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https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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a8f9576866
Fix a typo. Probably this has not been found because EVP_CIPHER_CTX is smaller than EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX and heap overflow does not occur. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2294)
455 lines
14 KiB
C
455 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
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# include <openssl/evp.h>
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# include <openssl/objects.h>
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# include "evp_locl.h"
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# include "internal/evp_int.h"
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# include "internal/chacha.h"
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typedef struct {
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union {
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double align; /* this ensures even sizeof(EVP_CHACHA_KEY)%8==0 */
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unsigned int d[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE / 4];
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} key;
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unsigned int counter[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE / 4];
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unsigned char buf[CHACHA_BLK_SIZE];
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unsigned int partial_len;
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} EVP_CHACHA_KEY;
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#define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
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static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
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const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
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const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
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{
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EVP_CHACHA_KEY *key = data(ctx);
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unsigned int i;
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if (user_key)
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for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; i+=4) {
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key->key.d[i/4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(user_key+i);
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}
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if (iv)
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for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_CTR_SIZE; i+=4) {
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key->counter[i/4] = CHACHA_U8TOU32(iv+i);
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}
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key->partial_len = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int chacha_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *inp, size_t len)
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{
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EVP_CHACHA_KEY *key = data(ctx);
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unsigned int n, rem, ctr32;
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if ((n = key->partial_len)) {
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while (len && n < CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
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*out++ = *inp++ ^ key->buf[n++];
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len--;
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}
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key->partial_len = n;
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if (len == 0)
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return 1;
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if (n == CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
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key->partial_len = 0;
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key->counter[0]++;
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if (key->counter[0] == 0)
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key->counter[1]++;
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}
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}
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rem = (unsigned int)(len % CHACHA_BLK_SIZE);
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len -= rem;
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ctr32 = key->counter[0];
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while (len >= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE) {
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size_t blocks = len / CHACHA_BLK_SIZE;
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/*
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* 1<<28 is just a not-so-small yet not-so-large number...
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* Below condition is practically never met, but it has to
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* be checked for code correctness.
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*/
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if (sizeof(size_t)>sizeof(unsigned int) && blocks>(1U<<28))
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blocks = (1U<<28);
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/*
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* As ChaCha20_ctr32 operates on 32-bit counter, caller
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* has to handle overflow. 'if' below detects the
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* overflow, which is then handled by limiting the
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* amount of blocks to the exact overflow point...
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*/
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ctr32 += (unsigned int)blocks;
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if (ctr32 < blocks) {
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blocks -= ctr32;
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ctr32 = 0;
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}
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blocks *= CHACHA_BLK_SIZE;
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ChaCha20_ctr32(out, inp, blocks, key->key.d, key->counter);
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len -= blocks;
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inp += blocks;
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out += blocks;
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key->counter[0] = ctr32;
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if (ctr32 == 0) key->counter[1]++;
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}
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if (rem) {
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memset(key->buf, 0, sizeof(key->buf));
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ChaCha20_ctr32(key->buf, key->buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE,
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key->key.d, key->counter);
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for (n = 0; n < rem; n++)
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out[n] = inp[n] ^ key->buf[n];
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key->partial_len = rem;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const EVP_CIPHER chacha20 = {
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NID_chacha20,
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1, /* block_size */
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CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, /* key_len */
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CHACHA_CTR_SIZE, /* iv_len, 128-bit counter in the context */
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EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT,
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chacha_init_key,
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chacha_cipher,
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NULL,
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sizeof(EVP_CHACHA_KEY),
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL,
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NULL
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};
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const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20(void)
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{
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return (&chacha20);
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}
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
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# include "internal/poly1305.h"
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typedef struct {
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EVP_CHACHA_KEY key;
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unsigned int nonce[12/4];
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unsigned char tag[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
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struct { uint64_t aad, text; } len;
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int aad, mac_inited, tag_len, nonce_len;
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size_t tls_payload_length;
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} EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX;
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# define NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH ((size_t)-1)
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# define aead_data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
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# define POLY1305_ctx(actx) ((POLY1305 *)(actx + 1))
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static int chacha20_poly1305_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
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const unsigned char *inkey,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
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if (!inkey && !iv)
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return 1;
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actx->len.aad = 0;
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actx->len.text = 0;
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actx->aad = 0;
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actx->mac_inited = 0;
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actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
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if (iv != NULL) {
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unsigned char temp[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE] = { 0 };
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/* pad on the left */
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if (actx->nonce_len <= CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
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memcpy(temp + CHACHA_CTR_SIZE - actx->nonce_len, iv, actx->nonce_len);
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chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, temp, enc);
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actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1];
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actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2];
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actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3];
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} else {
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chacha_init_key(ctx, inkey, NULL, enc);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int chacha20_poly1305_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
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{
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EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
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size_t rem, plen = actx->tls_payload_length;
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static const unsigned char zero[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
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if (!actx->mac_inited) {
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actx->key.counter[0] = 0;
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memset(actx->key.buf, 0, sizeof(actx->key.buf));
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ChaCha20_ctr32(actx->key.buf, actx->key.buf, CHACHA_BLK_SIZE,
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actx->key.key.d, actx->key.counter);
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Poly1305_Init(POLY1305_ctx(actx), actx->key.buf);
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actx->key.counter[0] = 1;
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actx->key.partial_len = 0;
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actx->len.aad = actx->len.text = 0;
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actx->mac_inited = 1;
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}
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if (in) { /* aad or text */
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if (out == NULL) { /* aad */
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), in, len);
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actx->len.aad += len;
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actx->aad = 1;
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return len;
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} else { /* plain- or ciphertext */
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if (actx->aad) { /* wrap up aad */
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if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.aad % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE))
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero,
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POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem);
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actx->aad = 0;
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}
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actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
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if (plen == NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
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plen = len;
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else if (len != plen + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
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return -1;
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if (ctx->encrypt) { /* plaintext */
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chacha_cipher(ctx, out, in, plen);
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), out, plen);
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in += plen;
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out += plen;
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actx->len.text += plen;
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} else { /* ciphertext */
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), in, plen);
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chacha_cipher(ctx, out, in, plen);
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in += plen;
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out += plen;
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actx->len.text += plen;
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}
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}
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}
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if (in == NULL /* explicit final */
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|| plen != len) { /* or tls mode */
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const union {
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long one;
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char little;
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} is_endian = { 1 };
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unsigned char temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
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if (actx->aad) { /* wrap up aad */
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if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.aad % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE))
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero,
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POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem);
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actx->aad = 0;
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}
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if ((rem = (size_t)actx->len.text % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE))
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), zero,
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POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - rem);
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if (is_endian.little) {
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx),
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(unsigned char *)&actx->len, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
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} else {
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temp[0] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad);
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temp[1] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>8);
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temp[2] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>16);
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temp[3] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>24);
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temp[4] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>32);
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temp[5] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>40);
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temp[6] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>48);
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temp[7] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.aad>>56);
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temp[8] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text);
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temp[9] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>8);
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temp[10] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>16);
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temp[11] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>24);
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temp[12] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>32);
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temp[13] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>40);
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temp[14] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>48);
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temp[15] = (unsigned char)(actx->len.text>>56);
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Poly1305_Update(POLY1305_ctx(actx), temp, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
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}
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Poly1305_Final(POLY1305_ctx(actx), ctx->encrypt ? actx->tag
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: temp);
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actx->mac_inited = 0;
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if (in != NULL && len != plen) { /* tls mode */
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if (ctx->encrypt) {
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memcpy(out, actx->tag, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
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} else {
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(temp, in, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
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memset(out - plen, 0, plen);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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}
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else if (!ctx->encrypt) {
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(temp, actx->tag, actx->tag_len))
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return len;
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}
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static int chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
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{
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EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
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if (actx)
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->cipher_data, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
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return 1;
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}
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static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
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void *ptr)
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{
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EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX *actx = aead_data(ctx);
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switch(type) {
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case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
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if (actx == NULL)
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actx = ctx->cipher_data
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= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
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if (actx == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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actx->len.aad = 0;
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actx->len.text = 0;
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actx->aad = 0;
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actx->mac_inited = 0;
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actx->tag_len = 0;
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actx->nonce_len = 12;
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actx->tls_payload_length = NO_TLS_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
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if (actx) {
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dst = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
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dst->cipher_data =
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OPENSSL_memdup(actx, sizeof(*actx) + Poly1305_ctx_size());
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if (dst->cipher_data == NULL) {
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EVPerr(EVP_F_CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTRL, EVP_R_COPY_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
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return 0;
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actx->nonce_len = arg;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED:
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if (arg != 12)
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return 0;
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actx->nonce[0] = actx->key.counter[1]
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= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr);
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actx->nonce[1] = actx->key.counter[2]
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= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+4);
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actx->nonce[2] = actx->key.counter[3]
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= CHACHA_U8TOU32((unsigned char *)ptr+8);
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
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return 0;
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if (ptr != NULL) {
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memcpy(actx->tag, ptr, arg);
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actx->tag_len = arg;
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}
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE || !ctx->encrypt)
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return 0;
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memcpy(ptr, actx->tag, arg);
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
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if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
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return 0;
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{
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unsigned int len;
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unsigned char *aad = ptr, temp[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE];
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len = aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] << 8 |
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aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1];
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if (!ctx->encrypt) {
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if (len < POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)
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return 0;
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len -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* discount attached tag */
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memcpy(temp, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2);
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aad = temp;
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temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
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temp[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN - 1] = (unsigned char)len;
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}
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actx->tls_payload_length = len;
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/*
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* merge record sequence number as per RFC7905
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*/
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actx->key.counter[1] = actx->nonce[0];
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actx->key.counter[2] = actx->nonce[1] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad);
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actx->key.counter[3] = actx->nonce[2] ^ CHACHA_U8TOU32(aad+4);
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actx->mac_inited = 0;
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chacha20_poly1305_cipher(ctx, NULL, aad, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN);
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return POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; /* tag length */
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}
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
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/* no-op */
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return 1;
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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}
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static EVP_CIPHER chacha20_poly1305 = {
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NID_chacha20_poly1305,
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1, /* block_size */
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CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, /* key_len */
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12, /* iv_len, 96-bit nonce in the context */
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EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
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EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT |
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EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER,
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chacha20_poly1305_init_key,
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chacha20_poly1305_cipher,
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chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
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0, /* 0 moves context-specific structure allocation to ctrl */
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NULL, /* set_asn1_parameters */
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NULL, /* get_asn1_parameters */
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chacha20_poly1305_ctrl,
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NULL /* app_data */
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};
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const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void)
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{
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return(&chacha20_poly1305);
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}
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# endif
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#endif
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