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Last-minute release note updates.
Security: CVE-2012-0866, CVE-2012-0867, CVE-2012-0868
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@ -34,6 +34,36 @@
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<itemizedlist>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Require execute permission on the trigger function for
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<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
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</para>
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<para>
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This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
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function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
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This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
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<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
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as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
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comments (Robert Haas)
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</para>
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<para>
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<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
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that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
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containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
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incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
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injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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<para>
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Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
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Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
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@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
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<itemizedlist>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Require execute permission on the trigger function for
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<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
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</para>
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<para>
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This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
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function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
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|
This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
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<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
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as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
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certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
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</para>
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<para>
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Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
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extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes. Normally this would
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cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
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are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
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certificate holder to impersonate another. The victim would have to
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have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
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to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
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name has that string as a prefix. Impersonating a server would also
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require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
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(CVE-2012-0867)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
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comments (Robert Haas)
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</para>
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<para>
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<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
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|
that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
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|
containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
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incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
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injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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<para>
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Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
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Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
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@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
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<itemizedlist>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Require execute permission on the trigger function for
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<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
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</para>
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<para>
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This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
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function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
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This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
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<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
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as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
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certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
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</para>
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<para>
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Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
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extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes. Normally this would
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cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
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are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
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|
certificate holder to impersonate another. The victim would have to
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have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
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to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
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name has that string as a prefix. Impersonating a server would also
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require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
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(CVE-2012-0867)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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|
Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
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comments (Robert Haas)
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</para>
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<para>
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<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
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that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
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containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
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incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
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injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<listitem>
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||||||
<para>
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<para>
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Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
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Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
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