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https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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296 lines
8.7 KiB
C
296 lines
8.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "internal/x509_int.h"
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static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
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static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
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static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
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static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
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/*
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* WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
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* any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
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* into the table
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*/
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static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
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{X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
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NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
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NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
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NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
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NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
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NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
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NULL},
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{X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
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};
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#define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
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static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
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static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
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{
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return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
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}
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int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
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int) {
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int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
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oldtrust = default_trust;
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default_trust = trust;
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return oldtrust;
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}
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int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
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{
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X509_TRUST *pt;
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int idx;
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/* We get this as a default value */
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if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
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return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
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flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
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idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
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if (idx == -1)
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return default_trust(id, x, flags);
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pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
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return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
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}
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int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
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{
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if (!trtable)
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return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
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return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
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}
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X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
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{
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if (idx < 0)
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return NULL;
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if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
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return trstandard + idx;
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return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
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}
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int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
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{
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X509_TRUST tmp;
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int idx;
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if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
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return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
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tmp.trust = id;
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if (!trtable)
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return -1;
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idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
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if (idx == -1)
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return -1;
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return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
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}
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int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
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{
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if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
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X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
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return 0;
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}
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*t = trust;
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return 1;
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}
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int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
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char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
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{
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int idx;
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X509_TRUST *trtmp;
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/*
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* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
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*/
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flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
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/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
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flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
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/* Get existing entry if any */
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idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
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/* Need a new entry */
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if (idx == -1) {
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if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
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X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
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} else
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trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
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/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
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if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
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OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
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/* dup supplied name */
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if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
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X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
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trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
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/* Set all other flags */
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trtmp->flags |= flags;
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trtmp->trust = id;
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trtmp->check_trust = ck;
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trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
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trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
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/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
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if (idx == -1) {
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if (trtable == NULL
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&& (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
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X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
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X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
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{
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if (!p)
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return;
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if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
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if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
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OPENSSL_free(p->name);
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OPENSSL_free(p);
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}
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}
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void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 0; i < X509_TRUST_COUNT; i++)
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trtable_free(trstandard + i);
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sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
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trtable = NULL;
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}
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int X509_TRUST_get_flags(X509_TRUST *xp)
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{
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return xp->flags;
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}
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char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(X509_TRUST *xp)
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{
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return xp->name;
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}
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int X509_TRUST_get_trust(X509_TRUST *xp)
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{
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return xp->trust;
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}
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static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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/*
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* Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
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* any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
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* expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
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* certificate is self-signed.
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*/
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flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
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return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
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}
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static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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/*
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* Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
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* rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
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* trust in self-signed certificates apply.
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*/
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flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
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return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
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}
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static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
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if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
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return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
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else
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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}
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static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
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int i;
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if (ax && ax->reject) {
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
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ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
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int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
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if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
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(flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
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return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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}
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}
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if (ax && ax->trust) {
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for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
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ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
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int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
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if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
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(flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
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return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
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}
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/*
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* Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
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*
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* Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
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* self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
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* suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
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*
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* But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
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* trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
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* from lack of EKU constraints.
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*
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* Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
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* explicit reject.
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*/
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return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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}
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if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
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return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
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/*
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* Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
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*/
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return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
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}
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