openssl/test/recipes/70-test_sslsignature.t
Bernd Edlinger 39ed07454d Remove OPENSSL_ia32cap overrides in various test scripts
The removed override was: OPENSSL_ia32cap=~0x200000200000000
which disables AESNI codepaths and PCLMULQDQ (useful for ghash).
It is unclear why this was done, but it probably just hides bugs.

[extended tests]

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16693)
2021-10-06 15:18:09 +02:00

146 lines
5.2 KiB
Perl

#! /usr/bin/env perl
# Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
use strict;
use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT cmdstr srctop_file bldtop_dir/;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
use TLSProxy::Proxy;
my $test_name = "test_sslsignature";
setup($test_name);
plan skip_all => "TLSProxy isn't usable on $^O"
if $^O =~ /^(VMS)$/;
plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the dynamic engine feature enabled"
if disabled("engine") || disabled("dynamic-engine");
plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
if disabled("sock");
plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS enabled"
if alldisabled(available_protocols("tls"));
my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
undef,
cmdstr(app(["openssl"]), display => 1),
srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"),
(!$ENV{HARNESS_ACTIVE} || $ENV{HARNESS_VERBOSE})
);
use constant {
NO_CORRUPTION => 0,
CORRUPT_SERVER_CERT_VERIFY => 1,
CORRUPT_CLIENT_CERT_VERIFY => 2,
CORRUPT_TLS1_2_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE => 3,
};
$proxy->filter(\&signature_filter);
#Test 1: No corruption should succeed
my $testtype = NO_CORRUPTION;
$proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3") if disabled("ec") && disabled("dh");
$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
plan tests => 4;
ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "No corruption");
SKIP: {
skip "TLSv1.3 disabled", 1
if disabled("tls1_3") || (disabled("ec") && disabled("dh"));
#Test 2: Corrupting a server CertVerify signature in TLSv1.3 should fail
$proxy->clear();
$testtype = CORRUPT_SERVER_CERT_VERIFY;
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "Corrupt server TLSv1.3 CertVerify");
#Test x: Corrupting a client CertVerify signature in TLSv1.3 should fail
#$proxy->clear();
#$testtype = CORRUPT_CLIENT_CERT_VERIFY;
#$proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5");
#$proxy->clientflags("-cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"));
#$proxy->start();
#ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "Corrupt client TLSv1.3 CertVerify");
#TODO(TLS1.3): This test fails due to a problem in s_server/TLSProxy.
#Currently a connection is counted as "successful" if the client ends it
#with a close_notify. In TLSProxy the client initiates the closure of the
#connection so really we should not count it as successful until s_server
#has also responded with a close_notify. However s_server never sends a
#close_notify - it just closes the connection. Fixing this would be a
#significant change to the long established behaviour of s_server.
#Unfortunately in this test, it is the server that notices the incorrect
#signature and responds with an appropriate alert. However s_client never
#sees that because it occurs after the server Finished has been sent.
#Therefore s_client just continues to send its application data and sends
#its close_notify regardless. TLSProxy sees this and thinks that the
#connection was successful when in fact it was not. There isn't an easy fix
#for this, so leaving this test commented out for now.
}
SKIP: {
skip "TLS <= 1.2 disabled", 2
if alldisabled(("ssl3", "tls1", "tls1_1", "tls1_2"));
#Test 3: Corrupting a CertVerify signature in <=TLSv1.2 should fail
$proxy->clear();
$testtype = CORRUPT_CLIENT_CERT_VERIFY;
$proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5");
$proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3 -cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"));
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "Corrupt <=TLSv1.2 CertVerify");
SKIP: {
skip "DH disabled", 1 if disabled("dh");
#Test 4: Corrupting a ServerKeyExchange signature in <=TLSv1.2 should
#fail
$proxy->clear();
$testtype = CORRUPT_TLS1_2_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
$proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3");
$proxy->cipherc('DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA');
$proxy->ciphers('DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA');
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "Corrupt <=TLSv1.2 ServerKeyExchange");
}
}
sub signature_filter
{
my $proxy = shift;
my $flight;
my $mt = TLSProxy::Message::MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
if ($testtype == CORRUPT_SERVER_CERT_VERIFY
|| $testtype == CORRUPT_TLS1_2_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
|| (!disabled("tls1_3") && $testtype == NO_CORRUPTION)) {
$flight = 1;
} else {
$flight = 2;
}
# We're only interested in the initial server flight
return if ($proxy->flight != $flight);
$mt = TLSProxy::Message::MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
if ($testtype == CORRUPT_TLS1_2_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE);
foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
if ($message->mt == $mt) {
my $sig = $message->signature();
my $sigbase = substr($sig, 0, -1);
my $sigend = unpack("C", substr($sig, -1));
#Flip bits in final byte of signature to corrupt the sig
$sigend ^= 0xff unless $testtype == NO_CORRUPTION;
$message->signature($sigbase.pack("C", $sigend));
$message->repack();
}
}
}