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eeccc23723
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12615)
239 lines
8.2 KiB
C
239 lines
8.2 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "crypto/x509.h" /* for X509_add_cert_new() */
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/*- CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
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* hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
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* issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key (excluding the tag & length fields)
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* serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
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*/
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struct ocsp_cert_id_st {
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X509_ALGOR hashAlgorithm;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerNameHash;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING issuerKeyHash;
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ASN1_INTEGER serialNumber;
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};
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/*- Request ::= SEQUENCE {
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* reqCert CertID,
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* singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_one_request_st {
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OCSP_CERTID *reqCert;
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STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleRequestExtensions;
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};
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/*- TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
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* version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
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* requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
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* requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
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* requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_req_info_st {
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ASN1_INTEGER *version;
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GENERAL_NAME *requestorName;
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STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) *requestList;
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STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *requestExtensions;
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};
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/*- Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
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* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* signature BIT STRING,
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* certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_signature_st {
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X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
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};
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/*- OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
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* tbsRequest TBSRequest,
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* optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_request_st {
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OCSP_REQINFO tbsRequest;
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OCSP_SIGNATURE *optionalSignature; /* OPTIONAL */
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};
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/*- OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
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* successful (0), --Response has valid confirmations
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* malformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation request
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* internalError (2), --Internal error in issuer
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* tryLater (3), --Try again later
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* --(4) is not used
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* sigRequired (5), --Must sign the request
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* unauthorized (6) --Request unauthorized
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* }
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*/
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/*- ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
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* responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
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* response OCTET STRING }
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*/
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struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st {
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ASN1_OBJECT *responseType;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *response;
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};
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/*- OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
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* responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
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* responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_response_st {
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ASN1_ENUMERATED *responseStatus;
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OCSP_RESPBYTES *responseBytes;
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};
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/*- ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
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* byName [1] Name,
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* byKey [2] KeyHash }
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*/
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struct ocsp_responder_id_st {
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int type;
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union {
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X509_NAME *byName;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *byKey;
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} value;
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};
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/*- KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
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* --(excluding the tag and length fields)
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*/
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/*- RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
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* revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
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* revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_revoked_info_st {
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revocationTime;
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ASN1_ENUMERATED *revocationReason;
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};
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/*- CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
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* good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
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* revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
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* unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
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*/
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struct ocsp_cert_status_st {
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int type;
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union {
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ASN1_NULL *good;
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OCSP_REVOKEDINFO *revoked;
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ASN1_NULL *unknown;
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} value;
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};
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/*- SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
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* certID CertID,
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* certStatus CertStatus,
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* thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
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* nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
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* singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_single_response_st {
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OCSP_CERTID *certId;
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OCSP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus;
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisUpdate;
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextUpdate;
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STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *singleExtensions;
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};
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/*- ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
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* version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
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* responderID ResponderID,
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* producedAt GeneralizedTime,
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* responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
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* responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_response_data_st {
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ASN1_INTEGER *version;
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OCSP_RESPID responderId;
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *producedAt;
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STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *responses;
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STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *responseExtensions;
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};
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/*- BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
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* tbsResponseData ResponseData,
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* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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* signature BIT STRING,
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* certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
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*/
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/*
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* Note 1: The value for "signature" is specified in the OCSP rfc2560 as
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* follows: "The value for the signature SHALL be computed on the hash of
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* the DER encoding ResponseData." This means that you must hash the
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* DER-encoded tbsResponseData, and then run it through a crypto-signing
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* function, which will (at least w/RSA) do a hash-'n'-private-encrypt
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* operation. This seems a bit odd, but that's the spec. Also note that
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* the data structures do not leave anywhere to independently specify the
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* algorithm used for the initial hash. So, we look at the
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* signature-specification algorithm, and try to do something intelligent.
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* -- Kathy Weinhold, CertCo
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*/
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/*
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* Note 2: It seems that the mentioned passage from RFC 2560 (section
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* 4.2.1) is open for interpretation. I've done tests against another
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* responder, and found that it doesn't do the double hashing that the RFC
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* seems to say one should. Therefore, all relevant functions take a flag
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* saying which variant should be used. -- Richard Levitte, OpenSSL team
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* and CeloCom
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*/
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struct ocsp_basic_response_st {
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OCSP_RESPDATA tbsResponseData;
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X509_ALGOR signatureAlgorithm;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
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};
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/*-
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* CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
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* crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
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* crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
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* crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_crl_id_st {
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ASN1_IA5STRING *crlUrl;
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ASN1_INTEGER *crlNum;
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ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *crlTime;
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};
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/*-
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* ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
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* issuer Name,
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* locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax OPTIONAL }
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*/
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struct ocsp_service_locator_st {
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X509_NAME *issuer;
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STACK_OF(ACCESS_DESCRIPTION) *locator;
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};
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# define OCSP_REQUEST_sign(o,pkey,md) \
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ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\
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&(o)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,NULL,\
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(o)->optionalSignature->signature,&(o)->tbsRequest,pkey,md)
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# define OCSP_BASICRESP_sign(o,pkey,md,d) \
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ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),&(o)->signatureAlgorithm,\
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NULL,(o)->signature,&(o)->tbsResponseData,pkey,md)
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# define OCSP_BASICRESP_sign_ctx(o,ctx,d) \
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ASN1_item_sign_ctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),&(o)->signatureAlgorithm,\
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NULL,(o)->signature,&(o)->tbsResponseData,ctx)
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# define OCSP_REQUEST_verify(a,r) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_REQINFO),\
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&(a)->optionalSignature->signatureAlgorithm,\
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(a)->optionalSignature->signature,&(a)->tbsRequest,r)
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# define OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(a,r,d) ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OCSP_RESPDATA),\
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&(a)->signatureAlgorithm,(a)->signature,&(a)->tbsResponseData,r)
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