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c6fec81b88
Use of the low level DES functions has been informally discouraged for a long time. We now formally deprecate them. Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the equivalently named decrypt functions. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10858)
447 lines
13 KiB
C
447 lines
13 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* DES low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
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* use. We access the DES_set_odd_parity(3) function here.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/des.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "internal/numbers.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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#include "prov/provider_util.h"
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#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
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/* KRB5 KDF defined in RFC 3961, Section 5.1 */
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn krb5kdf_new;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn krb5kdf_free;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn krb5kdf_reset;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn krb5kdf_derive;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn krb5kdf_settable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn krb5kdf_set_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn krb5kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn krb5kdf_get_ctx_params;
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static int KRB5KDF(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *engine,
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const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
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const unsigned char *constant, size_t constant_len,
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unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
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typedef struct {
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void *provctx;
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PROV_CIPHER cipher;
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unsigned char *key;
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size_t key_len;
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unsigned char *constant;
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size_t constant_len;
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} KRB5KDF_CTX;
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static void *krb5kdf_new(void *provctx)
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{
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KRB5KDF_CTX *ctx;
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if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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ctx->provctx = provctx;
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return ctx;
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}
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static void krb5kdf_free(void *vctx)
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{
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KRB5KDF_CTX *ctx = (KRB5KDF_CTX *)vctx;
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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krb5kdf_reset(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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}
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}
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static void krb5kdf_reset(void *vctx)
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{
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KRB5KDF_CTX *ctx = (KRB5KDF_CTX *)vctx;
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ossl_prov_cipher_reset(&ctx->cipher);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->constant, ctx->constant_len);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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static int krb5kdf_set_membuf(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
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const OSSL_PARAM *p)
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{
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OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
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*dst = NULL;
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return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)dst, 0, dst_len);
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}
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static int krb5kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
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size_t keylen)
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{
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KRB5KDF_CTX *ctx = (KRB5KDF_CTX *)vctx;
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = ossl_prov_cipher_cipher(&ctx->cipher);
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ENGINE *engine = ossl_prov_cipher_engine(&ctx->cipher);
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if (cipher == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CIPHER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->key == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->constant == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CONSTANT);
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return 0;
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}
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return KRB5KDF(cipher, engine, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
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ctx->constant, ctx->constant_len,
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key, keylen);
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}
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static int krb5kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *p;
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KRB5KDF_CTX *ctx = vctx;
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OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
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if (!ossl_prov_cipher_load_from_params(&ctx->cipher, params, provctx))
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return 0;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
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if (!krb5kdf_set_membuf(&ctx->key, &ctx->key_len, p))
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return 0;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CONSTANT))
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!= NULL)
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if (!krb5kdf_set_membuf(&ctx->constant, &ctx->constant_len, p))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM *krb5kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CIPHER, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CONSTANT, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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return known_settable_ctx_params;
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}
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static int krb5kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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KRB5KDF_CTX *ctx = (KRB5KDF_CTX *)vctx;
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
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size_t len;
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OSSL_PARAM *p;
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cipher = ossl_prov_cipher_cipher(&ctx->cipher);
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if (cipher)
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len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
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else
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len = EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
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return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, len);
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return -2;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM *krb5kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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return known_gettable_ctx_params;
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}
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const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_krb5kdf_functions[] = {
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))krb5kdf_new },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))krb5kdf_free },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))krb5kdf_reset },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))krb5kdf_derive },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))krb5kdf_settable_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))krb5kdf_set_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))krb5kdf_gettable_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))krb5kdf_get_ctx_params },
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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/*
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* DES3 is a special case, it requires a random-to-key function and its
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* input truncated to 21 bytes of the 24 produced by the cipher.
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* See RFC3961 6.3.1
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*/
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static int fixup_des3_key(unsigned char *key)
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{
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unsigned char *cblock;
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int i, j;
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for (i = 2; i >= 0; i--) {
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cblock = &key[i * 8];
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memmove(cblock, &key[i * 7], 7);
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cblock[7] = 0;
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for (j = 0; j < 7; j++)
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cblock[7] |= (cblock[j] & 1) << (j + 1);
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DES_set_odd_parity((DES_cblock *)cblock);
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}
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/* fail if keys are such that triple des degrades to single des */
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(&key[0], &key[8], 8) == 0 ||
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CRYPTO_memcmp(&key[8], &key[16], 8) == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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/*
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* N-fold(K) where blocksize is N, and constant_len is K
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* Note: Here |= denotes concatenation
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*
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* L = lcm(N,K)
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* R = L/K
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*
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* for r: 1 -> R
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* s |= constant rot 13*(r-1))
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*
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* block = 0
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* for k: 1 -> K
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* block += s[N(k-1)..(N-1)k] (one's complement addition)
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*
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* Optimizing for space we compute:
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* for each l in L-1 -> 0:
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* s[l] = (constant rot 13*(l/K))[l%k]
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* block[l % N] += s[l] (with carry)
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* finally add carry if any
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*/
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static void n_fold(unsigned char *block, unsigned int blocksize,
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const unsigned char *constant, size_t constant_len)
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{
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unsigned int tmp, gcd, remainder, lcm, carry;
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int b, l;
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if (constant_len == blocksize) {
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memcpy(block, constant, constant_len);
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return;
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}
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/* Least Common Multiple of lengths: LCM(a,b)*/
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gcd = blocksize;
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remainder = constant_len;
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/* Calculate Great Common Divisor first GCD(a,b) */
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while (remainder != 0) {
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tmp = gcd % remainder;
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gcd = remainder;
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remainder = tmp;
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}
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/* resulting a is the GCD, LCM(a,b) = |a*b|/GCD(a,b) */
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lcm = blocksize * constant_len / gcd;
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/* now spread out the bits */
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memset(block, 0, blocksize);
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/* last to first to be able to bring carry forward */
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carry = 0;
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for (l = lcm - 1; l >= 0; l--) {
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unsigned int rotbits, rshift, rbyte;
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/* destination byte in block is l % N */
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b = l % blocksize;
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/* Our virtual s buffer is R = L/K long (K = constant_len) */
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/* So we rotate backwards from R-1 to 0 (none) rotations */
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rotbits = 13 * (l / constant_len);
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/* find the byte on s where rotbits falls onto */
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rbyte = l - (rotbits / 8);
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/* calculate how much shift on that byte */
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rshift = rotbits & 0x07;
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/* rbyte % constant_len gives us the unrotated byte in the
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* constant buffer, get also the previous byte then
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* appropriately shift them to get the rotated byte we need */
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tmp = (constant[(rbyte-1) % constant_len] << (8 - rshift)
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| constant[rbyte % constant_len] >> rshift)
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& 0xff;
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/* add with carry to any value placed by previous passes */
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tmp += carry + block[b];
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block[b] = tmp & 0xff;
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/* save any carry that may be left */
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carry = tmp >> 8;
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}
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/* if any carry is left at the end, add it through the number */
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for (b = blocksize - 1; b >= 0 && carry != 0; b--) {
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carry += block[b];
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block[b] = carry & 0xff;
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carry >>= 8;
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}
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}
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static int cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
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const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *engine,
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const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
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{
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int klen, ret;
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ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, engine, key, NULL);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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/* set the key len for the odd variable key len cipher */
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klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
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if (key_len != (size_t)klen) {
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ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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}
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/* we never want padding, either the length requested is a multiple of
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* the cipher block size or we are passed a cipher that can cope with
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* partial blocks via techniques like cipher text stealing */
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ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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out:
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return ret;
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}
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static int KRB5KDF(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *engine,
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const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
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const unsigned char *constant, size_t constant_len,
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unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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unsigned char block[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
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unsigned char *plainblock, *cipherblock;
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size_t blocksize;
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size_t cipherlen;
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size_t osize;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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int des3_no_fixup = 0;
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#endif
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int ret;
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if (key_len != okey_len) {
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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/* special case for 3des, where the caller may be requesting
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* the random raw key, instead of the fixed up key */
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if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc &&
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key_len == 24 && okey_len == 21) {
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des3_no_fixup = 1;
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} else {
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#endif
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
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return 0;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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}
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#endif
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}
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ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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ret = cipher_init(ctx, cipher, engine, key, key_len);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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/* Initialize input block */
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blocksize = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
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if (constant_len > blocksize) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CONSTANT_LENGTH);
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ret = 0;
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goto out;
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}
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n_fold(block, blocksize, constant, constant_len);
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plainblock = block;
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cipherblock = block + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
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for (osize = 0; osize < okey_len; osize += cipherlen) {
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int olen;
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ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, cipherblock, &olen,
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plainblock, blocksize);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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cipherlen = olen;
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ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherblock, &olen);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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if (olen != 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH);
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ret = 0;
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goto out;
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}
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/* write cipherblock out */
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if (cipherlen > okey_len - osize)
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cipherlen = okey_len - osize;
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memcpy(okey + osize, cipherblock, cipherlen);
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if (okey_len > osize + cipherlen) {
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/* we need to reinitialize cipher context per spec */
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ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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ret = cipher_init(ctx, cipher, engine, key, key_len);
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if (!ret)
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goto out;
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/* also swap block offsets so last ciphertext becomes new
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* plaintext */
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plainblock = cipherblock;
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if (cipherblock == block) {
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cipherblock += EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
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} else {
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cipherblock = block;
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}
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}
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
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if (EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc && !des3_no_fixup) {
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ret = fixup_des3_key(okey);
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if (!ret) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GENERATE_KEY);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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#endif
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ret = 1;
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out:
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(block, EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH * 2);
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return ret;
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}
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