mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-11-27 05:21:51 +08:00
33388b44b6
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)
472 lines
14 KiB
C
472 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
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* use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "internal/numbers.h"
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/provider_util.h"
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#include "e_os.h"
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#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_hkdf_new;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_hkdf_free;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_hkdf_reset;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_hkdf_derive;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
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static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
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static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
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unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
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static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
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typedef struct {
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void *provctx;
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int mode;
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PROV_DIGEST digest;
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unsigned char *salt;
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size_t salt_len;
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unsigned char *key;
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size_t key_len;
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unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
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size_t info_len;
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} KDF_HKDF;
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static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx;
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if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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else
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ctx->provctx = provctx;
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return ctx;
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}
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static void kdf_hkdf_free(void *vctx)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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kdf_hkdf_reset(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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}
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}
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static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
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{
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int sz;
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const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
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if (ctx->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
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return SIZE_MAX;
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if (md == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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sz = EVP_MD_size(md);
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if (sz < 0)
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return 0;
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return sz;
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}
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static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
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if (md == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->key == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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return 0;
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}
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switch (ctx->mode) {
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case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
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return HKDF(md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
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ctx->key_len, ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key,
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keylen);
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case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
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return HKDF_Extract(md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
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ctx->key_len, key, keylen);
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case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
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return HKDF_Expand(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info,
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ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *p;
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
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OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
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int n;
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if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
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return 0;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE)) != NULL) {
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if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
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if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0) {
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ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
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} else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0) {
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ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
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} else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0) {
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ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
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} else {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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} else if (OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &n)) {
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if (n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND
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&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
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&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->mode = n;
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} else {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
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ctx->key = NULL;
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->key, 0,
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&ctx->key_len))
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return 0;
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}
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
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if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
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ctx->salt = NULL;
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->salt, 0,
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&ctx->salt_len))
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* The info fields concatenate, so process them all */
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
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ctx->info_len = 0;
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for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
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OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) {
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const void *q = ctx->info + ctx->info_len;
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size_t sz = 0;
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if (p->data_size != 0
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&& p->data != NULL
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&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
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HKDF_MAXBUF - ctx->info_len,
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&sz))
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return 0;
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ctx->info_len += sz;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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return known_settable_ctx_params;
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}
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static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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OSSL_PARAM *p;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
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return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, kdf_hkdf_size(ctx));
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return -2;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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return known_gettable_ctx_params;
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}
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const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[] = {
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_derive },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params },
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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/*
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* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
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* Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
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* "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
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* Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
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*
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* From the paper:
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* The scheme HKDF is specified as:
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* HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
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*
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* where:
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* SKM is source key material
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* XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
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* CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
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* L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
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* k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
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* t = ceil(L/k)
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* the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
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*
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* From RFC 5869:
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* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
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* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
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* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
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* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
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*/
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static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
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{
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unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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int ret, sz;
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size_t prk_len;
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sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
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if (sz < 0)
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return 0;
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prk_len = (size_t)sz;
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/* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
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if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
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return 0;
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/* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
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ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
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* Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
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*
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* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
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*
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* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
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*
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* Options:
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* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
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* hash function output in octets
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*
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* Inputs:
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* salt optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
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* if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
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* IKM input keying material
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*
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* Output:
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* PRK a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
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*
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* The output PRK is calculated as follows:
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*
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* PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
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*/
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static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
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unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
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{
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int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
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if (sz < 0)
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return 0;
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if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
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return HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, NULL) != NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
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* Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
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*
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* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
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*
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* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
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*
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* Options:
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* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
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* hash function output in octets
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*
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* Inputs:
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* PRK a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
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* (usually, the output from the extract step)
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* info optional context and application specific information
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* (can be a zero-length string)
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* L length of output keying material in octets
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* (<= 255*HashLen)
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*
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* Output:
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* OKM output keying material (of L octets)
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*
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* The output OKM is calculated as follows:
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*
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* N = ceil(L/HashLen)
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* T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
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* OKM = first L octets of T
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*
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* where:
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* T(0) = empty string (zero length)
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* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
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* T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
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* T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
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* ...
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*
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* (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
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* single octet.)
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*/
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static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
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{
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HMAC_CTX *hmac;
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int ret = 0, sz;
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unsigned int i;
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unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
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sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
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if (sz <= 0)
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return 0;
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dig_len = (size_t)sz;
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/* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
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n = okm_len / dig_len;
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if (okm_len % dig_len)
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n++;
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if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
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return 0;
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if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
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goto err;
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for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
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size_t copy_len;
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const unsigned char ctr = i;
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/* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
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if (i > 1) {
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
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goto err;
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if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
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goto err;
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|
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
|
|
okm_len - done_len :
|
|
dig_len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
|
|
|
|
done_len += copy_len;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
|
|
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|