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effb0dcf86
ASN1_STRING_length gets the field 'length' of msg, which can be manipulated through a crafted input. Add a check to avoid error execution of OPENSSL_malloc(). CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15583)
149 lines
3.4 KiB
C
149 lines
3.4 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/ts.h>
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#include "ts_local.h"
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TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void)
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{
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TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
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if (ctx == NULL)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_TS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return ctx;
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}
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void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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if (!ctx)
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return;
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TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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}
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int TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f)
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{
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ctx->flags |= f;
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return ctx->flags;
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}
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int TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f)
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{
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ctx->flags = f;
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return ctx->flags;
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}
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BIO *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, BIO *b)
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{
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ctx->data = b;
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return ctx->data;
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}
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X509_STORE *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *s)
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{
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ctx->store = s;
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return ctx->store;
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}
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STACK_OF(X509) *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
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{
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ctx->certs = certs;
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return ctx->certs;
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}
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unsigned char *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx,
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unsigned char *hexstr, long len)
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{
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ctx->imprint = hexstr;
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ctx->imprint_len = len;
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return ctx->imprint;
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}
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void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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if (!ctx)
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return;
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X509_STORE_free(ctx->store);
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sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free);
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ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->policy);
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X509_ALGOR_free(ctx->md_alg);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->imprint);
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BIO_free_all(ctx->data);
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ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->nonce);
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GENERAL_NAME_free(ctx->tsa_name);
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TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(ctx);
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}
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TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(TS_REQ *req, TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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TS_VERIFY_CTX *ret = ctx;
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ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
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TS_MSG_IMPRINT *imprint;
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X509_ALGOR *md_alg;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg;
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const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce;
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OPENSSL_assert(req != NULL);
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if (ret)
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TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ret);
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else if ((ret = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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return NULL;
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ret->flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE);
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if ((policy = req->policy_id) != NULL) {
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if ((ret->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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} else
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ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_POLICY;
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imprint = req->msg_imprint;
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md_alg = imprint->hash_algo;
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if ((ret->md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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msg = imprint->hashed_msg;
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ret->imprint_len = ASN1_STRING_length(msg);
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if (ret->imprint_len <= 0)
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goto err;
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if ((ret->imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(ret->imprint_len)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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memcpy(ret->imprint, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(msg), ret->imprint_len);
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if ((nonce = req->nonce) != NULL) {
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if ((ret->nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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} else
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ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_NONCE;
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return ret;
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err:
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if (ctx)
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TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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else
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TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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