openssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
Matt Caswell fc52ae8c4b Don't copy parameters on setting a key in libssl
Whenever we set a private key in libssl, we first found the certificate
that matched the key algorithm. Then we copied the key parameters from the
private key into the public key for the certficate before finally checking
that the private key matched the public key in the certificate. This makes
no sense! Part of checking the private key is to make sure that the
parameters match. It seems that this code has been present since SSLeay.
Perhaps at some point it made sense to do this - but it doesn't any more.

We remove that piece of code altogether. The previous code also had the
undocumented side effect of removing the certificate if the key didn't
match. This makes sense if you've just overwritten the parameters in the
certificate with bad values - but doesn't seem to otherwise. I've also
removed that error logic.

Due to issue #13893, the public key associated with the certificate is
always a legacy key. EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters will downgrade the "from"
key to legacy if the target is legacy, so this means that in libssl all
private keys were always downgraded to legacy when they are first set
in the SSL/SSL_CTX. Removing the EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters code has the
added benefit of removing that downgrade.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13899)
2021-01-22 09:30:53 +00:00

984 lines
29 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include "internal/packet.h"
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
#define SYNTHV1CONTEXT (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY \
| SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO \
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO \
| SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION)
int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
{
int rv;
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
rv = ssl_security_cert(ssl, NULL, x, 0, 1);
if (rv != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv);
return 0;
}
return ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x);
}
int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
{
int j;
BIO *in;
int ret = 0;
X509 *cert = NULL, *x = NULL;
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (type != SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 && type != SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
goto end;
}
x = X509_new_ex(ssl->ctx->libctx, ssl->ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
cert = d2i_X509_bio(in, &x);
} else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, ssl->default_passwd_callback,
ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
goto end;
}
if (cert == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, j);
goto end;
}
ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
end:
X509_free(x);
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len)
{
X509 *x;
int ret;
x = X509_new_ex(ssl->ctx->libctx, ssl->ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (d2i_X509(&x, &d, (long)len)== NULL) {
X509_free(x);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
X509_free(x);
return ret;
}
static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
size_t i;
if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &i) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
&& !X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey))
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
c->pkeys[i].privatekey = pkey;
c->key = &c->pkeys[i];
return 1;
}
int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
int ret;
if (pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
return ret;
}
int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type)
{
int j, ret = 0;
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey_ex(in, NULL,
ssl->default_passwd_callback,
ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata,
ssl->ctx->libctx,
ssl->ctx->propq);
} else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex_bio(in, NULL, ssl->ctx->libctx,
ssl->ctx->propq);
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
goto end;
}
if (pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, j);
goto end;
}
ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
end:
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d,
long len)
{
int ret;
const unsigned char *p;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
p = d;
if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex(type, NULL, &p, (long)len, ssl->ctx->libctx,
ssl->ctx->propq)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
int rv;
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
rv = ssl_security_cert(NULL, ctx, x, 0, 1);
if (rv != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv);
return 0;
}
return ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x);
}
static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
size_t i;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &i) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (i == SSL_PKEY_ECC && !EVP_PKEY_can_sign(pkey)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
return 0;
}
#endif
if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) {
/*
* The return code from EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters is deliberately
* ignored. Some EVP_PKEY types cannot do this.
*/
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
ERR_clear_error();
if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) {
/*
* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private
* key (when switching to a different cert & key, first this
* function should be used, then ssl_set_pkey
*/
EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
c->pkeys[i].privatekey = NULL;
/* clear error queue */
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
X509_up_ref(x);
c->pkeys[i].x509 = x;
c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
{
int j = SSL_R_BAD_VALUE;
BIO *in;
int ret = 0;
X509 *x = NULL, *cert = NULL;
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (type != SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 && type != SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
goto end;
}
x = X509_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
cert = d2i_X509_bio(in, &x);
} else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, ctx->default_passwd_callback,
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata);
}
if (cert == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, j);
goto end;
}
ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
end:
X509_free(x);
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d)
{
X509 *x;
int ret;
x = X509_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (d2i_X509(&x, &d, (long)len) == NULL) {
X509_free(x);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
X509_free(x);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
return ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
}
int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type)
{
int j, ret = 0;
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
j = ERR_R_PEM_LIB;
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey_ex(in, NULL,
ctx->default_passwd_callback,
ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata,
ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
} else if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB;
pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex_bio(in, NULL, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE);
goto end;
}
if (pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, j);
goto end;
}
ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
end:
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *d, long len)
{
int ret;
const unsigned char *p;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
p = d;
if ((pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_ex(type, NULL, &p, (long)len, ctx->libctx,
ctx->propq)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
/*
* Read a file that contains our certificate in "PEM" format, possibly
* followed by a sequence of CA certificates that should be sent to the peer
* in the Certificate message.
*/
static int use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl, const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
int ret = 0;
X509 *x = NULL;
pem_password_cb *passwd_callback;
void *passwd_callback_userdata;
SSL_CTX *real_ctx = (ssl == NULL) ? ctx : ssl->ctx;
ERR_clear_error(); /* clear error stack for
* SSL_CTX_use_certificate() */
if (ctx != NULL) {
passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback;
passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
} else {
passwd_callback = ssl->default_passwd_callback;
passwd_callback_userdata = ssl->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
}
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
x = X509_new_ex(real_ctx->libctx, real_ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, &x, passwd_callback,
passwd_callback_userdata) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (ctx)
ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
else
ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x);
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0)
ret = 0; /* Key/certificate mismatch doesn't imply
* ret==0 ... */
if (ret) {
/*
* If we could set up our certificate, now proceed to the CA
* certificates.
*/
X509 *ca;
int r;
unsigned long err;
if (ctx)
r = SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);
else
r = SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
if (r == 0) {
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
while (1) {
ca = X509_new_ex(real_ctx->libctx, real_ctx->propq);
if (ca == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &ca, passwd_callback,
passwd_callback_userdata) != NULL) {
if (ctx)
r = SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca);
else
r = SSL_add0_chain_cert(ssl, ca);
/*
* Note that we must not free ca if it was successfully added to
* the chain (while we must free the main certificate, since its
* reference count is increased by SSL_CTX_use_certificate).
*/
if (!r) {
X509_free(ca);
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
} else {
X509_free(ca);
break;
}
}
/* When the while loop ends, it's usually just EOF. */
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM
&& ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)
ERR_clear_error();
else
ret = 0; /* some real error */
}
end:
X509_free(x);
BIO_free(in);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
{
return use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, NULL, file);
}
int SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file)
{
return use_certificate_chain_file(NULL, ssl, file);
}
static int serverinfo_find_extension(const unsigned char *serverinfo,
size_t serverinfo_length,
unsigned int extension_type,
const unsigned char **extension_data,
size_t *extension_length)
{
PACKET pkt, data;
*extension_data = NULL;
*extension_length = 0;
if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0)
return -1;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, serverinfo, serverinfo_length))
return -1;
for (;;) {
unsigned int type = 0;
unsigned long context = 0;
/* end of serverinfo */
if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) == 0)
return 0; /* Extension not found */
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &context)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &type)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &data))
return -1;
if (type == extension_type) {
*extension_data = PACKET_data(&data);
*extension_length = PACKET_remaining(&data);;
return 1; /* Success */
}
}
/* Unreachable */
}
static int serverinfoex_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
const unsigned char *in,
size_t inlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
int *al, void *arg)
{
if (inlen != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int serverinfo_srv_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
const unsigned char *in,
size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg)
{
return serverinfoex_srv_parse_cb(s, ext_type, 0, in, inlen, NULL, 0, al,
arg);
}
static int serverinfoex_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
unsigned int context,
const unsigned char **out,
size_t *outlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
int *al, void *arg)
{
const unsigned char *serverinfo = NULL;
size_t serverinfo_length = 0;
/* We only support extensions for the first Certificate */
if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE) != 0 && chainidx > 0)
return 0;
/* Is there serverinfo data for the chosen server cert? */
if ((ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(s, &serverinfo,
&serverinfo_length)) != 0) {
/* Find the relevant extension from the serverinfo */
int retval = serverinfo_find_extension(serverinfo, serverinfo_length,
ext_type, out, outlen);
if (retval == -1) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return -1; /* Error */
}
if (retval == 0)
return 0; /* No extension found, don't send extension */
return 1; /* Send extension */
}
return 0; /* No serverinfo data found, don't send
* extension */
}
static int serverinfo_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen,
int *al, void *arg)
{
return serverinfoex_srv_add_cb(s, ext_type, 0, out, outlen, NULL, 0, al,
arg);
}
/*
* With a NULL context, this function just checks that the serverinfo data
* parses correctly. With a non-NULL context, it registers callbacks for
* the included extensions.
*/
static int serverinfo_process_buffer(unsigned int version,
const unsigned char *serverinfo,
size_t serverinfo_length, SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
PACKET pkt;
if (serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0)
return 0;
if (version != SSL_SERVERINFOV1 && version != SSL_SERVERINFOV2)
return 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, serverinfo, serverinfo_length))
return 0;
while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt)) {
unsigned long context = 0;
unsigned int ext_type = 0;
PACKET data;
if ((version == SSL_SERVERINFOV2 && !PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt, &context))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &ext_type)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &data))
return 0;
if (ctx == NULL)
continue;
/*
* The old style custom extensions API could be set separately for
* server/client, i.e. you could set one custom extension for a client,
* and *for the same extension in the same SSL_CTX* you could set a
* custom extension for the server as well. It seems quite weird to be
* setting a custom extension for both client and server in a single
* SSL_CTX - but theoretically possible. This isn't possible in the
* new API. Therefore, if we have V1 serverinfo we use the old API. We
* also use the old API even if we have V2 serverinfo but the context
* looks like an old style <= TLSv1.2 extension.
*/
if (version == SSL_SERVERINFOV1 || context == SYNTHV1CONTEXT) {
if (!SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(ctx, ext_type,
serverinfo_srv_add_cb,
NULL, NULL,
serverinfo_srv_parse_cb,
NULL))
return 0;
} else {
if (!SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext(ctx, ext_type, context,
serverinfoex_srv_add_cb,
NULL, NULL,
serverinfoex_srv_parse_cb,
NULL))
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_ex(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int version,
const unsigned char *serverinfo,
size_t serverinfo_length)
{
unsigned char *new_serverinfo;
if (ctx == NULL || serverinfo == NULL || serverinfo_length == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(version, serverinfo, serverinfo_length,
NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->cert->key == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
new_serverinfo = OPENSSL_realloc(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo,
serverinfo_length);
if (new_serverinfo == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ctx->cert->key->serverinfo = new_serverinfo;
memcpy(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo, serverinfo, serverinfo_length);
ctx->cert->key->serverinfo_length = serverinfo_length;
/*
* Now that the serverinfo is validated and stored, go ahead and
* register callbacks.
*/
if (!serverinfo_process_buffer(version, serverinfo, serverinfo_length,
ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SERVERINFO_DATA);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *serverinfo,
size_t serverinfo_length)
{
return SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_ex(ctx, SSL_SERVERINFOV1, serverinfo,
serverinfo_length);
}
int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file)
{
unsigned char *serverinfo = NULL;
unsigned char *tmp;
size_t serverinfo_length = 0;
unsigned char *extension = 0;
long extension_length = 0;
char *name = NULL;
char *header = NULL;
static const char namePrefix1[] = "SERVERINFO FOR ";
static const char namePrefix2[] = "SERVERINFOV2 FOR ";
unsigned int name_len;
int ret = 0;
BIO *bin = NULL;
size_t num_extensions = 0, contextoff = 0;
if (ctx == NULL || file == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto end;
}
bin = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (bin == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(bin, file) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto end;
}
for (num_extensions = 0;; num_extensions++) {
unsigned int version;
if (PEM_read_bio(bin, &name, &header, &extension, &extension_length)
== 0) {
/*
* There must be at least one extension in this file
*/
if (num_extensions == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_PEM_EXTENSIONS);
goto end;
} else /* End of file, we're done */
break;
}
/* Check that PEM name starts with "BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR " */
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len < sizeof(namePrefix1) - 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT);
goto end;
}
if (strncmp(name, namePrefix1, sizeof(namePrefix1) - 1) == 0) {
version = SSL_SERVERINFOV1;
} else {
if (name_len < sizeof(namePrefix2) - 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT);
goto end;
}
if (strncmp(name, namePrefix2, sizeof(namePrefix2) - 1) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_BAD_PREFIX);
goto end;
}
version = SSL_SERVERINFOV2;
}
/*
* Check that the decoded PEM data is plausible (valid length field)
*/
if (version == SSL_SERVERINFOV1) {
/* 4 byte header: 2 bytes type, 2 bytes len */
if (extension_length < 4
|| (extension[2] << 8) + extension[3]
!= extension_length - 4) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
goto end;
}
/*
* File does not have a context value so we must take account of
* this later.
*/
contextoff = 4;
} else {
/* 8 byte header: 4 bytes context, 2 bytes type, 2 bytes len */
if (extension_length < 8
|| (extension[6] << 8) + extension[7]
!= extension_length - 8) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
goto end;
}
}
/* Append the decoded extension to the serverinfo buffer */
tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(serverinfo, serverinfo_length + extension_length
+ contextoff);
if (tmp == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
serverinfo = tmp;
if (contextoff > 0) {
unsigned char *sinfo = serverinfo + serverinfo_length;
/* We know this only uses the last 2 bytes */
sinfo[0] = 0;
sinfo[1] = 0;
sinfo[2] = (SYNTHV1CONTEXT >> 8) & 0xff;
sinfo[3] = SYNTHV1CONTEXT & 0xff;
}
memcpy(serverinfo + serverinfo_length + contextoff,
extension, extension_length);
serverinfo_length += extension_length + contextoff;
OPENSSL_free(name);
name = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(header);
header = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(extension);
extension = NULL;
}
ret = SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_ex(ctx, SSL_SERVERINFOV2, serverinfo,
serverinfo_length);
end:
/* SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo makes a local copy of the serverinfo. */
OPENSSL_free(name);
OPENSSL_free(header);
OPENSSL_free(extension);
OPENSSL_free(serverinfo);
BIO_free(bin);
return ret;
}
static int ssl_set_cert_and_key(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *privatekey,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int override)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t i;
int j;
int rv;
CERT *c = ssl != NULL ? ssl->cert : ctx->cert;
STACK_OF(X509) *dup_chain = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
/* Do all security checks before anything else */
rv = ssl_security_cert(ssl, ctx, x509, 0, 1);
if (rv != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv);
goto out;
}
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(chain); j++) {
rv = ssl_security_cert(ssl, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, j), 0, 0);
if (rv != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv);
goto out;
}
}
pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509); /* bumps reference */
if (pubkey == NULL)
goto out;
if (privatekey == NULL) {
privatekey = pubkey;
} else {
/* For RSA, which has no parameters, missing returns 0 */
if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(privatekey)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pubkey)) {
/* nobody has parameters? - error */
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
goto out;
} else {
/* copy to privatekey from pubkey */
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(privatekey, pubkey);
}
} else if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pubkey)) {
/* copy to pubkey from privatekey */
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pubkey, privatekey);
} /* else both have parameters */
/* check that key <-> cert match */
if (EVP_PKEY_eq(pubkey, privatekey) != 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH);
goto out;
}
}
if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pubkey, &i) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto out;
}
if (!override && (c->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
|| c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL
|| c->pkeys[i].chain != NULL)) {
/* No override, and something already there */
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NOT_REPLACING_CERTIFICATE);
goto out;
}
if (chain != NULL) {
dup_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (dup_chain == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto out;
}
}
sk_X509_pop_free(c->pkeys[i].chain, X509_free);
c->pkeys[i].chain = dup_chain;
X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509);
X509_up_ref(x509);
c->pkeys[i].x509 = x509;
EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey);
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(privatekey);
c->pkeys[i].privatekey = privatekey;
c->key = &(c->pkeys[i]);
ret = 1;
out:
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return ret;
}
int SSL_use_cert_and_key(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *privatekey,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int override)
{
return ssl_set_cert_and_key(ssl, NULL, x509, privatekey, chain, override);
}
int SSL_CTX_use_cert_and_key(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *privatekey,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int override)
{
return ssl_set_cert_and_key(NULL, ctx, x509, privatekey, chain, override);
}