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openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
Gerd Hoffmann d7af3f7aa7 fix vs2019 warning 
windows vs2019 throws warnings when compiling openssl for edk2:

ERROR - Compiler #2220 from [2024-07-15 13:43:34] [build-stdout] d:\a\edk2\edk2\CryptoPkg\Library\OpensslLib\openssl\ssl\statem\statem_clnt.c(1895) : the following warning is treated as an error
WARNING - Compiler #4701 from [2024-07-15 13:43:34] [build-stdout] d:\a\edk2\edk2\CryptoPkg\Library\OpensslLib\openssl\ssl\statem\statem_clnt.c(1895) : potentially uninitialized local variable 'peer_rpk' used
WARNING - Compiler #4703 from [2024-07-15 13:43:34] [build-stdout] d:\a\edk2\edk2\CryptoPkg\Library\OpensslLib\openssl\ssl\statem\statem_clnt.c(1895) : potentially uninitialized local pointer variable 'peer_rpk' used

Explicitly initialize the peer_rpk variable to make the compiler happy.

Yes, it's a false positive, but you have to check the tls_process_rpk()
body in another source file to see that, which apparently is beyond the
compiler's capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24895)
2024-07-18 16:13:41 +02:00

4177 lines
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/*
* Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include "statem_local.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/comp.h"
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt);
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt);
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
WPACKET *pkt);
static ossl_inline int received_server_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
{
return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
}
/*
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
&& (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
|| (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite or for SRP
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
| SSL_kSRP)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
* yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
* ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
*/
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
/*
* This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
* thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
if (s->hit) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
&& s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
return 1;
}
#endif
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
&& s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT;
return 1;
}
#endif
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
return 1;
}
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
/* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
# error Internal DTLS version error
#endif
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
&& s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
/*
* In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
* digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
* to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
* message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
*/
if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
}
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ske_expected;
/*
* Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
* we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
goto err;
return 1;
}
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
/*
* We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
* data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
* HelloRetryRequest.
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
&& mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
&& s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
&& s->session->ext.tick != NULL
&& mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
* from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
* the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
* the server is resuming.
*/
s->hit = 1;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
} else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
} else {
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
|| ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
/*
* The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
* |ext.status_expected| is set
*/
if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
return 1;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
goto err;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
goto err;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
return 1;
}
break;
}
err:
/* No valid transition found */
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
BIO *rbio;
/*
* CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
* because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
*/
s->init_num = 0;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
return 0;
}
SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
{
/* If we negotiated RPK, we won't try to compress it */
return sc->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
&& sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
* server.
*/
static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
* TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
* ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
*/
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
if (do_compressed_cert(s))
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
* we already sent close_notify
*/
if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
/* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
&& s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
/* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
: TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Try to read from the server instead */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
* move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
* version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
* later
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (!s->renegotiate) {
/*
* We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
* received a message from the server. Better read it.
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
/* Renegotiation */
/* fall thru */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
/*
* We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
* actually selected a version yet.
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
*/
s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
/*
* We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
* CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
* because we did early data.
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
} else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
} else {
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endif
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
/*
* If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
* convenient time.
*/
if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), 1)) {
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
} else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED) {
/*
* This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
* earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
* previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
* write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
*/
if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
TLS_ANY_VERSION,
OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL,
NULL)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->hit) {
/*
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
* messages unless we need to.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)))) {
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
}
#endif
}
break;
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
/*
* If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
* attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
* on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
*/
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
|| s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
s->init_num = 0;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->max_early_data > 0) {
/*
* We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
* cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
* we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
*/
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
/* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
} else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|| s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
break;
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->max_early_data > 0) {
/*
* We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
* cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
* we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
*/
if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
return WORK_ERROR;
break;
}
s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_B;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
* client
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
return 0;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
*confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
else
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
*confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
*confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
*mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
break;
case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
*confunc = NULL;
*mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
*confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT:
*confunc = tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate;
*mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
break;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
*confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
*mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
break;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
*confunc = tls_construct_finished;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
*confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
*mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
break;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return 0;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
/*
* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
* practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
* to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
*/
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 3;
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
: SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
}
}
/*
* Process a message that the client has received from the server.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
#endif
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
}
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the server
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT:
return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
}
}
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t sess_id_len;
int i, protverr;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
unsigned char *session_id;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
if (sess == NULL
|| !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
|| !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
&& !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3.client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
}
}
} else {
i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
}
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*
* For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
* supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* Session ID */
session_id = s->session->session_id;
if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
&& RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
} else {
sess_id_len = 0;
}
} else {
assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
}
}
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
sess_id_len))
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
/* Ciphers supported */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)),
pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
&& sctx->comp_methods
&& (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
|| s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, i);
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
}
#endif
/* Add the NULL method */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
size_t cookie_len;
PACKET cookiepkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
const unsigned char *cipherchars)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
int i;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
&& s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
/* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(sctx, c->algorithm2);
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
* ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
*/
if (md == NULL
|| md != ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
return 0;
}
} else {
/*
* Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
* ciphersuite.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
return 0;
}
}
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
return 1;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET session_id, extpkt;
size_t session_id_len;
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
int hrr = 0;
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
unsigned int context;
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* load the server random */
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
&& PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
&& memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
/* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hrr = 1;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
} else {
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
}
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* TLS extensions */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
} else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!hrr) {
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
&extensions, NULL, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
if (compression != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
|| memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
session_id_len) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
goto err;
}
}
if (hrr) {
if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
}
/*
* Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
* are appropriate for this version.
*/
context = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
: SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
s->hit = 0;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
* the message must be on a record boundary.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
goto err;
}
/* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
extensions, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else {
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
* secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
* EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
* ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
* first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
* message to see if the server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
&& s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
* backwards compat reasons
*/
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (session_id_len != 0
&& session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
session_id_len) == 0)
s->hit = 1;
}
if (s->hit) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto err;
}
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
/*
* In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
* resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
* echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
* used for resumption.
*/
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
if (session_id_len > 0)
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
session_id_len);
}
}
/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
* version.
*/
s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
#else
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto err;
}
if (compression == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto err;
} else {
comp = ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->comp_methods,
compression);
}
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
} else {
s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
size_t labellen;
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
/* Don't include the terminating zero. */
labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
labellen += 1;
if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
/*
* In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
* we're done with this message
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|| !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* If we're not doing early-data and we're not going to send a dummy CCS
* (i.e. no middlebox compat mode) then we can change the write keys
* immediately. Otherwise we have to defer this until after all possible
* early data is written. We could just always defer until the last
* moment except QUIC needs it done at the same time as the read keys
* are changed. Since QUIC doesn't do TLS early data or need middlebox
* compat this doesn't cause a problem.
*/
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
&& !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *extpkt)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
/*
* If we were sending early_data then any alerts should not be sent using
* the old wrlmethod.
*/
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
&& !ssl_set_new_record_layer(s,
TLS_ANY_VERSION,
OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE,
OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
/* We are definitely going to be using TLSv1.3 */
s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, TLS1_3_VERSION);
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
&extensions, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
extensions = NULL;
if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
/*
* We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
* ClientHello will not change
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
* a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
*/
if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
* automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
* need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
* for HRR messages.
*/
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
err:
OPENSSL_free(extensions);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
static WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
WORK_STATE wst)
{
size_t certidx;
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
if (sc->session->peer_rpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_INVALID_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, sc->session->peer_rpk) > 0
&& sc->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(sc->session->peer_rpk, &certidx,
SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc))) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
* skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
* type.
*/
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
if ((clu->amask & sc->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_RPK_TYPE);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
/* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
X509_free(sc->session->peer);
sc->session->peer = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)
&& !ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
&sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
size_t chainidx;
unsigned int context = 0;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
return tls_process_server_rpk(s, pkt);
if (s->ext.server_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
|| context != 0
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
cert_len) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
PACKET extensions;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
NULL, chainidx == 0)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
rawexts, x, chainidx,
PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
/* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
}
if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
X509_free(x);
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
s->session->peer_chain = NULL;
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
* On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
* Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
*/
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
size_t certidx;
int i;
if (s->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
return tls_post_process_server_rpk(s, wst);
if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY)
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, s->session->peer_chain);
if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) {
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
/*
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
* However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
* to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
* no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
* reverted because at least one application *only* set
* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
* server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
* nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
* sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0);
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx,
SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s))) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
* skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
* type.
*/
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
X509_free(s->session->peer);
X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* Ensure there is no RPK */
EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
&s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
{
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
PACKET tmppkt;
BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
ret = tls_process_server_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
return ret;
}
#endif
static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.g =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.s =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
*pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
return 1;
#else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = NULL;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
int ret = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
NULL);
bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
(int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
if (tmpl == NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
bnpub_key)
|| (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx->libctx, "DH", sctx->propq);
if (pctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx, &peer_tmp, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, peer_tmp, sctx->propq);
if (pctx == NULL
/*
* EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
* a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
* we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
* EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
*/
|| EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx) != 1
|| EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx) != 1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp),
0, peer_tmp)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
peer_tmp = NULL;
/*
* FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
*/
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
*pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
ret = 1;
err:
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
return ret;
}
static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
{
PACKET encoded_pt;
unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
* server has sent an invalid curve.
*/
if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
}
if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
*pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
*pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
/* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
return 1;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
long alg_k;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
PACKET params;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *tbs;
size_t tbslen;
int rv;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
* equals the length of the parameters.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
unsigned int sigalg;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md));
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
PACKET_remaining(&params));
if (tbslen == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
if (rv <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
md_ctx = NULL;
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
&& !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DATA);
}
/* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt)
{
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags != NULL)
memset(s->s3.tmp.valid_flags, 0, s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
else
s->s3.tmp.valid_flags = OPENSSL_zalloc(s->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(uint32_t));
/* Give up for good if allocation didn't work */
if (s->s3.tmp.valid_flags == NULL)
return 0;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
PACKET reqctx, extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
/*
* We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
* post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
* we just ignore it
*/
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
/* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
s->pha_context = NULL;
s->pha_context_len = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
!PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
&rawexts, NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
} else {
PACKET ctypes;
/* get the certificate types */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
PACKET sigalgs;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
* with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
*/
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
/*
* In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
* after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
* in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
* but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
* SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
* client_cert_cb.
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned int ticklen;
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
unsigned int sess_len;
RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
PACKET nonce;
EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
|| (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
|| (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
: PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/*
* Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
* ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
* be 0 here in that instance
*/
if (ticklen == 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
/*
* Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
* we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
* we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
* time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
* post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
* cache.
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
*/
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
* any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
* old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
*/
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
PACKET extpkt;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
* ticket.
*/
sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(sctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", sctx->propq);
if (sha256 == NULL) {
/* Error is already recorded */
SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
* but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
*/
if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
sha256, NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_free(sha256);
sha256 = NULL;
s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
s->session->not_resumable = 0;
/* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
size_t hashlen;
static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
nonce_label,
sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
PACKET_data(&nonce),
PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
s->session->master_key,
hashlen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
OPENSSL_free(exts);
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
EVP_MD_free(sha256);
OPENSSL_free(exts);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
* parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
*/
int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
size_t resplen;
unsigned int type;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
}
/*
* Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
* server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
* In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
* on failure.
*/
int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
/*
* Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
* |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
* message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
*/
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
int ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
sctx->ext.status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
return 0;
}
if (ret < 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
/* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
#endif
return 1;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int ret = 0;
/*
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
* strnlen.
*/
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identitylen = 0;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
char *tmpidentity = NULL;
size_t psklen = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
psklen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
goto err;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto err;
}
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
tmppsk = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
tmpidentity = NULL;
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
return ret;
#else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t enclen;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (!received_server_cert(s)) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pkey, sctx->propq);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
int prime_len;
unsigned char *encoded_pub = NULL;
size_t encoded_pub_len, pad_len;
int ret = 0;
skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* send off the data */
/* Generate encoding of server key */
encoded_pub_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encoded_pub);
if (encoded_pub_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
/*
* For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
* as the prime.
*/
prime_len = EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey);
pad_len = prime_len - encoded_pub_len;
if (pad_len > 0) {
if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, pad_len, &keybytes)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memset(keybytes, 0, pad_len);
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pub, encoded_pub_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
}
static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Generate encoding of client key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
}
static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
/*
* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
return 0;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
pkey,
sctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
/* Generate session key
*/
|| RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ukm_hash == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
ukm_hash = NULL;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*
* Encapsulate it into sequence
*/
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
|| (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
return 0;
#else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
return NID_magma_ctr;
else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
return NID_undef;
}
int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *hash = NULL;
unsigned int md_len;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256,
sctx->propq);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
ssl_evp_md_free(md);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
ssl_evp_md_free(md);
return 1;
}
#endif
static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
/* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
size_t msglen;
int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, pms, pmslen, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
if ((pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx,
pkey,
sctx->propq);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, NULL, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, msglen, &encdata)
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, encdata, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
pkey_ctx = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
return 0;
#else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
&abytes)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/*
* All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
* no need to do so here.
*/
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
&& !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
goto err;
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
goto err;
} else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
#endif
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
/* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
pms = NULL;
pmslen = 0;
goto err;
}
pms = NULL;
pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
size_t labellen;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
/* Don't include the terminating zero. */
labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
labellen += 1;
if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0;
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
i = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (i == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509)
|| !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
}
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|| (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
WPACKET *pkt)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
/* no context available, add 0-length context */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
} else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
}
if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 2)
cpk = s->cert->key;
switch (s->ext.client_cert_type) {
case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
break;
default:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
/*
* If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
* then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
* moment. We need to do it now.
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
&& SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
&& (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
|| (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
&& (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
/*
* This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
* state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc,
WPACKET *pkt)
{
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc);
WPACKET tmppkt;
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
size_t length;
size_t max_length;
COMP_METHOD *method;
COMP_CTX *comp = NULL;
int comp_len;
int ret = 0;
int alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0];
/* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL || !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt, buf))
goto err;
/* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
if (sc->pha_context == NULL) {
/* no context available, add 0-length context */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt, 0))
goto err;
} else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc, &tmppkt, sc->cert->key, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto out;
}
/* continue with the real |pkt| */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt, &length)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, length))
goto err;
switch (alg) {
case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib:
method = COMP_zlib_oneshot();
break;
case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli:
method = COMP_brotli_oneshot();
break;
case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd:
method = COMP_zstd_oneshot();
break;
default:
goto err;
}
max_length = ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg, length);
if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, max_length, NULL))
goto err;
comp_len = COMP_compress_block(comp, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt), max_length,
(unsigned char *)buf->data, length);
if (comp_len <= 0)
goto err;
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, comp_len, NULL)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt))
goto err;
/*
* If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode
* then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible
* moment. We need to do it now.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc)
&& (sc->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
|| (sc->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
&& (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(sc,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
/*
* This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
* inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
*/
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
goto out;
}
ret = 1;
goto out;
err:
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
out:
if (buf != NULL) {
/* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt);
}
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
COMP_CTX_free(comp);
return ret;
}
#endif
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
size_t idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
return 1;
/* This is the passed certificate */
pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s));
/* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
return 0;
}
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
return 0;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Early out to skip the checks below */
if (s->session->peer_rpk != NULL)
return 1;
if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
size_t len, padding_len;
unsigned char *padding = NULL;
len = s->ext.npn_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
/*
* This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
* compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
* attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
* HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
* but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
*/
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
SSL_renegotiate(ssl);
else
SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET extensions;
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
NULL, 1)
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (sctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (sctx->client_cert_cb)
i = sctx->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
WPACKET *pkt)
{
int i;
size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
&& ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, TLS1_VERSION, NULL)
&& s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
if (sk == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
# error Max cipher length too short
# endif
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
else
#endif
/* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
maxlen = 0xfffe;
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
maxlen -= 2;
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
maxlen -= 2;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
continue;
if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
if (!maxverok) {
int minproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls;
int maxproto = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls;
if (ssl_version_cmp(s, maxproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) >= 0
&& ssl_version_cmp(s, minproto, s->s3.tmp.max_ver) <= 0)
maxverok = 1;
}
totlen += len;
}
if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
const char *maxvertext =
!maxverok
? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
: NULL;
SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE,
maxvertext);
return 0;
}
if (totlen != 0) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static const SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
if (!ssl->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
}
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
}
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