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openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
Matt Caswell 88050dd196 Update ServerHello to new draft-22 format 
The new ServerHello format is essentially now the same as the old TLSv1.2
one, but it must additionally include supported_versions. The version
field is fixed at TLSv1.2, and the version negotiation happens solely via
supported_versions.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)
2017-12-14 15:06:37 +00:00

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/*
* Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#endif
static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
/* The defined type for the extension */
unsigned int type;
/*
* The context that this extension applies to, e.g. what messages and
* protocol versions
*/
unsigned int context;
/*
* Initialise extension before parsing. Always called for relevant contexts
* even if extension not present
*/
int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Parse extension sent from client to server */
int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
/* Parse extension send from server to client */
int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx);
/* Construct extension sent from server to client */
EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/* Construct extension sent from client to server */
EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
/*
* Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
* initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
* the extension was seen, or 0 otherwise.
*/
int (*final)(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
} EXTENSION_DEFINITION;
/*
* Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
* of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
* indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h.
* Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
* server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
* extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the
* extension in the message that we received. The parser functions are only
* called if we see the extension in the message. The finalisers are always
* called if the initialiser was called.
* There are also server and client side constructor functions which are always
* called during message construction if the extension is relevant for the
* given context.
* The initialisation, parsing, finalisation and construction functions are
* always called in the order defined in this list. Some extensions may depend
* on others having been processed first, so the order of this list is
* significant.
* The extension context is defined by a series of flags which specify which
* messages the extension is relevant to. These flags also specify whether the
* extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these
*
* NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at
* the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm.
*/
#define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate, tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate,
tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate, tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate,
final_renegotiate
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
init_server_name,
tls_parse_ctos_server_name, tls_parse_stoc_server_name,
tls_construct_stoc_server_name, tls_construct_ctos_server_name,
final_server_name
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen, tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen,
tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen, tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen,
final_maxfragmentlen
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_srp, tls_parse_ctos_srp, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_srp, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats, tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats,
tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats, tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats,
final_ec_pt_formats
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL,
tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups,
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_session_ticket, tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket,
tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket,
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request,
tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request,
tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_npn, tls_parse_ctos_npn, tls_parse_stoc_npn,
tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg, tls_construct_ctos_npn, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
{
/*
* Must appear in this list after server_name so that finalisation
* happens after server_name callbacks
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
init_alpn, tls_parse_ctos_alpn, tls_parse_stoc_alpn,
tls_construct_stoc_alpn, tls_construct_ctos_alpn, final_alpn
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY,
init_srtp, tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp, tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp,
tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp, tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_etm, tls_parse_ctos_etm, tls_parse_stoc_etm,
tls_construct_stoc_etm, tls_construct_ctos_etm, NULL
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
NULL,
/*
* No server side support for this, but can be provided by a custom
* extension. This is an exception to the rule that custom extensions
* cannot override built in ones.
*/
NULL, tls_parse_stoc_sct, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_sct, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY,
NULL,
/* Processed inline as part of version selection */
NULL, tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions,
tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions,
tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL,
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{
/*
* Must be in this list after supported_groups. We need that to have
* been parsed before we do this one.
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share,
tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
final_key_share
},
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
| SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, NULL, tls_parse_stoc_cookie, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_cookie,
NULL
},
{
/*
* Special unsolicited ServerHello extension only used when
* SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG is set
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_cryptopro_bug,
SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data,
final_early_data
},
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
init_certificate_authorities,
tls_parse_certificate_authorities, tls_parse_certificate_authorities,
tls_construct_certificate_authorities,
tls_construct_certificate_authorities, NULL,
},
{
/* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */
TLSEXT_TYPE_padding,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
NULL,
/* We send this, but don't read it */
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL
},
{
/* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk,
tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL
}
};
/* Check whether an extension's context matches the current context */
static int validate_context(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx)
{
/* Check we're allowed to use this extension in this context */
if ((thisctx & extctx) == 0)
return 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_ONLY) != 0)
return 0;
} else if ((extctx & SSL_EXT_DTLS_ONLY) != 0) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_validate_all_contexts(SSL *s, unsigned int thisctx, RAW_EXTENSION *exts)
{
size_t i, num_exts, builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs), offset;
RAW_EXTENSION *thisext;
unsigned int context;
ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
else if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
/* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
num_exts = builtin_num + s->cert->custext.meths_count;
for (thisext = exts, i = 0; i < num_exts; i++, thisext++) {
if (!thisext->present)
continue;
if (i < builtin_num) {
context = ext_defs[i].context;
} else {
custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
meth = custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, thisext->type,
&offset);
if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL))
return 0;
context = meth->context;
}
if (!validate_context(s, context, thisctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current
* |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to
* indicate the extension is not allowed. If returning 1 then |*found| is set to
* the definition for the extension we found.
*/
static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type,
custom_ext_methods *meths, RAW_EXTENSION *rawexlist,
RAW_EXTENSION **found)
{
size_t i;
size_t builtin_num = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisext;
for (i = 0, thisext = ext_defs; i < builtin_num; i++, thisext++) {
if (type == thisext->type) {
if (!validate_context(s, thisext->context, context))
return 0;
*found = &rawexlist[i];
return 1;
}
}
/* Check the custom extensions */
if (meths != NULL) {
size_t offset = 0;
ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH;
custom_ext_method *meth = NULL;
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
role = ENDPOINT_SERVER;
else if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0)
role = ENDPOINT_CLIENT;
meth = custom_ext_find(meths, role, type, &offset);
if (meth != NULL) {
if (!validate_context(s, meth->context, context))
return 0;
*found = &rawexlist[offset + builtin_num];
return 1;
}
}
/* Unknown extension. We allow it */
*found = NULL;
return 1;
}
/*
* Check whether the context defined for an extension |extctx| means whether
* the extension is relevant for the current context |thisctx| or not. Returns
* 1 if the extension is relevant for this context, and 0 otherwise
*/
int extension_is_relevant(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx)
{
int is_tls13;
/*
* For HRR we haven't selected the version yet but we know it will be
* TLSv1.3
*/
if ((thisctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
is_tls13 = 1;
else
is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
|| (is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
|| (!is_tls13 && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->hit && (extctx & SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION) != 0))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Gather a list of all the extensions from the data in |packet]. |context|
* tells us which message this extension is for. The raw extension data is
* stored in |*res| on success. We don't actually process the content of the
* extensions yet, except to check their types. This function also runs the
* initialiser functions for all known extensions if |init| is nonzero (whether
* we have collected them or not). If successful the caller is responsible for
* freeing the contents of |*res|.
*
* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
* more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
* This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
* types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
* found, or an internal error occurred. We only check duplicates for
* extensions that we know about. We ignore others.
*/
int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
RAW_EXTENSION **res, size_t *len, int init)
{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
size_t i = 0;
size_t num_exts;
custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext;
RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
*res = NULL;
/*
* Initialise server side custom extensions. Client side is done during
* construction of extensions for the ClientHello.
*/
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0)
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0);
raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc(num_exts * sizeof(*raw_extensions));
if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
i = 0;
while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
unsigned int type, idx;
PACKET extension;
RAW_EXTENSION *thisex;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
/*
* Verify this extension is allowed. We only check duplicates for
* extensions that we recognise. We also have a special case for the
* PSK extension, which must be the last one in the ClientHello.
*/
if (!verify_extension(s, context, type, exts, raw_extensions, &thisex)
|| (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)
|| (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
&& (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
&& PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
idx = thisex - raw_extensions;
/*-
* Check that we requested this extension (if appropriate). Requests can
* be sent in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Unsolicited
* extensions can be sent in the NewSessionTicket. We only do this for
* the built-in extensions. Custom extensions have a different but
* similar check elsewhere.
* Special cases:
* - The HRR cookie extension is unsolicited
* - The renegotiate extension is unsolicited (the client signals
* support via an SCSV)
* - The signed_certificate_timestamp extension can be provided by a
* custom extension or by the built-in version. We let the extension
* itself handle unsolicited response checks.
*/
if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)
&& (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) == 0
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
&& type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
&& (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
goto err;
}
if (thisex != NULL) {
thisex->data = extension;
thisex->present = 1;
thisex->type = type;
thisex->received_order = i++;
if (s->ext.debug_cb)
s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type,
PACKET_data(&thisex->data),
PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data),
s->ext.debug_arg);
}
}
if (init) {
/*
* Initialise all known extensions relevant to this context,
* whether we have found them or not
*/
for (thisexd = ext_defs, i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
i++, thisexd++) {
if (thisexd->init != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
&& extension_is_relevant(s, thisexd->context, context)
&& !thisexd->init(s, context)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
}
*res = raw_extensions;
if (len != NULL)
*len = num_exts;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
return 0;
}
/*
* Runs the parser for a given extension with index |idx|. |exts| contains the
* list of all parsed extensions previously collected by
* tls_collect_extensions(). The parser is only run if it is applicable for the
* given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a
* Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant
* Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first
* Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If an extension is not
* present this counted as success.
*/
int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx];
int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx) = NULL;
/* Skip if the extension is not present */
if (!currext->present)
return 1;
/* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
if (currext->parsed)
return 1;
currext->parsed = 1;
if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)) {
/* We are handling a built-in extension */
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *extdef = &ext_defs[idx];
/* Check if extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
if (!extension_is_relevant(s, extdef->context, context))
return 1;
parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc;
if (parser != NULL)
return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx);
/*
* If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension
* processing
*/
}
/* Parse custom extensions */
return custom_ext_parse(s, context, currext->type,
PACKET_data(&currext->data),
PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
x, chainidx);
}
/*
* Parse all remaining extensions that have not yet been parsed. Also calls the
* finalisation for all extensions at the end if |fin| is nonzero, whether we
* collected them or not. Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are
* working on a Certificate message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and
* its position in the |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate.
*/
int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int fin)
{
size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
/* Calculate the number of extensions in the extensions list */
numexts += s->cert->custext.meths_count;
/* Parse each extension in turn */
for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) {
if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
if (fin) {
/*
* Finalise all known extensions relevant to this context,
* whether we have found them or not
*/
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
i++, thisexd++) {
if (thisexd->final != NULL && (thisexd->context & context) != 0
&& !thisexd->final(s, context, exts[i].present)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
int should_add_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int extctx, unsigned int thisctx,
int max_version)
{
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
if ((extctx & thisctx) == 0)
return 0;
/* Check if this extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */
if ((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY) != 0)
|| (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED) == 0)
|| (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY) != 0)
|| (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& (extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
&& (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0)
|| ((extctx & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY) != 0
&& (thisctx & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
&& (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Construct all the extensions relevant to the current |context| and write
* them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate
* message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and
* |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with
* 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On a
* failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct.
*/
int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
size_t i;
int min_version, max_version = 0, reason;
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
/*
* If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
* extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello
* (for non-TLSv1.3).
*/
|| ((context &
(SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
&& !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
reason);
return 0;
}
}
/* Add custom extensions first */
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
/* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
}
if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx);
EXT_RETURN ret;
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
if (!should_add_extension(s, thisexd->context, context, max_version))
continue;
construct = s->server ? thisexd->construct_stoc
: thisexd->construct_ctos;
if (construct == NULL)
continue;
ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx);
if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT
&& (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
| SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) != 0)
s->ext.extflags[i] |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Built in extension finalisation and initialisation functions. All initialise
* or finalise the associated extension type for the given |context|. For
* finalisers |sent| is set to 1 if we saw the extension during parsing, and 0
* otherwise. These functions return 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server) {
/*
* Check if we can connect to a server that doesn't support safe
* renegotiation
*/
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
&& !sent) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
&& !sent) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (s->server)
s->servername_done = 0;
return 1;
}
static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK, discard;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->ctx->ext.servername_arg);
else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
&& s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
if (!sent) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
}
/*
* If we switched contexts (whether here or in the client_hello callback),
* move the sess_accept increment from the session_ctx to the new
* context, to avoid the confusing situation of having sess_accept_good
* exceed sess_accept (zero) for the new context.
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &discard,
s->ctx->lock);
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, -1, &discard,
s->session_ctx->lock);
}
/*
* If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled,
* and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket.
* Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID
*/
if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected
&& was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) {
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
if (!s->hit) {
SSL_SESSION* ss = SSL_get_session(s);
if (ss != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick);
ss->ext.tick = NULL;
ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
ss->ext.tick_identity = 0;
if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
} else {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
SSLfatal(s, altmp, SSL_F_FINAL_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
return 0;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, altmp);
return 1;
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->servername_done = 0;
return 1;
default:
return 1;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
if (s->server)
return 1;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/*
* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
* must contain uncompressed.
*/
if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
&& s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
&& s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
&& s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
&& ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
unsigned char *list = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
break;
}
if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (!s->server)
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (s->server) {
s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
} else {
/*
* Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
* that we don't receive a status message
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
if (s->server) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
/*
* Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
* cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
* we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
* In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
* For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
*
* On failure SSLfatal() already called.
*/
return tls_handle_alpn(s);
}
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
return 1;
}
#endif
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
s->ext.use_etm = 0;
return 1;
}
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (!s->server)
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
return 1;
}
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!s->server && s->hit) {
/*
* Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
* original session.
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_FINAL_EMS,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = NULL;
return 1;
}
static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context,
X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (s->server)
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
return 1;
}
#endif
static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) {
SSLfatal(s, TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS,
SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
/* Nothing to do for key_share in an HRR */
if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
return 1;
/*
* If
* we are a client
* AND
* we have no key_share
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes)
* THEN
* fail;
*/
if (!s->server
&& !sent
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/*
* If
* we are a server
* AND
* we have no key_share
* THEN
* If
* we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
* AND
* the client sent a key_share extension
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
* AND
* a shared group exists
* THEN
* send a HelloRetryRequest
* ELSE If
* we are not resuming
* OR
* the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
* THEN
* fail;
*/
if (s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
/* No suitable share */
if (s->hello_retry_request == 0 && sent
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
!= 0)) {
const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
unsigned int group_id = 0;
/* Check if a shared group exists */
/* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
/* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
group_id = pgroups[i];
if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 1))
break;
}
if (i < num_groups) {
/* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
s->hello_retry_request = 1;
return 1;
}
}
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
SSLfatal(s,
sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
}
/* We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest messages */
if (s->server)
s->hello_retry_request = 0;
/*
* For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
* the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE;
return 1;
}
int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign,
int external)
{
EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
const char *label;
size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
int ret = -1;
int usepskfored = 0;
if (external
&& s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
&& s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
&& sess->ext.max_early_data > 0)
usepskfored = 1;
if (external) {
label = external_label;
labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1;
} else {
label = resumption_label;
labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
}
if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
goto err;
}
if (external) {
psk = sess->master_key;
} else {
psk = tmppsk;
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
(const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
* resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
* side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK
* that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early
* data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we
* generate it but store it away for later use.
*/
if (s->server || !external || usepskfored)
early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
else
early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are
* empty!
*/
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the binder key */
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Generate the finished key */
if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders. If we are
* following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first
* ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself.
*/
if (s->hello_retry_request) {
size_t hdatalen;
void *hdata;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
/*
* For servers the handshake buffer data will include the second
* ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off.
*/
if (s->server) {
PACKET hashprefix, msg;
/* Find how many bytes are left after the first two messages */
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&hashprefix, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)
|| !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
hdatalen -= PACKET_remaining(&hashprefix);
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
if (mackey == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!sign)
binderout = tmpbinder;
bindersize = hashsize;
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
|| bindersize != hashsize) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (sign) {
ret = 1;
} else {
/* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
if (!ret)
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
SSL_R_BINDER_DOES_NOT_VERIFY);
}
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey));
OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey));
EVP_PKEY_free(mackey);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return ret;
}
static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
if (!sent)
return 1;
if (!s->server) {
if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
&& sent
&& !s->ext.early_data_ok) {
/*
* If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we
* later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent
* ALPN)
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_FINAL_EARLY_DATA,
SSL_R_BAD_EARLY_DATA);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
if (s->max_early_data == 0
|| !s->hit
|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
|| s->hello_retry_request) {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
} else {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int final_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
{
/*
* Session resumption on server-side with MFL extension active
* BUT MFL extension packet was not resent (i.e. sent == 0)
*/
if (s->server && s->hit && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
&& !sent ) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_FINAL_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
/* Current SSL buffer is lower than requested MFL */
if (s->session && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
&& s->max_send_fragment < GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session))
/* trigger a larger buffer reallocation */
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
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