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https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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e077455e9e
Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and at least handle the file name and line number they are called from, there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`. There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where {lib} is the name of that sub-system. Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from the CRYPTO sub-system. Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc() wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
148 lines
4.0 KiB
C
148 lines
4.0 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* ECDH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include "ec_local.h"
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int ossl_ecdh_compute_key(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen,
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const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)
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{
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if (ecdh->group->meth->ecdh_compute_key == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH);
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return 0;
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}
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return ecdh->group->meth->ecdh_compute_key(psec, pseclen, pub_key, ecdh);
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}
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/*-
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* This implementation is based on the following primitives in the
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* IEEE 1363 standard:
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* - ECKAS-DH1
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* - ECSVDP-DH
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*
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* It also conforms to SP800-56A r3
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* See Section 5.7.1.2 "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
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* (ECC CDH) Primitive:". The steps listed below refer to SP800-56A.
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*/
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int ossl_ecdh_simple_compute_key(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
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const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)
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{
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BN_CTX *ctx;
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EC_POINT *tmp = NULL;
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BIGNUM *x = NULL;
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const BIGNUM *priv_key;
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const EC_GROUP *group;
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int ret = 0;
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size_t buflen, len;
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unsigned char *buf = NULL;
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if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ecdh->libctx)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (x == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh);
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if (priv_key == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
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goto err;
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}
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group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
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/*
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* Step(1) - Compute the point tmp = cofactor * owners_private_key
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* * peer_public_key.
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*/
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if (EC_KEY_get_flags(ecdh) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) {
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if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, x, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_mul(x, x, priv_key, ctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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priv_key = x;
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}
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if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp, NULL, pub_key, priv_key, ctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Step(2) : If point tmp is at infinity then clear intermediate values and
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* exit. Note: getting affine coordinates returns 0 if point is at infinity.
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* Step(3a) : Get x-coordinate of point x = tmp.x
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*/
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if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, tmp, x, NULL, ctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Step(3b) : convert x to a byte string, using the field-element-to-byte
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* string conversion routine defined in Appendix C.2
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*/
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buflen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
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len = BN_num_bytes(x);
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if (len > buflen) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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memset(buf, 0, buflen - len);
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if (len != (size_t)BN_bn2bin(x, buf + buflen - len)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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*pout = buf;
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*poutlen = buflen;
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buf = NULL;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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/* Step(4) : Destroy all intermediate calculations */
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BN_clear(x);
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EC_POINT_clear_free(tmp);
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(buf);
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return ret;
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}
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