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https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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eec0ad10b9
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13144)
122 lines
3.3 KiB
C
122 lines
3.3 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/* chacha20 cipher implementation */
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#include "cipher_chacha20.h"
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static int chacha20_initkey(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *bctx, const uint8_t *key,
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size_t keylen)
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{
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PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *)bctx;
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unsigned int i;
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if (key != NULL) {
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for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; i += 4)
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ctx->key.d[i / 4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(key + i);
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}
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ctx->partial_len = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int chacha20_initiv(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *bctx)
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{
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PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *)bctx;
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unsigned int i;
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if (bctx->iv_set) {
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for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_CTR_SIZE; i += 4)
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ctx->counter[i / 4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(bctx->oiv + i);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int chacha20_cipher(PROV_CIPHER_CTX *bctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
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{
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PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CHACHA20_CTX *)bctx;
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unsigned int n, rem, ctr32;
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n = ctx->partial_len;
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if (n > 0) {
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while (inl > 0 && n < CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
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*out++ = *in++ ^ ctx->buf[n++];
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inl--;
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}
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ctx->partial_len = n;
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if (inl == 0)
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return 1;
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if (n == CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
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ctx->partial_len = 0;
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ctx->counter[0]++;
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if (ctx->counter[0] == 0)
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ctx->counter[1]++;
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}
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}
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rem = (unsigned int)(inl % CHACHA_BLK_SIZE);
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inl -= rem;
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ctr32 = ctx->counter[0];
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while (inl >= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
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size_t blocks = inl / CHACHA_BLK_SIZE;
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/*
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* 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number...
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* Below condition is practically never met, but it has to
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* be checked for code correctness.
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*/
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if (sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks > (1U << 28))
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blocks = (1U << 28);
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/*
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* As ChaCha20_ctr32 operates on 32-bit counter, caller
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* has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the
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* overflow, which is then handled by limiting the
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* amount of blocks to the exact overflow point...
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*/
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ctr32 += (unsigned int)blocks;
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if (ctr32 < blocks) {
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blocks -= ctr32;
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ctr32 = 0;
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}
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blocks *= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE;
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ChaCha20_ctr32(out, in, blocks, ctx->key.d, ctx->counter);
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inl -= blocks;
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in += blocks;
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out += blocks;
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ctx->counter[0] = ctr32;
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if (ctr32 == 0) ctx->counter[1]++;
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}
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if (rem > 0) {
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memset(ctx->buf, 0, sizeof(ctx->buf));
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ChaCha20_ctr32(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE,
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ctx->key.d, ctx->counter);
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for (n = 0; n < rem; n++)
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out[n] = in[n] ^ ctx->buf[n];
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ctx->partial_len = rem;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const PROV_CIPHER_HW_CHACHA20 chacha20_hw = {
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{ chacha20_initkey, chacha20_cipher },
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chacha20_initiv
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};
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const PROV_CIPHER_HW *ossl_prov_cipher_hw_chacha20(size_t keybits)
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{
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return (PROV_CIPHER_HW *)&chacha20_hw;
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}
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