
/* slightly hacky way to convert timestamptz into integers */
TimestampDifference(0, port->SessionStartTime, &secs, &usecs);
srandom((unsigned int) (MyProcPid ^ (usecs << 12) ^ secs));
@ -5068,63 +5071,42 @@ StartupPacketTimeoutHandler(void)
/*
* RandomSalt
* Generate a random cancel key.
*/
static void
RandomSalt(char *salt, int len)
static bool
RandomCancelKey(int32 *cancel_key)
{
long rand;
int i;
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
return pg_strong_random((char *) cancel_key, sizeof(int32));
#else
/*
* We use % 255, sacrificing one possible byte value, so as to ensure that
* all bits of the random() value participate in the result. While at it,
* add one to avoid generating any null bytes.
* If built with --disable-strong-random, use plain old erand48.
*
* We cannot use pg_backend_random() in postmaster, because it stores
* its state in shared memory.
*/
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
rand = PostmasterRandom();
salt[i] = (rand % 255) + 1;
}
}
static unsigned short seed[3];
/*
* PostmasterRandom
*
* Caution: use this only for values needed during connection-request
* processing. Otherwise, the intended property of having an unpredictable
* delay between random_start_time and random_stop_time will be broken.
*/
static long
PostmasterRandom(void)
{
/*
* Select a random seed at the time of first receiving a request.
*/
if (random_seed == 0)
{
do
{
struct timeval random_stop_time;
struct timeval random_stop_time;
gettimeofday(&random_stop_time, NULL);
gettimeofday(&random_stop_time, NULL);
/*
* We are not sure how much precision is in tv_usec, so we swap
* the high and low 16 bits of 'random_stop_time' and XOR them
* with 'random_start_time'. On the off chance that the result is
* 0, we loop until it isn't.
*/
random_seed = random_start_time.tv_usec ^
((random_stop_time.tv_usec << 16) |
((random_stop_time.tv_usec >> 16) & 0xffff));
}
while (random_seed == 0);
seed[0] = (unsigned short) random_start_time.tv_usec;
seed[1] = (unsigned short) (random_stop_time.tv_usec) ^ (random_start_time.tv_usec >> 16);
seed[2] = (unsigned short) (random_stop_time.tv_usec >> 16);
srandom(random_seed);
random_seed = 1;
}
return random();
*cancel_key = pg_jrand48(seed);
return true;
#endif
}
/*
@ -5295,16 +5277,23 @@ StartAutovacuumWorker(void)
*/
if (canAcceptConnections() == CAC_OK)
{
/*
* Compute the cancel key that will be assigned to this session.
* We probably don't need cancel keys for autovac workers, but
* we'd better have something random in the field to prevent
* unfriendly people from sending cancels to them.
*/
if (!RandomCancelKey(&MyCancelKey))
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
errmsg("could not acquire random number")));
return;
}
bn = (Backend *) malloc(sizeof(Backend));
if (bn)
{
/*
* Compute the cancel key that will be assigned to this session.
* We probably don't need cancel keys for autovac workers, but
* we'd better have something random in the field to prevent
* unfriendly people from sending cancels to them.
*/
MyCancelKey = PostmasterRandom();
bn->cancel_key = MyCancelKey;
/* Autovac workers are not dead_end and need a child slot */
@ -5592,8 +5581,25 @@ bgworker_should_start_now(BgWorkerStartTime start_time)
static bool
assign_backendlist_entry(RegisteredBgWorker *rw)
{
Backend *bn = malloc(sizeof(Backend));
Backend *bn;
/*
* Compute the cancel key that will be assigned to this session. We
* probably don't need cancel keys for background workers, but we'd better
* have something random in the field to prevent unfriendly people from
* sending cancels to them.
*/
if (!RandomCancelKey(&MyCancelKey))
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
errmsg("could not acquire random number")));
rw->rw_crashed_at = GetCurrentTimestamp();
return false;
}
bn = malloc(sizeof(Backend));
if (bn == NULL)
{
ereport(LOG,
@ -5610,15 +5616,7 @@ assign_backendlist_entry(RegisteredBgWorker *rw)
return false;
}
/*
* Compute the cancel key that will be assigned to this session. We
* probably don't need cancel keys for background workers, but we'd better
* have something random in the field to prevent unfriendly people from
* sending cancels to them.
*/
MyCancelKey = PostmasterRandom();
bn->cancel_key = MyCancelKey;
bn->child_slot = MyPMChildSlot = AssignPostmasterChildSlot();
bn->bkend_type = BACKEND_TYPE_BGWORKER;
bn->dead_end = false;

3
src/backend/storage/ipc/ipci.c
View File

@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include "storage/procsignal.h"
#include "storage/sinvaladt.h"
#include "storage/spin.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
#include "utils/snapmgr.h"
@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ CreateSharedMemoryAndSemaphores(bool makePrivate, int port)
size = add_size(size, BTreeShmemSize());
size = add_size(size, SyncScanShmemSize());
size = add_size(size, AsyncShmemSize());
size = add_size(size, BackendRandomShmemSize());
#ifdef EXEC_BACKEND
size = add_size(size, ShmemBackendArraySize());
#endif
@ -253,6 +255,7 @@ CreateSharedMemoryAndSemaphores(bool makePrivate, int port)
BTreeShmemInit();
SyncScanShmemInit();
AsyncShmemInit();
BackendRandomShmemInit();
#ifdef EXEC_BACKEND

1
src/backend/storage/lmgr/lwlocknames.txt
View File

@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ CommitTsLock 39
ReplicationOriginLock 40
MultiXactTruncationLock 41
OldSnapshotTimeMapLock 42
BackendRandomLock 43

2
src/backend/utils/init/globals.c
View File

@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ volatile uint32 CritSectionCount = 0;
int MyProcPid;
pg_time_t MyStartTime;
struct Port *MyProcPort;
long MyCancelKey;
int32 MyCancelKey;
int MyPMChildSlot;
/*

5
src/backend/utils/misc/Makefile
View File

@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
override CPPFLAGS := -I. -I$(srcdir) $(CPPFLAGS)
OBJS = guc.o help_config.o pg_config.o pg_controldata.o pg_rusage.o \
ps_status.o rls.o sampling.o superuser.o timeout.o tzparser.o
OBJS = backend_random.o guc.o help_config.o pg_config.o pg_controldata.o \
pg_rusage.o ps_status.o rls.o sampling.o superuser.o timeout.o \
tzparser.o
# This location might depend on the installation directories. Therefore
# we can't subsitute it into pg_config.h.

158
src/backend/utils/misc/backend_random.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* backend_random.c
* Backend random number generation routine.
*
* pg_backend_random() function fills a buffer with random bytes. Normally,
* it is just a thin wrapper around pg_strong_random(), but when compiled
* with --disable-strong-random, we provide a built-in implementation.
*
* This function is used for generating nonces in authentication, and for
* random salt generation in pgcrypto. The built-in implementation is not
* cryptographically strong, but if the user asked for it, we'll go ahead
* and use it anyway.
*
* The built-in implementation uses the standard erand48 algorithm, with
* a seed shared between all backends.
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/backend/utils/misc/backend_random.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <sys/time.h>
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/lwlock.h"
#include "storage/shmem.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
#include "utils/timestamp.h"
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
Size
BackendRandomShmemSize(void)
{
return 0;
}
void
BackendRandomShmemInit(void)
{
/* do nothing */
}
bool
pg_backend_random(char *dst, int len)
{
/* should not be called in postmaster */
Assert (IsUnderPostmaster || !IsPostmasterEnvironment);
return pg_strong_random(dst, len);
}
#else
/*
* Seed for the PRNG, stored in shared memory.
*
* Protected by BackendRandomLock.
*/
typedef struct
{
bool initialized;
unsigned short seed[3];
} BackendRandomShmemStruct;
static BackendRandomShmemStruct *BackendRandomShmem;
Size
BackendRandomShmemSize(void)
{
return sizeof(BackendRandomShmemStruct);
}
void
BackendRandomShmemInit(void)
{
bool found;
BackendRandomShmem = (BackendRandomShmemStruct *)
ShmemInitStruct("Backend PRNG state",
BackendRandomShmemSize(),
&found);
if (!IsUnderPostmaster)
{
Assert(!found);
BackendRandomShmem->initialized = false;
}
else
Assert(found);
}
bool
pg_backend_random(char *dst, int len)
{
int i;
char *end = dst + len;
/* should not be called in postmaster */
Assert (IsUnderPostmaster || !IsPostmasterEnvironment);
LWLockAcquire(BackendRandomLock, LW_EXCLUSIVE);
/*
* Seed the PRNG on the first use.
*/
if (!BackendRandomShmem->initialized)
{
struct timeval now;
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
BackendRandomShmem->seed[0] = now.tv_sec;
BackendRandomShmem->seed[1] = (unsigned short) (now.tv_usec);
BackendRandomShmem->seed[2] = (unsigned short) (now.tv_usec >> 16);
/*
* Mix in the cancel key, generated by the postmaster. This adds
* what little entropy the postmaster had to the seed.
*/
BackendRandomShmem->seed[0] ^= (MyCancelKey);
BackendRandomShmem->seed[1] ^= (MyCancelKey >> 16);
BackendRandomShmem->initialized = true;
}
for (i = 0; dst < end; i++)
{
uint32 r;
int j;
/*
* pg_jrand48 returns a 32-bit integer. Fill the next 4 bytes from it.
*/
r = (uint32) pg_jrand48(BackendRandomShmem->seed);
for (j = 0; j < 4 && dst < end; j++)
{
*(dst++) = (char) (r & 0xFF);
r >>= 8;
}
}
LWLockRelease(BackendRandomLock);
return true;
}
#endif /* HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM */

2
src/include/libpq/crypt.h
View File

@ -16,6 +16,6 @@
#include "libpq/libpq-be.h"
extern int md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role,
char *client_pass, char **logdetail);
char *client_pass, char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len, char **logdetail);
#endif

1
src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
View File

@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ typedef struct Port
* Information that needs to be held during the authentication cycle.
*/
HbaLine *hba;
char md5Salt[4]; /* Password salt */
/*
* Information that really has no business at all being in struct Port,

2
src/include/miscadmin.h
View File

@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ extern PGDLLIMPORT int MyProcPid;
extern PGDLLIMPORT pg_time_t MyStartTime;
extern PGDLLIMPORT struct Port *MyProcPort;
extern PGDLLIMPORT struct Latch *MyLatch;
extern long MyCancelKey;
extern int32 MyCancelKey;
extern int MyPMChildSlot;
extern char OutputFileName[];

12
src/include/pg_config.h.in
View File

@ -497,6 +497,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
/* Define to use have a strong random number source */
#undef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
@ -814,6 +817,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with BSD Authentication support. (--with-bsd-auth) */
#undef USE_BSD_AUTH
/* Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation */
#undef USE_DEV_URANDOM
/* Define to 1 if you want float4 values to be passed by value.
(--enable-float4-byval) */
#undef USE_FLOAT4_BYVAL
@ -842,6 +848,9 @@
/* Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl) */
#undef USE_OPENSSL
/* Define to use OpenSSL for random number generation */
#undef USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
#undef USE_PAM
@ -869,6 +878,9 @@
/* Define to select unnamed POSIX semaphores. */
#undef USE_UNNAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES
/* Define to use native Windows API for random number generation */
#undef USE_WIN32_RANDOM
/* Define to select Win32-style semaphores. */
#undef USE_WIN32_SEMAPHORES

12
src/include/pg_config.h.win32
View File

@ -348,6 +348,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
#define HAVE_STRING_H 1
/* Define to use have a strong random number source */
#define HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM 1
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
//#define HAVE_STRTOLL 1
@ -616,6 +619,9 @@
/* Define to 1 to build with BSD Authentication support. (--with-bsd-auth) */
/* #undef USE_BSD_AUTH */
/* Define to use /dev/urandom for random number generation */
/* #undef USE_DEV_URANDOM */
/* Define to 1 if you want 64-bit integer timestamp and interval support.
(--enable-integer-datetimes) */
/* #undef USE_INTEGER_DATETIMES */
@ -629,6 +635,9 @@
/* Define to build with OpenSSL support. (--with-openssl) */
/* #undef USE_OPENSSL */
/* Define to use OpenSSL for random number generation */
/* #undef USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM */
/* Define to 1 to build with PAM support. (--with-pam) */
/* #undef USE_PAM */
@ -657,6 +666,9 @@
/* Define to select unnamed POSIX semaphores. */
/* #undef USE_UNNAMED_POSIX_SEMAPHORES */
/* Define to use native Windows API for random number generation */
#define USE_WIN32_RANDOM 1
/* Define to select Win32-style semaphores. */
#define USE_WIN32_SEMAPHORES 1

6
src/include/port.h
View File

@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ extern off_t ftello(FILE *stream);
extern double pg_erand48(unsigned short xseed[3]);
extern long pg_lrand48(void);
extern long pg_jrand48(unsigned short xseed[3]);
extern void pg_srand48(long seed);
#ifndef HAVE_FLS
@ -454,6 +455,11 @@ extern int pg_codepage_to_encoding(UINT cp);
extern char *inet_net_ntop(int af, const void *src, int bits,
char *dst, size_t size);
/* port/pg_strong_random.c */
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
extern bool pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len);
#endif
/* port/pgcheckdir.c */
extern int pg_check_dir(const char *dir);

19
src/include/utils/backend_random.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* backend_random.h
* Declarations for backend random number generation
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
* src/include/utils/backend_random.h
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef BACKEND_RANDOM_H
#define BACKEND_RANDOM_H
extern Size BackendRandomShmemSize(void);
extern void BackendRandomShmemInit(void);
extern bool pg_backend_random(char *dst, int len);
#endif /* BACKEND_RANDOM_H */

4
src/port/Makefile
View File

@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ OBJS = $(LIBOBJS) $(PG_CRC32C_OBJS) chklocale.o erand48.o inet_net_ntop.o \
pgstrcasecmp.o pqsignal.o \
qsort.o qsort_arg.o quotes.o sprompt.o tar.o thread.o
ifeq ($(enable_strong_random), yes)
OBJS += pg_strong_random.o
endif
# foo_srv.o and foo.o are both built from foo.c, but only foo.o has -DFRONTEND
OBJS_SRV = $(OBJS:%.o=%_srv.o)

7
src/port/erand48.c
View File

@ -91,6 +91,13 @@ pg_lrand48(void)
return ((long) _rand48_seed[2] << 15) + ((long) _rand48_seed[1] >> 1);
}
long
pg_jrand48(unsigned short xseed[3])
{
_dorand48(xseed);
return ((long) xseed[2] << 16) + ((long) xseed[1]);
}
void
pg_srand48(long seed)
{

149
src/port/pg_strong_random.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* pg_strong_random.c
* generate a cryptographically secure random number
*
* Our definition of "strong" is that it's suitable for generating random
* salts and query cancellation keys, during authentication.
*
* Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/port/pg_strong_random.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef FRONTEND
#include "postgres.h"
#else
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
#include <Wincrypt.h>
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
/*
* Cache a global crypto provider that only gets freed when the process
* exits, in case we need random numbers more than once.
*/
static HCRYPTPROV hProvider = 0;
#endif
#if defined(USE_DEV_URANDOM)
/*
* Read (random) bytes from a file.
*/
static bool
random_from_file(char *filename, void *buf, size_t len)
{
int f;
char *p = buf;
ssize_t res;
f = open(filename, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (f == -1)
return false;
while (len)
{
res = read(f, p, len);
if (res <= 0)
{
if (errno == EINTR)
continue; /* interrupted by signal, just retry */
close(f);
return false;
}
p += res;
len -= res;
}
close(f);
return true;
}
#endif
/*
* pg_strong_random
*
* Generate requested number of random bytes. The returned bytes are
* cryptographically secure, suitable for use e.g. in authentication.
*
* We rely on system facilities for actually generating the numbers.
* We support a number of sources:
*
* 1. OpenSSL's RAND_bytes()
* 2. Windows' CryptGenRandom() function
* 3. /dev/urandom
*
* The configure script will choose which one to use, and set
* a USE_*_RANDOM flag accordingly.
*
* Returns true on success, and false if none of the sources
* were available. NB: It is important to check the return value!
* Proceeding with key generation when no random data was available
* would lead to predictable keys and security issues.
*/
bool
pg_strong_random(void *buf, size_t len)
{
/*
* When built with OpenSSL, use OpenSSL's RAND_bytes function.
*/
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_RANDOM)
if (RAND_bytes(buf, len) == 1)
return true;
return false;
/*
* Windows has CryptoAPI for strong cryptographic numbers.
*/
#elif defined(USE_WIN32_RANDOM)
if (hProvider == 0)
{
if (!CryptAcquireContext(&hProvider,
NULL,
MS_DEF_PROV,
PROV_RSA_FULL,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT))
{
/*
* On failure, set back to 0 in case the value was for some reason
* modified.
*/
hProvider = 0;
}
}
/* Re-check in case we just retrieved the provider */
if (hProvider != 0)
{
if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, len, buf))
return true;
}
return false;
/*
* Read /dev/urandom ourselves.
*/
#elif defined(USE_DEV_URANDOM)
if (random_from_file("/dev/urandom", buf, len))
return true;
return false;
#else
/* The autoconf script should not have allowed this */
#error no source of random numbers configured
#endif
}

5
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
View File

@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ sub mkvcbuild
chklocale.c crypt.c fls.c fseeko.c getrusage.c inet_aton.c random.c
srandom.c getaddrinfo.c gettimeofday.c inet_net_ntop.c kill.c open.c
erand48.c snprintf.c strlcat.c strlcpy.c dirmod.c noblock.c path.c
pgcheckdir.c pgmkdirp.c pgsleep.c pgstrcasecmp.c pqsignal.c
mkdtemp.c qsort.c qsort_arg.c quotes.c system.c
pg_strong_random.c pgcheckdir.c pgmkdirp.c pgsleep.c pgstrcasecmp.c
pqsignal.c mkdtemp.c qsort.c qsort_arg.c quotes.c system.c
sprompt.c tar.c thread.c getopt.c getopt_long.c dirent.c
win32env.c win32error.c win32security.c win32setlocale.c);
@ -425,7 +425,6 @@ sub mkvcbuild
'sha1.c', 'sha2.c',
'internal.c', 'internal-sha2.c',
'blf.c', 'rijndael.c',
'fortuna.c', 'random.c',
'pgp-mpi-internal.c', 'imath.c');
}
$pgcrypto->AddReference($postgres);