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openssl/test/bad_dtls_test.c
Amir Mohammadi abe05fda8b Fix potential memory leak in test_bad_dtls 
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24464)
2024-05-29 13:26:05 +01:00

613 lines
20 KiB
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/*
* Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Unit test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER session resume, as used by
* AnyConnect VPN protocol.
*
* This is designed to exercise the code paths in
* http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/openconnect.git/blob/HEAD:/dtls.c
* which have frequently been affected by regressions in DTLS1_BAD_VER
* support.
*
* Note that unlike other SSL tests, we don't test against our own SSL
* server method. Firstly because we don't have one; we *only* support
* DTLS1_BAD_VER as a client. And secondly because even if that were
* fixed up it's the wrong thing to test against - because if changes
* are made in generic DTLS code which don't take DTLS1_BAD_VER into
* account, there's plenty of scope for making those changes such that
* they break *both* the client and the server in the same way.
*
* So we handle the server side manually. In a session resume there isn't
* much to be done anyway.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "internal/packet.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "testutil.h"
/* For DTLS1_BAD_VER packets the MAC doesn't include the handshake header */
#define MAC_OFFSET (DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
static unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
static unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
/* These are all generated locally, sized purely according to our own whim */
static unsigned char session_id[32];
static unsigned char master_secret[48];
static unsigned char cookie[20];
/* We've hard-coded the cipher suite; we know it's 104 bytes */
static unsigned char key_block[104];
#define mac_key (key_block + 20)
#define dec_key (key_block + 40)
#define enc_key (key_block + 56)
static EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_md;
static int do_PRF(const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
size_t outlen = olen;
/* No error handling. If it all screws up, the test will fail anyway */
EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_tls1_prf_md(pctx, EVP_md5_sha1());
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_tls1_prf_secret(pctx, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed1, seed1_len);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed2, seed2_len);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_tls1_prf_seed(pctx, seed3, seed3_len);
EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, out, &outlen);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 1;
}
static SSL_SESSION *client_session(void)
{
static unsigned char session_asn1[] = {
0x30, 0x5F, /* SEQUENCE, length 0x5F */
0x02, 0x01, 0x01, /* INTEGER, SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION */
0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, /* INTEGER, DTLS1_BAD_VER */
0x04, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2F, /* OCTET_STRING, AES128-SHA */
0x04, 0x20, /* OCTET_STRING, session id */
#define SS_SESSID_OFS 15 /* Session ID goes here */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x04, 0x30, /* OCTET_STRING, master secret */
#define SS_SECRET_OFS 49 /* Master secret goes here */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
};
const unsigned char *p = session_asn1;
/* Copy the randomly-generated fields into the above ASN1 */
memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
memcpy(session_asn1 + SS_SECRET_OFS, master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sizeof(session_asn1));
}
/* Returns 1 for initial ClientHello, 2 for ClientHello with cookie */
static int validate_client_hello(BIO *wbio)
{
PACKET pkt, pkt2;
long len;
unsigned char *data;
int cookie_found = 0;
unsigned int u = 0;
if ((len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data)) < 0)
return 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
return 0;
/* Check record header type */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
return 0;
/* Version */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 0;
/* Skip the rest of the record header */
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
return 0;
/* Check it's a ClientHello */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
return 0;
/* Skip the rest of the handshake message header */
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1))
return 0;
/* Check client version */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 0;
/* Store random */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
return 0;
/* Check session id length and content */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2) ||
!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, session_id, sizeof(session_id)))
return 0;
/* Check cookie */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
if (!PACKET_equal(&pkt2, cookie, sizeof(cookie)))
return 0;
cookie_found = 1;
}
/* Skip ciphers */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
return 0;
/* Skip compression */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
return 0;
/* Skip extensions */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, u))
return 0;
/* Now we are at the end */
if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt))
return 0;
/* Update handshake MAC for second ClientHello (with cookie) */
if (cookie_found && !EVP_DigestUpdate(handshake_md, data + MAC_OFFSET,
len - MAC_OFFSET))
return 0;
(void)BIO_reset(wbio);
return 1 + cookie_found;
}
static int send_hello_verify(BIO *rbio)
{
static unsigned char hello_verify[] = {
0x16, /* Handshake */
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
0x00, 0x23, /* Length */
0x03, /* Hello Verify */
0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Length */
0x00, 0x00, /* Seq# 0 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
0x00, 0x00, 0x17, /* Fragment length */
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
0x14, /* Cookie length */
#define HV_COOKIE_OFS 28 /* Cookie goes here */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
};
memcpy(hello_verify + HV_COOKIE_OFS, cookie, sizeof(cookie));
BIO_write(rbio, hello_verify, sizeof(hello_verify));
return 1;
}
static int send_server_hello(BIO *rbio)
{
static unsigned char server_hello[] = {
0x16, /* Handshake */
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# 1 */
0x00, 0x52, /* Length */
0x02, /* Server Hello */
0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Length */
0x00, 0x01, /* Seq# */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
0x00, 0x00, 0x46, /* Fragment length */
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
#define SH_RANDOM_OFS 27 /* Server random goes here */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x20, /* Session ID length */
#define SH_SESSID_OFS 60 /* Session ID goes here */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x2f, /* Cipher suite AES128-SHA */
0x00, /* Compression null */
};
static unsigned char change_cipher_spec[] = {
0x14, /* Change Cipher Spec */
0x01, 0x00, /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
0x00, 0x00, /* Epoch 0 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* Seq# 2 */
0x00, 0x03, /* Length */
0x01, 0x00, 0x02, /* Message */
};
memcpy(server_hello + SH_RANDOM_OFS, server_random, sizeof(server_random));
memcpy(server_hello + SH_SESSID_OFS, session_id, sizeof(session_id));
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(handshake_md, server_hello + MAC_OFFSET,
sizeof(server_hello) - MAC_OFFSET))
return 0;
BIO_write(rbio, server_hello, sizeof(server_hello));
BIO_write(rbio, change_cipher_spec, sizeof(change_cipher_spec));
return 1;
}
/* Create header, HMAC, pad, encrypt and send a record */
static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, uint64_t seqnr,
const void *msg, size_t len)
{
/* Note that the order of the record header fields on the wire,
* and in the HMAC, is different. So we just keep them in separate
* variables and handle them individually. */
static unsigned char epoch[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
static unsigned char seq[6] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
static unsigned char ver[2] = { 0x01, 0x00 }; /* DTLS1_BAD_VER */
unsigned char lenbytes[2];
EVP_MAC *hmac = NULL;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_ctx = NULL;
unsigned char iv[16];
unsigned char pad;
unsigned char *enc;
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
int ret = 0;
seq[0] = (seqnr >> 40) & 0xff;
seq[1] = (seqnr >> 32) & 0xff;
seq[2] = (seqnr >> 24) & 0xff;
seq[3] = (seqnr >> 16) & 0xff;
seq[4] = (seqnr >> 8) & 0xff;
seq[5] = seqnr & 0xff;
pad = 15 - ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) % 16);
enc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + pad);
if (enc == NULL)
return 0;
/* Copy record to encryption buffer */
memcpy(enc, msg, len);
/* Append HMAC to data */
if (!TEST_ptr(hmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL))
|| !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(hmac)))
goto end;
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
"SHA1", 0);
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
lenbytes[0] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
lenbytes[1] = (unsigned char)(len);
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, mac_key, 20, params)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, epoch, 2)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seq, 6)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &type, 1)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, ver, 2) /* Version */
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, lenbytes, 2) /* Length */
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, enc, len) /* Finally the data itself */
|| !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, enc + len, NULL, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto end;
/* Append padding bytes */
len += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
do {
enc[len++] = pad;
} while (len % 16);
/* Generate IV, and encrypt */
if (!TEST_int_gt(RAND_bytes(iv, sizeof(iv)), 0)
|| !TEST_ptr(enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())
|| !TEST_true(EVP_CipherInit_ex(enc_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
enc_key, iv, 1))
|| !TEST_int_ge(EVP_Cipher(enc_ctx, enc, enc, len), 0))
goto end;
/* Finally write header (from fragmented variables), IV and encrypted record */
BIO_write(rbio, &type, 1);
BIO_write(rbio, ver, 2);
BIO_write(rbio, epoch, 2);
BIO_write(rbio, seq, 6);
lenbytes[0] = (unsigned char)((len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8);
lenbytes[1] = (unsigned char)(len + sizeof(iv));
BIO_write(rbio, lenbytes, 2);
BIO_write(rbio, iv, sizeof(iv));
BIO_write(rbio, enc, len);
ret = 1;
end:
EVP_MAC_free(hmac);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(enc_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(enc);
return ret;
}
static int send_finished(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
{
static unsigned char finished_msg[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH +
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH] = {
0x14, /* Finished */
0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Length */
0x00, 0x03, /* Seq# 3 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Fragment offset */
0x00, 0x00, 0x0c, /* Fragment length */
/* Finished MAC (12 bytes) */
};
unsigned char handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int md_size;
/* Derive key material */
do_PRF(TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
key_block, sizeof(key_block));
/* Generate Finished MAC */
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(handshake_md, handshake_hash, NULL))
return 0;
md_size = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(handshake_md);
if (md_size <= 0)
return 0;
do_PRF(TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
handshake_hash, md_size,
NULL, 0,
finished_msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH);
return send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 0,
finished_msg, sizeof(finished_msg));
}
static int validate_ccs(BIO *wbio)
{
PACKET pkt;
long len;
unsigned char *data;
unsigned int u;
len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
if (len < 0)
return 0;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
return 0;
/* Check record header type */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
return 0;
/* Version */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 0;
/* Skip the rest of the record header */
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 3))
return 0;
/* Check ChangeCipherSpec message */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_MT_CCS)
return 0;
/* A DTLS1_BAD_VER ChangeCipherSpec also contains the
* handshake sequence number (which is 2 here) */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0002)
return 0;
/* Now check the Finished packet */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
return 0;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 0;
/* Check epoch is now 1 */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &u) || u != 0x0001)
return 0;
/* That'll do for now. If OpenSSL accepted *our* Finished packet
* then it's evidently remembered that DTLS1_BAD_VER doesn't
* include the handshake header in the MAC. There's not a lot of
* point in implementing decryption here, just to check that it
* continues to get it right for one more packet. */
return 1;
}
#define NODROP(x) { x##UL, 0 }
#define DROP(x) { x##UL, 1 }
static struct {
uint64_t seq;
int drop;
} tests[] = {
NODROP(1), NODROP(3), NODROP(2),
NODROP(0x1234), NODROP(0x1230), NODROP(0x1235),
NODROP(0xffff), NODROP(0x10001), NODROP(0xfffe), NODROP(0x10000),
DROP(0x10001), DROP(0xff), NODROP(0x100000), NODROP(0x800000), NODROP(0x7fffe1),
NODROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000000), NODROP(0xfffffe), DROP(0xffffff), NODROP(0x1000010),
NODROP(0xfffffd), NODROP(0x1000011), DROP(0x12), NODROP(0x1000012),
NODROP(0x1ffffff), NODROP(0x2000000), DROP(0x1ff00fe), NODROP(0x2000001),
NODROP(0x20fffff), NODROP(0x2105500), DROP(0x20ffffe), NODROP(0x21054ff),
NODROP(0x211ffff), DROP(0x2110000), NODROP(0x2120000)
/* The last test should be NODROP, because a DROP wouldn't get tested. */
};
static int test_bad_dtls(void)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL *con = NULL;
BIO *rbio = NULL;
BIO *wbio = NULL;
time_t now = 0;
int testresult = 0;
int ret;
int i;
RAND_bytes(session_id, sizeof(session_id));
RAND_bytes(master_secret, sizeof(master_secret));
RAND_bytes(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
RAND_bytes(server_random + 4, sizeof(server_random) - 4);
now = time(NULL);
memcpy(server_random, &now, sizeof(now));
sess = client_session();
if (!TEST_ptr(sess))
goto end;
handshake_md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (!TEST_ptr(handshake_md)
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(handshake_md, EVP_md5_sha1(),
NULL)))
goto end;
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(DTLS_client_method());
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx)
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,
SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "AES128-SHA")))
goto end;
SSL_CTX_set_security_level(ctx, 0);
con = SSL_new(ctx);
if (!TEST_ptr(con)
|| !TEST_true(SSL_set_session(con, sess)))
goto end;
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!TEST_ptr(rbio)
|| !TEST_ptr(wbio))
goto end;
SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
if (!TEST_true(BIO_up_ref(rbio))) {
/*
* We can't up-ref but we assigned ownership to con, so we shouldn't
* free in the "end" block
*/
rbio = wbio = NULL;
goto end;
}
if (!TEST_true(BIO_up_ref(wbio))) {
wbio = NULL;
goto end;
}
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
/* Send initial ClientHello */
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
if (!TEST_int_le(ret, 0)
|| !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(con, ret), SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
|| !TEST_int_eq(validate_client_hello(wbio), 1)
|| !TEST_true(send_hello_verify(rbio)))
goto end;
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
if (!TEST_int_le(ret, 0)
|| !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(con, ret), SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
|| !TEST_int_eq(validate_client_hello(wbio), 2)
|| !TEST_true(send_server_hello(rbio)))
goto end;
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
if (!TEST_int_le(ret, 0)
|| !TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(con, ret), SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
|| !TEST_true(send_finished(con, rbio)))
goto end;
ret = SSL_do_handshake(con);
if (!TEST_int_gt(ret, 0)
|| !TEST_true(validate_ccs(wbio)))
goto end;
/* While we're here and crafting packets by hand, we might as well do a
bit of a stress test on the DTLS record replay handling. Not Cisco-DTLS
specific but useful anyway for the general case. It's been broken
before, and in fact was broken even for a basic 0, 2, 1 test case
when this test was first added.... */
for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(tests); i++) {
uint64_t recv_buf[2];
if (!TEST_true(send_record(rbio, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, tests[i].seq,
&tests[i].seq, sizeof(uint64_t)))) {
TEST_error("Failed to send data seq #0x%x%08x (%d)\n",
(unsigned int)(tests[i].seq >> 32), (unsigned int)tests[i].seq, i);
goto end;
}
if (tests[i].drop)
continue;
ret = SSL_read(con, recv_buf, 2 * sizeof(uint64_t));
if (!TEST_int_eq(ret, (int)sizeof(uint64_t))) {
TEST_error("SSL_read failed or wrong size on seq#0x%x%08x (%d)\n",
(unsigned int)(tests[i].seq >> 32), (unsigned int)tests[i].seq, i);
goto end;
}
if (!TEST_true(recv_buf[0] == tests[i].seq))
goto end;
}
/* The last test cannot be DROP() */
if (!TEST_false(tests[i-1].drop))
goto end;
testresult = 1;
end:
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
BIO_free(rbio);
BIO_free(wbio);
SSL_free(con);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(handshake_md);
return testresult;
}
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_TEST(test_bad_dtls);
return 1;
}
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