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openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
Matt Caswell e657515620 Don't finish the handshake twice 
We finish the handshake when we move into the TLS_ST_OK state. At various
points we were also unnecessarily finishing it when we were reading/writing
the Finished message. It's much simpler just to do it in TLS_ST_OK, so
remove the other calls.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2015-11-06 15:32:44 +00:00

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/* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p);
/*
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
* -1: Error
*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
{
long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite or for SRP
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
| SSL_kSRP)) {
return 1;
}
/*
* Export ciphersuites may have temporary RSA keys if the public key in the
* server certificate is longer than the maximum export strength
*/
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (pkey == NULL)
return -1;
/*
* If the public key in the certificate is shorter than or equal to the
* maximum export strength then a temporary RSA key is not allowed
*/
if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey)
<= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ske_expected;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
} else {
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
if (ske_expected < 0)
return 0;
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
if (ske_expected < 0)
return 0;
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
return 0;
}
/*
* client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
* when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Renegotiation - fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
/*
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endif
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->hit) {
/*
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
* messages unless we need to.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
s->init_num = 0;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Disable buffering for SCTP */
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
#endif
/*
* turn on buffering for the next lot of output
*/
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
return WORK_ERROR;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
return WORK_ERROR;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
return WORK_ERROR;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_B;
break;
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
else
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
return tls_construct_finished(s,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the server
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch(st->hand_state) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
#endif
default:
break;
}
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
* the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
* Returns 1 on success
* Returns 0 on error
*/
static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/*
* SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
* some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
* to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
* that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
* TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
* answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
*/
mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
#endif
;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
if ((options & mask) != mask) {
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
} else {
s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
#else
if ((options & mask) == mask) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#endif
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
#endif
if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return 0;
}
} else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Determine which DTLS version to use */
/* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
*/
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
} else {
/*
* We only support one version: update method
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
}
}
s->client_version = s->version;
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
int al = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
goto err;
if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
*/
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
(sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
}
}
} else
i = 1;
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++) = i;
if (i != 0) {
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
p += i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i, p);
p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 1;
#else
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j = 0;
else
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++) = 1 + j;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
*(p++) = comp->id;
}
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((p =
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
l = p - d;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned int cookie_len;
PACKET cookiepkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
PACKET session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
unsigned char *cipherchars;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int compression;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
unsigned int sversion;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
#error Code needs updating for new TLS version
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
if (FIPS_mode()) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
} else
#endif
if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
} else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
} else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Work out correct protocol version to use */
unsigned int hversion;
int options;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
options = s->options;
if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = hversion;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = hversion;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
} else {
unsigned char *vers;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
|| (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
}
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
* server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
session_id_len) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
session_id_len);
}
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
* return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/*
* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
* authentication.
*/
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto f_err;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (compression == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
} else {
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
}
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_type = i;
X509_free(s->session->peer);
X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
int al, j, verify_ret;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
#endif
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA_free(s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp);
s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.g =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.s =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
PACKET mod, exp;
/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &mod)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exp)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&mod), PACKET_remaining(&mod),
rsa->n)) == NULL
|| (rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&exp), PACKET_remaining(&exp),
rsa->e)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
rsa = NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0) ;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (dh->pub_key =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
PACKET encoded_pt;
unsigned char *ecparams;
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), bn_ctx) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
PACKET params;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
* equals the length of the parameters.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
unsigned char *sigalgs;
int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0) {
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
} else {
md = EVP_sha1();
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (j < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check signature length
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int num;
unsigned int size;
j = 0;
q = md_buf;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),
PACKET_remaining(&params));
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
q += size;
j += size;
}
verify_ret =
RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (verify_ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (verify_ret == 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),
PACKET_remaining(&params));
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
unsigned char *data;
unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
namestart = namebytes;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
name_len)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return ret;
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned int ticklen;
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
if (ticklen == 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
/*
* Remove the old session from the cache
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
s->session);
} else {
/* We carry on if this fails */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
}
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned long resplen;
unsigned int type;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only applies to renegotiation */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
&& s->renegotiate != 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
else
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
#endif
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
int psk_err = 1;
/*
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
* strnlen.
*/
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identitylen;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
goto memerr;
}
s2n(identitylen, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
p += identitylen;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
if (psk_err != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
n = 0;
} else
#endif
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
RSA *rsa;
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
else {
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
s2n(n, q);
n += 2;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
else {
/* we get them from the cert */
EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
dh_srvr = NULL;
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (spkey) {
dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
}
if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
/* Use client certificate key */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
dh_clnt = NULL;
if (clkey)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
}
pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
DH_free(dh_srvr);
if (n <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
pmslen = n;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
n = 0;
else {
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
n += 2;
}
DH_free(dh_clnt);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
/*
* Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
/*-
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp;
} else {
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/*
* Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
* private key to perform the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
} else {
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
} else {
/*
* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
* accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (!pms)
goto memerr;
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
peer_cert = s->session->peer;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
*
* * parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
/*
* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* * would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
shared_ukm) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*
* Encapsulate it into sequence
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80) {
*(p++) = 0x81;
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 3;
} else {
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
n = msglen + 2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
/* send off the data */
n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(n, p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
n += 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
n += pskhdrlen;
#endif
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
memerr:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
* digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize = 64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
int i = s->session->peer_type;
EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
return 1;
if (i >= 0)
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (spkey) {
/* Compare server and client parameters */
i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
if (i != 1)
return 0;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int pkey_bits;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh;
#endif
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
rsa = s->s3->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx = s->session->peer_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else {
return 1;
}
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if (rsa != NULL) {
/* server key exchange is not allowed. */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
} else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# endif
#endif
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else if (RSA_bits(rsa) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
/* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (DH_bits(dh) >
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
/* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
/* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p)
{
int i, j = 0;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
continue;
else
empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
}
#endif
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}
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