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f3652dff2f
PRF in PBKDF2-params is optional and defaults to hmacWithSHA1. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25568)
530 lines
17 KiB
C
530 lines
17 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1999-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
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* use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
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#include "p12_local.h"
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static int pkcs12_pbmac1_pbkdf2_key_gen(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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int id, int iter, int keylen,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type);
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int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12)
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{
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return p12->mac ? 1 : 0;
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}
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void PKCS12_get0_mac(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pmac,
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const X509_ALGOR **pmacalg,
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING **psalt,
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const ASN1_INTEGER **piter,
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const PKCS12 *p12)
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{
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if (p12->mac) {
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, pmacalg, pmac);
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if (psalt)
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*psalt = p12->mac->salt;
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if (piter)
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*piter = p12->mac->iter;
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} else {
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if (pmac)
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*pmac = NULL;
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if (pmacalg)
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*pmacalg = NULL;
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if (psalt)
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*psalt = NULL;
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if (piter)
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*piter = NULL;
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}
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}
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#define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32
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static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *key,
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const EVP_MD *digest)
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{
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unsigned char out[96];
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if (keylen != TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
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digest, sizeof(out), out)) {
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return 0;
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}
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memcpy(key, out + sizeof(out) - TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN, TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(out, sizeof(out));
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return 1;
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}
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PBKDF2PARAM *PBMAC1_get1_pbkdf2_param(const X509_ALGOR *macalg)
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{
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PBMAC1PARAM *param = NULL;
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PBKDF2PARAM *pbkdf2_param = NULL;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid;
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param = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBMAC1PARAM), macalg->parameter);
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if (param == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
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return NULL;
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}
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_oid, NULL, NULL, param->keyDerivationFunc);
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(kdf_oid) != NID_id_pbkdf2) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
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PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
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return NULL;
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}
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pbkdf2_param = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM),
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param->keyDerivationFunc->parameter);
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PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
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return pbkdf2_param;
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}
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static int PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *propq,
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const char *pass, int passlen,
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const X509_ALGOR *macalg, unsigned char *key)
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{
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PBKDF2PARAM *pbkdf2_param = NULL;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_hmac_oid;
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int kdf_hmac_nid;
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int ret = -1;
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int keylen = 0;
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EVP_MD *kdf_md = NULL;
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pbkdf2_salt = NULL;
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pbkdf2_param = PBMAC1_get1_pbkdf2_param(macalg);
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if (pbkdf2_param == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
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goto err;
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}
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keylen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->keylength);
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pbkdf2_salt = pbkdf2_param->salt->value.octet_string;
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if (pbkdf2_param->prf == NULL) {
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kdf_hmac_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
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} else {
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_hmac_oid, NULL, NULL, pbkdf2_param->prf);
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kdf_hmac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf_hmac_oid);
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}
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kdf_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(ossl_hmac2mdnid(kdf_hmac_nid)), propq);
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if (kdf_md == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_FETCH_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
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if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, pbkdf2_salt->data, pbkdf2_salt->length,
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ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbkdf2_param->iter), kdf_md, keylen, key) <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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ret = keylen;
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err:
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EVP_MD_free(kdf_md);
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PBKDF2PARAM_free(pbkdf2_param);
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return ret;
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}
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/* Generate a MAC, also used for verification */
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static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
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int pbmac1_md_nid, int pbmac1_kdf_nid,
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int (*pkcs12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int slen,
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int id, int iter, int n,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type))
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{
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int ret = 0;
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const EVP_MD *md;
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EVP_MD *md_fetch;
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HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
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unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
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int saltlen, iter;
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char md_name[80];
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int keylen = 0;
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int md_nid = NID_undef;
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const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
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if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
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return 0;
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}
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if (p12->authsafes->d.data == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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salt = p12->mac->salt->data;
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saltlen = p12->mac->salt->length;
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if (p12->mac->iter == NULL)
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iter = 1;
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else
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iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(p12->mac->iter);
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg);
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(macoid) == NID_pbmac1) {
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if (OBJ_obj2txt(md_name, sizeof(md_name), OBJ_nid2obj(pbmac1_md_nid), 0) < 0)
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return 0;
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} else {
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if (OBJ_obj2txt(md_name, sizeof(md_name), macoid, 0) < 0)
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return 0;
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}
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(void)ERR_set_mark();
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md = md_fetch = EVP_MD_fetch(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, md_name,
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p12->authsafes->ctx.propq);
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if (md == NULL)
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md = EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(macoid));
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if (md == NULL) {
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(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
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return 0;
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}
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(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
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keylen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
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md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
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if (keylen <= 0)
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goto err;
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/* For PBMAC1 we use a special keygen callback if not provided (e.g. on verification) */
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if (pbmac1_md_nid != NID_undef && pkcs12_key_gen == NULL) {
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keylen = PBMAC1_PBKDF2_HMAC(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->authsafes->ctx.propq,
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pass, passlen, macalg, key);
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if (keylen < 0)
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goto err;
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} else if ((md_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94
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|| md_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
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|| md_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512)
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&& ossl_safe_getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12") == NULL) {
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keylen = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN;
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if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
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keylen, key, md)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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EVP_MD *hmac_md = (EVP_MD *)md;
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int fetched = 0;
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if (pbmac1_kdf_nid != NID_undef) {
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char hmac_md_name[128];
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if (OBJ_obj2txt(hmac_md_name, sizeof(hmac_md_name), OBJ_nid2obj(pbmac1_kdf_nid), 0) < 0)
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goto err;
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hmac_md = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, hmac_md_name, NULL);
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if (hmac_md == NULL)
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goto err;
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fetched = 1;
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}
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if (pkcs12_key_gen != NULL) {
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int res = (*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
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iter, keylen, key, hmac_md);
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if (fetched)
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EVP_MD_free(hmac_md);
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if (res != 1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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if (fetched)
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EVP_MD_free(hmac_md);
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/* Default to UTF-8 password */
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if (!PKCS12_key_gen_utf8_ex(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
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iter, keylen, key, md,
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p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->authsafes->ctx.propq)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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}
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if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL
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|| !HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, keylen, md, NULL)
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|| !HMAC_Update(hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
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p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
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|| !HMAC_Final(hmac, mac, maclen)) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
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HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
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EVP_MD_free(md_fetch);
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return ret;
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}
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int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen)
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{
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return pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, maclen, NID_undef, NID_undef, NULL);
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}
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/* Verify the mac */
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int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
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{
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unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int maclen;
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
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const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
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if (p12->mac == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_ABSENT);
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return 0;
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}
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&macoid, NULL, NULL, macalg);
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(macoid) == NID_pbmac1) {
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PBMAC1PARAM *param = NULL;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *hmac_oid;
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int md_nid = NID_undef;
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param = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBMAC1PARAM), macalg->parameter);
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if (param == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
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return 0;
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}
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&hmac_oid, NULL, NULL, param->messageAuthScheme);
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md_nid = ossl_hmac2mdnid(OBJ_obj2nid(hmac_oid));
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if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, md_nid, NID_undef, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
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PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
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return 0;
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}
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PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
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} else {
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if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, NID_undef, NID_undef, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
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if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
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|| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Set a mac */
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int PKCS12_set_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
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const EVP_MD *md_type)
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{
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unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned int maclen;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
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if (md_type == NULL)
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/* No need to do a fetch as the md_type is used only to get a NID */
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md_type = EVP_sha256();
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if (!iter)
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iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
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if (PKCS12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, md_type) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8...
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*/
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if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen, NID_undef, NID_undef, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
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if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkcs12_pbmac1_pbkdf2_key_gen(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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int id, int iter, int keylen,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type)
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{
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return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
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md_type, keylen, out);
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}
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static int pkcs12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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int nid)
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{
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X509_ALGOR *macalg;
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PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free(p12->mac);
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p12->mac = NULL;
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if ((p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()) == NULL)
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return PKCS12_ERROR;
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if (iter > 1) {
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if ((p12->mac->iter = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p12->mac->iter, iter)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (saltlen == 0)
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saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
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else if (saltlen < 0)
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return 0;
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if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL)
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return 0;
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p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
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if (salt == NULL) {
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if (RAND_bytes_ex(p12->authsafes->ctx.libctx, p12->mac->salt->data,
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(size_t)saltlen, 0) <= 0)
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return 0;
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} else {
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memcpy(p12->mac->salt->data, salt, saltlen);
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}
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X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, NULL);
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if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(macalg, OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* Set up a mac structure */
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int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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const EVP_MD *md_type)
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{
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return pkcs12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt, saltlen, EVP_MD_get_type(md_type));
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}
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int PKCS12_set_pbmac1_pbkdf2(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
|
|
const EVP_MD *md_type, const char *prf_md_name)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned int maclen;
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *macoct;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
int prf_md_nid = NID_undef, prf_nid = NID_undef, hmac_nid;
|
|
unsigned char *known_salt = NULL;
|
|
int keylen = 0;
|
|
PBMAC1PARAM *param = NULL;
|
|
X509_ALGOR *hmac_alg = NULL, *macalg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (md_type == NULL)
|
|
/* No need to do a fetch as the md_type is used only to get a NID */
|
|
md_type = EVP_sha256();
|
|
|
|
if (prf_md_name == NULL)
|
|
prf_md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md_type);
|
|
else
|
|
prf_md_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(prf_md_name);
|
|
|
|
if (iter == 0)
|
|
iter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
|
|
|
|
keylen = EVP_MD_get_size(md_type);
|
|
|
|
prf_nid = ossl_md2hmacnid(prf_md_nid);
|
|
hmac_nid = ossl_md2hmacnid(EVP_MD_get_type(md_type));
|
|
|
|
if (prf_nid == NID_undef || hmac_nid == NID_undef) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (salt == NULL) {
|
|
known_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen);
|
|
if (known_salt == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, known_salt, saltlen, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, ERR_R_RAND_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
param = PBMAC1PARAM_new();
|
|
hmac_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
|
alg = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, salt ? salt : known_salt, saltlen, prf_nid, keylen);
|
|
if (param == NULL || hmac_alg == NULL || alg == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (pkcs12_setup_mac(p12, iter, salt ? salt : known_salt, saltlen,
|
|
NID_pbmac1) == PKCS12_ERROR) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(hmac_alg, OBJ_nid2obj(hmac_nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_SETUP_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(param->keyDerivationFunc);
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(param->messageAuthScheme);
|
|
param->keyDerivationFunc = alg;
|
|
param->messageAuthScheme = hmac_alg;
|
|
|
|
X509_SIG_getm(p12->mac->dinfo, &macalg, &macoct);
|
|
if (!ASN1_TYPE_pack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBMAC1PARAM), param, &macalg->parameter))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that output mac is forced to UTF-8...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
|
|
EVP_MD_get_type(md_type), prf_md_nid,
|
|
pkcs12_pbmac1_pbkdf2_key_gen)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(macoct, mac, maclen)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, PKCS12_R_MAC_STRING_SET_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
PBMAC1PARAM_free(param);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(known_salt);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|