mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-12-03 05:41:46 +08:00
5a285addbf
Changed PKEY/KDF API to call the new API. Added wrappers for PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() and EVP_PBE_scrypt() to call the new EVP KDF APIs. Documentation updated. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6674)
274 lines
7.8 KiB
C
274 lines
7.8 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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#include "kdf_local.h"
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static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
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static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
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const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
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#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
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/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
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struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
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/* Digest to use for PRF */
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* Secret value to use for PRF */
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unsigned char *sec;
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size_t seclen;
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/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
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unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
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size_t seedlen;
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};
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static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void)
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{
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EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
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if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return impl;
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}
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static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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kdf_tls1_prf_reset(impl);
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OPENSSL_free(impl);
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}
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static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
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memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
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}
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static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
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{
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const unsigned char *p;
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size_t len;
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const EVP_MD *md;
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switch (cmd) {
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
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md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
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if (md == NULL)
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return 0;
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impl->md = md;
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return 1;
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET:
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p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
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impl->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
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if (impl->sec == NULL)
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return 0;
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impl->seclen = len;
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return 1;
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_TLS_SEED:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
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impl->seedlen = 0;
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return 1;
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED:
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p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (len > (TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - impl->seedlen))
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return 0;
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memcpy(impl->seed + impl->seedlen, p, len);
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impl->seedlen += len;
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return 1;
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default:
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return -2;
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}
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}
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static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
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const char *type, const char *value)
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{
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if (value == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
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return 0;
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}
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if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
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return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
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return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
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EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
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return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
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EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
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return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
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value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
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return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
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value);
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return -2;
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}
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static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
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size_t keylen)
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{
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if (impl->md == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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if (impl->sec == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
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return 0;
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}
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if (impl->seedlen == 0) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SEED);
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return 0;
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}
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return tls1_prf_alg(impl->md, impl->sec, impl->seclen,
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impl->seed, impl->seedlen,
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key, keylen);
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}
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const EVP_KDF_METHOD tls1_prf_kdf_meth = {
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EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF,
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kdf_tls1_prf_new,
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kdf_tls1_prf_free,
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kdf_tls1_prf_reset,
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kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
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kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str,
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NULL,
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kdf_tls1_prf_derive
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};
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static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
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const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
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{
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int chunk;
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EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
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unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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size_t A1_len;
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int ret = 0;
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chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
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if (!ossl_assert(chunk > 0))
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goto err;
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ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
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ctx_tmp = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
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ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
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if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_MD, md) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_KEY, sec, sec_len) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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for (;;) {
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/* Reinit mac contexts */
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if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, A1, A1_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_tmp, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len))
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goto err;
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if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
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size_t mac_len;
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, &mac_len))
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goto err;
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out += mac_len;
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olen -= mac_len;
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/* calc the next A1 value */
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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} else { /* last one */
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
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goto err;
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memcpy(out, A1, olen);
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break;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
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return ret;
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}
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static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
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const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
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unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
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{
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if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
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size_t i;
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unsigned char *tmp;
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if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
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seed, seed_len, out, olen))
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return 0;
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if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
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seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
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OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
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return 0;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
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out[i] ^= tmp[i];
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OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
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return 1;
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}
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if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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