mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-12-21 06:09:35 +08:00
c026101be0
Fixes #7940: Updated the compression check logic to improve protocol compliance. The code now returns `SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR` when no compression method is provided in the ClientHello message. It returns `SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER` if the “null” compression method (0x00) is missing. Additionally, refactored the related test code for enhanced readability and maintainability. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25255)
4404 lines
144 KiB
C
4404 lines
144 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "../ssl_local.h"
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#include "statem_local.h"
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#include "internal/constant_time.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/trace.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/comp.h>
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#include "internal/comp.h"
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#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
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typedef struct {
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ASN1_TYPE *kxBlob;
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ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
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} GOST_KX_MESSAGE;
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DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
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ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
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ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
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static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
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WPACKET *pkt);
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static ossl_inline int received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
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{
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return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
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}
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/*
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* ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
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* handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
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* the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
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* The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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*
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* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
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* (transition not allowed)
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*/
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static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
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{
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OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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/*
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* Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
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* not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
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* ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
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*/
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switch (st->hand_state) {
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default:
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break;
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case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
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if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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} else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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}
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/* Fall through */
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case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
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case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
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&& s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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} else {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
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case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
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if (!received_client_cert(s)) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_OK:
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/*
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* Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
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* early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
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*/
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if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
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break;
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if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
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&& s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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}
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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}
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/* No valid transition found */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
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* handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
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* client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
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* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
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*
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* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
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* (transition not allowed)
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*/
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int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
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{
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OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
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if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
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if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
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goto err;
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return 1;
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}
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switch (st->hand_state) {
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default:
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break;
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case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
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case TLS_ST_OK:
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case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
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/*
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* If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
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* 1) We didn't request a Certificate
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* OR
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* 2) If we did request one then
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* a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
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* AND
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* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
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* list if we requested a certificate)
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*/
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
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if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
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if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
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&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
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/*
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* This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
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* not going to accept it because we require a client
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* cert.
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*/
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SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
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SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
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return 0;
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}
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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return 1;
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}
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} else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
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/*
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* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
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* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
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* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
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* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
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* the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
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* set.
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*/
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if (!received_client_cert(s) || st->no_cert_verify) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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/*
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* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
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* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
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* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
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* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
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*/
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
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return 1;
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}
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} else {
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#endif
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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}
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#endif
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break;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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#endif
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case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
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if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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}
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err:
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/* No valid transition found */
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if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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BIO *rbio;
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/*
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* CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
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* because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
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*/
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s->init_num = 0;
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s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
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BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
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BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
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return 0;
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}
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SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
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*
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* Valid return values are:
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* 1: Yes
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* 0: No
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*/
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static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
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{
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unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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/*
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* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
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* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
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* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
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* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
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* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
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* key exchange.
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*/
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if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
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/*
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* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
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* provided
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*/
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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/* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
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|| ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
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&& s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
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/* For other PSK always send SKE */
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|| (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
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|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
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#endif
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) {
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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|
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/*
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* Used to determine if we should send a CompressedCertificate message
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*
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* Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
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*/
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static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
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int *alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer;
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|
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if (sc->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
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return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
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|
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for (; *alg != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; alg++) {
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if (sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[*alg] != NULL)
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return *alg;
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}
|
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#endif
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return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
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}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
|
|
*
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
* 1: Yes
|
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* 0: No
|
|
*/
|
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int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
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{
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if (
|
|
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
|
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
|
|
/*
|
|
* don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
|
|
* post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
|
|
*/
|
|
&& (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
|| !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
|| s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
|
|
/*
|
|
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
|
|
* a second time:
|
|
*/
|
|
&& (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
|
|
/*
|
|
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
|
|
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
|
|
* RFC 2246):
|
|
*/
|
|
&& (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
/*
|
|
* ... except when the application insists on
|
|
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
|
|
* this for SSL 3)
|
|
*/
|
|
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
|
|
&& !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
|
|
/*
|
|
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
|
|
* are omitted
|
|
*/
|
|
&& !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If we negotiated RPK, we won't attempt to compress it */
|
|
return sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
|
|
&& get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
|
|
* move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
|
|
* client.
|
|
*/
|
|
static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
|
|
* TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Try to read from the client instead */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
|
|
&& s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
|
|
else if (send_certificate_request(s))
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
|
|
else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
|
|
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
|
|
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
} else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
|
|
s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
|
|
/*
|
|
* Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
|
|
* going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
|
|
* immediately.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
|
|
s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
|
|
} else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
|
|
* handshake at this point.
|
|
*/
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
/* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
|
|
* Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
|
|
* been configured for.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
|
|
/* We've written enough tickets out. */
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
|
|
* to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
|
|
* to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
|
|
return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
|
|
/* We must be trying to renegotiate */
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
|
|
st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
|
|
if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
|
|
&& (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
|
|
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
|
} else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
|
|
/* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
else
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
|
|
/* normal PSK or SRP */
|
|
if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
|
|
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
|
|
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
} else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
|
if (s->ext.status_expected) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
} else {
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
}
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
|
|
}
|
|
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
|
|
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
|
|
* the server to the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No pre work to be done */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
s->shutdown = 0;
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
|
|
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
|
|
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
|
|
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
|
|
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
|
|
&& s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
|
|
* straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
|
|
* the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
|
|
*
|
|
* Calls SSLfatal as required.
|
|
*/
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
|
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
|
|
break;
|
|
/* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
|
|
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
} else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
|
|
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
|
|
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
|
|
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
|
|
*/
|
|
st->use_timer = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|
|
&& (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_OK:
|
|
/* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
|
|
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
|
|
#if defined(EPIPE)
|
|
case EPIPE:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(ECONNRESET)
|
|
case ECONNRESET:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
|
|
case WSAECONNRESET:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
|
|
* server to the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No post work to be done */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
|
|
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
|
|
* treat like it was the first packet
|
|
*/
|
|
s->first_packet = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
|
|
&& statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
|
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
|
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
|
size_t labellen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
|
|
* SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
|
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
|
|
|
/* Don't include the terminating zero. */
|
|
labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
|
|
labellen += 1;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
labellen, NULL, 0,
|
|
0) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
|| ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
|
|
&& s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
|
|
break;
|
|
/* Fall through */
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
|
|
if (!statem_flush(s))
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
|
|
|| !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
|
|
&& !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
|
|
* is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
|
|
* handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
|
|
s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
|
|
* no SCTP used.
|
|
*/
|
|
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
|
|
size_t dummy;
|
|
if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
|
|
&dummy)
|
|
|| !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
|| (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
|
|
s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
if (!s->hit && !send_certificate_request(s)) {
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
|| (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
|
|
s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
|
|
if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
|
|
&& conn_is_closed()) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
|
|
* NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
|
|
* so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
|
|
* that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
|
|
* waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
|
|
* server
|
|
*
|
|
* Valid return values are:
|
|
* 1: Success
|
|
* 0: Error
|
|
*/
|
|
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
|
|
*confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
|
|
else
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
|
|
*confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
|
|
*mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
|
|
/* No construction function needed */
|
|
*confunc = NULL;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_finished;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
*confunc = NULL;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
*confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
|
|
*mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
|
|
* calculated as follows:
|
|
*
|
|
* 2 + # client_version
|
|
* 32 + # only valid length for random
|
|
* 1 + # length of session_id
|
|
* 32 + # maximum size for session_id
|
|
* 2 + # length of cipher suites
|
|
* 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
|
|
* 1 + # length of compression_methods
|
|
* 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
|
|
* 2 + # length of extensions
|
|
* 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
|
|
|
|
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
|
|
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
|
|
* reading. Excludes the message header.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
return s->max_cert_list;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
|
|
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
|
|
return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
|
|
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
|
|
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
|
|
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
|
|
* from the client
|
|
*/
|
|
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
|
|
|
|
switch (st->hand_state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
|
|
return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
|
|
|
|
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
|
|
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
/* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
|
|
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
|
|
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
|
|
* login name
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, al,
|
|
al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
|
|
? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
|
|
: SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
|
|
size_t cookie_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int cookie_leni;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
|
|
|| sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
|
|
&cookie_leni) == 0
|
|
|| cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
|
|
|
|
if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
|
|
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
|
|
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
|
|
* SNI,
|
|
* elliptic_curves
|
|
* ec_point_formats
|
|
* signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
|
|
*
|
|
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
|
|
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
|
|
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
|
|
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
|
|
{
|
|
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
|
|
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
|
|
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
|
|
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
|
|
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
|
|
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
|
|
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
|
|
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
|
|
0x01, /* 1 point format */
|
|
0x00, /* uncompressed */
|
|
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
|
|
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
|
|
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
|
|
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
|
|
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
|
|
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
|
|
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
|
|
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
|
|
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
|
|
};
|
|
/* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
|
|
static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
|
|
unsigned int type;
|
|
PACKET sni, tmppkt;
|
|
size_t ext_len;
|
|
|
|
tmppkt = hello->extensions;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
|
|
SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
|
|
sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
|
|
|
|
s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
|
|
ext_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
|
|
((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
|
|
&& (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
|
|
PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
|
|
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
|
|
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
|
|
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
|
|
|| (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
|
|
&& (s->options
|
|
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
}
|
|
s->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->new_session = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
|
|
if (clienthello == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
|
|
|
|
if (clienthello->isv2) {
|
|
unsigned int mt;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
|
|
|| s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
|
|
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
|
|
* record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
|
|
* the rest right through. Its format is:
|
|
* Byte Content
|
|
* 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
|
|
* 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
|
|
* 3-4 version
|
|
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
|
|
* 7-8 session_id_length
|
|
* 9-10 challenge_length
|
|
* ... ...
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|
|
|| mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
|
|
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
|
|
* in the first place
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
|
|
if (clienthello->isv2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
|
|
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
|
|
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
|
|
PACKET challenge;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
|
|
ciphersuite_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
|
|
/* No extensions. */
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
|
|
* here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
|
|
* for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
|
|
* sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
|
|
*/
|
|
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
|
|
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
|
|
memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
|
|
clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
|
|
challenge_len, challenge_len)
|
|
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|
|
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Regular ClientHello. */
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
|
|
|| !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
|
|
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
|
|
&clienthello->session_id_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
|
|
DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
|
|
&clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
|
|
* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
|
|
* So check cookie length...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Could be empty. */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
|
|
PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
|
|
MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
|
|
&clienthello->compressions_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
|
|
extensions = clienthello->extensions;
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
&clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
|
|
&clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal already been called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->clienthello = clienthello;
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (clienthello != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int j;
|
|
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
int protverr;
|
|
unsigned long id;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
|
|
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
|
|
DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
|
|
|
|
/* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
|
|
/* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
|
|
if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
|
|
/* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
|
|
switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ssl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
|
|
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set up the client_random */
|
|
memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/* Choose the version */
|
|
|
|
if (clienthello->isv2) {
|
|
if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
|
|
|| (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
|
|
!= (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
|
|
* support it.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* SSLv3/TLS */
|
|
s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Choose the server SSL/TLS/DTLS version. */
|
|
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
|
|
|
|
if (protverr) {
|
|
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
|
|
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
|
|
s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
|
|
}
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
|
|
if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
|
|
if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
|
|
clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
|
|
}
|
|
/* default verification */
|
|
} else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
|
|
|| memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
|
|
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
|
|
clienthello->isv2) ||
|
|
!ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
|
|
&scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
|
|
/* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
|
|
if (scsvs != NULL) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
|
|
if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
|
|
if (s->renegotiate) {
|
|
/* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
|
|
} else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
|
|
!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
|
|
* a higher version. We should fail if the current version
|
|
* is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
|
|
* connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
|
|
* an insecure downgrade.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
|
|
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
|
|
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
|
|
|
|
if (cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
|
|
&& (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
|
|
|| s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
|
|
* just selected. Something must have changed.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We need to do this before getting the session */
|
|
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
|
|
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
|
|
* In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
|
|
*
|
|
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
|
|
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
|
|
* ignore resumption requests with flag
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
|
|
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
|
|
* this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
|
|
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
|
|
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
|
|
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
|
|
* ignored.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (clienthello->isv2 ||
|
|
(s->new_session &&
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
|
|
if (i == 1) {
|
|
/* previous session */
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
} else if (i == -1) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* i == 0 */
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
|
|
s->clienthello->session_id_len);
|
|
s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
|
|
* ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
|
|
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
|
|
BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
|
|
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
|
|
if (trc_out != NULL)
|
|
BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
|
if (c->id == id) {
|
|
j = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (j == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
|
|
* to reuse it
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
|
OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At least one compression method must be preset. */
|
|
if (clienthello->compressions_len == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure at least the null compression is supported. */
|
|
if (memchr(clienthello->compressions, 0,
|
|
clienthello->compressions_len) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
|
|
ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
|
|
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
|
|
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
|
|
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
|
|
* processing to use it in key derivation.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *pos;
|
|
pos = s->s3.server_random;
|
|
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && !tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit
|
|
&& s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
|
|
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
|
|
&& s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
|
/*
|
|
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
|
|
* backwards compat reasons
|
|
*/
|
|
int master_key_length;
|
|
|
|
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
|
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
|
|
&master_key_length, ciphers,
|
|
&pref_cipher,
|
|
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
|
|
&& master_key_length > 0) {
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
|
|
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
ciphers = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
|
|
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
|
|
pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
|
|
SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
|
|
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
|
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
|
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
|
|
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
|
|
* the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
|
|
* a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
|
|
else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
|
|
/* Can't disable compression */
|
|
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for resumed compression method */
|
|
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
|
|
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
|
|
if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
|
|
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->hit) {
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
} else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
|
|
/* See if we have a match */
|
|
int m, nn, v, done = 0;
|
|
unsigned int o;
|
|
|
|
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
|
|
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
|
|
v = comp->id;
|
|
for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
|
|
if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
|
|
done = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
else
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
|
* using compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
|
|
s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
|
|
if (ciphers == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphers = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
|
|
s->clienthello = NULL;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
|
|
s->clienthello = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
|
|
* Upon failure, returns 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
|
|
* called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
|
|
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
|
|
* influence which certificate is sent
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
|
|
&& sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
|
|
* et al can pick it up.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
|
|
ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
|
|
sctx->ext.status_arg);
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
/* status request response should be sent */
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
|
|
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
|
|
s->ext.status_expected = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
/* something bad happened */
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
|
|
* Upon failure, returns 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
|
|
int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
|
|
&selected, &selected_len,
|
|
s->s3.alpn_proposed,
|
|
(unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
|
|
sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
|
|
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
|
|
s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
|
|
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
|
|
|| selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
|
|
|| memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
|
|
selected_len) != 0) {
|
|
/* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
|
|
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
|
|
* been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
|
|
* selected ALPN.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
|
|
selected_len);
|
|
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
|
|
* present.
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
|
|
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
|
|
/* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
|
|
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
|
|
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
|
|
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
|
int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
|
|
if (rv == 0) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() was already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv < 0)
|
|
return WORK_MORE_A;
|
|
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
|
|
if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
|
|
if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
|
|
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
|
|
if (rv == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv < 0) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return WORK_MORE_B;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
cipher =
|
|
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
|
|
SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
|
|
|
|
if (cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
|
|
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
s->session->not_resumable =
|
|
s->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl,
|
|
((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
|
|
& (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
|
|
if (s->session->not_resumable)
|
|
/* do not send a session ticket */
|
|
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Session-id reuse */
|
|
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* we now have the following setup.
|
|
* client_random
|
|
* cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
|
|
* ciphers - the client's preferred list of ciphers
|
|
* compression - basically ignored right now
|
|
* ssl version is set - sslv3
|
|
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
|
* s->hit - session reuse flag
|
|
* s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
|
|
* certificate callbacks etc above.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
|
|
* cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
|
|
* we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
|
|
* we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wst = WORK_MORE_C;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* callback indicates further work to be done
|
|
*/
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return WORK_MORE_C;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
|
|
err:
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int compm;
|
|
size_t sl, len;
|
|
int version;
|
|
unsigned char *session_id;
|
|
int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
|| s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
|
|
|
|
version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
|
|
* tls_process_client_hello()
|
|
*/
|
|
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
|
|
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
|
|
? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
|
|
* back in the server hello:
|
|
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
|
|
* we send back the old session ID.
|
|
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
|
|
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
|
|
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
|
|
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
|
|
* session ID.
|
|
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
|
|
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
|
|
* - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
|
|
* regardless
|
|
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
|
|
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
|
|
* to send back.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
|
|
&& !s->hit)
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (usetls13) {
|
|
sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
|
|
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
session_id = s->session->session_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* set up the compression method */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
compm = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
compm = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
|
|
|| !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
|
|
pkt, &len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
|
|
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
|
|
? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
|
|
: (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
|
|
: SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
|
|
NULL, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
|
|
/* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = NULL;
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
|
|
* a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
|
|
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
size_t encodedlen = 0;
|
|
int curve_id = 0;
|
|
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
|
|
int freer = 0;
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
/* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
CERT *cert = s->cert;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
|
|
pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
|
|
if (pkdh == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
pkdhp = pkdh;
|
|
} else {
|
|
pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
|
|
}
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
|
|
if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
|
|
pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
|
|
0, 1024));
|
|
if (pkdh == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
pkdhp = pkdh;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (pkdhp == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
|
|
pkdh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
|
|
freer = 1;
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
|
|
&r[0])
|
|
|| !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
|
|
&r[1])
|
|
|| !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
|
|
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
|
|
curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
|
|
if (curve_id == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
|
|
s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
|
|
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
|
|
s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key. */
|
|
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
|
|
&encodedPoint);
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
|
|
* can set these to NULLs
|
|
*/
|
|
r[0] = NULL;
|
|
r[1] = NULL;
|
|
r[2] = NULL;
|
|
r[3] = NULL;
|
|
} else
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
|
|
r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
|
|
r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
|
|
r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
|
|
|| ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
|
|
lu = NULL;
|
|
} else if (lu == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (type & SSL_PSK) {
|
|
size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
|
? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
|
|
* checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
|
|
*/
|
|
if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
|
|
len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
|
|
unsigned char *binval;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
|
res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
|
|
|
|
if (!res) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
|
|
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
|
|
* as the prime
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
|
|
size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
|
|
|
|
if (len > 0) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(binval, 0, len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
|
|
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
|
|
* point itself
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
if (lu != NULL) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
|
|
size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* send signature algorithm */
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
|
|
md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
|
|
sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
|
|
NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
|
|
s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
|
|
paramlen);
|
|
if (tbslen == 0) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
|
|
|| EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
|
|
|| sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
|
|
if (freer) {
|
|
BN_free(r[0]);
|
|
BN_free(r[1]);
|
|
BN_free(r[2]);
|
|
BN_free(r[3]);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
/* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
|
|
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
|
|
s->pha_context_len = 32;
|
|
if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
|
|
s->pha_context_len = 0;
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
|
|
s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
|
|
s->pha_context_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
|
|
if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
|
|
0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|
|
|| !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
const uint16_t *psigs;
|
|
size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|
|
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
s->certreqs_sent++;
|
|
s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
|
|
size_t psklen;
|
|
PACKET psk_identity;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
|
|
s->session->psk_identity,
|
|
psk, sizeof(psk));
|
|
|
|
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (psklen == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK related to the given identity not found
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
|
|
s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
|
|
s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t outlen;
|
|
PACKET enc_premaster;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
|
enc_premaster = *pkt;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
|
|
if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
|
|
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
|
|
* section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
|
|
* RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
|
|
* RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
|
|
* in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
|
|
* to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
|
|
* still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
|
|
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
|
|
*/
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
|
|
(unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
|
|
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
|
|
(unsigned int *)&s->version);
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
|
|
PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
|
|
* we double check anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, outlen, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
|
|
if (skey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
|
/* We already checked we have enough data */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
|
|
s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
|
|
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
|
|
* ClientKeyExchange message.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Get encoded point length */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (skey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
|
|
s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
|
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
|
|
const unsigned char *start;
|
|
size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a;
|
|
GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
|
|
const unsigned char *ptr;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
/* Get our certificate private key */
|
|
alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
|
|
*/
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
|
|
if (pk == NULL) {
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pk == NULL) {
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
|
|
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
|
|
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
|
|
* client certificate for authorization only.
|
|
*/
|
|
client_pub_pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
|
|
if (client_pub_pkey) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
|
|
/* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
|
|
* We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
|
|
pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
|
|
if (pKX == NULL
|
|
|| pKX->kxBlob == NULL
|
|
|| ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
|
|
start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
|
|
inlen) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Generate master secret */
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
|
|
NULL) > 0)
|
|
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
|
|
const unsigned char *start = NULL;
|
|
size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen = 0;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get our certificate private key */
|
|
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
|
|
s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
|
|
s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
|
|
if (pk == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
|
|
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
|
|
start = PACKET_data(pkt);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Generate master secret */
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long alg_k;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
|
|
if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
|
|
s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
|
|
s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WORK_STATE wst)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
|
|
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
|
|
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
|
|
size_t labellen;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
|
|
* used.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
|
|
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
|
|
|
|
/* Don't include the terminating zero. */
|
|
labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
|
|
labellen += 1;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
|
|
sctpauthkey,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
|
|
labellen, NULL, 0,
|
|
0) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
|
|
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !received_client_cert(s)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
|
|
* the handshake_buffer
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
|
|
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return WORK_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
|
|
if ((sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
|
|
&& (sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
|
|
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, peer_rpk) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
|
|
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
|
|
* we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
|
|
* we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
|
|
* a new RPK (or certificate) is received via post-handshake authentication,
|
|
* as the session may have already gone into the session cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
|
|
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(sc->session, 0)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sc->session);
|
|
sc->session = new_sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
|
|
X509_free(sc->session->peer);
|
|
sc->session->peer = NULL;
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
|
|
sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
|
|
/* Save RPK */
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
|
|
sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
|
|
peer_rpk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
|
|
* message
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(sc, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
|
|
if (!ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
|
|
sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
|
|
&sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* resend session tickets */
|
|
sc->sent_tickets = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(peer_rpk);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
|
PACKET spkt, context;
|
|
size_t chainidx;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
|
|
* longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
|
|
s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (s->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
|
|
return tls_process_client_rpk(s, pkt);
|
|
|
|
if (s->ext.client_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
|
|
|| (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
|
|
|| (s->pha_context != NULL
|
|
&& !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
|
|
s->pha_context_len)))) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certstart = certbytes;
|
|
x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
|
|
PACKET extensions;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
|
|
NULL, chainidx == 0)
|
|
|| !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
rawexts, x, chainidx,
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
|
|
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
|
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
|
|
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
|
|
if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
|
|
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
|
|
if (pkey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
|
|
* we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
|
|
* we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
|
|
* a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
|
|
* session may have already gone into the session cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
|
|
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = new_sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
|
|
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
|
|
sk = NULL;
|
|
/* Ensure there is no RPK */
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
|
|
s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
|
|
* message
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
|
|
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
|
|
sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
|
|
&s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Resend session tickets */
|
|
s->sent_tickets = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
PACKET tmppkt;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
|
|
|
|
if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
|
|
ret = tls_process_client_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
|
|
|
|
if (cpk == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
|
|
* for the server Certificate message
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
switch (s->ext.server_cert_type) {
|
|
case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
|
|
if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
|
|
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int alg = get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc);
|
|
OSSL_COMP_CERT *cc = sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[alg];
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(cc != NULL)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Server can't compress on-demand
|
|
* Use pre-compressed certificate
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, cc->orig_len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cc->data, cc->len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
sc->s3.tmp.cert->cert_comp_used++;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
|
uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s->session->timeout);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ticket lifetime hint:
|
|
* In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
|
|
* timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
|
|
* For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
|
|
* resumed session (for simplicity).
|
|
*/
|
|
#define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (ossl_time_compare(s->session->timeout,
|
|
ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC)) > 0)
|
|
timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
|
|
} else if (s->hit)
|
|
timeout = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CON_FUNC_RETURN construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WPACKET *pkt,
|
|
uint32_t age_add,
|
|
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
|
SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
|
|
const unsigned char *const_p;
|
|
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
size_t hlen;
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
|
|
int iv_len;
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN ok = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
|
|
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
|
|
SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
|
|
|
|
/* get session encoding length */
|
|
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
|
|
* long
|
|
*/
|
|
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
|
|
if (senc == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
|
|
if (hctx == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
|
|
*/
|
|
const_p = senc;
|
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &const_p, slen_full, sctx->libctx,
|
|
sctx->propq);
|
|
if (sess == NULL) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
|
|
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
|
|
/* shouldn't ever happen */
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = senc;
|
|
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
|
|
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
|
|
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
|
|
#else
|
|
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
|
|
ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
|
|
ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
|
|
1);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
|
|
else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
|
|
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
|
|
ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
|
|
ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
|
|
* length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
|
|
* ticket
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
ok = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Put timeout and length */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
|
if (iv_len < 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
|
|
sctx->propq);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher == NULL) {
|
|
/* Error is already recorded */
|
|
SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
|
|
if (iv_len < 0
|
|
|| RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
|
|
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
|
|
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
|
|
|| !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
|
|
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
|
|
"SHA256")) {
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
|
|
memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
|
|
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
|
|
/* Output key name */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
|
|
/* output IV */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
|
|
&encdata1)
|
|
/* Encrypt session data */
|
|
|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
|
|
|| encdata1 != encdata2
|
|
|| !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
|
|
|| encdata1 + len != encdata2
|
|
|| len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
|
|
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
|
|
|| !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
|
|
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
|
|
macendoffset - macoffset)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
|
|
|| !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
|
|
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|
|
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|
|
|| macdata1 != macdata2) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(senc);
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
|
uint32_t age_add,
|
|
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
|
|
s->session->session_id_length)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
|
|
* gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
|
|
* auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
|
|
* tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->sent_tickets++;
|
|
s->next_ticket_nonce++;
|
|
if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
|
|
s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
|
|
union {
|
|
unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
|
|
uint32_t age_add;
|
|
} age_add_u;
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
age_add_u.age_add = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
size_t i, hashlen;
|
|
uint64_t nonce;
|
|
static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
|
|
int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(hashleni > 0)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
|
|
* s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
|
|
* Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (new_sess == NULL) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = new_sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
|
|
age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
|
|
|
|
nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
|
|
for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
|
|
tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
|
|
nonce >>= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
|
|
nonce_label,
|
|
sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
|
|
tick_nonce,
|
|
TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
|
hashlen, 1)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
|
|
|
|
s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
|
|
ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
|
|
if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
|
|
s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
|
|
OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
|
|
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
|
|
tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
|
|
tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
|
|
* is no point in using full stateless tickets.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
|
|
&& ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
|
|
|| (s->max_early_data > 0
|
|
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
|
|
if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret;
|
|
|
|
tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
|
|
tick_nonce);
|
|
if (tmpret != CON_FUNC_SUCCESS) {
|
|
if (tmpret == CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND) {
|
|
/* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
|
|
ret = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
|
|
/* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
|
|
tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
|
|
}
|
|
/* else SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
|
|
SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
|
|
NULL, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
err:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
|
|
* create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
|
|
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/*
|
|
* tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
|
|
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
|
|
*/
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET next_proto, padding;
|
|
size_t next_proto_len;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* The payload looks like:
|
|
* uint8 proto_len;
|
|
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
|
|
* uint8 padding_len;
|
|
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
|
|
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
|
|
WPACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
|
|
NULL, 0)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
|
|
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
|
|
* a record boundary.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
|
|
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
|
|
if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
|
|
/* SSLfatal() already called */
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
|
|
}
|