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99b9aa95c4
This function is recently introduced and never called by the library or tests. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11053)
379 lines
9.4 KiB
C
379 lines
9.4 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "crypto/sm2.h"
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#include "crypto/sm2err.h"
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/* EC pkey context structure */
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typedef struct {
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/* message digest */
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* Distinguishing Identifier, ISO/IEC 15946-3 */
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uint8_t *id;
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size_t id_len;
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/* id_set indicates if the 'id' field is set (1) or not (0) */
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int id_set;
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} SM2_PKEY_CTX;
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static int pkey_sm2_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *smctx;
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if ((smctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*smctx))) == NULL) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->data = smctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static void pkey_sm2_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *smctx = ctx->data;
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if (smctx != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(smctx->id);
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OPENSSL_free(smctx);
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ctx->data = NULL;
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}
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
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{
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
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if (!pkey_sm2_init(dst))
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return 0;
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sctx = src->data;
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dctx = dst->data;
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if (sctx->id != NULL) {
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dctx->id = OPENSSL_malloc(sctx->id_len);
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if (dctx->id == NULL) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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pkey_sm2_cleanup(dst);
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(dctx->id, sctx->id, sctx->id_len);
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}
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dctx->id_len = sctx->id_len;
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dctx->id_set = sctx->id_set;
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dctx->md = sctx->md;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
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const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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int ret;
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unsigned int sltmp;
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EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
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const int sig_sz = ECDSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.ec);
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if (sig_sz <= 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (sig == NULL) {
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*siglen = (size_t)sig_sz;
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return 1;
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}
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if (*siglen < (size_t)sig_sz) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_SIGN, SM2_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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ret = sm2_sign(tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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*siglen = (size_t)sltmp;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
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const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
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return sm2_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ec);
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
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const EVP_MD *md = (dctx->md == NULL) ? EVP_sm3() : dctx->md;
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if (out == NULL) {
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if (!sm2_ciphertext_size(ec, md, inlen, outlen))
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return -1;
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else
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return 1;
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}
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return sm2_encrypt(ec, md, in, inlen, out, outlen);
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
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const EVP_MD *md = (dctx->md == NULL) ? EVP_sm3() : dctx->md;
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if (out == NULL) {
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if (!sm2_plaintext_size(ec, md, inlen, outlen))
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return -1;
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else
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return 1;
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}
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return sm2_decrypt(ec, md, in, inlen, out, outlen);
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
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{
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *smctx = ctx->data;
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uint8_t *tmp_id;
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID:
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/*
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* This control could be removed, which would signal it being
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* unsupported. However, that means that when the caller uses
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* the correct curve, it may interpret the unsupported signal
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* as an error, so it's better to accept the control, check the
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* value and return a corresponding value.
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*/
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if (p1 != NID_sm2) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_CTRL, SM2_R_INVALID_CURVE);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
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smctx->md = p2;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
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*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = smctx->md;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID:
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if (p1 > 0) {
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tmp_id = OPENSSL_malloc(p1);
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if (tmp_id == NULL) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(tmp_id, p2, p1);
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OPENSSL_free(smctx->id);
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smctx->id = tmp_id;
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} else {
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/* set null-ID */
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OPENSSL_free(smctx->id);
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smctx->id = NULL;
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}
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smctx->id_len = (size_t)p1;
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smctx->id_set = 1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID:
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memcpy(p2, smctx->id, smctx->id_len);
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID_LEN:
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*(size_t *)p2 = smctx->id_len;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
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/* nothing to be inited, this is to suppress the error... */
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return 1;
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default:
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return -2;
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}
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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const char *type, const char *value)
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{
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uint8_t *hex_id;
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long hex_len = 0;
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int ret = 0;
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if (strcmp(type, "ec_paramgen_curve") == 0) {
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int nid = NID_undef;
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if (((nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value)) == NID_undef)
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&& ((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value)) == NID_undef)
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&& ((nid = OBJ_ln2nid(value)) == NID_undef)) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_CTRL_STR, SM2_R_INVALID_CURVE);
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return 0;
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}
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid);
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} else if (strcmp(type, "ec_param_enc") == 0) {
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int param_enc;
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if (strcmp(value, "explicit") == 0)
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param_enc = 0;
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else if (strcmp(value, "named_curve") == 0)
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param_enc = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
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else
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return -2;
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, param_enc);
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} else if (strcmp(type, "sm2_id") == 0) {
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return pkey_sm2_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID,
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(int)strlen(value), (void *)value);
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} else if (strcmp(type, "sm2_hex_id") == 0) {
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/*
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* TODO(3.0): reconsider the name "sm2_hex_id", OR change
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* OSSL_PARAM_allocate_from_text() to handle infix "_hex_"
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*/
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hex_id = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf((const char *)value, &hex_len);
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if (hex_id == NULL) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_CTRL_STR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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ret = pkey_sm2_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID, (int)hex_len,
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(void *)hex_id);
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OPENSSL_free(hex_id);
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return ret;
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}
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return -2;
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_digest_custom(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx)
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{
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uint8_t z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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SM2_PKEY_CTX *smctx = ctx->data;
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EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
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const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(mctx);
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int mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
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if (!smctx->id_set) {
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/*
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* An ID value must be set. The specifications are not clear whether a
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* NULL is allowed. We only allow it if set explicitly for maximum
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* flexibility.
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*/
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_DIGEST_CUSTOM, SM2_R_ID_NOT_SET);
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return 0;
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}
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if (mdlen < 0) {
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SM2err(SM2_F_PKEY_SM2_DIGEST_CUSTOM, SM2_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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/* get hashed prefix 'z' of tbs message */
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if (!sm2_compute_z_digest(z, md, smctx->id, smctx->id_len, ec))
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return 0;
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return EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, z, (size_t)mdlen);
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
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int ret;
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ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_sm2);
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if (ec == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (!ossl_assert(ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec)))
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EC_KEY_free(ec);
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return ret;
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}
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static int pkey_sm2_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
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ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_sm2);
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if (ec == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (!ossl_assert(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec))) {
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EC_KEY_free(ec);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Note: if error is returned, we count on caller to free pkey->pkey.ec */
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if (ctx->pkey != NULL
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&& !EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
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return 0;
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return EC_KEY_generate_key(ec);
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}
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static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD sm2_pkey_meth = {
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EVP_PKEY_SM2,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_init,
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pkey_sm2_copy,
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pkey_sm2_cleanup,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_paramgen,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_keygen,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_sign,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_verify,
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0, 0,
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0, 0, 0, 0,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_encrypt,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_decrypt,
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0,
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0,
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pkey_sm2_ctrl,
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pkey_sm2_ctrl_str,
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0, 0,
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0, 0, 0,
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pkey_sm2_digest_custom
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};
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const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *sm2_pkey_method(void)
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{
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return &sm2_pkey_meth;
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}
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