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86fde069d4
openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
Bernd Edlinger d3bc980585 Avoid questionable use of the value of a pointer 
that refers to space
deallocated by a call to the free function in tls_decrypt_ticket.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2897)
(cherry picked from commit 13ed1afa92)
2017-03-10 15:56:58 -05:00

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/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
0,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_mac,
tls1_setup_key_block,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
tls13_enc,
tls1_mac,
tls13_setup_key_block,
tls13_generate_master_secret,
tls13_change_cipher_state,
tls13_final_finish_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls13_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
long tls1_default_timeout(void)
{
/*
* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
* http, the cache would over fill
*/
return (60 * 60 * 2);
}
int tls1_new(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_new(s))
return (0);
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
}
void tls1_free(SSL *s)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
ssl3_free(s);
}
void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
{
ssl3_clear(s);
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
else
s->version = s->method->version;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
typedef struct {
int nid; /* Curve NID */
int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
} tls_curve_info;
/*
* Table of curve information.
* Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
* table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
*/
static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
{NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
{NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
{NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
{NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
{NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
{NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
{NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
{NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
{NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
{NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
{NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
{NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
{NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
{NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
{NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
{NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
{NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
{NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
{NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
{NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
{NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
{NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
};
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
};
/* The default curves */
static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
};
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
if (pflags)
*pflags = cinfo->flags;
return cinfo->nid;
}
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
return (int)(i + 1);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
* preferred list.
* Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
* the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
* Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
* The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
* lists in the first place.
* TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
* parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
* so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
*/
int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
if (sess) {
*pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
} else {
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
*pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
}
}
/* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
if (pcurveslen & 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*num_curves = 0;
return 0;
}
*num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
return 1;
}
/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
if (curve[0])
return 1;
if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
return 0;
# endif
return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
}
/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *curves;
size_t num_curves, i;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
return 0;
/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
if (suiteb_flags) {
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (p[1])
return 0;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
return 0;
} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
return 0;
} else /* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
}
return 0;
}
/*-
* For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
* if there is no match.
* For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
* For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
* an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
*/
int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
int k;
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
if (nmatch == -2) {
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
/*
* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
/* Should never happen */
return NID_undef;
}
/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
nmatch = 0;
}
/*
* Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
* but s->options is a long...
*/
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
&supp, &num_supp))
/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
&pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k) {
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
}
k++;
}
}
}
if (nmatch == -1)
return k;
/* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
return NID_undef;
}
int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
int *groups, size_t ngroups)
{
unsigned char *glist, *p;
size_t i;
/*
* Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
* ids < 32
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
if (glist == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
int id;
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
idmask = 1L << id;
if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
OPENSSL_free(glist);
return 0;
}
dup_list |= idmask;
s2n(id, p);
}
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = glist;
*pextlen = ngroups * 2;
return 1;
}
# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
typedef struct {
size_t nidcnt;
int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
} nid_cb_st;
static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
size_t i;
int nid;
char etmp[20];
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
return 0;
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
etmp[len] = 0;
nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
if (nid == NID_undef)
nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
if (nid == NID_undef)
nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
if (nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
return 0;
narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
return 1;
}
/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
{
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
return 0;
if (pext == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
}
/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
EC_KEY *ec)
{
int id;
const EC_GROUP *grp;
if (!ec)
return 0;
/* Determine if it is a prime field */
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
if (!grp)
return 0;
/* Determine curve ID */
id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
/* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
if (id == 0)
return 0;
curve_id[0] = 0;
curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
if (comp_id) {
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
return 0;
if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
} else {
if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
else
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
{
const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
int j;
/*
* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
* supported (see RFC4492).
*/
if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
if (*comp_id == *pformats)
break;
}
if (i == num_formats)
return 0;
}
if (!curve_id)
return 1;
/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
return 0;
if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
/*
* If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
* RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
* so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
* It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
* extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
*/
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
break;
}
if (i == num_curves)
return 0;
/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
if (!s->server)
break;
}
return 1;
}
void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
*/
if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
*pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
*num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
} else {
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
else
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
}
}
/*
* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
*/
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
{
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int rv;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (!pkey)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
return 1;
rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
* curves extension.
*/
rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
* SHA384+P-384.
*/
if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
int check_md;
size_t i;
CERT *c = s->cert;
if (curve_id[0])
return 0;
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
break;
if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
return 0;
}
return rv;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
* tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
* @s: SSL connection
* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
*
* Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
* is compatible with the client extensions.
*
* Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
*/
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
/*
* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
* curves permitted.
*/
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
unsigned char curve_id[2];
/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
else
return 0;
curve_id[0] = 0;
/* Check this curve is acceptable */
if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* Need a shared curve */
if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
return 1;
return 0;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#else
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
{
return 1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Default sigalg schemes */
static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
#endif
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
#endif
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
#endif
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
};
#endif
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
{"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
{"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
#endif
{"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
{"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
NID_undef, NID_undef}
#endif
};
/* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
"rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
NID_undef, NID_undef
};
/*
* Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
* From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
*/
static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
};
/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
{
size_t i;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, s++) {
if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
return s;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
* is fixed by the certificate type.
*/
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
return NULL;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return lu;
}
return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
}
/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
if (lu == NULL)
return 0;
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
return 1;
}
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
{
/*
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
* preferences.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return 1;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
return 1;
}
#endif
/*
* We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
* and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
* determining which shared algorithm to use.
*/
if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
}
}
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
* s.
*/
int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
char sigalgstr[2];
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
/* Should never happen */
if (pkeyid == -1)
return -1;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
}
lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
/*
* Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1 with TLS 1.3. Check key type is
* consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
*/
if (lu == NULL || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->hash == NID_sha1)
|| (pkeyid != lu->sig
&& (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
return 0;
}
/* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
}
} else {
unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
return 0;
if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
}
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
/* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
&& sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
* this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
* check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
* If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
*/
if (curve != lu->curve) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
}
}
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
return 0;
}
#endif
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
if (sig == *sent_sigs)
break;
}
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
|| s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
if (md == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
/*
* Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
* have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
*/
sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
(void *)sigalgstr)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
return 1;
}
int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
{
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
return 0;
*pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
return 1;
}
/*
* Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
* supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
* by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
*
* This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
* by the client.
*
* Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
*/
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
}
#endif
}
/*
* ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
* @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
* @c: cipher to check
* @op: Security check that you want to do
*
* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
*/
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
{
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|| (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|| DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
return 0;
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
int al;
size_t i;
/* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/* Clear certificate validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
/*
* If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
* the default algorithm for each certificate type
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
size_t j;
if (lu == NULL)
continue;
/* Check default matches a type we sent */
for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
break;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
return 1;
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
/*-
* Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
*
* hello: The parsed ClientHello data
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*
* If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
* ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
* never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
*
* Returns:
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
* 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
* 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
* session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
* 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
* couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
*
* Side effects:
* Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
* a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
* (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
* s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
* Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
*/
TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
int retv;
size_t size;
RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
*ret = NULL;
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
* (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
return TICKET_NONE;
ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
if (!ticketext->present)
return TICKET_NONE;
size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
if (size == 0) {
/*
* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
* one.
*/
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return TICKET_EMPTY;
}
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
switch (retv) {
case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
case TICKET_SUCCESS:
return TICKET_SUCCESS;
case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return TICKET_SUCCESS;
default:
return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
}
/*-
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*/
TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto err;
}
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
etick
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
if (mlen == 0) {
goto err;
}
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
if (eticklen <=
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
|| HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
slen += declen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
slen -= p - sdec;
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/* Some additional consistency checks */
if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
* standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
else
return TICKET_SUCCESS;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
}
static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
{
switch (sig_nid) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
/*
* For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
* this will need to be updated.
*/
case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
#endif
}
return -1;
}
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
int secbits;
/* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
return 0;
/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
return 0;
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(lu->sig) == -1)
return 0;
/* Security bits: half digest bits */
secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
}
/*
* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
* algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
* disabled.
*/
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
{
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
size_t i, sigalgslen;
int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
/*
* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
* RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
* down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
*/
sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
if (lu == NULL)
continue;
switch (lu->sig) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
have_rsa = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
have_dsa = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
have_ecdsa = 1;
break;
#endif
}
}
if (!have_rsa)
*pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
if (!have_dsa)
*pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
if (!have_ecdsa)
*pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
{
size_t i;
int rv = 0;
for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
continue;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
return 0;
/*
* If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
* signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1
*/
if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
|| (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA && lu->hash != NID_sha1)))
rv = 1;
}
if (rv == 0)
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return rv;
}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
{
const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
continue;
for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
nmatch++;
if (shsig)
*shsig++ = lu;
break;
}
}
}
return nmatch;
}
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
size_t nmatch;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
} else
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
} else {
allow = conf;
allowlen = conflen;
pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
if (salgs == NULL)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
} else {
salgs = NULL;
}
c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
return 1;
}
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int stmp;
size_t size, i;
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return 1;
/* Should never happen */
if (!c)
return 0;
size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
/* Invalid data length */
if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
return 0;
size >>= 1;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
if (i != size)
return 0;
return 1;
}
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
size_t i;
uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
CERT *c = s->cert;
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
pvalid[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
/* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
/* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig) != -1)
pvalid[sigptr->sig_idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
return 0;
psig += idx;
if (rhash != NULL)
*rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
if (rsig != NULL)
*rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
if (psign != NULL)
*psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
if (phash != NULL)
*phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
if (psignhash != NULL)
*psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
}
return (int)numsigalgs;
}
int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
|| idx < 0
|| idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
|| s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
if (phash != NULL)
*phash = shsigalgs->hash;
if (psign != NULL)
*psign = shsigalgs->sig;
if (psignhash != NULL)
*psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
if (rsig != NULL)
*rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
if (rhash != NULL)
*rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
}
/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
#define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
typedef struct {
size_t sigalgcnt;
int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
} sig_cb_st;
static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
{
if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
} else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
} else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
} else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
} else {
*phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
if (*phash == NID_undef)
*phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
}
}
/* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
#define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
size_t i;
char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
return 0;
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
etmp[len] = 0;
p = strchr(etmp, '+');
/* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
if (p == NULL) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, s++) {
if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
sig_alg = s->sig;
hash_alg = s->hash;
break;
}
}
} else {
*p = 0;
p++;
if (*p == 0)
return 0;
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
}
if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
return 0;
}
sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
return 1;
}
/*
* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
{
sig_cb_st sig;
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
if (c == NULL)
return 1;
return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
}
int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
size_t i;
if (salglen & 1)
return 0;
sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
if (sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
size_t j;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
int md_id = *psig_nids++;
int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
j++, curr++) {
if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
*sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
break;
}
}
if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
goto err;
}
if (client) {
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
} else {
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
}
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
return 0;
}
static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
{
int sig_nid;
size_t i;
if (default_nid == -1)
return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (default_nid)
return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *nm;
int i;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
* server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
* passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
* attempting to use them.
*/
/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
/* Strict mode flags */
#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
(CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
| CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
int idx)
{
int i;
int rv = 0;
int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
uint32_t *pvalid;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
if (idx != -1) {
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
} else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
x = cpk->x509;
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
} else {
if (!x || !pk)
return 0;
idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
if (idx == -1)
return 0;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
else
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
strict_mode = 1;
}
if (suiteb_flags) {
int ok;
if (check_flags)
check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
if (ok == X509_V_OK)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
}
/*
* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
* algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
int rsign = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
default_nid = 0;
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
else {
switch (idx) {
case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
break;
default:
default_nid = -1;
break;
}
}
/*
* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
* preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
*/
if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
size_t j;
const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
break;
}
if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
if (check_flags)
goto skip_sigs;
else
goto end;
}
}
/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
if (!check_flags)
goto end;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
if (check_flags) {
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
break;
} else
goto end;
}
}
}
/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
else if (check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
skip_sigs:
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
if (!s->server)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
else if (strict_mode) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
if (check_flags) {
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
break;
} else
goto end;
}
}
}
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
int check_type = 0;
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
break;
}
if (check_type) {
const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
size_t j;
for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
if (*ctypes == check_type) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
break;
}
}
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
goto end;
} else {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
}
ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
}
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
break;
}
}
}
if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
goto end;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
end:
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
/*
* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
* chain is invalid.
*/
if (!check_flags) {
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
*pvalid = rv;
} else {
/* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
*pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
return 0;
}
}
return rv;
}
/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
{
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
}
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
{
int dh_secbits = 80;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
return DH_get_1024_160();
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
dh_secbits = 128;
else
dh_secbits = 80;
} else {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
return NULL;
dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
}
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
DH *dhp = DH_new();
BIGNUM *p, *g;
if (dhp == NULL)
return NULL;
g = BN_new();
if (g != NULL)
BN_set_word(g, 2);
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
DH_free(dhp);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
return NULL;
}
return dhp;
}
if (dh_secbits >= 112)
return DH_get_2048_224();
return DH_get_1024_160();
}
#endif
static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
{
int secbits = -1;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey) {
/*
* If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
* security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
* reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
* omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
*/
secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
}
if (s)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
else
return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
}
static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
{
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
/* Don't check signature if self signed */
if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
const EVP_MD *md;
if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
}
if (s)
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
else
return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
}
int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
{
if (vfy)
vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
if (is_ee) {
if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
} else {
if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
return 1;
}
/*
* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
* x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
* one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
*/
int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
{
int rv, start_idx, i;
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
start_idx = 1;
} else
start_idx = 0;
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
if (rv != 1)
return rv;
for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
if (rv != 1)
return rv;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
* Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
*
* For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
* and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
*
* For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
* a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
* to the server. In this case no error is set.
*/
int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
{
int idx = -1;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
size_t i;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
#endif
/* Look for a certificate matching shared sigaglgs */
for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
/* Skip SHA1, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
if (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
if (ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
continue;
idx = lu->sig_idx;
if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
continue;
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (curve == -1) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
!= POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
skip_ec = 1;
}
if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
continue;
#else
continue;
#endif
}
break;
}
if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (s->server) {
/* Find index corresponding to ciphersuite */
idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
/* If no certificate for ciphersuite return */
if (idx == -1)
return 1;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
/* Work out which GOST certificate is avaiable */
if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
} else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
} else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
} else {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx)) {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else {
/* Find index for client certificate */
idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
return 1;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
size_t i;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int curve;
/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
} else {
curve = -1;
}
#endif
/*
* Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
* cert type
*/
for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (lu->sig_idx == idx)
break;
#else
if (lu->sig_idx == idx
&& (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve))
break;
#endif
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
break;
}
if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else {
/*
* If we have no sigalg use defaults
*/
const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
break;
}
if (i == sent_sigslen) {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
}
}
} else {
if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
if (al == NULL)
return 1;
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (idx == -1) {
if (al != NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
return 1;
}
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