mirror of
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5060cd5f3e
The legacy_asn1_ctrl_to_param implementation of ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID calls EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name() which returns an mdname. Previously we were using OBJ_sn2nid/OBJ_ln2nid to lookup that name in the OBJ database. However we might get an md name back that only exists in the namemap, not in the OBJ database. In that case we need to check the various aliases for the name, to see if one of those matches the name we are looking for. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13899)
2141 lines
62 KiB
C
2141 lines
62 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "internal/refcount.h"
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#include "internal/namemap.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/dsa.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/cmac.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/param_build.h>
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#include <openssl/encoder.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include "internal/ffc.h"
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#include "crypto/asn1.h"
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "crypto/ec.h"
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#include "crypto/ecx.h"
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#include "internal/provider.h"
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#include "evp_local.h"
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#include "crypto/ec.h"
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/* TODO remove this when the EVP_PKEY_is_a() #legacy support hack is removed */
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#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp on Windows */
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static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int type, const char *str,
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int len, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
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static void evp_pkey_free_it(EVP_PKEY *key);
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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/* The type of parameters selected in key parameter functions */
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# define SELECT_PARAMETERS OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS
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int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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int size = 0;
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if (pkey != NULL) {
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size = pkey->cache.bits;
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if (pkey->ameth != NULL && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits != NULL)
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size = pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey);
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}
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return size < 0 ? 0 : size;
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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int size = 0;
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if (pkey != NULL) {
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size = pkey->cache.security_bits;
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if (pkey->ameth != NULL && pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits != NULL)
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size = pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits(pkey);
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}
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return size < 0 ? 0 : size;
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode)
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{
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
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if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
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int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
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if (mode >= 0)
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pkey->save_parameters = mode;
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return ret;
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}
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# endif
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
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int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
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if (mode >= 0)
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pkey->save_parameters = mode;
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return ret;
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}
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# endif
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return 0;
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_set_ex_data(EVP_PKEY *key, int idx, void *arg)
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{
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&key->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *EVP_PKEY_get_ex_data(const EVP_PKEY *key, int idx)
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{
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&key->ex_data, idx);
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
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{
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/*
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* TODO: clean up legacy stuff from this function when legacy support
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* is gone.
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*/
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/*
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* If |to| is a legacy key and |from| isn't, we must downgrade |from|.
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* If that fails, this function fails.
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*/
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if (evp_pkey_is_legacy(to) && evp_pkey_is_provided(from))
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if (!evp_pkey_downgrade((EVP_PKEY *)from))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Make sure |to| is typed. Content is less important at this early
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* stage.
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*
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* 1. If |to| is untyped, assign |from|'s key type to it.
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* 2. If |to| contains a legacy key, compare its |type| to |from|'s.
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* (|from| was already downgraded above)
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*
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* If |to| is a provided key, there's nothing more to do here, functions
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* like evp_keymgmt_util_copy() and evp_pkey_export_to_provider() called
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* further down help us find out if they are the same or not.
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*/
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if (evp_pkey_is_blank(to)) {
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if (evp_pkey_is_legacy(from)) {
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if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(to, from->type) == 0)
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return 0;
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} else {
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if (EVP_PKEY_set_type_by_keymgmt(to, from->keymgmt) == 0)
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return 0;
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}
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} else if (evp_pkey_is_legacy(to)) {
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if (to->type != from->type) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(to)) {
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if (EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq(to, from) == 1)
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return 1;
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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/* For purely provided keys, we just call the keymgmt utility */
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if (to->keymgmt != NULL && from->keymgmt != NULL)
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return evp_keymgmt_util_copy(to, (EVP_PKEY *)from, SELECT_PARAMETERS);
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/*
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* If |to| is provided, we know that |from| is legacy at this point.
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* Try exporting |from| to |to|'s keymgmt, then use evp_keymgmt_copy()
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* to copy the appropriate data to |to|'s keydata.
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*/
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if (to->keymgmt != NULL) {
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EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt = to->keymgmt;
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void *from_keydata =
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evp_pkey_export_to_provider((EVP_PKEY *)from, NULL, &to_keymgmt,
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NULL);
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/*
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* If we get a NULL, it could be an internal error, or it could be
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* that there's a key mismatch. We're pretending the latter...
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*/
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if (from_keydata == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
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return 0;
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}
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return evp_keymgmt_copy(to->keymgmt, to->keydata, from_keydata,
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SELECT_PARAMETERS);
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}
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/* Both keys are legacy */
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if (from->ameth != NULL && from->ameth->param_copy != NULL)
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return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
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err:
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return 0;
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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if (pkey != NULL) {
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if (pkey->keymgmt != NULL)
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return !evp_keymgmt_util_has((EVP_PKEY *)pkey, SELECT_PARAMETERS);
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else if (pkey->ameth != NULL && pkey->ameth->param_missing != NULL)
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return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* This function is called for any mixture of keys except pure legacy pair.
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* TODO When legacy keys are gone, we replace a call to this functions with
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* a call to evp_keymgmt_util_match().
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*/
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static int evp_pkey_cmp_any(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b,
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int selection)
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{
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EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt1 = NULL, *keymgmt2 = NULL;
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void *keydata1 = NULL, *keydata2 = NULL, *tmp_keydata = NULL;
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/* If none of them are provided, this function shouldn't have been called */
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if (!ossl_assert(evp_pkey_is_provided(a) || evp_pkey_is_provided(b)))
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return -2;
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/* For purely provided keys, we just call the keymgmt utility */
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if (evp_pkey_is_provided(a) && evp_pkey_is_provided(b))
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return evp_keymgmt_util_match((EVP_PKEY *)a, (EVP_PKEY *)b, selection);
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/*
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* At this point, one of them is provided, the other not. This allows
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* us to compare types using legacy NIDs.
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*/
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if (evp_pkey_is_legacy(a)
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&& !EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(b->keymgmt, OBJ_nid2sn(a->type)))
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return -1; /* not the same key type */
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if (evp_pkey_is_legacy(b)
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&& !EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(a->keymgmt, OBJ_nid2sn(b->type)))
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return -1; /* not the same key type */
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/*
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* We've determined that they both are the same keytype, so the next
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* step is to do a bit of cross export to ensure we have keydata for
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* both keys in the same keymgmt.
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*/
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keymgmt1 = a->keymgmt;
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keydata1 = a->keydata;
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keymgmt2 = b->keymgmt;
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keydata2 = b->keydata;
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if (keymgmt2 != NULL && keymgmt2->match != NULL) {
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tmp_keydata =
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evp_pkey_export_to_provider((EVP_PKEY *)a, NULL, &keymgmt2, NULL);
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if (tmp_keydata != NULL) {
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keymgmt1 = keymgmt2;
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keydata1 = tmp_keydata;
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}
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}
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if (tmp_keydata == NULL && keymgmt1 != NULL && keymgmt1->match != NULL) {
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tmp_keydata =
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evp_pkey_export_to_provider((EVP_PKEY *)b, NULL, &keymgmt1, NULL);
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if (tmp_keydata != NULL) {
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keymgmt2 = keymgmt1;
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keydata2 = tmp_keydata;
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}
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}
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/* If we still don't have matching keymgmt implementations, we give up */
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if (keymgmt1 != keymgmt2)
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return -2;
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/* If the keymgmt implementations are NULL, the export failed */
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if (keymgmt1 == NULL)
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return -2;
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return evp_keymgmt_match(keymgmt1, keydata1, keydata2, selection);
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
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{
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return EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq(a, b);
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_parameters_eq(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
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{
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/*
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* TODO: clean up legacy stuff from this function when legacy support
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* is gone.
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*/
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if (a->keymgmt != NULL || b->keymgmt != NULL)
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return evp_pkey_cmp_any(a, b, SELECT_PARAMETERS);
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/* All legacy keys */
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if (a->type != b->type)
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return -1;
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if (a->ameth != NULL && a->ameth->param_cmp != NULL)
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return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
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return -2;
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
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{
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return EVP_PKEY_eq(a, b);
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}
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int EVP_PKEY_eq(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
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{
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/*
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* TODO: clean up legacy stuff from this function when legacy support
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* is gone.
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*/
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if (a->keymgmt != NULL || b->keymgmt != NULL)
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return evp_pkey_cmp_any(a, b, (SELECT_PARAMETERS
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| OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY));
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/* All legacy keys */
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if (a->type != b->type)
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return -1;
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if (a->ameth != NULL) {
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int ret;
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/* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */
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if (a->ameth->param_cmp != NULL) {
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ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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}
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if (a->ameth->pub_cmp != NULL)
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return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b);
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}
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return -2;
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}
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static EVP_PKEY *new_raw_key_int(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
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const char *strtype,
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const char *propq,
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int nidtype,
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ENGINE *e,
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const unsigned char *key,
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size_t len,
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int key_is_priv)
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{
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
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int result = 0;
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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/* Check if there is an Engine for this type */
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if (e == NULL) {
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ENGINE *tmpe = NULL;
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if (strtype != NULL)
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ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpe, strtype, -1);
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else if (nidtype != EVP_PKEY_NONE)
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ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&tmpe, nidtype);
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/* If tmpe is NULL then no engine is claiming to support this type */
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if (tmpe == NULL)
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ameth = NULL;
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ENGINE_finish(tmpe);
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}
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# endif
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if (e == NULL && ameth == NULL) {
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/*
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* No engine is claiming to support this type, so lets see if we have
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* a provider.
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*/
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ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx,
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strtype != NULL ? strtype
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: OBJ_nid2sn(nidtype),
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propq);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* May fail if no provider available */
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ERR_set_mark();
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if (EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(ctx) == 1) {
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OSSL_PARAM params[] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
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ERR_clear_last_mark();
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params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(
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key_is_priv ? OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY
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: OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
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(void *)key, len);
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if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, params) != 1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
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goto err;
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}
|
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|
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
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|
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return pkey;
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}
|
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ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
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/* else not supported so fallback to legacy */
|
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}
|
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|
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/* Legacy code path */
|
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|
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pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
|
|
|
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if (!pkey_set_type(pkey, e, nidtype, strtype, -1, NULL)) {
|
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/* EVPerr already called */
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goto err;
|
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}
|
|
|
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if (!ossl_assert(pkey->ameth != NULL))
|
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goto err;
|
|
|
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if (key_is_priv) {
|
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if (pkey->ameth->set_priv_key == NULL) {
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
|
|
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if (!pkey->ameth->set_priv_key(pkey, key, len)) {
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
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} else {
|
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if (pkey->ameth->set_pub_key == NULL) {
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
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goto err;
|
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}
|
|
|
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if (!pkey->ameth->set_pub_key(pkey, key, len)) {
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (!result) {
|
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
pkey = NULL;
|
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}
|
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
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return pkey;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
|
|
const char *keytype,
|
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const char *propq,
|
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const unsigned char *priv, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
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return new_raw_key_int(libctx, keytype, propq, EVP_PKEY_NONE, NULL, priv,
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|
len, 1);
|
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}
|
|
|
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EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
|
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const unsigned char *priv,
|
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size_t len)
|
|
{
|
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return new_raw_key_int(NULL, NULL, NULL, type, e, priv, len, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
|
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const char *keytype, const char *propq,
|
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const unsigned char *pub, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
return new_raw_key_int(libctx, keytype, propq, EVP_PKEY_NONE, NULL, pub,
|
|
len, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
|
|
const unsigned char *pub,
|
|
size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
return new_raw_key_int(NULL, NULL, NULL, type, e, pub, len, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct raw_key_details_st
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char **key;
|
|
size_t *len;
|
|
int selection;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static OSSL_CALLBACK get_raw_key_details;
|
|
static int get_raw_key_details(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
|
|
struct raw_key_details_st *raw_key = arg;
|
|
|
|
if (raw_key->selection == OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) {
|
|
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY))
|
|
!= NULL)
|
|
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)raw_key->key,
|
|
SIZE_MAX, raw_key->len);
|
|
} else if (raw_key->selection == OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) {
|
|
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY))
|
|
!= NULL)
|
|
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)raw_key->key,
|
|
SIZE_MAX, raw_key->len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *priv,
|
|
size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt != NULL) {
|
|
struct raw_key_details_st raw_key;
|
|
|
|
raw_key.key = priv == NULL ? NULL : &priv;
|
|
raw_key.len = len;
|
|
raw_key.selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY;
|
|
|
|
return evp_keymgmt_util_export(pkey, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY,
|
|
get_raw_key_details, &raw_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->ameth == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->ameth->get_priv_key == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pkey->ameth->get_priv_key(pkey, priv, len)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_GET_RAW_KEY_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *pub,
|
|
size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt != NULL) {
|
|
struct raw_key_details_st raw_key;
|
|
|
|
raw_key.key = pub == NULL ? NULL : &pub;
|
|
raw_key.len = len;
|
|
raw_key.selection = OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
|
|
return evp_keymgmt_util_export(pkey, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
|
get_raw_key_details, &raw_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->ameth == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->ameth->get_pub_key == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pkey->ameth->get_pub_key(pkey, pub, len)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_GET_RAW_KEY_FAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static EVP_PKEY *new_cmac_key_int(const unsigned char *priv, size_t len,
|
|
const char *cipher_name,
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
|
|
const char *propq, ENGINE *e)
|
|
{
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
const char *engine_id = e != NULL ? ENGINE_get_id(e) : NULL;
|
|
# endif
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[5], *p = params;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (cipher != NULL)
|
|
cipher_name = EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher);
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_name == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "CMAC", propq);
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(ctx)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
|
|
(void *)priv, len);
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_CIPHER,
|
|
(char *)cipher_name, 0);
|
|
if (propq != NULL)
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
|
|
(char *)propq, 0);
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
if (engine_id != NULL)
|
|
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_ENGINE,
|
|
(char *)engine_id, 0);
|
|
# endif
|
|
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, params)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
return pkey;
|
|
# else
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
# endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *priv,
|
|
size_t len, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
|
|
{
|
|
return new_cmac_key_int(priv, len, NULL, cipher, NULL, NULL, e);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, type, NULL, -1, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_is_legacy(pkey)) {
|
|
const char *name = OBJ_nid2sn(type);
|
|
|
|
if (name != NULL && EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, name))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == type) {
|
|
return 1; /* it already is that type */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The application is requesting to alias this to a different pkey type,
|
|
* but not one that resolves to the base type.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_type(type) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey->type = type;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e)
|
|
{
|
|
if (e != NULL) {
|
|
if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, pkey->type) == NULL) {
|
|
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine);
|
|
pkey->pmeth_engine = e;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ENGINE *EVP_PKEY_get0_engine(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey->engine;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
|
|
{
|
|
int alias = type;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if ((key != NULL) && (EVP_PKEY_type(type) == EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key);
|
|
|
|
if (group != NULL && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) == NID_sm2)
|
|
alias = EVP_PKEY_SM2;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, alias))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
|
|
return (key != NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_downgrade((EVP_PKEY *)pkey)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INACCESSIBLE_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return pkey->pkey.ptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
|
|
*len = os->length;
|
|
return os->data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
|
|
const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_poly1305(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_POLY1305_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
|
|
*len = os->length;
|
|
return os->data;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIPHASH
|
|
const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_siphash(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_SIPHASH) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_SIPHASH_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
|
|
*len = os->length;
|
|
return os->data;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_downgrade((EVP_PKEY *)pkey)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INACCESSIBLE_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return pkey->pkey.dsa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
DSA_up_ref(key);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
DSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
DSA_up_ref(ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_downgrade((EVP_PKEY *)pkey)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INACCESSIBLE_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return pkey->pkey.ec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
EC_KEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
EC_KEY_up_ref(ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ECX_KEY *evp_pkey_get0_ECX_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_downgrade((EVP_PKEY *)pkey)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INACCESSIBLE_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) != type) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_ECX_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return pkey->pkey.ecx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ECX_KEY *evp_pkey_get1_ECX_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
ECX_KEY *ret = evp_pkey_get0_ECX_KEY(pkey, type);
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
ecx_key_up_ref(ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# define IMPLEMENT_ECX_VARIANT(NAME) \
|
|
ECX_KEY *evp_pkey_get1_##NAME(EVP_PKEY *pkey) \
|
|
{ \
|
|
return evp_pkey_get1_ECX_KEY(pkey, EVP_PKEY_##NAME); \
|
|
}
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ECX_VARIANT(X25519)
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ECX_VARIANT(X448)
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ECX_VARIANT(ED25519)
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ECX_VARIANT(ED448)
|
|
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key)
|
|
{
|
|
int type = DH_get0_q(key) == NULL ? EVP_PKEY_DH : EVP_PKEY_DHX;
|
|
int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, type, key);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
DH_up_ref(key);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_downgrade((EVP_PKEY *)pkey)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INACCESSIBLE_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return pkey->pkey.dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
DH *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
DH_up_ref(ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_type(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
|
|
ENGINE *e;
|
|
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
|
|
if (ameth)
|
|
ret = ameth->pkey_id;
|
|
else
|
|
ret = NID_undef;
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
|
# endif
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return pkey->type;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
int evp_pkey_name2type(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* These hard coded cases are pure hackery to get around the fact
|
|
* that names in crypto/objects/objects.txt are a mess. There is
|
|
* no "EC", and "RSA" leads to the NID for 2.5.8.1.1, an OID that's
|
|
* fallen out in favor of { pkcs-1 1 }, i.e. 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1,
|
|
* the NID of which is used for EVP_PKEY_RSA. Strangely enough,
|
|
* "DSA" is accurate... but still, better be safe and hard-code
|
|
* names that we know.
|
|
* On a similar topic, EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_SM2) will result in
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_EC, because of aliasing.
|
|
* TODO Clean this away along with all other #legacy support.
|
|
*/
|
|
int type = NID_undef;
|
|
|
|
if (strcasecmp(name, "RSA") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "RSA-PSS") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "EC") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "ED25519") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_ED25519;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "ED448") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_ED448;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "X25519") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_X25519;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "X448") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_X448;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "SM2") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_SM2;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "DH") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_DH;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "X9.42 DH") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_DHX;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "DHX") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_DHX;
|
|
else if (strcasecmp(name, "DSA") == 0)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
|
|
|
|
if (type == NID_undef)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_sn2nid(name));
|
|
if (type == NID_undef)
|
|
type = EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_ln2nid(name));
|
|
|
|
return type;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_is_a(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt == NULL) {
|
|
int type = evp_pkey_name2type(name);
|
|
|
|
return pkey->type == type;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(pkey->keymgmt, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void EVP_PKEY_typenames_do_all(const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
|
void (*fn)(const char *name, void *data),
|
|
void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_is_typed(pkey))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_is_provided(pkey)) {
|
|
const char *name = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey));
|
|
|
|
fn(name, data);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT_names_do_all(pkey->keymgmt, fn, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_can_sign(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt == NULL) {
|
|
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_ED448:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* Including SM2 */
|
|
return EC_KEY_can_sign(pkey->pkey.ec);
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
const OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(pkey->keymgmt);
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_provider_libctx(prov);
|
|
const char *supported_sig =
|
|
pkey->keymgmt->query_operation_name != NULL
|
|
? pkey->keymgmt->query_operation_name(OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE)
|
|
: evp_first_name(prov, pkey->keymgmt->name_id);
|
|
EVP_SIGNATURE *signature = NULL;
|
|
|
|
signature = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(libctx, supported_sig, NULL);
|
|
if (signature != NULL) {
|
|
EVP_SIGNATURE_free(signature);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int print_reset_indent(BIO **out, int pop_f_prefix, long saved_indent)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO_set_indent(*out, saved_indent);
|
|
if (pop_f_prefix) {
|
|
BIO *next = BIO_pop(*out);
|
|
|
|
BIO_free(*out);
|
|
*out = next;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int print_set_indent(BIO **out, int *pop_f_prefix, long *saved_indent,
|
|
long indent)
|
|
{
|
|
*pop_f_prefix = 0;
|
|
*saved_indent = 0;
|
|
if (indent > 0) {
|
|
long i = BIO_get_indent(*out);
|
|
|
|
*saved_indent = (i < 0 ? 0 : i);
|
|
if (BIO_set_indent(*out, indent) <= 0) {
|
|
if ((*out = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_prefix()), *out)) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*pop_f_prefix = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (BIO_set_indent(*out, indent) <= 0) {
|
|
print_reset_indent(out, *pop_f_prefix, *saved_indent);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
|
const char *kstr)
|
|
{
|
|
return BIO_indent(out, indent, 128)
|
|
&& BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n",
|
|
kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type)) > 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int print_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *out, int indent,
|
|
int selection /* For provided encoding */,
|
|
const char *propquery /* For provided encoding */,
|
|
int (*legacy_print)(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
|
int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx),
|
|
ASN1_PCTX *legacy_pctx /* For legacy print */)
|
|
{
|
|
int pop_f_prefix;
|
|
long saved_indent;
|
|
OSSL_ENCODER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
|
int ret = -2; /* default to unsupported */
|
|
|
|
if (!print_set_indent(&out, &pop_f_prefix, &saved_indent, indent))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx = OSSL_ENCODER_CTX_new_by_EVP_PKEY(pkey, selection, "TEXT", NULL,
|
|
propquery);
|
|
if (OSSL_ENCODER_CTX_get_num_encoders(ctx) != 0)
|
|
ret = OSSL_ENCODER_to_bio(ctx, out);
|
|
OSSL_ENCODER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != -2)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* legacy fallback */
|
|
if (legacy_print != NULL)
|
|
ret = legacy_print(out, pkey, 0, legacy_pctx);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = unsup_alg(out, pkey, 0, "Public Key");
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
print_reset_indent(&out, pop_f_prefix, saved_indent);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
|
int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return print_pkey(pkey, out, indent, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, NULL,
|
|
(pkey->ameth != NULL ? pkey->ameth->pub_print : NULL),
|
|
pctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
|
int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return print_pkey(pkey, out, indent, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, NULL,
|
|
(pkey->ameth != NULL ? pkey->ameth->priv_print : NULL),
|
|
pctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
|
int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return print_pkey(pkey, out, indent, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, NULL,
|
|
(pkey->ameth != NULL ? pkey->ameth->param_print : NULL),
|
|
pctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void find_md_nid(const char *mdname, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
int *nid = (int *)data;
|
|
|
|
if (*nid != NID_undef)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
*nid = OBJ_sn2nid(mdname);
|
|
if (*nid == NID_undef)
|
|
*nid = OBJ_ln2nid(mdname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int legacy_asn1_ctrl_to_param(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
|
|
int arg1, void *arg2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
|
|
{
|
|
char mdname[80] = "";
|
|
int rv = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(pkey, mdname,
|
|
sizeof(mdname));
|
|
|
|
if (rv > 0) {
|
|
int mdnum;
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_provider_libctx(pkey->keymgmt->prov);
|
|
/* Make sure the MD is in the namemap if available */
|
|
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, NULL);
|
|
OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap = ossl_namemap_stored(libctx);
|
|
int nid = NID_undef;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The only reason to fetch the MD was to make sure it is in the
|
|
* namemap. We can immediately free it.
|
|
*/
|
|
EVP_MD_free(md);
|
|
mdnum = ossl_namemap_name2num(namemap, mdname);
|
|
if (mdnum == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have the namemap number - now we need to find the
|
|
* associated nid
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_namemap_doall_names(namemap, mdnum, find_md_nid, &nid);
|
|
*(int *)arg2 = nid;
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, int arg1, void *arg2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->ameth == NULL)
|
|
return legacy_asn1_ctrl_to_param(pkey, op, arg1, arg2);
|
|
if (pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl == NULL)
|
|
return -2;
|
|
return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, op, arg1, arg2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid)
|
|
{
|
|
return evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID, 0, pnid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
|
char *mdname, size_t mdname_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->ameth == NULL)
|
|
return evp_keymgmt_util_get_deflt_digest_name(pkey->keymgmt,
|
|
pkey->keydata,
|
|
mdname, mdname_sz);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
int nid = NID_undef;
|
|
int rv = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid);
|
|
const char *name = rv > 0 ? OBJ_nid2sn(nid) : NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rv > 0)
|
|
OPENSSL_strlcpy(mdname, name, mdname_sz);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, char *gname, size_t gname_sz,
|
|
size_t *gname_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (evp_pkey_is_legacy(pkey)) {
|
|
const char *name = NULL;
|
|
|
|
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
{
|
|
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
|
|
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
|
|
|
|
if (nid != NID_undef)
|
|
name = ec_curve_nid2name(nid);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
|
|
{
|
|
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
|
|
int uid = DH_get_nid(dh);
|
|
|
|
if (uid != NID_undef) {
|
|
const DH_NAMED_GROUP *dh_group =
|
|
ossl_ffc_uid_to_dh_named_group(uid);
|
|
|
|
name = ossl_ffc_named_group_get_name(dh_group);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gname_len != NULL)
|
|
*gname_len = (name == NULL ? 0 : strlen(name));
|
|
if (name != NULL) {
|
|
if (gname != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_strlcpy(gname, name, gname_sz);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (evp_pkey_is_provided(pkey)) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_get_utf8_string_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
|
|
gname, gname_sz, gname_len))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int nid)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv, default_nid;
|
|
|
|
rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SUPPORTS_MD_NID, nid, NULL);
|
|
if (rv == -2) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there is a mandatory default digest and this isn't it, then
|
|
* the answer is 'no'.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &default_nid);
|
|
if (rv == 2)
|
|
return (nid == default_nid);
|
|
/* zero is an error from EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() */
|
|
if (rv == 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char *pub,
|
|
size_t publen)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey->ameth == NULL) {
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt == NULL || pkey->keydata == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] =
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_ENCODED_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
|
(unsigned char *)pub, publen);
|
|
return evp_keymgmt_set_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (publen > INT_MAX)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Historically this function was EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint */
|
|
if (evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT, publen,
|
|
(void *)pub) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppub)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->ameth == NULL) {
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
|
|
|
|
if (pkey->keymgmt == NULL || pkey->keydata == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] =
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_ENCODED_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*ppub = OPENSSL_malloc(params[0].return_size);
|
|
if (*ppub == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] =
|
|
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_ENCODED_PUBLIC_KEY,
|
|
*ppub, params[0].return_size);
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return params[0].return_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT, 0, ppub);
|
|
if (rv <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
|
|
|
/*- All methods below can also be used in FIPS_MODULE */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This reset function must be used very carefully, as it literally throws
|
|
* away everything in an EVP_PKEY without freeing them, and may cause leaks
|
|
* of memory, what have you.
|
|
* The only reason we have this is to have the same code for EVP_PKEY_new()
|
|
* and evp_pkey_downgrade().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int evp_pkey_reset_unlocked(EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pk == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (pk->lock != NULL) {
|
|
const size_t offset = (unsigned char *)&pk->lock - (unsigned char *)pk;
|
|
|
|
memset(pk, 0, offset);
|
|
memset((unsigned char *)pk + offset + sizeof(pk->lock),
|
|
0,
|
|
sizeof(*pk) - offset - sizeof(pk->lock));
|
|
}
|
|
/* EVP_PKEY_new uses zalloc so no need to call memset if pk->lock is NULL */
|
|
|
|
pk->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
|
|
pk->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
|
|
pk->references = 1;
|
|
pk->save_parameters = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_reset_unlocked(ret))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
|
|
if (ret->lock == NULL) {
|
|
EVPerr(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EVP_PKEY, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ret->lock);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ret);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Setup a public key management method.
|
|
*
|
|
* For legacy keys, either |type| or |str| is expected to have the type
|
|
* information. In this case, the setup consists of finding an ASN1 method
|
|
* and potentially an ENGINE, and setting those fields in |pkey|.
|
|
*
|
|
* For provider side keys, |keymgmt| is expected to be non-NULL. In this
|
|
* case, the setup consists of setting the |keymgmt| field in |pkey|.
|
|
*
|
|
* If pkey is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the key management method exists.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int type, const char *str,
|
|
int len, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
|
|
ENGINE **eptr = (e == NULL) ? &e : NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The setups can't set both legacy and provider side methods.
|
|
* It is forbidden
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(type == EVP_PKEY_NONE || keymgmt == NULL)
|
|
|| !ossl_assert(e == NULL || keymgmt == NULL)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
int free_it = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
free_it = free_it || pkey->pkey.ptr != NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
free_it = free_it || pkey->keydata != NULL;
|
|
if (free_it)
|
|
evp_pkey_free_it(pkey);
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
/*
|
|
* If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has
|
|
* succeeded once so just indicate success.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_NONE
|
|
&& type == pkey->save_type
|
|
&& pkey->ameth != NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
/* If we have ENGINEs release them */
|
|
ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
|
|
pkey->engine = NULL;
|
|
ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine);
|
|
pkey->pmeth_engine = NULL;
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (str != NULL)
|
|
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(eptr, str, len);
|
|
else if (type != EVP_PKEY_NONE)
|
|
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(eptr, type);
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
if (pkey == NULL && eptr != NULL)
|
|
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
int check = 1;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
check = check && ameth == NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
check = check && keymgmt == NULL;
|
|
if (check) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
if (keymgmt != NULL && !EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(keymgmt)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey->keymgmt = keymgmt;
|
|
|
|
pkey->save_type = type;
|
|
pkey->type = type;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the internal "origin" key is provider side, don't save |ameth|.
|
|
* The main reason is that |ameth| is one factor to detect that the
|
|
* internal "origin" key is a legacy one.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (keymgmt == NULL)
|
|
pkey->ameth = ameth;
|
|
pkey->engine = e;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD |pkey_id| retains its legacy key purpose
|
|
* for any key type that has a legacy implementation, regardless of
|
|
* if the internal key is a legacy or a provider side one. When
|
|
* there is no legacy implementation for the key, the type becomes
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT, which indicates that one should be cautious
|
|
* with functions that expect legacy internal keys.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ameth != NULL)
|
|
pkey->type = ameth->pkey_id;
|
|
else
|
|
pkey->type = EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
static void find_ameth(const char *name, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
const char **str = data;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The error messages from pkey_set_type() are uninteresting here,
|
|
* and misleading.
|
|
*/
|
|
ERR_set_mark();
|
|
|
|
if (pkey_set_type(NULL, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE, name, strlen(name),
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
if (str[0] == NULL)
|
|
str[0] = name;
|
|
else if (str[1] == NULL)
|
|
str[1] = name;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_set_type_by_keymgmt(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR str[0]
|
|
# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN (str[0] == NULL ? -1 : (int)strlen(str[0]))
|
|
/*
|
|
* Find at most two strings that have an associated EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD
|
|
* Ideally, only one should be found. If two (or more) are found, the
|
|
* match is ambiguous. This should never happen, but...
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *str[2] = { NULL, NULL };
|
|
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT_names_do_all(keymgmt, find_ameth, &str);
|
|
if (str[1] != NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR NULL
|
|
# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN -1
|
|
#endif
|
|
return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR, EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN,
|
|
keymgmt);
|
|
|
|
#undef EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR
|
|
#undef EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&pkey->references, &i, pkey->lock) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", pkey);
|
|
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
|
|
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
void evp_pkey_free_legacy(EVP_PKEY *x)
|
|
{
|
|
if (x->ameth != NULL) {
|
|
if (x->ameth->pkey_free != NULL)
|
|
x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
|
|
x->pkey.ptr = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE_finish(x->engine);
|
|
x->engine = NULL;
|
|
ENGINE_finish(x->pmeth_engine);
|
|
x->pmeth_engine = NULL;
|
|
# endif
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
|
|
|
static void evp_pkey_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
|
|
{
|
|
/* internal function; x is never NULL */
|
|
|
|
evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(x);
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
evp_pkey_free_legacy(x);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (x->keymgmt != NULL) {
|
|
evp_keymgmt_freedata(x->keymgmt, x->keydata);
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(x->keymgmt);
|
|
x->keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
x->keydata = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
x->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&x->references, &i, x->lock);
|
|
REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", x);
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
|
|
evp_pkey_free_it(x);
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EVP_PKEY, x, &x->ex_data);
|
|
#endif
|
|
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(x->lock);
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
|
|
#endif
|
|
OPENSSL_free(x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
int size = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
size = pkey->cache.size;
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (pkey->ameth != NULL && pkey->ameth->pkey_size != NULL)
|
|
size = pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return size < 0 ? 0 : size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT **keymgmt,
|
|
const char *propquery)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT *allocated_keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
void *keydata = NULL;
|
|
int check;
|
|
|
|
if (pk == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* No key data => nothing to export */
|
|
check = 1;
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
check = check && pk->pkey.ptr == NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
check = check && pk->keydata == NULL;
|
|
if (check)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (pk->pkey.ptr != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the legacy key doesn't have an dirty counter or export function,
|
|
* give up
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt == NULL || pk->ameth->export_to == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (keymgmt != NULL) {
|
|
tmp_keymgmt = *keymgmt;
|
|
*keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no keymgmt was given or found, get a default keymgmt. We do so by
|
|
* letting EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey() do it for us, then we steal it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pk, propquery);
|
|
|
|
tmp_keymgmt = ctx->keymgmt;
|
|
ctx->keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If there's still no keymgmt to be had, give up */
|
|
if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
if (pk->pkey.ptr != NULL) {
|
|
size_t i = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the legacy "origin" hasn't changed since last time, we try
|
|
* to find our keymgmt in the operation cache. If it has changed,
|
|
* |i| remains zero, and we will clear the cache further down.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
|
|
i = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache_index(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If |tmp_keymgmt| is present in the operation cache, it means
|
|
* that export doesn't need to be redone. In that case, we take
|
|
* token copies of the cached pointers, to have token success
|
|
* values to return.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i < OSSL_NELEM(pk->operation_cache)
|
|
&& pk->operation_cache[i].keymgmt != NULL) {
|
|
keydata = pk->operation_cache[i].keydata;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(3.0) Right now, we assume we have ample space. We will have
|
|
* to think about a cache aging scheme, though, if |i| indexes outside
|
|
* the array.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(i < OSSL_NELEM(pk->operation_cache)))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure that the keymgmt key type matches the legacy NID */
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(tmp_keymgmt, OBJ_nid2sn(pk->type))))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if ((keydata = evp_keymgmt_newdata(tmp_keymgmt)) == NULL)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (!pk->ameth->export_to(pk, keydata, tmp_keymgmt, libctx, propquery)) {
|
|
evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
|
|
keydata = NULL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the dirty counter changed since last time, then clear the
|
|
* operation cache. In that case, we know that |i| is zero. Just
|
|
* in case this is a re-export, we increment then decrement the
|
|
* keymgmt reference counter.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(tmp_keymgmt)) { /* refcnt++ */
|
|
evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
|
|
keydata = NULL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) != pk->dirty_cnt_copy)
|
|
evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(pk);
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt); /* refcnt-- */
|
|
|
|
/* Add the new export to the operation cache */
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, i, tmp_keymgmt, keydata)) {
|
|
evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
|
|
keydata = NULL;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Synchronize the dirty count */
|
|
pk->dirty_cnt_copy = pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
|
|
|
keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
/*
|
|
* If nothing was exported, |tmp_keymgmt| might point at a freed
|
|
* EVP_KEYMGMT, so we clear it to be safe. It shouldn't be useful for
|
|
* the caller either way in that case.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (keydata == NULL)
|
|
tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (keymgmt != NULL)
|
|
*keymgmt = tmp_keymgmt;
|
|
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(allocated_keymgmt);
|
|
return keydata;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
|
int evp_pkey_copy_downgraded(EVP_PKEY **dest, const EVP_PKEY *src)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(dest != NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (evp_pkey_is_assigned(src) && evp_pkey_is_provided(src)) {
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt = src->keymgmt;
|
|
void *keydata = src->keydata;
|
|
int type = src->type;
|
|
const char *keytype = NULL;
|
|
|
|
keytype = evp_first_name(EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt),
|
|
keymgmt->name_id);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the type is EVP_PKEY_NONE, then we have a problem somewhere
|
|
* else in our code. If it's not one of the well known EVP_PKEY_xxx
|
|
* values, it should at least be EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT at this point.
|
|
* TODO(3.0) remove this check when we're confident that the rest
|
|
* of the code treats this correctly.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(type != EVP_PKEY_NONE)) {
|
|
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"keymgmt key type = %s but legacy type = EVP_PKEY_NONE",
|
|
keytype);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prefer the legacy key type name for error reporting */
|
|
if (type != EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT)
|
|
keytype = OBJ_nid2sn(type);
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we have a clean slate to copy into */
|
|
if (*dest == NULL)
|
|
*dest = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
else
|
|
evp_pkey_free_it(*dest);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(*dest, type)) {
|
|
/* If the key is typed but empty, we're done */
|
|
if (keydata == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if ((*dest)->ameth->import_from == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NO_IMPORT_FUNCTION,
|
|
"key type = %s", keytype);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We perform the export in the same libctx as the keymgmt
|
|
* that we are using.
|
|
*/
|
|
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx =
|
|
ossl_provider_libctx(keymgmt->prov);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx =
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, *dest, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (pctx == NULL)
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
if (pctx != NULL
|
|
&& evp_keymgmt_export(keymgmt, keydata,
|
|
OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL,
|
|
(*dest)->ameth->import_from,
|
|
pctx)) {
|
|
/* Synchronize the dirty count */
|
|
(*dest)->dirty_cnt_copy = (*dest)->ameth->dirty_cnt(*dest);
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_KEYMGMT_EXPORT_FAILURE,
|
|
"key type = %s", keytype);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int evp_pkey_downgrade(EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY tmp_copy; /* Stack allocated! */
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(pk != NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Throughout this whole function, we must ensure that we lock / unlock
|
|
* the exact same lock. Note that we do pass it around a bit.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(pk->lock))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If this isn't an assigned provider side key, we're done */
|
|
if (!evp_pkey_is_assigned(pk) || !evp_pkey_is_provided(pk)) {
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* To be able to downgrade, we steal the contents of |pk|, then reset
|
|
* it, and finally try to make it a downgraded copy. If any of that
|
|
* fails, we restore the copied contents into |pk|.
|
|
*/
|
|
tmp_copy = *pk; /* |tmp_copy| now owns THE lock */
|
|
|
|
if (evp_pkey_reset_unlocked(pk)
|
|
&& evp_pkey_copy_downgraded(&pk, &tmp_copy)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Restore the common attributes, then empty |tmp_copy| */
|
|
pk->references = tmp_copy.references;
|
|
pk->attributes = tmp_copy.attributes;
|
|
pk->save_parameters = tmp_copy.save_parameters;
|
|
pk->ex_data = tmp_copy.ex_data;
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that stuff we've copied won't be freed */
|
|
tmp_copy.lock = NULL;
|
|
tmp_copy.attributes = NULL;
|
|
memset(&tmp_copy.ex_data, 0, sizeof(tmp_copy.ex_data));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the provider side data in the operation cache, so they'll
|
|
* find it again. |pk| is new, so it's safe to assume slot zero
|
|
* is free.
|
|
* Note that evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata() increments keymgmt's
|
|
* reference count, so we need to decrement it, or there will be a
|
|
* leak.
|
|
*/
|
|
evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, 0, tmp_copy.keymgmt,
|
|
tmp_copy.keydata);
|
|
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_copy.keymgmt);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear keymgmt and keydata from |tmp_copy|, or they'll get
|
|
* inadvertently freed.
|
|
*/
|
|
tmp_copy.keymgmt = NULL;
|
|
tmp_copy.keydata = NULL;
|
|
|
|
evp_pkey_free_it(&tmp_copy);
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Restore the original key */
|
|
*pk = tmp_copy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(pk->lock))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
|
|
|
const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_PKEY_gettable_params(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkey == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keydata == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return EVP_KEYMGMT_gettable_params(pkey->keymgmt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *key_name,
|
|
BIGNUM **bn)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
unsigned char buffer[2048];
|
|
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
|
|
size_t buf_sz = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keydata == NULL
|
|
|| key_name == NULL
|
|
|| bn == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
|
|
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_BN(key_name, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
|
|
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params)) {
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_modified(params) || params[0].return_size == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
buf_sz = params[0].return_size;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If it failed because the buffer was too small then allocate the
|
|
* required buffer size and retry.
|
|
*/
|
|
buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(buf_sz);
|
|
if (buf == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
params[0].data = buf;
|
|
params[0].data_size = buf_sz;
|
|
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fail if the param was not found */
|
|
if (!OSSL_PARAM_modified(params))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ret = OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(params, bn);
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_octet_string_param(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *key_name,
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t max_buf_sz,
|
|
size_t *out_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keydata == NULL
|
|
|| key_name == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(key_name, buf, max_buf_sz);
|
|
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params)
|
|
|| !OSSL_PARAM_modified(params))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (out_sz != NULL)
|
|
*out_sz = params[0].return_size;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_utf8_string_param(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *key_name,
|
|
char *str, size_t max_buf_sz,
|
|
size_t *out_sz)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keydata == NULL
|
|
|| key_name == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(key_name, str, max_buf_sz);
|
|
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params)
|
|
|| !OSSL_PARAM_modified(params))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (out_sz != NULL)
|
|
*out_sz = params[0].return_size;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *key_name,
|
|
int *out)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keydata == NULL
|
|
|| key_name == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(key_name, out);
|
|
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params)
|
|
|| !OSSL_PARAM_modified(params))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EVP_PKEY_get_size_t_param(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *key_name,
|
|
size_t *out)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
|
|
|
if (pkey == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|
|
|| pkey->keydata == NULL
|
|
|| key_name == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(key_name, out);
|
|
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
|
if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params)
|
|
|| !OSSL_PARAM_modified(params))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|