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openssl/ssl/ssl_sess.c
Todd Short 25959e04c3 Optimize session cache flushing 
Sort SSL_SESSION structures by timeout in the linked list.
Iterate over the linked list for timeout, stopping when no more
session can be flushed.
Do SSL_SESSION_free() outside of SSL_CTX lock
Update timeout upon use

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8687)
2021-06-10 18:32:25 +10:00

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#if defined(__TANDEM) && defined(_SPT_MODEL_)
# include <spthread.h>
# include <spt_extensions.h> /* timeval */
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include "statem/statem_local.h"
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_SESSION)
__owur static int sess_timedout(time_t t, SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
/* if timeout overflowed, it can never timeout! */
if (ss->timeout_ovf)
return 0;
return t > ss->calc_timeout;
}
/*
* Returns -1/0/+1 as other XXXcmp-type functions
* Takes overflow of calculated timeout into consideration
*/
__owur static int timeoutcmp(SSL_SESSION *a, SSL_SESSION *b)
{
/* if only one overflowed, then it is greater */
if (a->timeout_ovf && !b->timeout_ovf)
return 1;
if (!a->timeout_ovf && b->timeout_ovf)
return -1;
/* No overflow, or both overflowed, so straight compare is safe */
if (a->calc_timeout < b->calc_timeout)
return -1;
if (a->calc_timeout > b->calc_timeout)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Calculates effective timeout, saving overflow state
* Locking must be done by the caller of this function
*/
void ssl_session_calculate_timeout(SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
/* Force positive timeout */
if (ss->timeout < 0)
ss->timeout = 0;
ss->calc_timeout = ss->time + ss->timeout;
/*
* |timeout| is always zero or positive, so the check for
* overflow only needs to consider if |time| is positive
*/
ss->timeout_ovf = ss->time > 0 && ss->calc_timeout < ss->time;
/*
* N.B. Realistic overflow can only occur in our lifetimes on a
* 32-bit machine in January 2038.
* However, There are no controls to limit the |timeout|
* value, except to keep it positive.
*/
}
/*
* SSL_get_session() and SSL_get1_session() are problematic in TLS1.3 because,
* unlike in earlier protocol versions, the session ticket may not have been
* sent yet even though a handshake has finished. The session ticket data could
* come in sometime later...or even change if multiple session ticket messages
* are sent from the server. The preferred way for applications to obtain
* a resumable session is to use SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb().
*/
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
{
return ssl->session;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
/*
* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
* and when we up the reference count.
*/
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->lock))
return NULL;
sess = ssl->session;
if (sess)
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(sess);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock);
return sess;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx);
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
{
SSL_SESSION *ss;
if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL))
return NULL;
ss = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ss));
if (ss == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
ss->references = 1;
ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
ss->time = time(NULL);
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(ss);
ss->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (ss->lock == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OPENSSL_free(ss);
return NULL;
}
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data)) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock);
OPENSSL_free(ss);
return NULL;
}
return ss;
}
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src)
{
return ssl_session_dup(src, 1);
}
/*
* Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If
* ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is.
*/
SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket)
{
SSL_SESSION *dest;
dest = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*dest));
if (dest == NULL) {
goto err;
}
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(*dest));
/*
* Set the various pointers to NULL so that we can call SSL_SESSION_free in
* the case of an error whilst halfway through constructing dest
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
dest->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
dest->psk_identity = NULL;
#endif
dest->ext.hostname = NULL;
dest->ext.tick = NULL;
dest->ext.alpn_selected = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
dest->srp_username = NULL;
#endif
dest->peer_chain = NULL;
dest->peer = NULL;
dest->ticket_appdata = NULL;
memset(&dest->ex_data, 0, sizeof(dest->ex_data));
/* We deliberately don't copy the prev and next pointers */
dest->prev = NULL;
dest->next = NULL;
dest->references = 1;
dest->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (dest->lock == NULL)
goto err;
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, dest, &dest->ex_data))
goto err;
if (src->peer != NULL) {
if (!X509_up_ref(src->peer))
goto err;
dest->peer = src->peer;
}
if (src->peer_chain != NULL) {
dest->peer_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(src->peer_chain);
if (dest->peer_chain == NULL)
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (src->psk_identity_hint) {
dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint);
if (dest->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (src->psk_identity) {
dest->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity);
if (dest->psk_identity == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION,
&dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) {
goto err;
}
if (src->ext.hostname) {
dest->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(src->ext.hostname);
if (dest->ext.hostname == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (ticket != 0 && src->ext.tick != NULL) {
dest->ext.tick =
OPENSSL_memdup(src->ext.tick, src->ext.ticklen);
if (dest->ext.tick == NULL)
goto err;
} else {
dest->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
dest->ext.ticklen = 0;
}
if (src->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
dest->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(src->ext.alpn_selected,
src->ext.alpn_selected_len);
if (dest->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (src->srp_username) {
dest->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(src->srp_username);
if (dest->srp_username == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (src->ticket_appdata != NULL) {
dest->ticket_appdata =
OPENSSL_memdup(src->ticket_appdata, src->ticket_appdata_len);
if (dest->ticket_appdata == NULL)
goto err;
}
return dest;
err:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
SSL_SESSION_free(dest);
return NULL;
}
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
{
if (len)
*len = (unsigned int)s->session_id_length;
return s->session_id;
}
const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *s,
unsigned int *len)
{
if (len != NULL)
*len = (unsigned int)s->sid_ctx_length;
return s->sid_ctx;
}
unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->compress_meth;
}
/*
* SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling
* the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to
* complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw:
* understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid
* a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the
* RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to
* 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions
* is perhaps a more interesting question ...
*/
#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
static int def_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
unsigned int *id_len)
{
unsigned int retry = 0;
do
if (RAND_bytes_ex(ssl->ctx->libctx, id, *id_len, 0) <= 0)
return 0;
while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
(++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
return 1;
/* else - woops a session_id match */
/*
* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
* a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
* creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
* means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
* a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
* internal cache as well).
*/
return 0;
}
int ssl_generate_session_id(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
unsigned int tmp;
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
switch (s->version) {
case SSL3_VERSION:
case TLS1_VERSION:
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
case TLS1_3_VERSION:
case DTLS1_BAD_VER:
case DTLS1_VERSION:
case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
break;
default:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
/*-
* If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
* Note that:
* (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
* ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
* When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, statem_srvr.c calls
* ssl_get_new_session() in tls_process_client_hello().
* At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
* however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
* whether a ticket is expected or not.
*
* (b) statem_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
* ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
* ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
*/
if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
return 1;
}
/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->lock))
return 0;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock)) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
return 0;
}
if (s->generate_session_id)
cb = s->generate_session_id;
else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
/* Choose a session ID */
memset(ss->session_id, 0, ss->session_id_length);
tmp = (int)ss->session_id_length;
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
/* The callback failed */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
* set it higher than it was.
*/
if (tmp == 0 || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
/* The callback set an illegal length */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
/* Finally, check for a conflict */
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
(unsigned int)ss->session_id_length)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
{
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
else
ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
if (session) {
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* We generate the session id while constructing the
* NewSessionTicket in TLSv1.3.
*/
ss->session_id_length = 0;
} else if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
} else {
ss->session_id_length = 0;
}
if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
return 0;
}
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
s->session = ss;
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
/* If client supports extended master secret set it in session */
if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)
ss->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id,
size_t sess_id_len)
{
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP) == 0) {
SSL_SESSION data;
data.ssl_version = s->version;
if (!ossl_assert(sess_id_len <= SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
return NULL;
memcpy(data.session_id, sess_id, sess_id_len);
data.session_id_length = sess_id_len;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(s->session_ctx->lock))
return NULL;
ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
if (ret != NULL) {
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->session_ctx->lock);
if (ret == NULL)
tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
}
if (ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
int copy = 1;
ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, sess_id, sess_id_len, &copy);
if (ret != NULL) {
tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
/*
* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
* to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
* callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
* reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
* thread-safe).
*/
if (copy)
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
/*
* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
* well if and only if we are supposed to.
*/
if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0) {
/*
* Either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session should not
* interrupt the session resumption process. The return
* value is intentionally ignored.
*/
(void)SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
}
}
return ret;
}
/*-
* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
* connection. It is only called by servers.
*
* hello: The parsed ClientHello data
*
* Returns:
* -1: fatal error
* 0: no session found
* 1: a session may have been found.
*
* Side effects:
* - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
* existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
* - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 1
* if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
*/
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
/* This is used only by servers. */
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
int fatal = 0;
int try_session_cache = 0;
SSL_TICKET_STATUS r;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/*
* By default we will send a new ticket. This can be overridden in the
* ticket processing.
*/
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, hello->pre_proc_exts,
NULL, 0)
|| !tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
hello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0))
return -1;
ret = s->session;
} else {
/* sets s->ext.ticket_expected */
r = tls_get_ticket_from_client(s, hello, &ret);
switch (r) {
case SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC:
case SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER:
fatal = 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
case SSL_TICKET_NONE:
case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
if (hello->session_id_len > 0) {
try_session_cache = 1;
ret = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, hello->session_id,
hello->session_id_len);
}
break;
case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS:
case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
break;
}
}
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
/* Check TLS version consistency */
if (ret->ssl_version != s->version)
goto err;
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
/*
* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
* use it in this context.
*/
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
}
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
/*
* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
* which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
* should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
* case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
* cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
* noticing).
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
if (sess_timedout(time(NULL), ret)) {
tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
if (try_session_cache) {
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
}
goto err;
}
/* Check extended master secret extension consistency */
if (ret->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
/* If old session includes extms, but new does not: abort handshake */
if (!(s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
fatal = 1;
goto err;
}
} else if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
/* If new session includes extms, but old does not: do not resume */
goto err;
}
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* We already did this for TLS1.3 */
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = ret;
}
tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
return 1;
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
/* In TLSv1.3 s->session was already set to ret, so we NULL it out */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
s->session = NULL;
if (!try_session_cache) {
/*
* The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
* the new session
*/
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
}
}
if (fatal)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
int ret = 0;
SSL_SESSION *s;
/*
* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
* it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
* an lhash
*/
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c);
/*
* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
*/
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(c);
return 0;
}
s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
/*
* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
* case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
* ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
*/
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
/*
* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
* handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
* same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
* obtain the same session from an external cache)
*/
s = NULL;
} else if (s == NULL &&
lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c) == NULL) {
/* s == NULL can also mean OOM error in lh_SSL_SESSION_insert ... */
/*
* ... so take back the extra reference and also don't add
* the session to the SSL_SESSION_list at this time
*/
s = c;
}
/* Adjust last used time, and add back into the cache at the appropriate spot */
if (ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_UPDATE_TIME) {
c->time = time(NULL);
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(c);
}
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
if (s != NULL) {
/*
* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
* count because it already takes into account the cache
*/
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
ret = 0;
} else {
/*
* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
*/
ret = 1;
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
break;
else
tsan_counter(&ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
}
}
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
return ret;
}
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
{
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
}
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
{
SSL_SESSION *r;
int ret = 0;
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
if (lck) {
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock))
return 0;
}
if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) != NULL) {
ret = 1;
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, r);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, r);
}
c->not_resumable = 1;
if (lck)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, c);
if (ret)
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
}
return ret;
}
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
int i;
if (ss == NULL)
return;
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&ss->references, &i, ss->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof(ss->master_key));
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof(ss->session_id));
X509_free(ss->peer);
sk_X509_pop_free(ss->peer_chain, X509_free);
OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.hostname);
OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint);
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(ss->srp_username);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.alpn_selected);
OPENSSL_free(ss->ticket_appdata);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ss->lock);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ss, sizeof(*ss));
}
int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *ss)
{
int i;
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ss->references, &i, ss->lock) <= 0)
return 0;
REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
}
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
if (s->ctx->method != s->method) {
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s, s->ctx->method))
return 0;
}
if (session != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
s->verify_result = session->verify_result;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = session;
return 1;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid,
unsigned int sid_len)
{
if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->session_id_length = sid_len;
if (sid != s->session_id)
memcpy(s->session_id, sid, sid_len);
return 1;
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
{
time_t new_timeout = (time_t)t;
if (s == NULL || t < 0)
return 0;
if (s->owner != NULL) {
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->owner->lock))
return 0;
s->timeout = new_timeout;
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s);
SSL_SESSION_list_add(s->owner, s);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->owner->lock);
} else {
s->timeout = new_timeout;
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s);
}
return 1;
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
return (long)s->timeout;
}
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
return (long)s->time;
}
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
{
time_t new_time = (time_t)t;
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
if (s->owner != NULL) {
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->owner->lock))
return 0;
s->time = new_time;
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s);
SSL_SESSION_list_add(s->owner, s);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->owner->lock);
} else {
s->time = new_time;
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s);
}
return t;
}
int SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->ssl_version;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *s, int version)
{
s->ssl_version = version;
return 1;
}
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->cipher;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(SSL_SESSION *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
{
s->cipher = cipher;
return 1;
}
const char *SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->ext.hostname;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_hostname(SSL_SESSION *s, const char *hostname)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
if (hostname == NULL) {
s->ext.hostname = NULL;
return 1;
}
s->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(hostname);
return s->ext.hostname != NULL;
}
int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return (s->ext.ticklen > 0) ? 1 : 0;
}
unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->ext.tick_lifetime_hint;
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick,
size_t *len)
{
*len = s->ext.ticklen;
if (tick != NULL)
*tick = s->ext.tick;
}
uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->ext.max_early_data;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set_max_early_data(SSL_SESSION *s, uint32_t max_early_data)
{
s->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
return 1;
}
void SSL_SESSION_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL_SESSION *s,
const unsigned char **alpn,
size_t *len)
{
*alpn = s->ext.alpn_selected;
*len = s->ext.alpn_selected_len;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_alpn_selected(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *alpn,
size_t len)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn_selected);
if (alpn == NULL || len == 0) {
s->ext.alpn_selected = NULL;
s->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
return 1;
}
s->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(alpn, len);
if (s->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
return 0;
}
s->ext.alpn_selected_len = len;
return 1;
}
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s)
{
return s->peer;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
{
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
if (sid_ctx != s->sid_ctx)
memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
return 1;
}
int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared "ticket" without a
* session ID.
*/
return !s->not_resumable
&& (s->session_id_length > 0 || s->ext.ticklen > 0);
}
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
long l;
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
l = s->session_timeout;
s->session_timeout = t;
return l;
}
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
return s->session_timeout;
}
int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s,
tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb,
void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
s->ext.session_secret_cb = tls_session_secret_cb;
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg = arg;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn cb,
void *arg)
{
if (s == NULL)
return 0;
s->ext.session_ticket_cb = cb;
s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg = arg;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
{
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
s->ext.session_ticket = NULL;
s->ext.session_ticket =
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
if (s->ext.session_ticket == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (ext_data != NULL) {
s->ext.session_ticket->length = ext_len;
s->ext.session_ticket->data = s->ext.session_ticket + 1;
memcpy(s->ext.session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
} else {
s->ext.session_ticket->length = 0;
s->ext.session_ticket->data = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sk;
SSL_SESSION *current;
unsigned long i;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(s->lock))
return;
sk = sk_SSL_SESSION_new_null();
i = lh_SSL_SESSION_get_down_load(s->sessions);
lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, 0);
/*
* Iterate over the list from the back (oldest), and stop
* when a session can no longer be removed.
* Add the session to a temporary list to be freed outside
* the SSL_CTX lock.
* But still do the remove_session_cb() within the lock.
*/
while (s->session_cache_tail != NULL) {
current = s->session_cache_tail;
if (t == 0 || sess_timedout((time_t)t, current)) {
lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(s->sessions, current);
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(s, current);
current->not_resumable = 1;
if (s->remove_session_cb != NULL)
s->remove_session_cb(s, current);
/*
* Throw the session on a stack, it's entirely plausible
* that while freeing outside the critical section, the
* session could be re-added, so avoid using the next/prev
* pointers. If the stack failed to create, or the session
* couldn't be put on the stack, just free it here
*/
if (sk == NULL || !sk_SSL_SESSION_push(sk, current))
SSL_SESSION_free(current);
} else {
break;
}
}
lh_SSL_SESSION_set_down_load(s->sessions, i);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(s->lock);
sk_SSL_SESSION_pop_free(sk, SSL_SESSION_free);
}
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
{
if ((s->session != NULL) &&
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) {
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL))
return;
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
/* last element in list */
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
/* only one element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
} else {
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
}
} else {
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) {
/* first element in list */
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
} else {
/* middle of list */
s->next->prev = s->prev;
s->prev->next = s->next;
}
}
s->prev = s->next = NULL;
s->owner = NULL;
}
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
{
SSL_SESSION *next;
if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
} else {
if (timeoutcmp(s, ctx->session_cache_head) >= 0) {
/*
* if we timeout after (or the same time as) the first
* session, put us first - usual case
*/
s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
s->next->prev = s;
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
} else if (timeoutcmp(s, ctx->session_cache_tail) < 0) {
/* if we timeout before the last session, put us last */
s->prev = ctx->session_cache_tail;
s->prev->next = s;
s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
} else {
/*
* we timeout somewhere in-between - if there is only
* one session in the cache it will be caught above
*/
next = ctx->session_cache_head->next;
while (next != (SSL_SESSION*)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) {
if (timeoutcmp(s, next) >= 0) {
s->next = next;
s->prev = next->prev;
next->prev->next = s;
next->prev = s;
break;
}
next = next->next;
}
}
}
s->owner = ctx;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess))
{
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->new_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess))
{
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *sess) {
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *(*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl,
const unsigned char *data,
int len, int *copy))
{
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
}
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl,
const unsigned char
*data, int len,
int *copy) {
return ctx->get_session_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
{
ctx->info_callback = cb;
}
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *ssl, int type,
int val) {
return ctx->info_callback;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
EVP_PKEY **pkey))
{
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
}
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int *cookie_len))
{
ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned int cookie_len))
{
ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb;
}
int SSL_SESSION_set1_ticket_appdata(SSL_SESSION *ss, const void *data, size_t len)
{
OPENSSL_free(ss->ticket_appdata);
ss->ticket_appdata_len = 0;
if (data == NULL || len == 0) {
ss->ticket_appdata = NULL;
return 1;
}
ss->ticket_appdata = OPENSSL_memdup(data, len);
if (ss->ticket_appdata != NULL) {
ss->ticket_appdata_len = len;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket_appdata(SSL_SESSION *ss, void **data, size_t *len)
{
*data = ss->ticket_appdata;
*len = ss->ticket_appdata_len;
return 1;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
unsigned char *cookie,
size_t *cookie_len))
{
ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb = cb;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb(
SSL_CTX *ctx,
int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
const unsigned char *cookie,
size_t cookie_len))
{
ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb = cb;
}
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
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