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openssl/providers/implementations/signature/rsa.c
Shane Lontis d16d0b71a9 Add RSA sign to the fips provider 
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11199)
2020-03-15 17:38:00 +10:00

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/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
{ RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
{ RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
{ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/*
* What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
* We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
* we use that here too.
*/
typedef struct {
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
RSA *rsa;
/*
* Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
* Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
* operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
* by their Final function.
*/
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
/* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
unsigned char aid[128];
size_t aid_len;
/* main digest */
EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
int mdnid;
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
/* RSA padding mode */
int pad_mode;
/* message digest for MGF1 */
EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
/* PSS salt length */
int saltlen;
/* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
int min_saltlen;
/* Temp buffer */
unsigned char *tbuf;
} PROV_RSA_CTX;
static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
{
if (prsactx->md != NULL)
return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
return 0;
}
static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
{
/*
* Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
* We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
* map.
*/
static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
{ NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
{ NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
{ NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
{ NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
{ NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
{ NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
{ NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
{ NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
{ NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
{ NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
{ NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
{ NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
{ NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
{ NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
{ NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
};
size_t i;
int mdnid = NID_undef;
if (md == NULL)
goto end;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
break;
}
}
if (mdnid == NID_undef)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
end:
return mdnid;
}
static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
{
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
if (prsactx == NULL)
return NULL;
prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
return prsactx;
}
/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
return 0;
RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
else
prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
return 1;
}
static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
if (mdname != NULL) {
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier = NULL;
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
if (!rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
ctx->md = NULL;
ctx->mdctx = NULL;
ctx->mdname[0] = '\0';
ctx->aid[0] = '\0';
ctx->aid_len = 0;
algorithmidentifier =
rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(md_nid, &algorithmidentifier_len);
ctx->md = md;
ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
if (algorithmidentifier != NULL) {
memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *props)
{
if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
return 0;
OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
return 1;
}
static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
return 1;
if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
}
static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
ctx->tbuf = NULL;
}
static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
int ret;
size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = rsasize;
return 1;
}
if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
return 0;
if (mdsize != 0) {
if (tbslen != mdsize) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
unsigned int sltmp;
if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
"only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
goto end;
}
#endif
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
clean_tbuf(prsactx);
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
{
unsigned int sltmp;
ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
}
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
/* Check PSS restrictions */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHRU */
default:
if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
&& prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
break;
}
}
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
return 0;
if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
prsactx->saltlen)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
clean_tbuf(prsactx);
break;
default:
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
"Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
return 0;
}
} else {
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
end:
#endif
if (ret <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
*siglen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
unsigned char *rout,
size_t *routlen,
size_t routsize,
const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
int ret;
if (rout == NULL) {
*routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
return 1;
}
if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
return 0;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
ret--;
if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
"Should be %d, but got %d",
EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
return 0;
}
*routlen = ret;
if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
{
size_t sltmp;
ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
}
break;
default:
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
"Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
return 0;
}
} else {
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
}
*routlen = ret;
return 1;
}
static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
size_t rslen;
if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
prsactx->rsa)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
return 1;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
return 0;
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
{
int ret;
size_t mdsize;
/* Check PSS restrictions */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return 0;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHRU */
default:
if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
&& prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
break;
}
}
/*
* We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
* call
*/
mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
if (tbslen != mdsize) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
"Should be %d, but got %d",
mdsize, tbslen);
return 0;
}
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
return 0;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
prsactx->tbuf,
prsactx->saltlen);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
default:
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
"Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
return 0;
rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
if (rslen == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
return 0;
}
}
if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
const char *props, void *vrsa)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
|| !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
return 0;
prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
goto error;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
goto error;
return 1;
error:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
prsactx->md = NULL;
return 0;
}
int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
}
int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
* are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
*/
if (sig != NULL) {
/*
* TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
* digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
* but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
}
return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
* digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
* but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx == NULL)
return;
RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
free_tbuf(prsactx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
}
static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
if (dstctx == NULL)
return NULL;
*dstctx = *srcctx;
dstctx->rsa = NULL;
dstctx->md = NULL;
dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
goto err;
dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
goto err;
dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
goto err;
dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
goto err;
}
return dstctx;
err:
rsa_freectx(dstctx);
return NULL;
}
static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
if (p != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL)
switch (p->data_type) {
case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
return 0;
break;
case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
{
int i;
const char *word = NULL;
for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
word = padding_item[i].ptr;
break;
}
}
if (word != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
return 0;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
if (p != NULL) {
if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
return 0;
} else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
return 0;
break;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
return 0;
break;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
return 0;
break;
default:
if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
<= 0)
return 0;
break;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
/* Not allowed during certain operations */
if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
if (propsp != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
/* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
/* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
return 1;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
return 0;
}
/* non-PSS code follows */
if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
return 0;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL) {
int pad_mode = 0;
switch (p->data_type) {
case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
return 0;
break;
case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
{
int i;
if (p->data == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
break;
}
}
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
switch (pad_mode) {
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
/*
* OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
* with signature use.
*/
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
"OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
return 0;
case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
goto cont;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
"X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
return 0;
}
cont:
if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
return 0;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
if (p != NULL) {
int saltlen;
if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
"PSS padding has been specified first");
return 0;
}
switch (p->data_type) {
case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
return 0;
break;
case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
else
saltlen = atoi(p->data);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
/*
* RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
* Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
* lowest saltlen number possible.
*/
if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
return 0;
}
prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL) {
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
if (propsp != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
return 0;
}
/* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
/* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
|| EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
return 1;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
return 0;
}
/* non-PSS code follows */
if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
{
/*
* TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
* params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
* case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
* digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
*/
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx->md == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
}
static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
if (prsactx->md == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
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