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0122add654
Multi-prime RSA security is not determined by modulus length alone, but depends even on number of primes. Too many primes render security inadequate, but there is no common amount of primes or common factors' length that provide equivalent secuity promise as two-prime for given modulus length. Maximum amount of permitted primes is determined according to following table. <1024 | >=1024 | >=4096 | >=8192 ------+--------+--------+------- 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4791)
440 lines
10 KiB
C
440 lines
10 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "internal/refcount.h"
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#include "internal/bn_int.h"
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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#include "rsa_locl.h"
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RSA *RSA_new(void)
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{
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return RSA_new_method(NULL);
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}
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const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
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{
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return rsa->meth;
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}
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int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth)
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{
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/*
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* NB: The caller is specifically setting a method, so it's not up to us
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* to deal with which ENGINE it comes from.
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*/
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const RSA_METHOD *mtmp;
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mtmp = rsa->meth;
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if (mtmp->finish)
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mtmp->finish(rsa);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine);
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rsa->engine = NULL;
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#endif
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rsa->meth = meth;
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if (meth->init)
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meth->init(rsa);
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return 1;
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}
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RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
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{
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RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->references = 1;
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ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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if (ret->lock == NULL) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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OPENSSL_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
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if (engine) {
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if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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ret->engine = engine;
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} else {
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ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
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}
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if (ret->engine) {
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ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
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if (ret->meth == NULL) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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#endif
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ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
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if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
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goto err;
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}
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return ret;
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err:
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RSA_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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void RSA_free(RSA *r)
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{
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int i;
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if (r == NULL)
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return;
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CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
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REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
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if (i > 0)
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return;
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REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
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if (r->meth->finish)
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r->meth->finish(r);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
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#endif
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
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CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
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BN_clear_free(r->n);
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BN_clear_free(r->e);
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BN_clear_free(r->d);
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BN_clear_free(r->p);
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BN_clear_free(r->q);
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BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
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BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
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BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
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RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
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sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
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BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
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BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
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OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
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OPENSSL_free(r);
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}
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int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
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{
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int i;
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if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
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return 0;
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REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
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REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
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return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
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}
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int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
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{
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
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{
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
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}
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int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
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{
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int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
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if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
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/* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
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int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
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if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
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return 0;
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}
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return BN_security_bits(bits, -1);
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}
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int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
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{
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/* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
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* parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
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* left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
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*/
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if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
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|| (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
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return 0;
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if (n != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->n);
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r->n = n;
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}
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if (e != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->e);
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r->e = e;
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}
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if (d != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->d);
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r->d = d;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
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{
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/* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
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* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
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*/
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if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
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|| (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
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return 0;
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if (p != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->p);
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r->p = p;
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}
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if (q != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->q);
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r->q = q;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
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{
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/* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
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* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
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*/
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if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
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|| (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
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|| (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
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return 0;
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if (dmp1 != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->dmp1);
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r->dmp1 = dmp1;
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}
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if (dmq1 != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->dmq1);
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r->dmq1 = dmq1;
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}
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if (iqmp != NULL) {
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BN_free(r->iqmp);
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r->iqmp = iqmp;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
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* and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
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*/
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int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
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BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
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{
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STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
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RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
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int i;
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if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
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return 0;
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prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
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if (prime_infos == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
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old = r->prime_infos;
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for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
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pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
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if (pinfo == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
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BN_free(pinfo->r);
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BN_free(pinfo->d);
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BN_free(pinfo->t);
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pinfo->r = primes[i];
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pinfo->d = exps[i];
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pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
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} else {
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rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
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goto err;
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}
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(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
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}
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r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
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if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
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r->prime_infos = old;
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goto err;
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}
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if (old != NULL) {
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/*
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* This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
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* also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
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* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
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* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
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*/
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sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
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}
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r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
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return 1;
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err:
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/* r, d, t should not be freed */
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sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
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return 0;
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}
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void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
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const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
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{
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if (n != NULL)
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*n = r->n;
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if (e != NULL)
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*e = r->e;
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if (d != NULL)
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*d = r->d;
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}
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void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
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{
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if (p != NULL)
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*p = r->p;
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if (q != NULL)
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*q = r->q;
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}
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int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
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{
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int pnum;
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pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
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if (pnum <= 0)
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pnum = 0;
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return pnum;
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}
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int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
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{
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int pnum, i;
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RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
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if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
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return 0;
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/*
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* return other primes
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* it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
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pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
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primes[i] = pinfo->r;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
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const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
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const BIGNUM **iqmp)
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{
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if (dmp1 != NULL)
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*dmp1 = r->dmp1;
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if (dmq1 != NULL)
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*dmq1 = r->dmq1;
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if (iqmp != NULL)
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*iqmp = r->iqmp;
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}
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int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
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const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
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{
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int pnum;
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if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
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return 0;
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/* return other primes */
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if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
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RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
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int i;
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/* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
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for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
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pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
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if (exps != NULL)
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exps[i] = pinfo->d;
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if (coeffs != NULL)
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coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
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{
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r->flags &= ~flags;
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}
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int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags)
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{
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return r->flags & flags;
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}
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void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
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{
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r->flags |= flags;
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}
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int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
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{
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/* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
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return r->version;
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}
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ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
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{
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return r->engine;
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}
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int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
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{
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/* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
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if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
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&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
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&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
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return -1;
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
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}
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