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43341433a8
Suppress CT callbacks with aNULL or PSK ciphersuites that involve no certificates. Ditto when the certificate chain is validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records. Also skip SCT processing when the chain is fails verification. Move and consolidate CT callbacks from libcrypto to libssl. We also simplify the interface to SSL_{,CTX_}_enable_ct() which can specify either a permissive mode that just collects information or a strict mode that requires at least one valid SCT or else asks to abort the connection. Simplified SCT processing and options in s_client(1) which now has just a simple pair of "-noct" vs. "-ct" options, the latter enables the permissive callback so that we can complete the handshake and report all relevant information. When printing SCTs, print the validation status if set and not valid. Signed-off-by: Rob Percival <robpercival@google.com> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
435 lines
13 KiB
C
435 lines
13 KiB
C
/*
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* Written by Rob Stradling (rob@comodo.com), Stephen Henson (steve@openssl.org)
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* and Adam Eijdenberg (adam.eijdenberg@gmail.com) for the OpenSSL project 2016.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
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# error "CT disabled"
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#endif
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#include <openssl/ct.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/tls1.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "ct_locl.h"
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SCT *SCT_new(void)
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{
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SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
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if (sct == NULL) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET;
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sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET;
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return sct;
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}
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void SCT_free(SCT *sct)
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{
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if (sct == NULL)
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return;
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OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
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OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sct);
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OPENSSL_free(sct);
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}
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int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version)
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{
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if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_VERSION, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->version = version;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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}
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int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type)
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{
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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switch (entry_type) {
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case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509:
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case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
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sct->entry_type = entry_type;
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return 1;
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default:
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
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{
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if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET0_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
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sct->log_id = log_id;
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sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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}
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int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
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{
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if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
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sct->log_id = NULL;
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sct->log_id_len = 0;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
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sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
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if (sct->log_id == NULL) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_LOG_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp)
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{
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sct->timestamp = timestamp;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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}
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int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
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{
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switch (nid) {
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case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
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sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
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sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
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sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
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sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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default:
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
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sct->ext = ext;
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sct->ext_len = ext_len;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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}
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int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
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sct->ext = NULL;
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sct->ext_len = 0;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
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sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
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if (sct->ext == NULL) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->ext_len = ext_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
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sct->sig = sig;
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sct->sig_len = sig_len;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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}
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int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
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sct->sig = NULL;
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sct->sig_len = 0;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
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sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
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if (sct->sig == NULL) {
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CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET1_SIGNATURE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->sig_len = sig_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->version;
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}
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ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->entry_type;
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}
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size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id)
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{
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*log_id = sct->log_id;
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return sct->log_id_len;
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}
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uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->timestamp;
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}
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int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct)
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{
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if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
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if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
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switch (sct->sig_alg) {
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case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
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return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
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case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
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return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption;
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default:
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return NID_undef;
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}
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}
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}
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return NID_undef;
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}
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size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext)
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{
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*ext = sct->ext;
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return sct->ext_len;
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}
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size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig)
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{
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*sig = sct->sig;
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return sct->sig_len;
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}
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int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
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{
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switch (sct->version) {
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case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET:
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return 0;
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case SCT_VERSION_V1:
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return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct);
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default:
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return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */
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}
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}
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int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef &&
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sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0;
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}
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sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->source;
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}
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int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
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{
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sct->source = source;
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switch (source) {
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case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
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case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
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return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
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case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
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return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
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default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
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return 1;
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}
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}
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sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->validation_status;
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}
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int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int is_sct_valid = -1;
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SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
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X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
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const CTLOG *log;
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/*
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* With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
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* let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0).
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*/
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if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
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return 0;
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}
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log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
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sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
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/* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
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if (log == NULL) {
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
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return 0;
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}
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sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
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if (sctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) {
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EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey;
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if (ctx->issuer == NULL) {
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
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goto end;
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}
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issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer);
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1)
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy
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* lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
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* use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
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* processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
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* associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
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*
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* XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
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* issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
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* memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
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* mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
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* validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
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* processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
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* errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
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* issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
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* to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
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* application decide what to do.
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*/
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if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
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else
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sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
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SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
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end:
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is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID;
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err:
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X509_PUBKEY_free(pub);
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X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey);
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SCT_CTX_free(sctx);
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return is_sct_valid;
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}
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int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int are_scts_valid = 1;
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int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
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int is_sct_valid = -1;
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SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
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if (sct == NULL)
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continue;
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is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx);
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if (is_sct_valid < 0)
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return is_sct_valid;
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are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid;
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}
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return are_scts_valid;
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}
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