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d318389eff
Documenting the macros removes 14 undocumented items. Merged three separate manpages into one. Rename the DRBG CRYPTO_EX define into RAND_DRBG, but keep the old one for API compatibility. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10216)
1411 lines
40 KiB
C
1411 lines
40 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "rand_local.h"
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#include "internal/thread_once.h"
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#include "crypto/rand.h"
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#include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
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/*
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* Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
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*
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* See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview.
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*
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* The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
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* does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
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* instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
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* lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
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* DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
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* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
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*/
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typedef struct drbg_global_st {
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/*
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* The three shared DRBG instances
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*
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* There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
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*/
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/*
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* The <master> DRBG
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*
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* Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
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* DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
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* sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
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*
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* The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
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* all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
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* DRBG instances during reseeding.
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*/
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RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
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/*
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* The <public> DRBG
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*
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* Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
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*
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* The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
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* thread.
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*/
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CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
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/*
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* The <private> DRBG
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*
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* Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
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*
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* The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
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* thread.
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*/
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CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
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} DRBG_GLOBAL;
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typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st {
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CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
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int rand_nonce_count;
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} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL;
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/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
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static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
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#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
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RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
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#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER 0
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#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC 1
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#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE 2
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/* Defaults */
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static int rand_drbg_type[3] = {
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RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Master */
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RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Public */
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RAND_DRBG_TYPE /* Private */
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};
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static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags[3] = {
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RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER, /* Master */
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RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC, /* Public */
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RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE /* Private */
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};
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static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
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static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
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static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
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static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
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/* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */
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static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
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RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
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static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
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static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
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int secure,
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int type,
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unsigned int flags,
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RAND_DRBG *parent);
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static int is_ctr(int type)
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{
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switch (type) {
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case NID_aes_128_ctr:
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case NID_aes_192_ctr:
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case NID_aes_256_ctr:
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int is_digest(int type)
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{
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switch (type) {
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case NID_sha1:
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case NID_sha224:
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case NID_sha256:
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case NID_sha384:
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case NID_sha512:
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case NID_sha512_224:
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case NID_sha512_256:
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case NID_sha3_224:
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case NID_sha3_256:
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case NID_sha3_384:
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case NID_sha3_512:
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return 1;
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
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* Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
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*/
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static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
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{
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DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
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if (dgbl == NULL)
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return NULL;
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#ifndef FIPS_MODE
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/*
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* We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been
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* initialised.
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*/
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OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
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#endif
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if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
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goto err1;
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if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
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goto err2;
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dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
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if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
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goto err3;
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return dgbl;
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err3:
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CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
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err2:
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CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
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err1:
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OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
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return NULL;
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}
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static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
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{
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DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
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if (dgbl == NULL)
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return;
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RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
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CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
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CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
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OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
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}
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static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
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drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
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drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
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};
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/*
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* drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce()
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* which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since
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* drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock
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* to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an
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* infinite recursion loop.
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*/
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static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
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{
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DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl));
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if (dngbl == NULL)
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return NULL;
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dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
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return NULL;
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}
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return dngbl;
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}
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static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl)
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{
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DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl;
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if (dngbl == NULL)
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return;
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CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
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OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
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}
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static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = {
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drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new,
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drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free,
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};
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static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
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{
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return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
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&drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
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}
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/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */
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size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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unsigned char **pout,
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int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
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{
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size_t ret = 0;
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RAND_POOL *pool;
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DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
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= openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
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&drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
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struct {
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void *instance;
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int count;
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} data;
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if (dngbl == NULL)
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return 0;
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memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
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pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
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if (pool == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
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goto err;
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data.instance = drbg;
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CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
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dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
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if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
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goto err;
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ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
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*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
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err:
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rand_pool_free(pool);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
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*
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*/
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void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
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{
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OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
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}
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/*
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* Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
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*
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* If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults
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*
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* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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*/
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int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
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{
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int ret = 1;
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if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
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type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
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flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
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}
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/* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
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if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
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drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
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rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
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drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
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}
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drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
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drbg->flags = flags;
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drbg->type = type;
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if (type == 0) {
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/* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
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drbg->meth = NULL;
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return 1;
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} else if (is_ctr(type)) {
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ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
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} else if (is_digest(type)) {
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if (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
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ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg);
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else
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ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg);
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} else {
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drbg->type = 0;
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drbg->flags = 0;
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drbg->meth = NULL;
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ret == 0) {
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drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
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*
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* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
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*/
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int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
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{
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int all;
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if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS);
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return 0;
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}
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all = ((flags & RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS) == 0);
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if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) != 0) {
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rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = type;
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rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER;
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}
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if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) != 0) {
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rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = type;
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rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC;
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}
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if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) != 0) {
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rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = type;
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rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
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* the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
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* The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
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*
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* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
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*/
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static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
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int secure,
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int type,
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unsigned int flags,
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RAND_DRBG *parent)
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{
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RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
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: OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
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if (drbg == NULL) {
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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drbg->libctx = ctx;
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drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
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drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
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drbg->parent = parent;
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|
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if (parent == NULL) {
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#ifdef FIPS_MODE
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drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy;
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drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy;
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#else
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drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
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drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
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#endif
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#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
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drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
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drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
|
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#endif
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drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
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drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
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} else {
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drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
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drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
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/*
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* Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
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* obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
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*/
|
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|
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drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
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drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
|
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}
|
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|
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if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
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goto err;
|
|
|
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if (parent != NULL) {
|
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rand_drbg_lock(parent);
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if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
|
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/*
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* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
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* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
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*/
|
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rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
|
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RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
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goto err;
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}
|
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rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
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}
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|
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return drbg;
|
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|
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err:
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RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
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|
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return NULL;
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}
|
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|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
|
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RAND_DRBG *parent)
|
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{
|
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return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent);
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}
|
|
|
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RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
|
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{
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return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
|
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}
|
|
|
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RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
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unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
|
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{
|
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return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent);
|
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}
|
|
|
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RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->meth != NULL)
|
|
drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
|
|
rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->secure)
|
|
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
|
|
else
|
|
OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
|
|
* |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
|
|
*
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
|
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
|
|
size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
|
|
size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
|
|
size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
|
|
size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
|
|
|
|
if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
|
|
RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
|
|
RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
|
|
else
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
|
|
* and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
|
|
* the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce.
|
|
* We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
|
|
min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
|
|
min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
|
|
max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
|
|
if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
|
|
drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
|
|
if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
|
|
drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
|
|
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
|
|
min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
|
|
if (entropylen < min_entropylen
|
|
|| entropylen > max_entropylen) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
|
|
noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
|
|
drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
|
|
if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
|
|
nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
|
|
drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
|
|
drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
|
|
tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
|
|
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
|
|
if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
|
|
drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
|
|
*
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
|
{
|
|
int index = -1, type, flags;
|
|
if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
|
|
RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
|
|
* members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
|
|
* initial values.
|
|
*/
|
|
drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
|
|
|
|
/* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
|
|
if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
|
|
index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER;
|
|
else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
|
|
index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE;
|
|
else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
|
|
index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC;
|
|
|
|
if (index != -1) {
|
|
flags = rand_drbg_flags[index];
|
|
type = rand_drbg_type[index];
|
|
} else {
|
|
flags = drbg->flags;
|
|
type = drbg->type;
|
|
}
|
|
return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data
|
|
*
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
|
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
|
|
int prediction_resistance)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
|
|
size_t entropylen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (adin == NULL) {
|
|
adinlen = 0;
|
|
} else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
|
|
if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
|
|
drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
|
|
if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
|
|
drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
|
|
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
|
|
drbg->min_entropylen,
|
|
drbg->max_entropylen,
|
|
prediction_resistance);
|
|
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|
|
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
|
|
drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
|
|
drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
|
|
tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
|
|
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
|
|
*
|
|
* Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
|
|
* regardless of its current state.
|
|
*
|
|
* Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
|
|
* which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
|
|
*
|
|
* If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
|
|
*
|
|
* If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function is used internally only.
|
|
*/
|
|
int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
|
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
|
|
{
|
|
int reseeded = 0;
|
|
const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
|
|
size_t adinlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
|
|
drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (buffer != NULL) {
|
|
if (entropy > 0) {
|
|
if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
|
|
RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (entropy > 8 * len) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
|
|
drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
|
|
if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
|
|
RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
adin = buffer;
|
|
adinlen = len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* repair error state */
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
|
|
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
|
|
|
|
/* repair uninitialized state */
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
/* reinstantiate drbg */
|
|
RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
|
|
(const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
|
|
sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
|
|
/* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
|
|
reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
|
|
if (adin != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* mix in additional input without reseeding
|
|
*
|
|
* Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
|
|
* data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
|
|
* entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
|
|
* This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
|
|
*/
|
|
drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
|
|
} else if (reseeded == 0) {
|
|
/* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
|
|
RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
|
|
drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
|
|
* to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
|
|
* sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
|
|
*
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
|
|
int prediction_resistance,
|
|
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
|
|
{
|
|
int fork_id;
|
|
int reseed_required = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
|
|
/* try to recover from previous errors */
|
|
rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) {
|
|
drbg->fork_id = fork_id;
|
|
reseed_required = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
|
|
if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval)
|
|
reseed_required = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
if (now < drbg->reseed_time
|
|
|| now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
|
|
reseed_required = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
|
|
unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
|
|
if (reseed_counter > 0
|
|
&& tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
|
|
!= reseed_counter)
|
|
reseed_required = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
|
|
if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
adin = NULL;
|
|
adinlen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
|
|
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
|
|
* using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
|
|
*
|
|
* Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *additional = NULL;
|
|
size_t additional_len;
|
|
size_t chunk;
|
|
size_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
|
|
if (drbg->type == 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
|
|
if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
|
|
&additional);
|
|
|
|
for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
|
|
chunk = outlen;
|
|
if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
|
|
chunk = drbg->max_request;
|
|
ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (additional != NULL)
|
|
rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
|
|
*
|
|
* Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been
|
|
* initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
|
|
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
|
|
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
|
|
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
|
|
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
|
|
{
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
|
|
|| drbg->parent != NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
|
|
drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
|
|
drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
|
|
drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the reseed interval.
|
|
*
|
|
* The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the number of generate
|
|
* requests exceeds the given reseed interval. If the reseed interval
|
|
* is 0, then this feature is disabled.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
|
|
{
|
|
if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the reseed time interval.
|
|
*
|
|
* The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the time elapsed since
|
|
* the last reseeding exceeds the given reseed time interval. For safety,
|
|
* a reseeding will also occur if the clock has been reset to a smaller
|
|
* value.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
|
|
{
|
|
if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances
|
|
*
|
|
* The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances
|
|
* (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent).
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
|
|
unsigned int _master_reseed_interval,
|
|
unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval,
|
|
time_t _master_reseed_time_interval,
|
|
time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL
|
|
|| _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL
|
|
|| _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval;
|
|
slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval;
|
|
|
|
master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval;
|
|
slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking
|
|
* enabled is considered a successful no-op.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (drbg->lock != NULL)
|
|
return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking
|
|
* enabled is considered a successful no-op.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (drbg->lock != NULL)
|
|
return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enables locking for the given drbg
|
|
*
|
|
* Locking can only be enabled if the random generator
|
|
* is in the uninitialized state.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
|
|
RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
|
|
if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
|
|
RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
|
|
if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
|
|
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
|
|
RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get and set the EXDATA
|
|
*/
|
|
int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
|
|
* global DRBG. They lock.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and
|
|
* initializes it with default settings.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
|
|
{
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
|
|
|
drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
|
|
rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
|
|
if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* enable seed propagation */
|
|
tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
|
|
*
|
|
* The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
|
|
* an automatic recovery is attempted.
|
|
*/
|
|
(void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
|
|
(const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
|
|
sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
|
|
return drbg;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void drbg_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = arg;
|
|
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
|
|
|
if (dgbl == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
|
|
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
|
|
|
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
|
|
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
|
|
static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public();
|
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
|
|
* which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
|
|
* successfully.
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
|
|
* is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
|
|
* the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
|
|
* in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
|
|
*/
|
|
size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
|
|
size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
|
|
* get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
|
|
*/
|
|
if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
|
|
min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
|
|
min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
|
|
* (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
|
|
* all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
|
|
*/
|
|
min_entropy >>= 3;
|
|
|
|
/* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
|
|
return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
|
|
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
|
|
size_t buflen;
|
|
size_t seedlen;
|
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
|
|
seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
|
|
|
|
buflen = (size_t)num;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
|
|
/*
|
|
* NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
|
|
* by the consuming application. By setting the randomness to zero,
|
|
* we ensure that the buffer contents will be added to the internal
|
|
* state of the DRBG only as additional data.
|
|
*
|
|
* (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2)
|
|
*/
|
|
randomness = 0.0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
|
|
* inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
|
|
* the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
|
|
* dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
|
|
* Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned char dummy[1];
|
|
|
|
ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
|
|
rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
|
|
* as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
|
|
* reseeding.
|
|
*/
|
|
randomness = 0.0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
|
|
* relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
|
|
* overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
|
|
* call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
|
|
* not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
|
|
* security strength.
|
|
*/
|
|
randomness = (double)seedlen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
|
|
rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
|
|
static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
|
|
{
|
|
return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */
|
|
static int drbg_status(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
|
|
|
|
if (drbg == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
|
|
ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
|
|
rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the master DRBG.
|
|
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (dgbl == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return dgbl->master_drbg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the public DRBG.
|
|
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
|
|
|
if (dgbl == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
|
|
if (drbg == NULL) {
|
|
ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
|
|
if (!ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
|
|
}
|
|
return drbg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the private DRBG.
|
|
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
|
|
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
|
|
|
|
if (dgbl == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
|
|
if (drbg == NULL) {
|
|
ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
|
|
if (!ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
|
|
}
|
|
return drbg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
|
|
drbg_seed,
|
|
drbg_bytes,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
drbg_add,
|
|
drbg_bytes,
|
|
drbg_status
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
|
|
return &rand_meth;
|
|
#else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|