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openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
Kaspar Brand 9330a85e04 Fix SSL_CTX_get{first,next}_certificate. 
Fix typo that stopped SSL_CTX_get_{first,next}_certificate from working.
2014-04-21 16:52:28 +01:00

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/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include "o_dir.h"
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex);
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
{
static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
int got_write_lock = 0;
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
got_write_lock = 1;
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
{
ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
}
}
if (got_write_lock)
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
else
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
{
/* Set digest values to defaults */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
{
CERT *ret;
ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references=1;
ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
ret->sec_ex = NULL;
return(ret);
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
{
CERT *ret;
int i;
ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
/* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
* if you find that more readable */
ret->valid = cert->valid;
ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k;
ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
}
ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
{
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
{
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
if (!b)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
}
if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
{
BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
if (!b)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
}
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (cert->ecdh_tmp)
{
ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp);
if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb;
ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 != NULL)
{
rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
if (cpk->privatekey != NULL)
{
rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
switch(i)
{
/* If there was anything special to do for
* certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
* (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
/* We have an RSA key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
/* We have a DSA key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
/* We have a DH key. */
break;
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
/* We have an ECC key */
break;
default:
/* Can't happen. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
}
}
if (cpk->chain)
{
rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
if (!rpk->chain)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
rpk->valid_flags = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL)
{
/* Just copy everything. */
ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
}
#endif
}
ret->references=1;
/* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
* will be set during handshake.
*/
ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
/* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
/* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
if (cert->conf_sigalgs)
{
ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
cert->conf_sigalgslen);
ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
if (cert->client_sigalgs)
{
ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
cert->client_sigalgslen);
ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
}
else
ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
/* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
if (cert->ctypes)
{
ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
if (!ret->ctypes)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
}
ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
if (cert->verify_store)
{
CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
}
if (cert->chain_store)
{
CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
}
ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb;
ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
return(ret);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
{
int i;
if (c == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509)
{
X509_free(cpk->x509);
cpk->x509 = NULL;
}
if (cpk->privatekey)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
cpk->privatekey = NULL;
}
if (cpk->chain)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (cpk->serverinfo)
{
OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
}
#endif
/* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
}
}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
{
int i;
if(c == NULL)
return;
i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
#endif
if (i > 0) return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
if (c->peer_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
if (c->conf_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
if (c->client_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
if (c->shared_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
if (c->ctypes)
OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
if (c->verify_store)
X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
if (c->chain_store)
X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
if (c->ciphers_raw)
OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
{
/* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
* (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
* SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
* being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
* turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
* not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
* s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
* initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
*/
if (o == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return(0);
}
if (*o == NULL)
{
if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(0);
}
}
return(1);
}
int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int i, r;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
if (!cpk)
return 0;
if (cpk->chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
if (r != 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r);
return 0;
}
}
cpk->chain = chain;
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
if (!chain)
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL);
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (!dchain)
return 0;
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain))
{
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
int r;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
if (!cpk)
return 0;
r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
if (r != 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r);
return 0;
}
if (!cpk->chain)
cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x))
return 0;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
{
int i;
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey)
{
c->key = cpk;
return 1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x))
{
c->key = cpk;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
{
int i, idx;
if (!c)
return 0;
if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
idx = 0;
else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT)
{
idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
return 0;
}
else
return 0;
for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey)
{
c->key = cpk;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
{
c->cert_cb = cb;
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
{
SESS_CERT *ret;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references = 1;
return ret;
}
void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
{
int i;
if (sc == NULL)
return;
i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
#endif
if (i > 0)
return;
#ifdef REF_CHECK
if (i < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
abort(); /* ok */
}
#endif
/* i == 0 */
if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
* here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
* data structure. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(sc);
}
int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
{
sc->peer_cert_type = type;
return(1);
}
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
int i;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
else
verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
return(0);
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,verify_store,x,sk))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
#if 0
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
#endif
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
* the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
* or vice versa.
*/
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx,
s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the
* ctx.
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
#else
i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
#endif
else
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
#if 0
/* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
#endif
if (i > 0)
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1);
#else
i=0;
ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
#endif
}
s->verify_result=ctx.error;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(i);
}
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
if (*ca_list != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list=name_list;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
{
int i;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
X509_NAME *name;
ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
{
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
return(NULL);
}
}
return(ret);
}
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->client_CA);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
{
if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{ /* we are in the client */
if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(s->s3 != NULL))
return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
else
return(NULL);
}
else
{
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
return(s->client_CA);
else
return(s->ctx->client_CA);
}
}
static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *name;
if (x == NULL) return(0);
if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
return(0);
if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
return(0);
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
{
X509_NAME_free(name);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
}
static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
/*!
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
* much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
* \param file the file containing one or more certs.
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk;
sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if (ret == NULL)
{
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (ret == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
/* check for duplicates */
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
{
sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
}
}
if (0)
{
err:
if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
ret=NULL;
}
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
if (ret != NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
return(ret);
}
#endif
/*!
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to add to.
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
* already in the stack will be added.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
int ret=1;
int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if (in == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (0)
{
err:
ret=0;
}
if(in != NULL)
BIO_free(in);
if(x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
return ret;
}
/*!
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
* \param stack the stack to append to.
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
* examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
* SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
* included.
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
*/
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir)))
{
char buf[1024];
int r;
if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename);
#else
r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename);
#endif
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
goto err;
}
if (errno)
{
SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
return ret;
}
/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
{
int n;
unsigned char *p;
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n,p);
i2d_X509(x,&p);
*l+=n+3;
return 1;
}
/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
int i;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
X509_STORE *chain_store;
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!cpk || !cpk->x509)
return 1;
x = cpk->x509;
/* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use
* parent ctx.
*/
if (cpk->chain)
extra_certs = cpk->chain;
else
extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
chain_store = NULL;
else if (s->cert->chain_store)
chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
else
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
if (chain_store)
{
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,chain_store,x,NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0);
if (i != 1)
{
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
{
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
return 0;
}
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
}
else
{
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
if (i != 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
return 0;
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++)
{
x=sk_X509_value(extra_certs,i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
{
CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
int i, rv = 0;
unsigned long error;
if (!cpk->x509)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
goto err;
}
/* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
{
chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
if (!chain_store)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x))
{
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
goto err;
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509))
{
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
goto err;
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
else
{
if (c->chain_store)
chain_store = c->chain_store;
else if (s)
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
else
chain_store = ctx->cert_store;
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
untrusted = cpk->chain;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR)
{
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
ERR_clear_error();
i = 1;
rv = 2;
}
if (i > 0)
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
X509_free(x);
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT)
{
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0)
{
/* See if last cert is self signed */
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
{
x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
X509_free(x);
}
}
}
/* Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been
* checked already.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
if (rv != 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
rv = 0;
goto err;
}
}
if (cpk->chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = chain;
if (rv == 0)
rv = 1;
err:
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
return rv;
}
int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
{
X509_STORE **pstore;
if (chain)
pstore = &c->chain_store;
else
pstore = &c->verify_store;
if (*pstore)
X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
*pstore = store;
if (ref && store)
CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
return 1;
}
static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)
{
int level, minbits;
static const int minbits_table[5] = {80, 112, 128, 192, 256};
if (ctx)
level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
else
level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
/* Level 0: anything goes */
if (level <= 0)
return 1;
if (level > 5)
level = 5;
minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
switch (op)
{
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK:
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c = other;
/* No ciphers below security level */
if (bits < minbits)
return 0;
/* No SSLv2 ciphers */
if ((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) >> 24) == 0x2)
return 0;
/* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */
if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
return 0;
/* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */
if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5)
return 0;
/* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */
if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1)
return 0;
/* Level 2: no RC4 */
if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
return 0;
/* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kEECDH)))
return 0;
break;
}
case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
/* SSLv2 allowed only on level zero */
if (nid == SSL2_VERSION)
return 0;
/* SSLv3 not allowed on level 2 */
if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
return 0;
/* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
return 0;
/* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
return 0;
break;
case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
if (level >= 2)
return 0;
break;
case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
if (level >= 3)
return 0;
break;
case SSL_SECOP_SSL2_COMPAT:
/* SSLv2 compatible client hello only for level zero */
return 0;
default:
if (bits < minbits)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_security(SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
}
int ssl_ctx_security(SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ctx->cert->sec_ex);
}
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