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49a54634ec
Fixes #13754 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15705)
334 lines
9.3 KiB
C
334 lines
9.3 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "crypto/x509.h"
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
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ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
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ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
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ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
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ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
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/* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */
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extern void ossl_policy_cache_free(X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache);
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static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
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void *exarg)
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{
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X509 *ret = (X509 *)*pval;
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switch (operation) {
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case ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE:
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
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X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
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AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
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CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
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ossl_policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
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ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
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#endif
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->distinguishing_id);
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/* fall thru */
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case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
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ret->ex_cached = 0;
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ret->ex_kusage = 0;
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ret->ex_xkusage = 0;
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ret->ex_nscert = 0;
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ret->ex_flags = 0;
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ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
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ret->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
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ret->skid = NULL;
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ret->akid = NULL;
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ret->policy_cache = NULL;
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ret->altname = NULL;
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ret->nc = NULL;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
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ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
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#endif
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ret->distinguishing_id = NULL;
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ret->aux = NULL;
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ret->crldp = NULL;
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if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data))
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return 0;
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509, ret, &ret->ex_data);
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X509_CERT_AUX_free(ret->aux);
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->skid);
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AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(ret->akid);
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CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(ret->crldp);
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ossl_policy_cache_free(ret->policy_cache);
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(ret->altname);
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NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ret->nc);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
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ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
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#endif
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->distinguishing_id);
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OPENSSL_free(ret->propq);
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_DUP_POST:
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{
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X509 *old = exarg;
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if (!ossl_x509_set0_libctx(ret, old->libctx, old->propq))
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return 0;
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if (old->cert_info.key != NULL) {
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get0(old->cert_info.key);
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if (pkey != NULL) {
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pkey = EVP_PKEY_dup(pkey);
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&ret->cert_info.key, pkey)) {
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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}
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}
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}
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_GET0_LIBCTX:
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{
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OSSL_LIB_CTX **libctx = exarg;
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*libctx = ret->libctx;
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}
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_GET0_PROPQ:
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{
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const char **propq = exarg;
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*propq = ret->propq;
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}
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509, x509_cb) = {
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ASN1_EMBED(X509, cert_info, X509_CINF),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_EMBED(X509, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509, X509)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509)
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/*
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* This should only be used if the X509 object was embedded inside another
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* asn1 object and it needs a libctx to operate.
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* Use X509_new_ex() instead if possible.
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*/
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int ossl_x509_set0_libctx(X509 *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
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{
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if (x != NULL) {
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x->libctx = libctx;
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OPENSSL_free(x->propq);
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x->propq = NULL;
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if (propq != NULL) {
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x->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq);
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if (x->propq == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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X509 *X509_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
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{
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X509 *cert = NULL;
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cert = (X509 *)ASN1_item_new_ex(X509_it(), libctx, propq);
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if (!ossl_x509_set0_libctx(cert, libctx, propq)) {
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X509_free(cert);
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cert = NULL;
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}
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return cert;
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}
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int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg)
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{
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *X509_get_ex_data(const X509 *r, int idx)
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{
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
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}
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/*
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* X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
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* extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
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* is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
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* reliable source such as local storage.
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*/
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X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
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{
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const unsigned char *q;
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X509 *ret;
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int freeret = 0;
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/* Save start position */
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q = *pp;
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if (a == NULL || *a == NULL)
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freeret = 1;
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ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
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/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
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if (ret == NULL)
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return NULL;
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/* update length */
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length -= q - *pp;
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if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
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goto err;
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*pp = q;
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return ret;
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err:
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if (freeret) {
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X509_free(ret);
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if (a)
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*a = NULL;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
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* length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
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* error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
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* Here we avoid compounding the problem.
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*/
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static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(const X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
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{
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int length, tmplen;
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unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
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/*
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* This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
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* not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
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* both just in case.
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*/
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length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
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if (length <= 0 || a == NULL)
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return length;
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tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
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if (tmplen < 0) {
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if (start != NULL)
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*pp = start;
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return tmplen;
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}
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length += tmplen;
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return length;
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}
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/*
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* Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
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* length if pp == NULL.
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*
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* When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
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* we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
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* the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
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* allocated buffer.
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*/
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int i2d_X509_AUX(const X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
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{
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int length;
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unsigned char *tmp;
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/* Buffer provided by caller */
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if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL)
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return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
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/* Obtain the combined length */
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if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0)
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return length;
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/* Allocate requisite combined storage */
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*pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
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if (tmp == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer */
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length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
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if (length <= 0) {
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OPENSSL_free(*pp);
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*pp = NULL;
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}
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return length;
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}
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int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x, unsigned char **pp)
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{
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x->cert_info.enc.modified = 1;
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return i2d_X509_CINF(&x->cert_info, pp);
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}
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void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig,
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const X509_ALGOR **palg, const X509 *x)
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{
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if (psig)
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*psig = &x->signature;
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if (palg)
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*palg = &x->sig_alg;
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}
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int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
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{
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return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg.algorithm);
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}
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void X509_set0_distinguishing_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *d_id)
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{
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->distinguishing_id);
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x->distinguishing_id = d_id;
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}
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_distinguishing_id(X509 *x)
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{
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return x->distinguishing_id;
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}
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