openssl/test/verify_extra_test.c
Richard Levitte fda127beb2 TEST: Adapt all applicable tests to the new distinguishing ID
Fixes #11293

Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11302)
2020-03-15 19:42:05 +01:00

281 lines
6.4 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "testutil.h"
static const char *roots_f;
static const char *untrusted_f;
static const char *bad_f;
static const char *req_f;
static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
BIO *bio;
X509 *x;
bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
if (bio == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (certs == NULL) {
BIO_free(bio);
return NULL;
}
ERR_set_mark();
do {
x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
BIO_free(bio);
return NULL;
} else if (x == NULL) {
/*
* We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
* generated
*/
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
} while (x != NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
return certs;
}
/*
* Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
*
* Chain is as follows:
*
* rootCA (self-signed)
* |
* interCA
* |
* subinterCA subinterCA (self-signed)
* | |
* leaf ------------------
* |
* bad
*
* rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
* leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
*
* subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
*
* interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
* (roots.pem)
* leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
* bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
*
* Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
* CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
*
*/
static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
{
int ret = 0;
int i;
X509 *x = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
store = X509_STORE_new();
if (store == NULL)
goto err;
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
if (lookup == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, roots_f, X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
goto err;
untrusted = load_certs_from_file(untrusted_f);
if ((bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r")) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
goto err;
sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (sctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
goto err;
i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
/* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
ret = 1;
}
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
X509_free(x);
BIO_free(bio);
sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
X509_STORE_free(store);
return ret;
}
static int test_store_ctx(void)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
X509 *x = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int testresult = 0, ret;
bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
goto err;
x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (sctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, NULL, x, NULL))
goto err;
/* Verifying a cert where we have no trusted certs should fail */
ret = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
if (ret == 0) {
/* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
testresult = 1;
}
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
X509_free(x);
BIO_free(bio);
return testresult;
}
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("roots.pem untrusted.pem bad.pem\n")
static int test_distinguishing_id(void)
{
X509 *x = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v = NULL, *v2 = NULL;
char *distid = "this is an ID";
bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
goto err;
x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, (unsigned char *)distid,
(int)strlen(distid))) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
goto err;
}
X509_set0_distinguishing_id(x, v);
v2 = X509_get0_distinguishing_id(x);
if (!TEST_ptr(v2)
|| !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(v, v2), 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
X509_free(x);
BIO_free(bio);
return ret;
}
static int test_req_distinguishing_id(void)
{
X509_REQ *x = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v = NULL, *v2 = NULL;
char *distid = "this is an ID";
bio = BIO_new_file(req_f, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
goto err;
x = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, (unsigned char *)distid,
(int)strlen(distid))) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
goto err;
}
X509_REQ_set0_distinguishing_id(x, v);
v2 = X509_REQ_get0_distinguishing_id(x);
if (!TEST_ptr(v2)
|| !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(v, v2), 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
X509_REQ_free(x);
BIO_free(bio);
return ret;
}
int setup_tests(void)
{
if (!test_skip_common_options()) {
TEST_error("Error parsing test options\n");
return 0;
}
if (!TEST_ptr(roots_f = test_get_argument(0))
|| !TEST_ptr(untrusted_f = test_get_argument(1))
|| !TEST_ptr(bad_f = test_get_argument(2))
|| !TEST_ptr(req_f = test_get_argument(3)))
return 0;
ADD_TEST(test_alt_chains_cert_forgery);
ADD_TEST(test_store_ctx);
ADD_TEST(test_distinguishing_id);
ADD_TEST(test_req_distinguishing_id);
return 1;
}