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29844ea5b3
Fixes #12840 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12893)
1437 lines
40 KiB
C
1437 lines
40 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/cms.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/param_build.h>
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#include "crypto/asn1.h"
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "crypto/rsa.h"
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
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static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
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static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
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static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
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static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
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#endif
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static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg);
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static int rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa);
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/* Set any parameters associated with pkey */
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static int rsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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ASN1_STRING **pstr, int *pstrtype)
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{
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const RSA *rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
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*pstr = NULL;
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/* If RSA it's just NULL type */
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if (RSA_test_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) != RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS) {
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*pstrtype = V_ASN1_NULL;
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return 1;
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}
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/* If no PSS parameters we omit parameters entirely */
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if (rsa->pss == NULL) {
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*pstrtype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Encode PSS parameters */
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if (ASN1_item_pack(rsa->pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), pstr) == NULL)
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return 0;
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*pstrtype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Decode any parameters and set them in RSA structure */
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static int rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
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{
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const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
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const void *algp;
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int algptype;
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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return 1;
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if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
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return 1;
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if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PARAM_DECODE, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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rsa->pss = rsa_pss_decode(alg);
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if (rsa->pss == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (!rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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unsigned char *penc = NULL;
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int penclen;
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ASN1_STRING *str;
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int strtype;
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if (!rsa_param_encode(pkey, &str, &strtype))
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return 0;
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penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
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if (penclen <= 0)
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return 0;
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id),
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strtype, str, penc, penclen))
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return 1;
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OPENSSL_free(penc);
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return 0;
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}
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static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
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{
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const unsigned char *p;
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int pklen;
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X509_ALGOR *alg;
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RSA *rsa = NULL;
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if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, pubkey))
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return 0;
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if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return 0;
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}
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RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
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switch (pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
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case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
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RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
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break;
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case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
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RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
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break;
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default:
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/* Leave the type bits zero */
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break;
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}
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if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa)) {
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
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{
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/*
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* Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
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* cards.
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*/
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if (((RSA_flags(a->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))
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|| (RSA_flags(b->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) {
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return 1;
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}
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if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
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|| BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
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{
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RSA *rsa;
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if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL)
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return 0;
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
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return 1;
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}
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static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
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{
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return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
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}
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static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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unsigned char *rk = NULL;
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int rklen;
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ASN1_STRING *str;
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int strtype;
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if (!rsa_param_encode(pkey, &str, &strtype))
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return 0;
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rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
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if (rklen <= 0) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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ASN1_STRING_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0,
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strtype, str, rk, rklen)) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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ASN1_STRING_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
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{
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const unsigned char *p;
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RSA *rsa;
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int pklen;
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const X509_ALGOR *alg;
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if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8))
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return 0;
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rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen);
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return 0;
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}
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RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
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switch (pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
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case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
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RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
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break;
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case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
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RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
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break;
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default:
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/* Leave the type bits zero */
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break;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
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return 1;
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}
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static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
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}
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static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
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}
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static int rsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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return RSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa);
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}
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static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
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}
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static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
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{
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
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return NULL;
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return ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
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alg->parameter);
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}
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static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, int pss_key, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
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int indent)
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{
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int rv = 0;
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X509_ALGOR *maskHash = NULL;
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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goto err;
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if (pss_key) {
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if (pss == NULL) {
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "No PSS parameter restrictions\n") <= 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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} else {
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "PSS parameter restrictions:") <= 0)
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return 0;
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}
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} else if (pss == NULL) {
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if (BIO_puts(bp,"(INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (pss_key)
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indent += 2;
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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goto err;
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
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if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
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goto err;
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} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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goto err;
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
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if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
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goto err;
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maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
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if (maskHash != NULL) {
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if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
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goto err;
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} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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goto err;
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s Salt Length: 0x", pss_key ? "Minimum" : "") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (pss->saltLength) {
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if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
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goto err;
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} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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goto err;
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (pss->trailerField) {
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if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
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goto err;
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} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
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rv = 1;
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err:
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X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
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return rv;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv)
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{
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const RSA *x = pkey->pkey.rsa;
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char *str;
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const char *s;
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int ret = 0, mod_len = 0, ex_primes;
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if (x->n != NULL)
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mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
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ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos);
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
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goto err;
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s ", pkey_is_pss(pkey) ? "RSA-PSS" : "RSA") <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (priv && x->d) {
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit, %d primes)\n",
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mod_len, ex_primes <= 0 ? 2 : ex_primes + 2) <= 0)
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goto err;
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str = "modulus:";
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s = "publicExponent:";
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} else {
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
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goto err;
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str = "Modulus:";
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s = "Exponent:";
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}
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (priv) {
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int i;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off))
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goto err;
|
|
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off))
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goto err;
|
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off))
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goto err;
|
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for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos); i++) {
|
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/* print multi-prime info */
|
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BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
|
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RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
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int j;
|
|
|
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pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(x->prime_infos, i);
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for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
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goto err;
|
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switch (j) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
if (BIO_printf(bp, "prime%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
|
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goto err;
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|
bn = pinfo->r;
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break;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
if (BIO_printf(bp, "exponent%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
|
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goto err;
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bn = pinfo->d;
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break;
|
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case 2:
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|
if (BIO_printf(bp, "coefficient%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
|
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goto err;
|
|
bn = pinfo->t;
|
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break;
|
|
default:
|
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break;
|
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}
|
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "", bn, NULL, off))
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
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}
|
|
}
|
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if (pkey_is_pss(pkey) && !rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
|
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey_rsa_print(bp, pkey, indent, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
|
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey_rsa_print(bp, pkey, indent, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
|
|
pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
|
|
alg->parameter);
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) {
|
|
pss->maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
|
|
if (pss->maskHash == NULL) {
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return pss;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
|
const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
|
int rv;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
|
|
|
|
rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 0, pss, indent);
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
if (!rv)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sig)
|
|
return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
|
|
int min_saltlen;
|
|
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
|
if (arg1 == 0)
|
|
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs(arg2, NULL, NULL, &alg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
|
|
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
|
|
return -2;
|
|
if (arg1 == 0)
|
|
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
|
|
if (arg1 == 0)
|
|
return rsa_cms_sign(arg2);
|
|
else if (arg1 == 1)
|
|
return rsa_cms_verify(arg2);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
|
|
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
|
|
return -2;
|
|
if (arg1 == 0)
|
|
return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2);
|
|
else if (arg1 == 1)
|
|
return rsa_cms_decrypt(arg2);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
|
|
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
|
|
return -2;
|
|
*(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
|
|
if (pkey->pkey.rsa->pss != NULL) {
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pkey->pkey.rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
|
|
&min_saltlen)) {
|
|
RSAerr(0, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*(int *)arg2 = EVP_MD_type(md);
|
|
/* Return of 2 indicates this MD is mandatory */
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
*(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alg)
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
|
static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md)
|
|
{
|
|
if (md == NULL || EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
|
if (*palg == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate and set MGF1 algorithm ID from EVP_MD */
|
|
static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL;
|
|
ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*palg = NULL;
|
|
if (mgf1md == NULL || EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
|
if (*palg == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(*palg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
|
|
stmp = NULL;
|
|
err:
|
|
ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(algtmp);
|
|
if (*palg)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
|
static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
|
{
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg)
|
|
return EVP_sha1();
|
|
md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
|
|
if (md == NULL)
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
|
|
return md;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX in PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter,
|
|
* suitable for setting an AlgorithmIdentifier.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
|
|
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk);
|
|
int saltlen;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (saltlen == -1) {
|
|
saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
|
|
} else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) {
|
|
saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
|
|
if ((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
|
|
saltlen--;
|
|
if (saltlen < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (saltlen != 20) {
|
|
pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
|
|
if (pss->saltLength == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (mgf1md == NULL)
|
|
mgf1md = sigmd;
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->maskHash, mgf1md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
return pss;
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os;
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
os = ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), NULL);
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return os;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL
|
|
* then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are
|
|
* passed to pkctx instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
|
|
const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv = -1;
|
|
int saltlen;
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decode PSS parameters */
|
|
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen)) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We have all parameters now set up context */
|
|
if (pkey) {
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
const EVP_MD *checkmd;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &checkmd) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (EVP_MD_type(md) != EVP_MD_type(checkmd)) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* Carry on */
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_verify_param(const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
|
|
int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
|
|
{
|
|
if (psaltlen != NULL && *psaltlen < 0) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
|
|
* PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ptrailerField != NULL && *ptrailerField != 1) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
|
|
const EVP_MD **pmd,
|
|
const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
|
|
int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the defaults from the ONE place */
|
|
(void)rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params);
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*pmd = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
|
|
if (*pmd == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*pmgf1md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->maskHash);
|
|
if (*pmgf1md == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (pss->saltLength)
|
|
*psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
|
|
else
|
|
*psaltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params);
|
|
if (pss->trailerField)
|
|
*ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField);
|
|
else
|
|
*ptrailerField = rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
|
|
const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Callers do not care about the trailer field, and yet, we must
|
|
* pass it from get_param to verify_param, since the latter checks
|
|
* its value.
|
|
*
|
|
* When callers start caring, it's a simple thing to add another
|
|
* argument to this function.
|
|
*/
|
|
int trailerField = 0;
|
|
|
|
return rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(pss, pmd, pmgf1md, psaltlen,
|
|
&trailerField)
|
|
&& rsa_pss_verify_param(pmd, pmgf1md, psaltlen, &trailerField);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rsa != NULL && rsa->pss != NULL) {
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
|
|
int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just
|
|
* want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible
|
|
* to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test
|
|
* a bad situation.
|
|
*
|
|
* Other routines use rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will be
|
|
* checked, eventually.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
|
|
&saltlen, &trailerField))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
|
|
mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_type(mgf1md);
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, mgf1md_nid)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params, trailerField))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
rsa->pss_params = pss_params;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
|
|
{
|
|
int nid, nid2;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
|
|
|
|
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
|
|
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
|
|
if (nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
|
return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL);
|
|
/* Only PSS allowed for PSS keys */
|
|
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(pkctx)) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_VERIFY, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */
|
|
if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) {
|
|
if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Customised RSA item verification routine. This is called when a signature
|
|
* is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
|
|
const void *asn, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
|
const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) {
|
|
/* Carry on */
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
|
|
{
|
|
int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
|
|
|
|
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
|
|
if (pkctx) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* We don't support it */
|
|
if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
os = rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
|
|
if (!os)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const void *asn,
|
|
X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
int pad_mode;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL;
|
|
os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
|
|
if (!os1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Duplicate parameters if we have to */
|
|
if (alg2) {
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os2 = ASN1_STRING_dup(os1);
|
|
if (!os2) {
|
|
ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
|
|
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
|
|
}
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
|
|
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
|
|
return 3;
|
|
}
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_sig_info_set(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
|
const ASN1_STRING *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
|
int mdnid, saltlen;
|
|
uint32_t flags;
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
int secbits;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Decode PSS parameters */
|
|
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md);
|
|
/*
|
|
* For TLS need SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512, digest and MGF1 digest must
|
|
* match and salt length must equal digest size
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((mdnid == NID_sha256 || mdnid == NID_sha384 || mdnid == NID_sha512)
|
|
&& mdnid == EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) && saltlen == EVP_MD_size(md))
|
|
flags = X509_SIG_INFO_TLS;
|
|
else
|
|
flags = 0;
|
|
/* Note: security bits half number of digest bits */
|
|
secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
|
|
* they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
|
|
* really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our security
|
|
* level 1.
|
|
* https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for SHA1 at
|
|
* 2^63.4
|
|
* https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
|
|
* puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mdnid == NID_sha1)
|
|
secbits = 64;
|
|
else if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
|
|
secbits = 68;
|
|
else if (mdnid == NID_md5)
|
|
secbits = 39;
|
|
X509_SIG_INFO_set(siginf, mdnid, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, secbits,
|
|
flags);
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
|
|
|
|
oaep = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS),
|
|
alg->parameter);
|
|
|
|
if (oaep == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (oaep->maskGenFunc != NULL) {
|
|
oaep->maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(oaep->maskGenFunc);
|
|
if (oaep->maskHash == NULL) {
|
|
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return oaep;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *cmsalg;
|
|
int nid;
|
|
int rv = -1;
|
|
unsigned char *label = NULL;
|
|
int labellen = 0;
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
|
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
|
|
|
|
pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
|
|
if (pkctx == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cmsalg->algorithm);
|
|
if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (nid != NID_rsaesOaep) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Decode OAEP parameters */
|
|
oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg);
|
|
|
|
if (oaep == NULL) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mgf1md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->maskHash);
|
|
if (mgf1md == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc);
|
|
if (md == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (oaep->pSourceFunc != NULL) {
|
|
X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc;
|
|
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (plab->parameter->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
|
|
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
label = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data;
|
|
/* Stop label being freed when OAEP parameters are freed */
|
|
plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data = NULL;
|
|
labellen = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (label != NULL
|
|
&& EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* Carry on */
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
|
{
|
|
const EVP_MD *md, *mgf1md;
|
|
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = NULL;
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
|
|
int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, rv = 0, labellen;
|
|
unsigned char *label;
|
|
|
|
if (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (pkctx) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), V_ASN1_NULL, 0);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Not supported */
|
|
if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, &md) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
labellen = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, &label);
|
|
if (labellen < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
oaep = RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_new();
|
|
if (oaep == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&oaep->hashFunc, md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&oaep->maskGenFunc, mgf1md))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (labellen > 0) {
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *los;
|
|
oaep->pSourceFunc = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
|
if (oaep->pSourceFunc == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
los = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
|
|
if (los == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(los, label, labellen)) {
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(los);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(oaep->pSourceFunc, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pSpecified),
|
|
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, los);
|
|
}
|
|
/* create string with pss parameter encoding. */
|
|
if (!ASN1_item_pack(oaep, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS), &os))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaesOaep), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
|
|
os = NULL;
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
|
|
ASN1_STRING_free(os);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pkey_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return RSA_check_key_ex(pkey->pkey.rsa, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static size_t rsa_pkey_dirty_cnt(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey->pkey.rsa->dirty_cnt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For the moment, we trust the call path, where keys going through
|
|
* rsa_pkey_export_to() match a KEYMGMT for the "RSA" keytype, while
|
|
* keys going through rsa_pss_pkey_export_to() match a KEYMGMT for the
|
|
* "RSA-PSS" keytype.
|
|
* TODO(3.0) Investigate whether we should simply continue to trust the
|
|
* call path, or if we should strengthen this function by checking that
|
|
* |rsa_type| matches the RSA key subtype. The latter requires ensuring
|
|
* that the type flag for the RSA key is properly set by other functions
|
|
* in this file.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rsa_int_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, int rsa_type,
|
|
void *to_keydata, EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt,
|
|
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA *rsa = from->pkey.rsa;
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
|
|
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
|
|
int selection = 0;
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tmpl == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the RSA method is foreign, then we can't be sure of anything, and
|
|
* can therefore not export or pretend to export.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Public parameters must always be present */
|
|
if (RSA_get0_n(rsa) == NULL || RSA_get0_e(rsa) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_todata(rsa, tmpl, NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
if (RSA_get0_d(rsa) != NULL)
|
|
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->pss != NULL) {
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
|
|
int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerfield;
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
|
|
&saltlen, &trailerfield))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
|
|
mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_type(mgf1md);
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, mgf1md_nid)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
|
|
|| !rsa_pss_params_30_todata(&pss_params, tmpl, NULL))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* We export, the provider imports */
|
|
rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, selection, params);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_int_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx,
|
|
int rsa_type)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = vpctx;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
|
|
RSA *rsa = rsa_new_with_ctx(pctx->libctx);
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 rsa_pss_params = { 0, };
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
|
|
RSA_set_flags(rsa, rsa_type);
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(&rsa_pss_params, params, pctx->libctx))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
switch (rsa_type) {
|
|
case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Were PSS parameters filled in?
|
|
* In that case, something's wrong
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(&rsa_pss_params))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Were PSS parameters filled in? In that case, create the old
|
|
* RSA_PSS_PARAMS structure. Otherwise, this is an unrestricted key.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(&rsa_pss_params)) {
|
|
/* Create the older RSA_PSS_PARAMS from RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 data */
|
|
int mdnid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(&rsa_pss_params);
|
|
int mgf1mdnid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(&rsa_pss_params);
|
|
int saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&rsa_pss_params);
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mgf1mdnid);
|
|
|
|
if ((rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(md, mgf1md, saltlen)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* RSA key sub-types we don't know how to handle yet */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_fromdata(rsa, params))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
switch (rsa_type) {
|
|
case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
|
|
ok = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
|
|
break;
|
|
case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
|
|
ok = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, rsa);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
|
|
const char *propq)
|
|
{
|
|
return rsa_int_export_to(from, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA, to_keydata,
|
|
to_keymgmt, libctx, propq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
|
|
const char *propq)
|
|
{
|
|
return rsa_int_export_to(from, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS, to_keydata,
|
|
to_keymgmt, libctx, propq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pkey_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return rsa_int_import_from(params, vpctx, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_pkey_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return rsa_int_import_from(params, vpctx, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = {
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
|
|
|
|
"RSA",
|
|
"OpenSSL RSA method",
|
|
|
|
rsa_pub_decode,
|
|
rsa_pub_encode,
|
|
rsa_pub_cmp,
|
|
rsa_pub_print,
|
|
|
|
rsa_priv_decode,
|
|
rsa_priv_encode,
|
|
rsa_priv_print,
|
|
|
|
int_rsa_size,
|
|
rsa_bits,
|
|
rsa_security_bits,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
rsa_sig_print,
|
|
int_rsa_free,
|
|
rsa_pkey_ctrl,
|
|
old_rsa_priv_decode,
|
|
old_rsa_priv_encode,
|
|
rsa_item_verify,
|
|
rsa_item_sign,
|
|
rsa_sig_info_set,
|
|
rsa_pkey_check,
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
rsa_pkey_dirty_cnt,
|
|
rsa_pkey_export_to,
|
|
rsa_pkey_import_from
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_pss_asn1_meth = {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
|
ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
|
|
|
|
"RSA-PSS",
|
|
"OpenSSL RSA-PSS method",
|
|
|
|
rsa_pub_decode,
|
|
rsa_pub_encode,
|
|
rsa_pub_cmp,
|
|
rsa_pub_print,
|
|
|
|
rsa_priv_decode,
|
|
rsa_priv_encode,
|
|
rsa_priv_print,
|
|
|
|
int_rsa_size,
|
|
rsa_bits,
|
|
rsa_security_bits,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
rsa_sig_print,
|
|
int_rsa_free,
|
|
rsa_pkey_ctrl,
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
rsa_item_verify,
|
|
rsa_item_sign,
|
|
0,
|
|
rsa_pkey_check,
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
rsa_pkey_dirty_cnt,
|
|
rsa_pss_pkey_export_to,
|
|
rsa_pss_pkey_import_from
|
|
};
|