openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
Dr. David von Oheimb ce0465edc7 Fix too strict checks of ossl_cmp_calc_protection()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11998)
2020-06-13 15:13:21 +02:00

321 lines
11 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "cmp_local.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
/*
* This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
*
* Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
* and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
*
* secret or pkey must be set. Attempts doing PBMAC in case 'secret' is set
* and else signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
* do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
*
* returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
*/
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
int len;
size_t prot_part_der_len;
unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
size_t sig_len;
unsigned char *protection = NULL;
const void *ppval = NULL;
int pptype = 0;
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
int md_NID;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
return NULL;
/* construct data to be signed */
prot_part.header = msg->header;
prot_part.body = msg->body;
len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
goto end;
}
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
if (secret != NULL) {
if (ppval == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
goto end;
}
pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
if (pbm == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
goto end;
}
if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
secret->data, secret->length,
&protection, &sig_len))
goto end;
} else if (pkey != NULL) {
/* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
/* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
|| (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
|| (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
goto end;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
prot_part_der_len) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
|| (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
} else {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
goto end;
}
if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto end;
/* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
prot = NULL;
}
end:
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(protection);
OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
return prot;
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return 0;
if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
&& (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
/* make sure that our own cert is included in the first position */
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_cert(msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, 1, 1))
return 0;
/* if we have untrusted certs, try to add intermediate certs */
if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->cert);
int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
1 /* no self-issued */,
1 /* no duplicates */, 0);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (res == 0)
return 0;
}
}
/* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
return 0;
/* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
msg->extraCerts = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
* the pbm settings in the context
* returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
*/
static X509_ALGOR *create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
int pbm_der_len;
ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
ctx->pbm_mac);
pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (alg == NULL || pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
goto err;
if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return alg;
err:
ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return NULL;
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return 0;
/*
* For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
* TODO: Consider also removing any pre-existing extraCerts.
*/
X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
msg->protection = NULL;
if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
return 1;
/* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
ctx->referenceValue))
goto err;
} else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
/*
* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
* private key is given
*/
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
int algNID = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;
/* make sure that key and certificate match */
if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
goto err;
}
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL)
if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg, alg,
V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
goto err;
}
/*
* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
* to section 5.1.1
*/
subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert);
if (subjKeyIDStr == NULL)
subjKeyIDStr = ctx->referenceValue; /* fallback */
if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
goto err;
} else {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
goto err;
}
if ((msg->protection =
ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* If present, add ctx->cert followed by its chain as far as possible.
* Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
* even if not needed to validate the protection
* the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
goto err;
/*
* As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
* to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
* the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
*/
if (ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
&& msg->header->senderKID == NULL)
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
else
return 1;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}