openssl/demos/state_machine/state_machine.c
Matt Caswell 32ec41539b Server side version negotiation rewrite
This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
reason to maintain this complexity.

The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
ClientHellos.

Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.

Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
removal of the old s23* code.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-16 09:19:56 +01:00

406 lines
12 KiB
C

/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/*
* Nuron, a leader in hardware encryption technology, generously
* sponsored the development of this demo by Ben Laurie.
*
* See http://www.nuron.com/.
*/
/*
* the aim of this demo is to provide a fully working state-machine
* style SSL implementation, i.e. one where the main loop acquires
* some data, then converts it from or to SSL by feeding it into the
* SSL state machine. It then does any I/O required by the state machine
* and loops.
*
* In order to keep things as simple as possible, this implementation
* listens on a TCP socket, which it expects to get an SSL connection
* on (for example, from s_client) and from then on writes decrypted
* data to stdout and encrypts anything arriving on stdin. Verbose
* commentary is written to stderr.
*
* This implementation acts as a server, but it can also be done for a client. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
/*
* die_unless is intended to work like assert, except that it happens always,
* even if NDEBUG is defined. Use assert as a stopgap.
*/
#define die_unless(x) assert(x)
typedef struct {
SSL_CTX *pCtx;
BIO *pbioRead;
BIO *pbioWrite;
SSL *pSSL;
} SSLStateMachine;
void SSLStateMachine_print_error(SSLStateMachine * pMachine,
const char *szErr)
{
unsigned long l;
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", szErr);
while ((l = ERR_get_error())) {
char buf[1024];
ERR_error_string_n(l, buf, sizeof buf);
fprintf(stderr, "Error %lx: %s\n", l, buf);
}
}
SSLStateMachine *SSLStateMachine_new(const char *szCertificateFile,
const char *szKeyFile)
{
SSLStateMachine *pMachine = malloc(sizeof(*pMachine));
int n;
die_unless(pMachine);
pMachine->pCtx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
die_unless(pMachine->pCtx);
n = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(pMachine->pCtx, szCertificateFile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
die_unless(n > 0);
n = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(pMachine->pCtx, szKeyFile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
die_unless(n > 0);
pMachine->pSSL = SSL_new(pMachine->pCtx);
die_unless(pMachine->pSSL);
pMachine->pbioRead = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
pMachine->pbioWrite = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
SSL_set_bio(pMachine->pSSL, pMachine->pbioRead, pMachine->pbioWrite);
SSL_set_accept_state(pMachine->pSSL);
return pMachine;
}
void SSLStateMachine_read_inject(SSLStateMachine * pMachine,
const unsigned char *aucBuf, int nBuf)
{
int n = BIO_write(pMachine->pbioRead, aucBuf, nBuf);
/*
* If it turns out this assert fails, then buffer the data here and just
* feed it in in churn instead. Seems to me that it should be guaranteed
* to succeed, though.
*/
assert(n == nBuf);
fprintf(stderr, "%d bytes of encrypted data fed to state machine\n", n);
}
int SSLStateMachine_read_extract(SSLStateMachine * pMachine,
unsigned char *aucBuf, int nBuf)
{
int n;
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(pMachine->pSSL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Doing SSL_accept\n");
n = SSL_accept(pMachine->pSSL);
if (n == 0)
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_accept returned zero\n");
if (n < 0) {
int err;
if ((err =
SSL_get_error(pMachine->pSSL, n)) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_accept wants more data\n");
return 0;
}
SSLStateMachine_print_error(pMachine, "SSL_accept error");
exit(7);
}
return 0;
}
n = SSL_read(pMachine->pSSL, aucBuf, nBuf);
if (n < 0) {
int err = SSL_get_error(pMachine->pSSL, n);
if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL_read wants more data\n");
return 0;
}
SSLStateMachine_print_error(pMachine, "SSL_read error");
exit(8);
}
fprintf(stderr, "%d bytes of decrypted data read from state machine\n",
n);
return n;
}
int SSLStateMachine_write_can_extract(SSLStateMachine * pMachine)
{
int n = BIO_pending(pMachine->pbioWrite);
if (n)
fprintf(stderr, "There is encrypted data available to write\n");
else
fprintf(stderr, "There is no encrypted data available to write\n");
return n;
}
int SSLStateMachine_write_extract(SSLStateMachine * pMachine,
unsigned char *aucBuf, int nBuf)
{
int n;
n = BIO_read(pMachine->pbioWrite, aucBuf, nBuf);
fprintf(stderr, "%d bytes of encrypted data read from state machine\n",
n);
return n;
}
void SSLStateMachine_write_inject(SSLStateMachine * pMachine,
const unsigned char *aucBuf, int nBuf)
{
int n = SSL_write(pMachine->pSSL, aucBuf, nBuf);
/*
* If it turns out this assert fails, then buffer the data here and just
* feed it in in churn instead. Seems to me that it should be guaranteed
* to succeed, though.
*/
assert(n == nBuf);
fprintf(stderr, "%d bytes of unencrypted data fed to state machine\n", n);
}
int OpenSocket(int nPort)
{
int nSocket;
struct sockaddr_in saServer;
struct sockaddr_in saClient;
int one = 1;
int nSize;
int nFD;
int nLen;
nSocket = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (nSocket < 0) {
perror("socket");
exit(1);
}
if (setsockopt
(nSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)&one, sizeof one) < 0) {
perror("setsockopt");
exit(2);
}
memset(&saServer, 0, sizeof(saServer));
saServer.sin_family = AF_INET;
saServer.sin_port = htons(nPort);
nSize = sizeof saServer;
if (bind(nSocket, (struct sockaddr *)&saServer, nSize) < 0) {
perror("bind");
exit(3);
}
if (listen(nSocket, 512) < 0) {
perror("listen");
exit(4);
}
nLen = sizeof saClient;
nFD = accept(nSocket, (struct sockaddr *)&saClient, &nLen);
if (nFD < 0) {
perror("accept");
exit(5);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Incoming accepted on port %d\n", nPort);
return nFD;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
SSLStateMachine *pMachine;
int nPort;
int nFD;
const char *szCertificateFile;
const char *szKeyFile;
char rbuf[1];
int nrbuf = 0;
if (argc != 4) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s <port> <certificate file> <key file>\n", argv[0]);
exit(6);
}
nPort = atoi(argv[1]);
szCertificateFile = argv[2];
szKeyFile = argv[3];
OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
SSL_load_error_strings();
nFD = OpenSocket(nPort);
pMachine = SSLStateMachine_new(szCertificateFile, szKeyFile);
for (;;) {
fd_set rfds, wfds;
unsigned char buf[1024];
int n;
FD_ZERO(&rfds);
FD_ZERO(&wfds);
/* Select socket for input */
FD_SET(nFD, &rfds);
/* check whether there's decrypted data */
if (!nrbuf)
nrbuf = SSLStateMachine_read_extract(pMachine, rbuf, 1);
/* if there's decrypted data, check whether we can write it */
if (nrbuf)
FD_SET(1, &wfds);
/* Select socket for output */
if (SSLStateMachine_write_can_extract(pMachine))
FD_SET(nFD, &wfds);
/* Select stdin for input */
FD_SET(0, &rfds);
/* Wait for something to do something */
n = select(nFD + 1, &rfds, &wfds, NULL, NULL);
assert(n > 0);
/* Socket is ready for input */
if (FD_ISSET(nFD, &rfds)) {
n = read(nFD, buf, sizeof buf);
if (n == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got EOF on socket\n");
exit(0);
}
assert(n > 0);
SSLStateMachine_read_inject(pMachine, buf, n);
}
/* stdout is ready for output (and hence we have some to send it) */
if (FD_ISSET(1, &wfds)) {
assert(nrbuf == 1);
buf[0] = rbuf[0];
nrbuf = 0;
n = SSLStateMachine_read_extract(pMachine, buf + 1,
sizeof buf - 1);
if (n < 0) {
SSLStateMachine_print_error(pMachine, "read extract failed");
break;
}
assert(n >= 0);
++n;
if (n > 0) { /* FIXME: has to be true now */
int w;
w = write(1, buf, n);
/* FIXME: we should push back any unwritten data */
assert(w == n);
}
}
/*
* Socket is ready for output (and therefore we have output to send)
*/
if (FD_ISSET(nFD, &wfds)) {
int w;
n = SSLStateMachine_write_extract(pMachine, buf, sizeof buf);
assert(n > 0);
w = write(nFD, buf, n);
/* FIXME: we should push back any unwritten data */
assert(w == n);
}
/* Stdin is ready for input */
if (FD_ISSET(0, &rfds)) {
n = read(0, buf, sizeof buf);
if (n == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got EOF on stdin\n");
exit(0);
}
assert(n > 0);
SSLStateMachine_write_inject(pMachine, buf, n);
}
}
/* not reached */
return 0;
}