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ddb13b283b
Longer private key sizes unnecessarily raise the cycles needed to compute the shared secret without any increase of the real security. We use minimum key sizes as defined in RFC7919. For arbitrary parameters we cannot know whether they are safe primes (we could test but that would be too inefficient) we have to keep generating large keys. However we now set a small dh->length when we are generating safe prime parameters because we know it is safe to use small keys with them. That means users need to regenerate the parameters if they want to take the performance advantage of small private key. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18480)
239 lines
6.8 KiB
C
239 lines
6.8 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* NB: These functions have been upgraded - the previous prototypes are in
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* dh_depr.c as wrappers to these ones. - Geoff
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*/
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/*
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* DH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*
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* NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
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* states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
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* specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence DH pairwise tests are
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* omitted here.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include "crypto/dh.h"
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#include "crypto/security_bits.h"
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#include "dh_local.h"
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
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BN_GENCB *cb);
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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int ossl_dh_generate_ffc_parameters(DH *dh, int type, int pbits, int qbits,
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BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
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int ret, res;
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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if (type == DH_PARAMGEN_TYPE_FIPS_186_2)
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ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_2_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
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FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
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pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
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else
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#endif
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ret = ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_generate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
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FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH,
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pbits, qbits, &res, cb);
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if (ret > 0)
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dh->dirty_cnt++;
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return ret;
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}
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int ossl_dh_get_named_group_uid_from_size(int pbits)
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{
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/*
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* Just choose an approved safe prime group.
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* The alternative to this is to generate FIPS186-4 domain parameters i.e.
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* return dh_generate_ffc_parameters(ret, prime_len, 0, NULL, cb);
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* As the FIPS186-4 generated params are for backwards compatibility,
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* the safe prime group should be used as the default.
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*/
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int nid;
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switch (pbits) {
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case 2048:
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nid = NID_ffdhe2048;
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break;
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case 3072:
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nid = NID_ffdhe3072;
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break;
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case 4096:
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nid = NID_ffdhe4096;
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break;
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case 6144:
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nid = NID_ffdhe6144;
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break;
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case 8192:
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nid = NID_ffdhe8192;
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break;
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/* unsupported prime_len */
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default:
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return NID_undef;
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}
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return nid;
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}
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#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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static int dh_gen_named_group(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, DH *ret, int prime_len)
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{
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DH *dh;
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int ok = 0;
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int nid = ossl_dh_get_named_group_uid_from_size(prime_len);
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if (nid == NID_undef)
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return 0;
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dh = ossl_dh_new_by_nid_ex(libctx, nid);
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if (dh != NULL
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&& ossl_ffc_params_copy(&ret->params, &dh->params)) {
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ok = 1;
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ret->dirty_cnt++;
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}
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DH_free(dh);
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return ok;
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}
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
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BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
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#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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if (generator != 2)
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return 0;
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return dh_gen_named_group(ret->libctx, ret, prime_len);
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#else
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if (ret->meth->generate_params)
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return ret->meth->generate_params(ret, prime_len, generator, cb);
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return dh_builtin_genparams(ret, prime_len, generator, cb);
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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}
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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/*-
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* We generate DH parameters as follows
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* find a prime p which is prime_len bits long,
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* where q=(p-1)/2 is also prime.
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* In the following we assume that g is not 0, 1 or p-1, since it
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* would generate only trivial subgroups.
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* For this case, g is a generator of the order-q subgroup if
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* g^q mod p == 1.
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* Or in terms of the Legendre symbol: (g/p) == 1.
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*
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* Having said all that,
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* there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
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* Using the quadratic reciprocity law it is possible to solve
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* (g/p) == 1 for the special values 2, 3, 5:
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* (2/p) == 1 if p mod 8 == 1 or 7.
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* (3/p) == 1 if p mod 12 == 1 or 11.
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* (5/p) == 1 if p mod 5 == 1 or 4.
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* See for instance: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legendre_symbol
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*
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* Since all safe primes > 7 must satisfy p mod 12 == 11
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* and all safe primes > 11 must satisfy p mod 5 != 1
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* we can further improve the condition for g = 2, 3 and 5:
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* for 2, p mod 24 == 23
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* for 3, p mod 12 == 11
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* for 5, p mod 60 == 59
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*/
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static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
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BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
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BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
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int g, ok = -1;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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if (prime_len > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (prime_len < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (t2 == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */
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if (ret->params.p == NULL && ((ret->params.p = BN_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (ret->params.g == NULL && ((ret->params.g = BN_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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if (generator <= 1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
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goto err;
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}
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if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
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if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_set_word(t2, 23))
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goto err;
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g = 2;
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} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
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if (!BN_set_word(t1, 60))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_set_word(t2, 59))
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goto err;
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g = 5;
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} else {
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/*
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* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a generator or
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* not: since we are using safe primes, it will generate either an
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* order-q or an order-2q group, which both is OK
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*/
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if (!BN_set_word(t1, 12))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11))
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goto err;
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g = generator;
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}
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->params.p, prime_len, 1, t1, t2, cb))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_set_word(ret->params.g, g))
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goto err;
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/* We are using safe prime p, set key length equivalent to RFC 7919 */
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ret->length = (2 * ossl_ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(prime_len)
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+ 24) / 25 * 25;
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ret->dirty_cnt++;
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ok = 1;
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err:
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if (ok == -1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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ok = 0;
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}
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ok;
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}
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#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
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