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openssl/ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c
Tomas Mraz 25624c9087 Rationalize FIPS sources 
Avoid including QUIC related stuff in the FIPS sources.
Also avoid including libssl headers in ssl3_cbc.c.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19658)
2023-02-08 16:20:55 +01:00

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/*
* Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
#include "../../ssl_local.h"
#include "../record_local.h"
#include "recmethod_local.h"
static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
size_t taglen,
int mactype,
const EVP_MD *md,
COMP_METHOD *comp)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;
if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx;
rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (comp != NULL) {
rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
if (rl->compctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
}
#endif
/*
* If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
* setting up the MAC key.
*/
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) {
if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
rl->propq, mackey,
mackeylen);
} else {
/*
* If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
* the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
* a MAC key.
*/
mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
(int)mackeylen);
}
if (mac_key == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
NULL) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, enc)
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
(int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
(int)taglen, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
(int)ivlen, iv) <= 0
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
} else {
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
}
/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
&& mackeylen != 0
&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
(int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
&& !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md))
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
/* Calculate the explict IV length */
if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ciph_ctx);
int eivlen = 0;
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ciph_ctx);
if (eivlen < 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
}
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
} else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
} else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
}
rl->eivlen = (size_t)eivlen;
}
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}
#define MAX_PADDING 256
/*-
* tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls RLAYERfatal on
* internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
* report a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
*
* Returns:
* 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
* decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
* 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
*/
static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *recs,
size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs,
size_t macsize)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
int pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
unsigned char padval;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
if (n_recs == 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) {
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx);
if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
ds = rl->enc_ctx;
if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_ctx != NULL)) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx);
if (sending) {
int ivlen;
/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)
&& EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
else
ivlen = 0;
if (ivlen > 1) {
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
}
if (!ossl_assert(enc != NULL)) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
if (n_recs > 1) {
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
/*
* We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
* cipher doesn't support pipelining
*/
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
unsigned char *seq;
seq = rl->sequence;
if (rl->isdtls) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
s2n(rl->epoch, p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
} else {
memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
/* RLAYERfatal already called */
return 0;
}
}
buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
if (pad <= 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (sending) {
reclen[ctr] += pad;
recs[ctr].length += pad;
}
} else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
/*
* We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
* padding on the provider side.
*/
padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
/* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
reclen[ctr] += padnum;
recs[ctr].length += padnum;
}
if (!sending) {
if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
/* Publicly invalid */
return 0;
}
}
}
if (n_recs > 1) {
/* Set the output buffers */
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
(int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Set the input buffers */
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
(int)n_recs, data) <= 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
(int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree) {
int decrement_seq = 0;
/*
* When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
* So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
* Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
*/
if (sending && !rl->use_etm)
decrement_seq = 1;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq,
rl->sequence) <= 0) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (provided) {
int outlen;
/* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
if (n_recs > 1) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
(unsigned int)reclen[0]))
return 0;
recs[0].length = outlen;
/*
* The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
* payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
* any explicit IV
*/
if (!sending) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
} else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
recs[0].data += bs;
recs[0].input += bs;
recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
}
/* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
if (macs != NULL) {
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
/* Get the MAC */
macs[0].alloced = 0;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
(void **)&macs[0].mac,
macsize);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
/* Shouldn't normally happen */
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
} else {
/* Legacy cipher */
tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
(unsigned int)reclen[0]);
if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
? (tmpr < 0)
: (tmpr == 0)) {
/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
return 0;
}
if (!sending) {
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
/* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
} else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
return 0;
recs[ctr].data += bs;
recs[ctr].input += bs;
recs[ctr].length -= bs;
recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
}
/*
* If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
* with a random MAC if padding is invalid
*/
if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
recs[ctr].orig_len,
recs[ctr].data,
(macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
(macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
: NULL,
bs,
pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
rl->libctx))
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
int sending)
{
unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t md_size;
EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
int t;
int ret = 0;
hash = rl->md_ctx;
t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
return 0;
md_size = t;
if (rl->stream_mac) {
mac_ctx = hash;
} else {
hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
goto end;
}
mac_ctx = hmac;
}
if (!rl->isdtls
&& rl->tlstree
&& EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0)
goto end;
if (rl->isdtls) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
s2n(rl->epoch, p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
} else {
memcpy(header, seq, 8);
}
header[8] = rec->type;
header[9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
header[10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
if (!sending && !rl->use_etm
&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&& ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
&rec->orig_len);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
tls_hmac_params))
goto end;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0)
goto end;
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
} OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
if (!rl->isdtls && !tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
/* RLAYERfatal already called */
goto end;
}
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
} OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
ret = 1;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return ret;
}
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
# define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
# else
# define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
#else
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
# define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
# else
# define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
#endif
/* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
int tls1_allocate_write_buffers(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
size_t numtempl, size_t *prefix)
{
/* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
*prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
&& templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
/*
* In the prefix case we can allocate a much smaller buffer. Otherwise we
* just allocate the default buffer size
*/
if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + *prefix,
*prefix ? MAX_PREFIX_LEN : 0, 0)) {
/* RLAYERfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
int tls1_initialise_write_packets(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
size_t numtempl,
OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *prefixtempl,
WPACKET *pkt,
TLS_BUFFER *bufs,
size_t *wpinited)
{
size_t align = 0;
TLS_BUFFER *wb;
size_t prefix;
/* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
&& templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
if (prefix) {
/*
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
prefixtempl->buf = NULL;
prefixtempl->version = templates[0].version;
prefixtempl->buflen = 0;
prefixtempl->type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
wb = &bufs[0];
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
align = (size_t)TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1
- ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
#endif
TLS_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
TLS_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
*wpinited = 1;
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return tls_initialise_write_packets_default(rl, templates, numtempl,
NULL,
pkt + prefix, bufs + prefix,
wpinited);
}
/* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */
struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = {
tls1_set_crypto_state,
tls1_cipher,
tls1_mac,
tls_default_set_protocol_version,
tls_default_read_n,
tls_get_more_records,
tls_default_validate_record_header,
tls_default_post_process_record,
tls_get_max_records_multiblock,
tls_write_records_multiblock, /* Defined in tls_multib.c */
tls1_allocate_write_buffers,
tls1_initialise_write_packets,
NULL,
tls_prepare_record_header_default,
NULL,
tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
NULL
};
struct record_functions_st dtls_1_funcs = {
tls1_set_crypto_state,
tls1_cipher,
tls1_mac,
tls_default_set_protocol_version,
tls_default_read_n,
dtls_get_more_records,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
tls_write_records_default,
/*
* Don't use tls1_allocate_write_buffers since that handles empty fragment
* records which aren't needed in DTLS. We just use the default allocation
* instead.
*/
tls_allocate_write_buffers_default,
/* Don't use tls1_initialise_write_packets for same reason as above */
tls_initialise_write_packets_default,
NULL,
dtls_prepare_record_header,
NULL,
tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
dtls_post_encryption_processing,
NULL
};
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