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Sometimes the third time is the charm. Third try to fix the sql injection

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vulnerability.  This fix completely removes the ability (hack) of being able
to bind a list of values in an in clause.  It was demonstrated that by allowing
that functionality you open up the possibility for certain types of
sql injection attacks.  The previous fix attempts all focused on preventing
the insertion of additional sql statements (the semi-colon problem:
xxx; any new sql statement here).  But that still left the ability to
change the where clause on the current statement or perform a subselect
which can circumvent applicaiton security logic and/or allow you to call
any stored function.

 Modified Files:
 	jdbc/org/postgresql/jdbc1/AbstractJdbc1Statement.java
This commit is contained in:
Barry Lind 2003-08-07 04:03:13 +00:00
parent f0f137599a
commit acf09c64b0
1 changed files with 17 additions and 20 deletions
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37
src/interfaces/jdbc/org/postgresql/jdbc1/AbstractJdbc1Statement.java
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import java.sql.Timestamp;
import java.sql.Types;
import java.util.Vector;
/* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/jdbc/org/postgresql/jdbc1/Attic/AbstractJdbc1Statement.java,v 1.29 2003/07/24 00:30:39 barry Exp $
/* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/jdbc/org/postgresql/jdbc1/Attic/AbstractJdbc1Statement.java,v 1.30 2003/08/07 04:03:13 barry Exp $
* This class defines methods of the jdbc1 specification. This class is
* extended by org.postgresql.jdbc2.AbstractJdbc2Statement which adds the jdbc2
* methods. The real Statement class (for jdbc1) is org.postgresql.jdbc1.Jdbc1Statement
@ -1036,26 +1036,14 @@ public abstract class AbstractJdbc1Statement implements BaseStatement
sbuf.setLength(0);
sbuf.ensureCapacity(x.length() + (int)(x.length() / 10));
sbuf.append('\'');
escapeString(x, sbuf, true);
escapeString(x, sbuf);
sbuf.append('\'');
bind(parameterIndex, sbuf.toString(), type);
}
}
}
private String escapeString(String p_input) {
// use the shared buffer object. Should never clash but this makes
// us thread safe!
synchronized (sbuf)
{
sbuf.setLength(0);
sbuf.ensureCapacity(p_input.length());
escapeString(p_input, sbuf, false);
return sbuf.toString();
}
}
private void escapeString(String p_input, StringBuffer p_output, boolean p_allowStatementTerminator) {
private void escapeString(String p_input, StringBuffer p_output) {
for (int i = 0 ; i < p_input.length() ; ++i)
{
char c = p_input.charAt(i);
@ -1068,9 +1056,6 @@ public abstract class AbstractJdbc1Statement implements BaseStatement
break;
case '\0':
throw new IllegalArgumentException("\\0 not allowed");
case ';':
if (!p_allowStatementTerminator)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("semicolon not allowed");
default:
p_output.append(c);
}
@ -1493,8 +1478,14 @@ public abstract class AbstractJdbc1Statement implements BaseStatement
case Types.INTEGER:
if (x instanceof Boolean)
bind(parameterIndex,((Boolean)x).booleanValue() ? "1" :"0", PG_BOOLEAN);
else if (x instanceof Integer || x instanceof Long ||
x instanceof Double || x instanceof Short ||
x instanceof Number || x instanceof Float )
bind(parameterIndex, x.toString(), PG_INTEGER);
else
bind(parameterIndex, escapeString(x.toString()), PG_INTEGER);
//ensure the value is a valid numeric value to avoid
//sql injection attacks
bind(parameterIndex, new BigDecimal(x.toString()).toString(), PG_INTEGER);
break;
case Types.TINYINT:
case Types.SMALLINT:
@ -1506,8 +1497,14 @@ public abstract class AbstractJdbc1Statement implements BaseStatement
case Types.NUMERIC:
if (x instanceof Boolean)
bind(parameterIndex, ((Boolean)x).booleanValue() ? "1" : "0", PG_BOOLEAN);
else if (x instanceof Integer || x instanceof Long ||
x instanceof Double || x instanceof Short ||
x instanceof Number || x instanceof Float )
bind(parameterIndex, x.toString(), PG_NUMERIC);
else
bind(parameterIndex, escapeString(x.toString()), PG_NUMERIC);
//ensure the value is a valid numeric value to avoid
//sql injection attacks
bind(parameterIndex, new BigDecimal(x.toString()).toString(), PG_NUMERIC);
break;
case Types.CHAR:
case Types.VARCHAR: