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3712436071
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret scalar is feed to the point multiplication). The newly introduced default implementation directly used EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop. The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling and different coordinate systems. - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R. Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling; - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could, e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential addition-and-doubling; - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of the result point. This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`, as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily constant-time themselves. What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar. Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
168 lines
4.7 KiB
C
168 lines
4.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
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#include "ec_lcl.h"
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const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
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{
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static const EC_METHOD ret = {
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EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
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NID_X9_62_prime_field,
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ec_GFp_simple_group_init,
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ec_GFp_simple_group_finish,
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ec_GFp_simple_group_clear_finish,
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ec_GFp_nist_group_copy,
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ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve,
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ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve,
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ec_GFp_simple_group_get_degree,
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ec_group_simple_order_bits,
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ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_init,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_finish,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_clear_finish,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_copy,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity,
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ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
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ec_GFp_simple_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates,
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ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates,
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0, 0, 0,
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ec_GFp_simple_add,
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ec_GFp_simple_dbl,
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ec_GFp_simple_invert,
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ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity,
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ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve,
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ec_GFp_simple_cmp,
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ec_GFp_simple_make_affine,
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ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine,
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0 /* mul */ ,
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0 /* precompute_mult */ ,
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0 /* have_precompute_mult */ ,
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ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
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ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
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0 /* field_div */ ,
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0 /* field_encode */ ,
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0 /* field_decode */ ,
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0, /* field_set_to_one */
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ec_key_simple_priv2oct,
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ec_key_simple_oct2priv,
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0, /* set private */
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ec_key_simple_generate_key,
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ec_key_simple_check_key,
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ec_key_simple_generate_public_key,
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0, /* keycopy */
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0, /* keyfinish */
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ecdh_simple_compute_key,
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0, /* field_inverse_mod_ord */
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ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates,
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0, /* ladder_pre */
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0, /* ladder_step */
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0 /* ladder_post */
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};
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return &ret;
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}
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int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
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{
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dest->field_mod_func = src->field_mod_func;
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return ec_GFp_simple_group_copy(dest, src);
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}
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int ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
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const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
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if (ctx == NULL)
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if ((ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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return 0;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_192(), p) == 0)
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group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_192;
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else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_224(), p) == 0)
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group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_224;
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else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_256(), p) == 0)
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group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_256;
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else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_384(), p) == 0)
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group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_384;
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else if (BN_ucmp(BN_get0_nist_prime_521(), p) == 0)
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group->field_mod_func = BN_nist_mod_521;
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else {
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ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx);
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err:
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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int ec_GFp_nist_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
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const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL;
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if (!group || !r || !a || !b) {
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ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!ctx)
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if ((ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mul(r, a, b, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (!group->field_mod_func(r, r, group->field, ctx))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
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return ret;
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}
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int ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
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BN_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL;
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if (!group || !r || !a) {
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ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR, EC_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!ctx)
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if ((ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (!group->field_mod_func(r, r, group->field, ctx))
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goto err;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
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return ret;
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}
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