mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2025-01-06 13:26:43 +08:00
f590a5ea1a
The functions that check for the provider being runnable are: newctx, dupctx, sign init, sign, verify init, verify, verify recover init, verify recover, digest sign init, digest sign final, digest verify init and digest verify final. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12801)
560 lines
17 KiB
C
560 lines
17 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/dsa.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal/nelem.h"
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#include "internal/sizes.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "prov/providercommon.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
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#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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#include "crypto/dsa.h"
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#include "prov/der_dsa.h"
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn dsa_newctx;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_signature_init;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_signature_init;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn dsa_sign;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn dsa_verify;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_signverify_init;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn dsa_digest_sign_final;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_signverify_init;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn dsa_digest_verify_final;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn dsa_freectx;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn dsa_dupctx;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_md_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_md_params;
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static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
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/*
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* What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
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* We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes DSA structures, so
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* we use that here too.
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*/
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typedef struct {
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OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
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char *propq;
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DSA *dsa;
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/*
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* Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
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* Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
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* operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
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* by their Final function.
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*/
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unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
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char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
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/* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
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unsigned char aid_buf[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
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unsigned char *aid;
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size_t aid_len;
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/* main digest */
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EVP_MD *md;
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EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
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size_t mdsize;
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} PROV_DSA_CTX;
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static size_t dsa_get_md_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx)
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{
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if (pdsactx->md != NULL)
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return EVP_MD_size(pdsactx->md);
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return 0;
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}
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static int dsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
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{
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/*
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* Because the DSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
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* We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
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* map.
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*/
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static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
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{ NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
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{ NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
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{ NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
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{ NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
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{ NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
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{ NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
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{ NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
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{ NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
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{ NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
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};
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size_t i;
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int mdnid = NID_undef;
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if (md == NULL)
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goto end;
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for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
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if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
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mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (mdnid == NID_undef)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
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end:
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return mdnid;
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}
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static void *dsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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return NULL;
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pdsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_DSA_CTX));
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if (pdsactx == NULL)
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return NULL;
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pdsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
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pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
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if (propq != NULL && (pdsactx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(pdsactx);
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pdsactx = NULL;
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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}
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return pdsactx;
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}
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static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
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const char *mdname, const char *mdprops)
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{
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if (mdprops == NULL)
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mdprops = ctx->propq;
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if (mdname != NULL) {
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EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
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int md_nid = dsa_get_md_nid(md);
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WPACKET pkt;
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if (md == NULL || md_nid == NID_undef) {
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EVP_MD_free(md);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
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EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
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/*
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* TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
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* All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
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* AlgorithmIdentifier to be had, but the operation itself is
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* still valid, just as long as it's not used to construct
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* anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
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*/
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ctx->aid_len = 0;
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if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
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&& DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_DSA_with_MD(&pkt, -1, ctx->dsa,
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md_nid)
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&& WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
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WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
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ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
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}
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WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
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ctx->mdctx = NULL;
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ctx->md = md;
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OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int dsa_signature_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
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|| pdsactx == NULL
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|| vdsa == NULL
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|| !DSA_up_ref(vdsa))
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return 0;
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DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa);
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pdsactx->dsa = vdsa;
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return 1;
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}
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static int dsa_sign(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
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size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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int ret;
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unsigned int sltmp;
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size_t dsasize = DSA_size(pdsactx->dsa);
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size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx);
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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return 0;
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if (sig == NULL) {
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*siglen = dsasize;
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return 1;
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}
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if (sigsize < (size_t)dsasize)
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return 0;
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if (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize)
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return 0;
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ret = dsa_sign_int(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, pdsactx->dsa);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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*siglen = sltmp;
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return 1;
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}
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static int dsa_verify(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
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const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx);
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize))
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return 0;
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return DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, pdsactx->dsa);
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}
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static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
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void *vdsa)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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return 0;
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pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
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if (!dsa_signature_init(vpdsactx, vdsa))
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return 0;
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if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, NULL))
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return 0;
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pdsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
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goto error;
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, pdsactx->md, NULL))
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goto error;
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return 1;
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error:
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(pdsactx->mdctx);
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EVP_MD_free(pdsactx->md);
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pdsactx->mdctx = NULL;
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pdsactx->md = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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int dsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *data,
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size_t datalen)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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if (pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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return EVP_DigestUpdate(pdsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
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}
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int dsa_digest_sign_final(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
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size_t sigsize)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int dlen = 0;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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/*
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* If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
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* are ignored. Defer to dsa_sign.
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*/
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if (sig != NULL) {
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/*
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* TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
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* digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
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* but that problem is much larger than just in DSA.
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*/
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
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return 0;
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}
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pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
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return dsa_sign(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
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}
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int dsa_digest_verify_final(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
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size_t siglen)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int dlen = 0;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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/*
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* TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
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* digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
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* but that problem is much larger than just in DSA.
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*/
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
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return 0;
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pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
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return dsa_verify(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
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}
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static void dsa_freectx(void *vpdsactx)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
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EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
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ctx->propq = NULL;
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ctx->mdctx = NULL;
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ctx->md = NULL;
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ctx->mdsize = 0;
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DSA_free(ctx->dsa);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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}
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static void *dsa_dupctx(void *vpdsactx)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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PROV_DSA_CTX *dstctx;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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return NULL;
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dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
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if (dstctx == NULL)
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return NULL;
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*dstctx = *srcctx;
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dstctx->dsa = NULL;
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dstctx->md = NULL;
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dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
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if (srcctx->dsa != NULL && !DSA_up_ref(srcctx->dsa))
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goto err;
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dstctx->dsa = srcctx->dsa;
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if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
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goto err;
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dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
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if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
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dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
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if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
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|| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
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goto err;
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}
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return dstctx;
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err:
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dsa_freectx(dstctx);
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return NULL;
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}
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static int dsa_get_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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OSSL_PARAM *p;
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if (pdsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
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return 0;
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p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
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if (p != NULL
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&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, pdsactx->aid, pdsactx->aid_len))
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return 0;
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p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
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if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, pdsactx->mdname))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
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{
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return known_gettable_ctx_params;
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}
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static int dsa_set_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
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const OSSL_PARAM *p;
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if (pdsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
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return 0;
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p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
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/* Not allowed during certain operations */
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if (p != NULL && !pdsactx->flag_allow_md)
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return 0;
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if (p != NULL) {
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char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
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char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
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const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
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OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
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OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
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return 0;
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if (propsp != NULL
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&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
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return 0;
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if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, mdprops))
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
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|
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
|
};
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|
|
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static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
|
|
* params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
|
|
* case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
|
|
* digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
|
|
*/
|
|
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
|
|
{
|
|
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
|
|
|
|
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(pdsactx->mdctx, params);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx)
|
|
{
|
|
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
|
|
|
|
if (pdsactx->md == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
|
{
|
|
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
|
|
|
|
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(pdsactx->mdctx, params);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx)
|
|
{
|
|
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
|
|
|
|
if (pdsactx->md == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const OSSL_DISPATCH dsa_signature_functions[] = {
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_newctx },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_signature_init },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_signature_init },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_init },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_final },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_init },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_final },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_freectx },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_dupctx },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))dsa_get_ctx_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_gettable_ctx_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))dsa_set_ctx_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_settable_ctx_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_get_ctx_md_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_set_ctx_md_params },
|
|
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
|
|
(void (*)(void))dsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
|
|
{ 0, NULL }
|
|
};
|