openssl/crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c
Ben Laurie 3ba5d1cf2e Make EVPs allocate context memory, thus making them extensible. Rationalise
DES's keyschedules.

I know these two should be separate, and I'll back out the DES changes if they
are deemed to be an error.

Note that there is a memory leak lurking in SSL somewhere in this version.
2001-07-30 17:46:22 +00:00

198 lines
5.0 KiB
C

/* ede_cbcm_enc.c */
/* Written by Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> for the OpenSSL
* project 13 Feb 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/*
This is an implementation of Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output
Feedback Masking, by Coppersmith, Johnson and Matyas, (IBM and Certicom).
Note that there is a known attack on this by Biham and Knudsen but it takes
a lot of work:
http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/users/wwwb/cgi-bin/tr-get.cgi/1998/CS/CS0928.ps.gz
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DESCBCM
#include "des_locl.h"
void des_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
long length, des_key_schedule *ks1, des_key_schedule *ks2,
des_key_schedule *ks3, des_cblock *ivec1, des_cblock *ivec2,
int enc)
{
register DES_LONG tin0,tin1;
register DES_LONG tout0,tout1,xor0,xor1,m0,m1;
register long l=length;
DES_LONG tin[2];
unsigned char *iv1,*iv2;
iv1 = &(*ivec1)[0];
iv2 = &(*ivec2)[0];
if (enc)
{
c2l(iv1,m0);
c2l(iv1,m1);
c2l(iv2,tout0);
c2l(iv2,tout1);
for (l-=8; l>=-7; l-=8)
{
tin[0]=m0;
tin[1]=m1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks3,1);
m0=tin[0];
m1=tin[1];
if(l < 0)
{
c2ln(in,tin0,tin1,l+8);
}
else
{
c2l(in,tin0);
c2l(in,tin1);
}
tin0^=tout0;
tin1^=tout1;
tin[0]=tin0;
tin[1]=tin1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks1,1);
tin[0]^=m0;
tin[1]^=m1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks2,0);
tin[0]^=m0;
tin[1]^=m1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks1,1);
tout0=tin[0];
tout1=tin[1];
l2c(tout0,out);
l2c(tout1,out);
}
iv1=&(*ivec1)[0];
l2c(m0,iv1);
l2c(m1,iv1);
iv2=&(*ivec2)[0];
l2c(tout0,iv2);
l2c(tout1,iv2);
}
else
{
register DES_LONG t0,t1;
c2l(iv1,m0);
c2l(iv1,m1);
c2l(iv2,xor0);
c2l(iv2,xor1);
for (l-=8; l>=-7; l-=8)
{
tin[0]=m0;
tin[1]=m1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks3,1);
m0=tin[0];
m1=tin[1];
c2l(in,tin0);
c2l(in,tin1);
t0=tin0;
t1=tin1;
tin[0]=tin0;
tin[1]=tin1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks1,0);
tin[0]^=m0;
tin[1]^=m1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks2,1);
tin[0]^=m0;
tin[1]^=m1;
des_encrypt1(tin,ks1,0);
tout0=tin[0];
tout1=tin[1];
tout0^=xor0;
tout1^=xor1;
if(l < 0)
{
l2cn(tout0,tout1,out,l+8);
}
else
{
l2c(tout0,out);
l2c(tout1,out);
}
xor0=t0;
xor1=t1;
}
iv1=&(*ivec1)[0];
l2c(m0,iv1);
l2c(m1,iv1);
iv2=&(*ivec2)[0];
l2c(xor0,iv2);
l2c(xor1,iv2);
}
tin0=tin1=tout0=tout1=xor0=xor1=0;
tin[0]=tin[1]=0;
}
#endif