Using RSA_PKCS1_PADDING with RSA_private_decrypt is inherently unsafe.
The API requires writing output on success and touching the error queue
on error. Thus, although the padding check itself is constant-time as of
294d1e36c2, and the logic after the
decryption in the SSL code is constant-time as of
adb46dbc6d, the API boundary in the middle
still leaks whether the padding check succeeded, giving us our
much-loved Bleichenbacher padding oracle.
Instead, PKCS#1 padding must be handled by the caller which uses
RSA_NO_PADDING, in timing-sensitive code integrated with the
Bleichenbacher mitigation. Removing PKCS#1 padding in constant time is
actually much simpler when the expected length is a constant (and if
it's not a constant, avoiding a padding oracle seems unlikely), so just
do it inline.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1222
5b8fa431ae