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3dafbd4468
The initial thought was that only CS1 mode (the NIST variant) was allowed. The lab has asked if these other modes should be included. The algorithm form indicates that these are able to be validated. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13639)
362 lines
11 KiB
C
362 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* Helper functions for AES CBC CTS ciphers.
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*
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* The function dispatch tables are embedded into cipher_aes.c
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* using cipher_aes_cts.inc
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*/
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/*
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* Refer to SP800-38A-Addendum
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*
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* Ciphertext stealing encrypts plaintext using a block cipher, without padding
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* the message to a multiple of the block size, so the ciphertext is the same
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* size as the plaintext.
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* It does this by altering processing of the last two blocks of the message.
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* The processing of all but the last two blocks is unchanged, but a portion of
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* the second-last block's ciphertext is "stolen" to pad the last plaintext
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* block. The padded final block is then encrypted as usual.
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* The final ciphertext for the last two blocks, consists of the partial block
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* (with the "stolen" portion omitted) plus the full final block,
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* which are the same size as the original plaintext.
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* Decryption requires decrypting the final block first, then restoring the
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* stolen ciphertext to the partial block, which can then be decrypted as usual.
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* AES_CBC_CTS has 3 variants:
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* (1) CS1 The NIST variant.
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* If the length is a multiple of the blocksize it is the same as CBC mode.
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* otherwise it produces C1||C2||(C(n-1))*||Cn.
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* Where C(n-1)* is a partial block.
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* (2) CS2
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* If the length is a multiple of the blocksize it is the same as CBC mode.
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* otherwise it produces C1||C2||Cn||(C(n-1))*.
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* Where C(n-1)* is a partial block.
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* (3) CS3 The Kerberos5 variant.
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* Produces C1||C2||Cn||(C(n-1))* regardless of the length.
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* If the length is a multiple of the blocksize it looks similar to CBC mode
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* with the last 2 blocks swapped.
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* Otherwise it is the same as CS2.
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*/
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#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp */
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include "prov/ciphercommon.h"
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#include "internal/nelem.h"
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#include "cipher_aes_cts.h"
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/* The value assigned to 0 is the default */
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#define CTS_CS1 0
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#define CTS_CS2 1
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#define CTS_CS3 2
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typedef union {
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size_t align;
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unsigned char c[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
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} aligned_16bytes;
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typedef struct cts_mode_name2id_st {
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unsigned int id;
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const char *name;
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} CTS_MODE_NAME2ID;
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static CTS_MODE_NAME2ID cts_modes[] =
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{
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{ CTS_CS1, OSSL_CIPHER_CTS_MODE_CS1 },
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{ CTS_CS2, OSSL_CIPHER_CTS_MODE_CS2 },
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{ CTS_CS3, OSSL_CIPHER_CTS_MODE_CS3 },
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};
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const char *ossl_aes_cbc_cts_mode_id2name(unsigned int id)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(cts_modes); ++i) {
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if (cts_modes[i].id == id)
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return cts_modes[i].name;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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int ossl_aes_cbc_cts_mode_name2id(const char *name)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(cts_modes); ++i) {
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if (strcasecmp(name, cts_modes[i].name) == 0)
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return (int)cts_modes[i].id;
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}
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return -1;
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}
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static size_t cts128_cs1_encrypt(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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{
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aligned_16bytes tmp_in;
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size_t residue;
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residue = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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len -= residue;
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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if (residue == 0)
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return len;
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in += len;
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out += len;
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memset(tmp_in.c, 0, sizeof(tmp_in));
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memcpy(tmp_in.c, in, residue);
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out - AES_BLOCK_SIZE + residue, tmp_in.c,
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AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return 0;
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return len + residue;
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}
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static void do_xor(const unsigned char *in1, const unsigned char *in2,
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size_t len, unsigned char *out)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
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out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
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}
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static size_t cts128_cs1_decrypt(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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{
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aligned_16bytes mid_iv, ct_mid, pt_last;
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size_t residue;
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residue = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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if (residue == 0) {
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/* If there are no partial blocks then it is the same as CBC mode */
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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return len;
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}
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/* Process blocks at the start - but leave the last 2 blocks */
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len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE + residue;
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if (len > 0) {
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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in += len;
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out += len;
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}
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/* Save the iv that will be used by the second last block */
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memcpy(mid_iv.c, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Decrypt the last block first using an iv of zero */
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memset(ctx->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, pt_last.c, in + residue, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Rebuild the ciphertext of the second last block as a combination of
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* the decrypted last block + replace the start with the ciphertext bytes
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* of the partial second last block.
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*/
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memcpy(ct_mid.c, in, residue);
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memcpy(ct_mid.c + residue, pt_last.c + residue, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - residue);
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/*
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* Restore the last partial ciphertext block.
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* Now that we have the cipher text of the second last block, apply
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* that to the partial plaintext end block. We have already decrypted the
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* block using an IV of zero. For decryption the IV is just XORed after
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* doing an AES block - so just XOR in the cipher text.
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*/
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do_xor(ct_mid.c, pt_last.c, residue, out + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Restore the iv needed by the second last block */
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memcpy(ctx->iv, mid_iv.c, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/*
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* Decrypt the second last plaintext block now that we have rebuilt the
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* ciphertext.
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*/
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, ct_mid.c, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return 0;
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return len + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + residue;
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}
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static size_t cts128_cs3_encrypt(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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{
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aligned_16bytes tmp_in;
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size_t residue;
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if (len <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) /* CS3 requires 2 blocks */
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return 0;
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residue = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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if (residue == 0)
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residue = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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len -= residue;
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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in += len;
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out += len;
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memset(tmp_in.c, 0, sizeof(tmp_in));
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memcpy(tmp_in.c, in, residue);
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memcpy(out, out - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, residue);
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, tmp_in.c, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return 0;
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return len + residue;
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}
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/*
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* Note:
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* The cipher text (in) is of the form C(0), C(1), ., C(n), C(n-1)* where
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* C(n) is a full block and C(n-1)* can be a partial block
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* (but could be a full block).
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* This means that the output plaintext (out) needs to swap the plaintext of
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* the last two decoded ciphertext blocks.
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*/
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static size_t cts128_cs3_decrypt(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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{
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aligned_16bytes mid_iv, ct_mid, pt_last;
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size_t residue;
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if (len <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) /* CS3 requires 2 blocks */
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return 0;
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/* Process blocks at the start - but leave the last 2 blocks */
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residue = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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if (residue == 0)
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residue = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE + residue;
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if (len > 0) {
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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in += len;
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out += len;
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}
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/* Save the iv that will be used by the second last block */
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memcpy(mid_iv.c, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Decrypt the Cn block first using an iv of zero */
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memset(ctx->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, pt_last.c, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Rebuild the ciphertext of C(n-1) as a combination of
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* the decrypted C(n) block + replace the start with the ciphertext bytes
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* of the partial last block.
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*/
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memcpy(ct_mid.c, in + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, residue);
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if (residue != AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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memcpy(ct_mid.c + residue, pt_last.c + residue, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - residue);
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/*
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* Restore the last partial ciphertext block.
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* Now that we have the cipher text of the second last block, apply
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* that to the partial plaintext end block. We have already decrypted the
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* block using an IV of zero. For decryption the IV is just XORed after
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* doing an AES block - so just XOR in the ciphertext.
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*/
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do_xor(ct_mid.c, pt_last.c, residue, out + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* Restore the iv needed by the second last block */
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memcpy(ctx->iv, mid_iv.c, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/*
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* Decrypt the second last plaintext block now that we have rebuilt the
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* ciphertext.
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*/
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, ct_mid.c, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
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return 0;
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return len + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + residue;
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}
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static size_t cts128_cs2_encrypt(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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{
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if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0) {
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/* If there are no partial blocks then it is the same as CBC mode */
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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return len;
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}
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/* For partial blocks CS2 is equivalent to CS3 */
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return cts128_cs3_encrypt(ctx, in, out, len);
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}
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static size_t cts128_cs2_decrypt(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t len)
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{
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if (len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0) {
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/* If there are no partial blocks then it is the same as CBC mode */
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if (!ctx->hw->cipher(ctx, out, in, len))
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return 0;
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return len;
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}
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/* For partial blocks CS2 is equivalent to CS3 */
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return cts128_cs3_decrypt(ctx, in, out, len);
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}
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int ossl_aes_cbc_cts_block_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
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size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in,
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size_t inl)
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{
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PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CIPHER_CTX *)vctx;
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size_t sz = 0;
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if (inl < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) /* There must be at least one block for CTS mode */
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return 0;
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if (outsize < inl)
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return 0;
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if (out == NULL) {
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*outl = inl;
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Return an error if the update is called multiple times, only one shot
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* is supported.
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*/
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if (ctx->updated == 1)
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return 0;
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if (ctx->enc) {
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if (ctx->cts_mode == CTS_CS1)
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sz = cts128_cs1_encrypt(ctx, in, out, inl);
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else if (ctx->cts_mode == CTS_CS2)
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sz = cts128_cs2_encrypt(ctx, in, out, inl);
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else if (ctx->cts_mode == CTS_CS3)
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sz = cts128_cs3_encrypt(ctx, in, out, inl);
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} else {
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if (ctx->cts_mode == CTS_CS1)
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sz = cts128_cs1_decrypt(ctx, in, out, inl);
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else if (ctx->cts_mode == CTS_CS2)
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sz = cts128_cs2_decrypt(ctx, in, out, inl);
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else if (ctx->cts_mode == CTS_CS3)
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sz = cts128_cs3_decrypt(ctx, in, out, inl);
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}
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if (sz == 0)
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return 0;
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ctx->updated = 1; /* Stop multiple updates being allowed */
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*outl = sz;
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return 1;
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}
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int ossl_aes_cbc_cts_block_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
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size_t outsize)
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{
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*outl = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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