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642f60d840
openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
Dr. David von Oheimb 642f60d840 Rename CMP_PROTECTEDPART to OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART for consistency 
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11386)
2020-04-18 19:54:17 +02:00

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/*
* Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
#include "cmp_local.h"
#include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "crypto/x509.h"
/*
* Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
* (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
*
* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
*/
static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
int digest_nid, pk_nid;
const EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
int len;
size_t prot_part_der_len = 0;
unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
int res = 0;
if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
return 0;
/* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
&& (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
goto sig_err;
}
pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
if (pubkey == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
goto sig_err;
}
/* create the DER representation of protected part */
prot_part.header = msg->header;
prot_part.body = msg->body;
len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL)
goto end;
prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
/* verify signature of protected part */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg->header->protectionAlg->algorithm),
&digest_nid, &pk_nid)
|| digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
|| (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto sig_err;
}
/* check msg->header->protectionAlg is consistent with public key type */
if (EVP_PKEY_type(pk_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
goto sig_err;
}
if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto end;
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, digest, NULL, pubkey)
&& EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, msg->protection->data,
msg->protection->length,
prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len) == 1) {
res = 1;
goto end;
}
sig_err:
res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
if (res)
ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
res = 0;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
BIO_free(bio);
return res;
}
/* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
int valid = 0;
/* generate expected protection for the message */
if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, secret, NULL)) == NULL)
return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
&& msg->protection->type == protection->type
&& msg->protection->length == protection->length
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
protection->length) == 0;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
if (!valid)
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
return valid;
}
/*
* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
*
* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
X509 *cert)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
int err;
if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (trusted_store == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
return 0;
}
if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL
|| !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
cert, ctx->untrusted_certs))
goto err;
valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
/* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
err:
/* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
return valid;
}
/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
{
char *str;
if (expect_name == NULL)
return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
/* make sure that a matching name is there */
if (actual_name == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
return 0;
}
if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0)
return 1;
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 0;
}
/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
X509 *cert, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
{
char *actual, *expect;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
if (skid == NULL)
return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
/* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
if (ckid == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
return 0;
}
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0)
return 1;
if ((actual = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", actual);
if ((expect = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", expect);
OPENSSL_free(expect);
OPENSSL_free(actual);
return 0;
}
static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
{
int i;
for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
* Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
*
* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
*/
static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
char *str;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
int time_cmp;
ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if (!self_issued) {
str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
|| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
return 0;
}
time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
if (time_cmp != 0) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
: "cert is not yet valid");
return 0;
}
if (!check_name(ctx,
"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
return 0;
if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
return 0;
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
return 1;
}
static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
X509 *scrt, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
return 0;
}
if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
return 1;
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
return 0;
}
/*
* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
* and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
*/
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE *store;
if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
return 0;
if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
|| !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
1 /* self-issued only */))
goto err;
/* store does not include CRLs */
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
if (!valid) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
} else {
/*
* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
* OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
*/
EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID);
X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
/*
* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
* errors
*/
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
X509_free(newcrt);
}
err:
X509_STORE_free(store);
return valid;
}
/*
* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
*/
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
const char *desc,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
{
int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
int i;
if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
return 0;
if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
continue;
n_acceptable_certs++;
if (mode_3gpp ? check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg)
: check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)) {
/* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
return 0;
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
X509_free(cert);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
}
if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
*/
static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
int mode_3gpp)
{
int ret = 0;
if (mode_3gpp
&& ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
|| ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
return 0;
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
return 1;
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted_certs, "untrusted certs",
msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
return 1;
if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
: "no trusted store");
} else {
STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
: "certs in trusted store",
msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs,
msg, mode_3gpp);
sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
}
return ret;
}
static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
{
return 1;
}
/* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
char *sname = NULL;
char *skid_str = NULL;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
int res = 0;
if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
/*
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
*/
if (scrt != NULL) {
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
if (cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
return 1;
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
}
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
if (res) {
/* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
goto end;
}
/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
: OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
if (sname != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
if (skid_str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
else
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
}
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
if (sname != NULL) {
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
}
if (skid_str != NULL) {
ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
}
end:
OPENSSL_free(sname);
OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
return res;
}
/*
* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
*
* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
* if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
* validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
* This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_ALGOR *alg;
int nid = NID_undef, pk_nid = NID_undef;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
X509 *scrt;
if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
|| msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if ((alg = msg->header->protectionAlg) == NULL /* unprotected message */
|| msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
}
/* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, NULL, NULL, alg);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID);
switch (nid) {
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CHECKING_PBM_NO_SECRET_AVAILABLE);
break;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case -1:
return 0;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return 1;
}
break;
/*
* 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
* Not yet supported
*/
case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
break;
/*
* 5.1.3.3. Signature
*/
default:
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), NULL, &pk_nid)
|| pk_nid == NID_undef) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
break;
}
/* validate sender name of received msg */
if (msg->header->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break; /* FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
}
/*
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
* Expected name can be set explicitly or the subject of ctx->srvCert.
* Mitigates risk to accept misused certificate of an unauthorized
* entity of a trusted hierarchy.
*/
if (!check_name(ctx, "sender DN field",
msg->header->sender->d.directoryName,
"expected sender", ctx->expected_sender))
break;
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
if (scrt == NULL) {
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
return 1;
} else { /* use pinned sender cert */
/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
return 1;
/* call cert_acceptable() for adding diagnostic information */
(void)cert_acceptable(ctx, "explicitly set", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg);
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*-
* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
*
* Ensures that:
* it has a valid body type
* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
* its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
* its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
*
* If everything is fine:
* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
*
* returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
{
int rcvd_type;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return -1;
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
/* validate message protection */
if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
}
} else {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
}
}
/* check CMP version number in header */
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
return -1;
}
if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
&& (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
msg->header->transactionID) != 0)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
return -1;
}
/* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
&& (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
msg->header->recipNonce) != 0)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
return -1;
}
/*
* RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
* --> Store for setting in next message
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, msg->header->senderNonce))
return -1;
/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
return -1;
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return -1;
return rcvd_type;
}
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)
{
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
return 0;
switch (msg->body->type) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
{
X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
if (X509_REQ_verify(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) > 0)
return 1;
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
return 0;
}
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
return OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir,
OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
accept_RAVerified);
default:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
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