mirror/openssl
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git synced 2024-12-15 06:01:37 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
3ef1b7426b
openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
sashan 6dacee485f RSA decoder should check also sanity of p, q, e, d ... with respect to n 
This issue has been discovered by osss-fuzzer [1]. The test function decodes
RSA key created by fuzzer and calls EVP_PKEY_pairwise_check() which
proceeds to ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime() check which takes too long
exceeding timeout (45secs).

The idea is to fix OSSL_DECODER_from_data() code path so invalid
RSA keys will be refused.

[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=69134

Test case generated by the fuzzer is added.

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25190)
2024-08-28 16:50:46 +02:00

718 lines
24 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/*
* Copyright 2020-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
# include <openssl/x509.h>
# include "crypto/asn1.h"
#endif
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "internal/param_build_set.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_local.h"
/*
* The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support
* for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider
* implementations alike.
*/
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers,
const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL;
int i;
if (numbers == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++) {
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]);
if (p != NULL) {
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp))
return 0;
if (sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) {
BN_clear_free(tmp);
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
{
const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL;
const OSSL_PARAM *param_p, *param_q = NULL;
const OSSL_PARAM *param_derive = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL;
int is_private = 0;
int derive_from_pq = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
if (rsa == NULL)
return 0;
param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N);
param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E);
if ((param_n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
|| (param_e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
if (include_private) {
param_derive = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ);
if ((param_derive != NULL)
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_derive, &derive_from_pq))
goto err;
param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
if (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
if (derive_from_pq) {
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
/* we need at minimum p, q */
param_p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1);
param_q = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2);
if ((param_p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_p, &p))
|| (param_q == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_q, &q))) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
}
}
is_private = (d != NULL);
if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d))
goto err;
n = e = d = NULL;
if (is_private) {
if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names)
|| !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names)
|| !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params,
ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names))
goto err;
if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0
&& sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) {
/*
* If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we
* need to have at least 2 factors
*/
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
/*
* if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have
* been provided
*/
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2
&& (param_n == NULL || param_d == NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
/* build our exponents and coefficients here */
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) {
/* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0),
sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack
* so we don't free them below
*/
sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
/*
* Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no
* additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and
* since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip
* the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params
*/
if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa,
RSA_bits(rsa),
NULL, ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else {
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here
* for each additional prime
*/
if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa),
sk_BIGNUM_num(factors),
rsa->e, factors, exps,
coeffs)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Now we should have all our factors, exponents and
* coefficients
*/
if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#else
/* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
goto err;
#endif
}
} else {
/*
* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d
* but only if we're not using derive_from_pq
*/
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
&& !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
goto err;
}
/* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */
if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
|| sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0
|| sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n",
sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps),
sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs));
goto err;
}
}
if (!ossl_rsa_check_factors(rsa)) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR,
"RSA factors/exponents are too big for for n-modulus\n");
goto err;
}
BN_clear_free(p);
BN_clear_free(q);
sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
err:
BN_free(n);
BN_free(e);
BN_free(d);
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free);
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[],
int include_private)
{
int ret = 0;
const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null();
if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
goto err;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs);
if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e))
goto err;
/* Check private key data integrity */
if (include_private && rsa_d != NULL) {
if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D,
rsa_d)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names,
factors)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params,
ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names,
coeffs))
goto err;
}
#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
/* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */
if (bld == NULL)
ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params);
#endif
ret = 1;
err:
sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors);
sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps);
sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs);
return ret;
}
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss,
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss);
int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL);
int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
int default_maskgenhashalg_nid =
ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL);
const char *mdname =
(hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid
? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid));
const char *mgfname =
(maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid
? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid));
const char *mgf1mdname =
(maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid
? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid));
const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST;
const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC;
const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST;
const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN;
/*
* To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient,
* we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even
* if it has a default value; saltlen.
*/
if ((mdname != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname))
|| (mgfname != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
key_mgf, mgfname))
|| (mgf1mdname != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params,
key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname))
|| (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen)))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params,
int *defaults_set,
const OSSL_PARAM params[],
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen;
const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq;
const char *propq = NULL;
EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
int saltlen;
int ret = 0;
if (pss_params == NULL)
return 0;
param_propq =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS);
param_md =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST);
param_mgf =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC);
param_mgf1md =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST);
param_saltlen =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN);
if (param_propq != NULL) {
if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
propq = param_propq->data;
}
/*
* If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some
* restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each
* parameter override their specific restriction data.
*/
if (!*defaults_set
&& (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL
|| param_saltlen != NULL)) {
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params))
return 0;
*defaults_set = 1;
}
if (param_mgf != NULL) {
int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL);
const char *mgfname = NULL;
if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
mgfname = param_mgf->data;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname))
return 0;
if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(param_mgf->data,
ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0)
return 0;
}
/*
* We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the
* exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below.
*/
if (param_md != NULL) {
const char *mdname = NULL;
if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
mdname = param_md->data;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname))
goto err;
if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params,
ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md)))
goto err;
}
if (param_mgf1md != NULL) {
const char *mgf1mdname = NULL;
if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname))
goto err;
if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(
pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md)))
goto err;
}
if (param_saltlen != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen)
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_free(md);
EVP_MD_free(mgf1md);
return ret;
}
int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f)
{
if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection)
{
RSA *dupkey = NULL;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int pnum, i;
#endif
/* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */
if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa))
return NULL;
if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* public key */
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e))
goto err;
}
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) {
/* private key */
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d))
goto err;
/* factors and crt params */
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp))
goto err;
}
dupkey->version = rsa->version;
dupkey->flags = rsa->flags;
/* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */
dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params;
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/* multiprime */
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0
&& (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) {
dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL;
if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL)
goto err;
/* push first so cleanup in error case works */
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo);
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d))
goto err;
if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t))
goto err;
}
if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey))
goto err;
}
if (rsa->pss != NULL) {
dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss);
if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL
&& dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) {
dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL)
goto err;
}
}
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA,
&dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data))
goto err;
#endif
return dupkey;
err:
RSA_free(dupkey);
return NULL;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
alg->parameter);
if (pss == NULL)
return NULL;
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) {
pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
if (pss->maskHash == NULL) {
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
return NULL;
}
}
return pss;
}
static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa)
{
const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL;
if (rsa != NULL
&& (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL
&& (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) {
const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
/*
* We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just
* want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible
* to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test
* a bad situation.
*
* Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will
* be checked, eventually.
*/
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md,
&saltlen, &trailerField))
return 0;
md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md);
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
mgf1md_nid)
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
|| !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params,
trailerField))
return 0;
*pss = pss_params;
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
{
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
/* Get the defaults from the ONE place */
(void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params);
if (pss == NULL)
return 0;
*pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
if (*pmd == NULL)
return 0;
*pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash);
if (*pmgf1md == NULL)
return 0;
if (pss->saltLength)
*psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
else
*psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params);
if (pss->trailerField)
*ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField);
else
*ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);
return 1;
}
int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
{
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
const void *algp;
int algptype;
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
return 1;
if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
return 1;
if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL
|| !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) {
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
return 0;
}
if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa))
return 0;
return 1;
}
RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
{
const unsigned char *p;
RSA *rsa;
int pklen;
const X509_ALGOR *alg;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf))
return 0;
rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen);
if (rsa == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return NULL;
}
if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return NULL;
}
RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
break;
default:
/* Leave the type bits zero */
break;
}
return rsa;
}
#endif
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink