mirror/openssl
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2024-11-27 05:21:51 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
69687aa829
openssl/apps/verify.c
Dmitry Belyavskiy ad39b31c1c Added '-nameopt' option to the verify command. 
It makes possible to print the certificate's DN correctly in case of verification errors.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2656)
2017-02-20 19:35:14 -05:00

323 lines
10 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "apps.h"
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain);
static int v_verbose = 0, vflags = 0;
static unsigned long nmflag = 0;
typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_NOCAFILE,
OPT_UNTRUSTED, OPT_TRUSTED, OPT_CRLFILE, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SHOW_CHAIN,
OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_NAMEOPT,
OPT_VERBOSE
} OPTION_CHOICE;
const OPTIONS verify_options[] = {
{OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"},
{OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
{"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
{"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-',
"Print extra information about the operations being performed."},
{"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "A directory of trusted certificates"},
{"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
{"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-',
"Do not load the default certificates file"},
{"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-',
"Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"},
{"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "A file of untrusted certificates"},
{"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
{"CRLfile", OPT_CRLFILE, '<',
"File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load"},
{"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-',
"Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate"},
{"show_chain", OPT_SHOW_CHAIN, '-',
"Display information about the certificate chain"},
{"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"},
OPT_V_OPTIONS,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
{"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
#endif
{NULL}
};
int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
ENGINE *e = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL, *trusted = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
const char *prog, *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL;
int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
int vpmtouched = 0, crl_download = 0, show_chain = 0, i = 0, ret = 1;
char nmflag_set = 0;
OPTION_CHOICE o;
if ((vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new()) == NULL)
goto end;
prog = opt_init(argc, argv, verify_options);
while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
switch (o) {
case OPT_EOF:
case OPT_ERR:
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
goto end;
case OPT_HELP:
opt_help(verify_options);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Recognized usages:\n");
for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n",
X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Recognized verify names:\n");
for (i = 0; i < X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_count(); i++) {
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vptmp;
vptmp = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0(i);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\n",
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(vptmp));
}
ret = 0;
goto end;
case OPT_V_CASES:
if (!opt_verify(o, vpm))
goto end;
vpmtouched++;
break;
case OPT_CAPATH:
CApath = opt_arg();
break;
case OPT_CAFILE:
CAfile = opt_arg();
break;
case OPT_NOCAPATH:
noCApath = 1;
break;
case OPT_NOCAFILE:
noCAfile = 1;
break;
case OPT_UNTRUSTED:
/* Zero or more times */
if (!load_certs(opt_arg(), &untrusted, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
"untrusted certificates"))
goto end;
break;
case OPT_TRUSTED:
/* Zero or more times */
noCAfile = 1;
noCApath = 1;
if (!load_certs(opt_arg(), &trusted, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
"trusted certificates"))
goto end;
break;
case OPT_CRLFILE:
/* Zero or more times */
if (!load_crls(opt_arg(), &crls, FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
"other CRLs"))
goto end;
break;
case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD:
crl_download = 1;
break;
case OPT_ENGINE:
if ((e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0)) == NULL) {
/* Failure message already displayed */
goto end;
}
break;
case OPT_SHOW_CHAIN:
show_chain = 1;
break;
case OPT_NAMEOPT:
nmflag_set = 1;
if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
goto end;
break;
case OPT_VERBOSE:
v_verbose = 1;
break;
}
}
argc = opt_num_rest();
argv = opt_rest();
if (trusted != NULL && (CAfile || CApath)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"%s: Cannot use -trusted with -CAfile or -CApath\n",
prog);
goto end;
}
if (!nmflag_set)
nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
if ((store = setup_verify(CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) == NULL)
goto end;
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, cb);
if (vpmtouched)
X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm);
ERR_clear_error();
if (crl_download)
store_setup_crl_download(store);
ret = 0;
if (argc < 1) {
if (check(store, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, show_chain) != 1)
ret = -1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
if (check(store, argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls,
show_chain) != 1)
ret = -1;
}
end:
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
X509_STORE_free(store);
sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
release_engine(e);
return (ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
}
static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
STACK_OF(X509) *uchain, STACK_OF(X509) *tchain,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int show_chain)
{
X509 *x = NULL;
int i = 0, ret = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
int num_untrusted;
x = load_cert(file, FORMAT_PEM, "certificate file");
if (x == NULL)
goto end;
csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (csc == NULL) {
printf("error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
goto end;
}
X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
printf("error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
goto end;
}
if (tchain)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(csc, tchain);
if (crls)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);
i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
if (i > 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc) == X509_V_OK) {
printf("%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
ret = 1;
if (show_chain) {
int j;
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(csc);
num_untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(csc);
printf("Chain:\n");
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(chain); j++) {
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, j);
printf("depth=%d: ", j);
X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout,
X509_get_subject_name(cert),
0, nmflag);
if (j < num_untrusted)
printf(" (untrusted)");
printf("\n");
}
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
}
} else {
printf("error %s: verification failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
end:
if (i <= 0)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
X509_free(x);
return ret;
}
static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int cert_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
X509 *current_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
if (!ok) {
if (current_cert) {
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err,
X509_get_subject_name(current_cert),
0, nmflag);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n");
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%serror %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n",
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(ctx) ? "[CRL path] " : "",
cert_error,
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
X509_verify_cert_error_string(cert_error));
switch (cert_error) {
case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
policies_print(ctx);
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
/*
* since we are just checking the certificates, it is ok if they
* are self signed. But we should still warn the user.
*/
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
/* Continue after extension errors too */
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA:
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
ok = 1;
}
return ok;
}
if (cert_error == X509_V_OK && ok == 2)
policies_print(ctx);
if (!v_verbose)
ERR_clear_error();
return (ok);
}
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink