openssl/crypto/crmf/crmf_local.h
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre ae4186b004 Fix header file include guard names
Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below

For the public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory), the guard
names try to match the path specified in the include directives, with
all letters converted to upper case and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. For the
private header files files, an extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
2019-09-28 20:26:36 +02:00

395 lines
13 KiB
C

/*-
* Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb.
*/
#ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_CRMF_LOCAL_H
# define OSSL_CRYPTO_CRMF_LOCAL_H
# include <openssl/crmf.h>
# include <openssl/err.h>
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
# include <openssl/types.h>
# include <openssl/safestack.h>
# include <openssl/x509.h>
# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
/*-
* EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE {
* intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used
* symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value
* encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
* -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value
* keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key
* valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
* -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content
* -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and
* -- used only if EncryptedValue might be re-examined
* -- by the sending entity in the future)
* encValue BIT STRING
* -- the encrypted value itself
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_encryptedvalue_st {
X509_ALGOR *intendedAlg; /* 0 */
X509_ALGOR *symmAlg; /* 1 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *encSymmKey; /* 2 */
X509_ALGOR *keyAlg; /* 3 */
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *valueHint; /* 4 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *encValue;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE */;
/*-
* Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
* => X509_ATTRIBUTE
*
* PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* version INTEGER,
* privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* privateKey OCTET STRING,
* attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_privatekeyinfo_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *version;
X509_ALGOR *privateKeyAlgorithm;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; /* [ 0 ] */
} OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO)
/*-
* section 4.2.1 Private Key Info Content Type
* id-ct-encKeyWithID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ct 21}
*
* EncKeyWithID ::= SEQUENCE {
* privateKey PrivateKeyInfo,
* identifier CHOICE {
* string UTF8String,
* generalName GeneralName
* } OPTIONAL
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_enckeywithid_identifier_st {
int type;
union {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *string;
GENERAL_NAME *generalName;
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER)
typedef struct ossl_crmf_enckeywithid_st {
OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO *privateKey;
/* [0] */
OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER *identifier;
} OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID)
/*-
* CertId ::= SEQUENCE {
* issuer GeneralName,
* serialNumber INTEGER
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_certid_st {
GENERAL_NAME *issuer;
ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_CERTID */;
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
/*-
* SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* pubMethod INTEGER {
* dontCare (0),
* x500 (1),
* web (2),
* ldap (3) },
* pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_singlepubinfo_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *pubMethod;
GENERAL_NAME *pubLocation;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO */;
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO)
typedef STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO) OSSL_CRMF_PUBINFOS;
/*-
* PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* action INTEGER {
* dontPublish (0),
* pleasePublish (1) },
* pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL
* -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish"
* -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted,
* -- "dontCare" is assumed)
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_pkipublicationinfo_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *action;
OSSL_CRMF_PUBINFOS *pubInfos;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO */;
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO)
/*-
* PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE {
* algId AlgorithmIdentifier,
* -- algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
* -- parameter value is PBMParameter
* value BIT STRING
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_pkmacvalue_st {
X509_ALGOR *algId;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *value;
} OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE)
/*-
* SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER {
* encrCert (0),
* -- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the
* -- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a
* -- confirmation message)
* challengeResp (1)
* -- requests that CA engage in challenge-response exchange with
* -- end entity in order to prove private key possession
* }
*
* POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
* thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated
* -- possession is proven in this message (which contains the private
* -- key itself (encrypted for the CA))
* subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
* -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message
* dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated
* agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue,
* encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_popoprivkey_st {
int type;
union {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *thisMessage; /* 0 */ /* Deprecated */
ASN1_INTEGER *subsequentMessage; /* 1 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *dhMAC; /* 2 */ /* Deprecated */
OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE *agreeMAC; /* 3 */
/*
* TODO: This is not ASN1_NULL but CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA which should be
* somehow taken from crypto/cms which exists now
* - this is not used anywhere so far
*/
ASN1_NULL *encryptedKey; /* 4 */
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY)
/*-
* PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
* salt OCTET STRING,
* owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
* -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
* iterationCount INTEGER,
* -- number of times the OWF is applied
* mac AlgorithmIdentifier
* -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
* -- or HMAC [HMAC, RFC2202])
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_pbmparameter_st {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt;
X509_ALGOR *owf;
ASN1_INTEGER *iterationCount;
X509_ALGOR *mac;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER */;
#define OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT 100000 /* if too large allows DoS */
/*-
* POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
* authInfo CHOICE {
* sender [0] GeneralName,
* -- used only if an authenticated identity has been
* -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a
* -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate)
* publicKeyMAC PKMACValue },
* -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for
* -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC
* -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
* publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- from CertTemplate
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_poposigningkeyinput_authinfo_st {
int type;
union {
/* 0 */ GENERAL_NAME *sender;
/* 1 */ OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE *publicKeyMAC;
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO)
typedef struct ossl_crmf_poposigningkeyinput_st {
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO *authInfo;
X509_PUBKEY *publicKey;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT)
/*-
* POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
* algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signature BIT STRING
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_poposigningkey_st {
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT *poposkInput;
X509_ALGOR *algorithmIdentifier;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY)
/*-
* ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE {
* raVerified [0] NULL,
* -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in
* -- possession of the private key
* signature [1] POPOSigningKey,
* keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey,
* keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_popo_st {
int type;
union {
ASN1_NULL *raVerified; /* 0 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY *signature; /* 1 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY *keyEncipherment; /* 2 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY *keyAgreement; /* 3 */
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPO;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPO)
/*-
* OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE {
* notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL,
* notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL -- at least one MUST be present
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_optionalvalidity_st {
/* 0 */ ASN1_TIME *notBefore;
/* 1 */ ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY)
/*-
* CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
* version [0] Version OPTIONAL,
* serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL,
* validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL,
* subject [5] Name OPTIONAL,
* publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
* issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_certtemplate_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* 0 */
ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber; /* 1 */ /* serialNumber MUST be omitted */
/* This field is assigned by the CA during certificate creation */
X509_ALGOR *signingAlg; /* 2 */ /* signingAlg MUST be omitted */
/* This field is assigned by the CA during certificate creation */
X509_NAME *issuer; /* 3 */
OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY *validity; /* 4 */
X509_NAME *subject; /* 5 */
X509_PUBKEY *publicKey; /* 6 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerUID; /* 7 */ /* deprecated in version 2 */
/* According to rfc 3280: UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *subjectUID; /* 8 */ /* deprecated in version 2 */
/* Could be X509_EXTENSION*S*, but that's only cosmetic */
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* 9 */
} /* OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE */;
/*-
* CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
* certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply
* certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued
* controls Controls OPTIONAL -- Attributes affecting issuance
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_certrequest_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *certReqId;
OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *certTemplate;
/* TODO: make OSSL_CRMF_CONTROLS out of that - but only cosmetical */
STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) *controls;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
/* TODO: isn't there a better way to have this for ANY type? */
struct ossl_crmf_attributetypeandvalue_st {
ASN1_OBJECT *type;
union {
/* NID_id_regCtrl_regToken */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *regToken;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *authenticator;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo */
OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO *pkiPublicationInfo;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID */
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *oldCertID;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey */
X509_PUBKEY *protocolEncrKey;
/* NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8Pairs;
/* NID_id_regInfo_certReq */
OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST *certReq;
ASN1_TYPE *other;
} value;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
/*-
* CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg
* CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
* certReq CertRequest,
* popo ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL,
* -- content depends upon key type
* regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
* }
*/
struct ossl_crmf_msg_st {
OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST *certReq;
/* 0 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPO *popo;
/* 1 */
STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) *regInfo;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_MSG */;
/* DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_MSG) */
#endif