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openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
Tomas Mraz f7e2e513d1 Replace non-ASCII character in source file 
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15803)
2021-06-19 22:04:34 +10:00

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include "crypto/bn.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "crypto/security_bits.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA *RSA_new(void)
{
return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL);
}
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
{
return rsa->meth;
}
int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
{
/*
* NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
* to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
*/
const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
mtmp = rsa->meth;
if (mtmp->finish)
mtmp->finish(rsa);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
rsa->engine = NULL;
#endif
rsa->meth = meth;
if (meth->init)
meth->init(rsa);
return 1;
}
RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
{
return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL);
}
#endif
RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx);
}
static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ret->references = 1;
ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (ret->lock == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->libctx = libctx;
ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
if (engine) {
if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->engine = engine;
} else {
ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
}
if (ret->engine) {
ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
if (ret->meth == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
goto err;
}
#endif
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
RSA_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
void RSA_free(RSA *r)
{
int i;
if (r == NULL)
return;
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
r->meth->finish(r);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
#endif
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
BN_free(r->n);
BN_free(r->e);
BN_clear_free(r->d);
BN_clear_free(r->p);
BN_clear_free(r->q);
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
ossl_rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
#endif
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
#endif
BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
OPENSSL_free(r);
}
int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
{
int i;
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
return 0;
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
}
OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r)
{
return r->libctx;
}
void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
r->libctx = libctx;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
}
#endif
/*
* Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic.
* This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code
* makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so
* that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor
* should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers
* overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer.
*/
static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18;
static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3);
/* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */
static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */
static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */
static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */
static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */
/*
* Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result.
*/
static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
{
return a * b / scale;
}
/*
* Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer.
* Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned
* integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a
* 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some
* algebraic simplifications.
*/
static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x)
{
uint64_t r = 0;
uint64_t b;
int s;
for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) {
r <<= 1;
b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1;
if ((x >> s) >= b) {
x -= b << s;
r++;
}
}
return r * cbrt_scale;
}
/*
* Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer.
* This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling.
* The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so
* a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be
* greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results.
*/
static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v)
{
uint32_t i, r = 0;
/*
* Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2.
*
* If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs
* to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and
* reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed.
*/
while (v >= 2 * scale) {
v >>= 1;
r += scale;
}
for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) {
v = mul2(v, v);
if (v >= 2 * scale) {
v >>= 1;
r += i;
}
}
r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e;
return r;
}
/*
* NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC
* Modulus Lengths.
*
* Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D:
* for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe.
* After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to
* "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in
* Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight
* bits".
*
* The formula is:
*
* E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)}
* \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)}
* The two cube roots are merged together here.
*/
uint16_t ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n)
{
uint64_t x;
uint32_t lx;
uint16_t y, cap;
/*
* Look for common values as listed in standards.
* These values are not exactly equal to the results from the formulae in
* the standards but are defined to be canonical.
*/
switch (n) {
case 2048: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
return 112;
case 3072: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D and FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
return 128;
case 4096: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
return 152;
case 6144: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
return 176;
case 7680: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
return 192;
case 8192: /* SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
return 200;
case 15360: /* FIPS 140-2 IG 7.5 */
return 256;
}
/*
* The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs
* for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n
* as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is
* 1200 is used instead.
*/
if (n >= 687737)
return 1200;
if (n < 8)
return 0;
/*
* To ensure that the output is non-decreasing with respect to n,
* a cap needs to be applied to the two values where the function over
* estimates the strength (according to the above fast path).
*/
if (n <= 7680)
cap = 192;
else if (n <= 15360)
cap = 256;
else
cap = 1200;
x = n * (uint64_t)log_2;
lx = ilog_e(x);
y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690)
/ log_2);
y = (y + 4) & ~7;
if (y > cap)
y = cap;
return y;
}
int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
{
int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
/* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > ossl_rsa_multip_cap(bits))
return 0;
}
#endif
return ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits);
}
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
{
/* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
* parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
* left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
*/
if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
|| (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
return 0;
if (n != NULL) {
BN_free(r->n);
r->n = n;
}
if (e != NULL) {
BN_free(r->e);
r->e = e;
}
if (d != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r->d);
r->d = d;
BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
{
/* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
*/
if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
|| (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r->p);
r->p = p;
BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (q != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r->q);
r->q = q;
BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
{
/* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
*/
if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
|| (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
|| (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
return 0;
if (dmp1 != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
r->dmp1 = dmp1;
BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (dmq1 != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
r->dmq1 = dmq1;
BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (iqmp != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
r->iqmp = iqmp;
BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
* and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
*/
int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
{
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
int i;
if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
return 0;
prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
if (prime_infos == NULL)
return 0;
if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
old = r->prime_infos;
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
pinfo = ossl_rsa_multip_info_new();
if (pinfo == NULL)
goto err;
if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
pinfo->r = primes[i];
pinfo->d = exps[i];
pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
} else {
ossl_rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
goto err;
}
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
}
r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
r->prime_infos = old;
goto err;
}
if (old != NULL) {
/*
* This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
* also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
*/
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
}
r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
err:
/* r, d, t should not be freed */
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
return 0;
}
#endif
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
{
if (n != NULL)
*n = r->n;
if (e != NULL)
*e = r->e;
if (d != NULL)
*d = r->d;
}
void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
{
if (p != NULL)
*p = r->p;
if (q != NULL)
*q = r->q;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
{
int pnum;
pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
if (pnum <= 0)
pnum = 0;
return pnum;
}
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
{
int pnum, i;
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
return 0;
/*
* return other primes
* it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
*/
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
primes[i] = pinfo->r;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
const BIGNUM **iqmp)
{
if (dmp1 != NULL)
*dmp1 = r->dmp1;
if (dmq1 != NULL)
*dmq1 = r->dmq1;
if (iqmp != NULL)
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
{
int pnum;
if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
return 0;
/* return other primes */
if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
int i;
/* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
if (exps != NULL)
exps[i] = pinfo->d;
if (coeffs != NULL)
coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
{
return r->n;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r)
{
return r->e;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r)
{
return r->d;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r)
{
return r->p;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r)
{
return r->q;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r)
{
return r->dmp1;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r)
{
return r->dmq1;
}
const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r)
{
return r->iqmp;
}
const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return NULL;
#else
return r->pss;
#endif
}
/* Internal */
int ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(RSA *r, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return 0;
#else
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
r->pss = pss;
return 1;
#endif
}
/* Internal */
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r)
{
return &r->pss_params;
}
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
{
r->flags &= ~flags;
}
int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
{
return r->flags & flags;
}
void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
{
r->flags |= flags;
}
int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
{
/* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
return r->version;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
{
return r->engine;
}
int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
{
/* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
return -1;
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
}
#endif
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
#endif
int pnum;
if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
return 0;
pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes);
if (pnum < 2
|| pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)
|| pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1)
return 0;
if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0),
sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1))
|| !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0),
sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1),
sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
return 0;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
old_infos = r->prime_infos;
#endif
if (pnum > 2) {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int i;
prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
if (prime_infos == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) {
BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i);
BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i);
BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1);
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
goto err;
/* Using ossl_rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pinfo->r = prime;
pinfo->d = exp;
pinfo->t = coeff;
BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
}
r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
r->prime_infos = old_infos;
goto err;
}
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (old_infos != NULL) {
/*
* This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
* also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
*/
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free);
}
#endif
r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT;
r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
err:
/* r, d, t should not be freed */
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, ossl_rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
return 0;
#endif
}
DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
int i, pnum;
#endif
if (r == NULL)
return 0;
/* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */
if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL)
return 1;
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r));
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r));
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r);
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r);
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d);
sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
static int int_set_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
/* For checks */
int keytype, int optype,
/* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */
const char *mdkey, const char *mdname,
const char *propkey, const char *mdprops)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not RSA return error */
switch (keytype) {
case -1:
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
&& !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
return -1;
break;
default:
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
return -1;
break;
}
/* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, 0);
if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx) && mdprops != NULL) {
/* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(propkey, (char *)mdprops, 0);
}
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
}
/* Helpers to set or get diverse hash algorithm names */
static int int_get_rsa_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
/* For checks */
int keytype, int optype,
/* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() */
const char *mdkey,
char *mdname, size_t mdnamesize)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
if (ctx == NULL || mdname == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not RSA return error */
switch (keytype) {
case -1:
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
&& !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
return -1;
break;
default:
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, evp_pkey_type2name(keytype)))
return -1;
break;
}
/* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(mdkey, (char *)mdname, mdnamesize);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode)
{
return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
pad_mode, NULL);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode)
{
return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
0, pad_mode);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST, mdname,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
return
int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, mdname,
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, mdprops);
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
size_t namesize)
{
return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST,
name, namesize);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
{
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, mdprops);
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
size_t namesize)
{
return int_get_rsa_md_name(ctx, -1,
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, name, namesize);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const char *mdname)
{
return int_set_rsa_md_name(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, mdname,
NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
{
return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen)
{
OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not RSA return error */
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
return -1;
/* Cast away the const. This is read only so should be safe */
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
(void *)label, (size_t)llen);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, rsa_params))
return 0;
/* Ownership is supposed to be transfered to the callee. */
OPENSSL_free(label);
return 1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label)
{
OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
size_t labellen;
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not RSA return error */
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA"))
return -1;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
(void **)label, 0);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
return -1;
labellen = rsa_params[0].return_size;
if (labellen > INT_MAX)
return -1;
return (int)labellen;
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
{
/*
* For some reason, the optype was set to this:
*
* EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
*
* However, we do use RSA-PSS with the whole gamut of diverse signature
* and verification operations, so the optype gets upgraded to this:
*
* EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
*/
return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen, NULL);
}
/*
* This one is currently implemented as an EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() wrapper,
* simply because that's easier.
*/
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen)
{
/*
* Because of circumstances, the optype is updated from:
*
* EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN|EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
*
* to:
*
* EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG
*/
return RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, saltlen);
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
{
OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
return -1;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN,
&saltlen);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, pad_params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
size_t bits2 = bits;
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not RSA return error */
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
&& !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
return -1;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
{
int ret = RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
/*
* Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of
* EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input
* pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success.
*/
if (ret > 0 && evp_pkey_ctx_is_provided(ctx)) {
BN_free(ctx->rsa_pubexp);
ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* When we're dealing with a provider, there's no need to duplicate
* pubexp, as it gets copied when transforming to an OSSL_PARAM anyway.
*/
if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx))
pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp);
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx) && ret <= 0)
BN_free(pubexp);
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
size_t primes2 = primes;
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not RSA return error */
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA")
&& !EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, "RSA-PSS"))
return -1;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
}
#endif
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