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openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
Matt Caswell da1c088f59 Copyright year updates 
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
2023-09-07 09:59:15 +01:00

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/*
* Copyright 2006-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
/* RSA pkey context structure */
typedef struct {
/* Key gen parameters */
int nbits;
BIGNUM *pub_exp;
int primes;
/* Keygen callback info */
int gentmp[2];
/* RSA padding mode */
int pad_mode;
/* message digest */
const EVP_MD *md;
/* message digest for MGF1 */
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
/* PSS salt length */
int saltlen;
/* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
int min_saltlen;
/* Temp buffer */
unsigned char *tbuf;
/* OAEP label */
unsigned char *oaep_label;
size_t oaep_labellen;
/* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
int implicit_rejection;
} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
if (rctx == NULL)
return 0;
rctx->nbits = 2048;
rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
else
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
ctx->data = rctx;
ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
return 0;
sctx = src->data;
dctx = dst->data;
dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
if (sctx->pub_exp) {
dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
if (!dctx->pub_exp)
return 0;
}
dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
dctx->md = sctx->md;
dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
if (sctx->oaep_label) {
OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
if (!dctx->oaep_label)
return 0;
dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
}
return 1;
}
static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
{
if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
return 1;
if ((ctx->tbuf =
OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
if (rctx) {
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
OPENSSL_free(rctx);
}
}
static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
/*
* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
* be reflected back in the "original" key.
*/
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->md) {
if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
unsigned int sltmp;
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return -1;
ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = sltmp;
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return -1;
}
memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md));
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
unsigned int sltmp;
ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = sltmp;
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
rctx->tbuf, tbs,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
rctx->saltlen))
return -1;
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*siglen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
/*
* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
* be reflected back in the "original" key.
*/
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->md) {
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1)
return 0;
ret--;
if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (rout)
memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
size_t sltmp;
ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
sig, siglen, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
ret = sltmp;
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*routlen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
/*
* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
* be reflected back in the "original" key.
*/
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
size_t rslen;
if (rctx->md) {
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
sig, siglen, rsa);
if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
return 0;
} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
int ret;
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
if (rslen == 0)
return 0;
}
if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
int ret;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
/*
* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
* be reflected back in the "original" key.
*/
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
int klen = RSA_size(rsa);
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
in, inlen,
rctx->oaep_label,
rctx->oaep_labellen,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
return -1;
ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
} else {
ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*outlen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
int ret;
int pad_mode;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
/*
* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
* be reflected back in the "original" key.
*/
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;
ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
ret, ret,
rctx->oaep_label,
rctx->oaep_labellen,
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
} else {
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
else
pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode);
}
*outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
return ret;
}
static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
{
int mdnid;
if (!md)
return 1;
mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
} else {
switch (mdnid) {
/* List of all supported RSA digests */
case NID_sha1:
case NID_sha224:
case NID_sha256:
case NID_sha384:
case NID_sha512:
case NID_sha512_224:
case NID_sha512_256:
case NID_md5:
case NID_md5_sha1:
case NID_md2:
case NID_md4:
case NID_mdc2:
case NID_ripemd160:
case NID_sha3_224:
case NID_sha3_256:
case NID_sha3_384:
case NID_sha3_512:
return 1;
default:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
switch (type) {
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
return 0;
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
if (!(ctx->operation &
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
goto bad_pad;
if (!rctx->md)
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
} else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
goto bad_pad;
}
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
goto bad_pad;
if (!rctx->md)
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
}
rctx->pad_mode = p1;
return 1;
}
bad_pad:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
} else {
if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
return -2;
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
&& ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return -2;
}
if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
&& rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md))
|| (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
}
rctx->saltlen = p1;
}
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return -2;
}
rctx->nbits = p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
return -2;
}
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
return -2;
}
rctx->primes = p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
else
rctx->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
return 0;
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
return 1;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
return 0;
}
rctx->md = p2;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
&& rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
return -2;
}
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
if (rctx->mgf1md)
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
else
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
} else {
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
return 1;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
return 0;
}
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
}
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
rctx->oaep_label = p2;
rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
} else {
rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
}
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
if (p2 == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
*(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
return rctx->oaep_labellen;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return -2;
}
rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
#endif
return 1;
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
#endif
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
return 1;
/* fall through */
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
return -2;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const char *type, const char *value)
{
if (value == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
int pm;
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
return -2;
}
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
int saltlen;
if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
else
saltlen = atoi(value);
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
int nbits = atoi(value);
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
int ret;
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
return 0;
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
BN_free(pubexp);
return ret;
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
int nprimes = atoi(value);
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
int saltlen = atoi(value);
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
}
}
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
unsigned char *lab;
long lablen;
int ret;
lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
if (!lab)
return 0;
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
if (ret <= 0)
OPENSSL_free(lab);
return ret;
}
return -2;
}
/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
return 1;
/* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
return 1;
rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
rctx->saltlen == -2
? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
RSA *rsa = NULL;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
BN_GENCB *pcb;
int ret;
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
return 0;
}
rsa = RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
if (pcb == NULL) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
} else {
pcb = NULL;
}
ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
if (ret > 0)
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
else
RSA_free(rsa);
return ret;
}
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
pkey_rsa_init,
pkey_rsa_copy,
pkey_rsa_cleanup,
0, 0,
0,
pkey_rsa_keygen,
0,
pkey_rsa_sign,
0,
pkey_rsa_verify,
0,
pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
pkey_rsa_encrypt,
0,
pkey_rsa_decrypt,
0, 0,
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
};
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)
{
return &rsa_pkey_meth;
}
/*
* Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
* sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
*/
static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
const RSA *rsa;
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
const EVP_MD *md;
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
/* Should never happen */
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
return 0;
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
/* If no restrictions just return */
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
return 1;
/* Get and check parameters */
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
return 0;
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
max_saltlen--;
if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
/*
* Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
* use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
*/
rctx->md = md;
rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
return 1;
}
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
pkey_rsa_init,
pkey_rsa_copy,
pkey_rsa_cleanup,
0, 0,
0,
pkey_rsa_keygen,
pkey_pss_init,
pkey_rsa_sign,
pkey_pss_init,
pkey_rsa_verify,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
};
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void)
{
return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth;
}
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