mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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3e52878039
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22037)
3598 lines
122 KiB
C
3598 lines
122 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2022-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal/quic_channel.h"
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#include "internal/quic_error.h"
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#include "internal/quic_rx_depack.h"
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#include "internal/quic_lcidm.h"
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#include "internal/quic_srtm.h"
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#include "internal/qlog_event_helpers.h"
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#include "../ssl_local.h"
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#include "quic_channel_local.h"
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#include "quic_port_local.h"
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#include "quic_engine_local.h"
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/*
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* NOTE: While this channel implementation currently has basic server support,
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* this functionality has been implemented for internal testing purposes and is
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* not suitable for network use. In particular, it does not implement address
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* validation, anti-amplification or retry logic.
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*
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* TODO(QUIC SERVER): Implement address validation and anti-amplification
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* TODO(QUIC SERVER): Implement retry logic
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*/
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#define INIT_CRYPTO_RECV_BUF_LEN 16384
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#define INIT_CRYPTO_SEND_BUF_LEN 16384
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#define INIT_APP_BUF_LEN 8192
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/*
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* Interval before we force a PING to ensure NATs don't timeout. This is based
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* on the lowest commonly seen value of 30 seconds as cited in RFC 9000 s.
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* 10.1.2.
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*/
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#define MAX_NAT_INTERVAL (ossl_ms2time(25000))
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/*
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* Our maximum ACK delay on the TX side. This is up to us to choose. Note that
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* this could differ from QUIC_DEFAULT_MAX_DELAY in future as that is a protocol
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* value which determines the value of the maximum ACK delay if the
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* max_ack_delay transport parameter is not set.
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*/
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#define DEFAULT_MAX_ACK_DELAY QUIC_DEFAULT_MAX_ACK_DELAY
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DEFINE_LIST_OF_IMPL(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL);
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static void ch_save_err_state(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static int ch_rx(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int channel_only);
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static int ch_tx(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static int ch_tick_tls(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int channel_only);
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static void ch_rx_handle_packet(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int channel_only);
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static OSSL_TIME ch_determine_next_tick_deadline(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static int ch_retry(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
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const unsigned char *retry_token,
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size_t retry_token_len,
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const QUIC_CONN_ID *retry_scid);
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static void ch_cleanup(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static int ch_generate_transport_params(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static int ch_on_transport_params(const unsigned char *params,
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size_t params_len,
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void *arg);
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static int ch_on_handshake_alert(void *arg, unsigned char alert_code);
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static int ch_on_handshake_complete(void *arg);
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static int ch_on_handshake_yield_secret(uint32_t enc_level, int direction,
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uint32_t suite_id, EVP_MD *md,
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const unsigned char *secret,
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size_t secret_len,
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void *arg);
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static int ch_on_crypto_recv_record(const unsigned char **buf,
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size_t *bytes_read, void *arg);
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static int ch_on_crypto_release_record(size_t bytes_read, void *arg);
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static int crypto_ensure_empty(QUIC_RSTREAM *rstream);
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static int ch_on_crypto_send(const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len,
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size_t *consumed, void *arg);
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static OSSL_TIME get_time(void *arg);
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static uint64_t get_stream_limit(int uni, void *arg);
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static int rx_late_validate(QUIC_PN pn, int pn_space, void *arg);
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static void rxku_detected(QUIC_PN pn, void *arg);
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static int ch_retry(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
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const unsigned char *retry_token,
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size_t retry_token_len,
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const QUIC_CONN_ID *retry_scid);
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static void ch_update_idle(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static int ch_discard_el(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
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uint32_t enc_level);
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static void ch_on_idle_timeout(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static void ch_update_idle(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static void ch_update_ping_deadline(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static void ch_on_terminating_timeout(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static void ch_start_terminating(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
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const QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE *tcause,
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int force_immediate);
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static void ch_on_txp_ack_tx(const OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_ACK *ack, uint32_t pn_space,
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void *arg);
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static void ch_rx_handle_version_neg(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, OSSL_QRX_PKT *pkt);
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static void ch_raise_version_neg_failure(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch);
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static void ch_record_state_transition(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, uint32_t new_state);
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DEFINE_LHASH_OF_EX(QUIC_SRT_ELEM);
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QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
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static QLOG *ch_get_qlog(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
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{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG
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QLOG_TRACE_INFO qti = {0};
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if (ch->qlog != NULL)
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return ch->qlog;
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if (!ch->use_qlog)
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return NULL;
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qti.odcid = ch->init_dcid;
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qti.title = NULL;
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qti.description = NULL;
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qti.group_id = NULL;
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qti.is_server = ch->is_server;
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qti.now_cb = get_time;
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qti.now_cb_arg = ch;
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if ((ch->qlog = ossl_qlog_new_from_env(&qti)) == NULL) {
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ch->use_qlog = 0; /* don't try again */
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return NULL;
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}
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return ch->qlog;
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#else
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return NULL;
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* QUIC Channel Initialization and Teardown
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* ========================================
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*/
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#define DEFAULT_INIT_CONN_RXFC_WND (768 * 1024)
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#define DEFAULT_CONN_RXFC_MAX_WND_MUL 20
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#define DEFAULT_INIT_STREAM_RXFC_WND (512 * 1024)
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#define DEFAULT_STREAM_RXFC_MAX_WND_MUL 12
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#define DEFAULT_INIT_CONN_MAX_STREAMS 100
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static int ch_init(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
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{
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OSSL_QUIC_TX_PACKETISER_ARGS txp_args = {0};
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OSSL_QTX_ARGS qtx_args = {0};
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OSSL_QRX_ARGS qrx_args = {0};
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QUIC_TLS_ARGS tls_args = {0};
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uint32_t pn_space;
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size_t rx_short_dcid_len;
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size_t tx_init_dcid_len;
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if (ch->port == NULL || ch->lcidm == NULL || ch->srtm == NULL)
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goto err;
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rx_short_dcid_len = ossl_quic_port_get_rx_short_dcid_len(ch->port);
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tx_init_dcid_len = ossl_quic_port_get_tx_init_dcid_len(ch->port);
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/* For clients, generate our initial DCID. */
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if (!ch->is_server
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&& !ossl_quic_gen_rand_conn_id(ch->port->engine->libctx, tx_init_dcid_len,
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&ch->init_dcid))
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goto err;
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/* We plug in a network write BIO to the QTX later when we get one. */
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qtx_args.libctx = ch->port->engine->libctx;
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qtx_args.mdpl = QUIC_MIN_INITIAL_DGRAM_LEN;
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ch->rx_max_udp_payload_size = qtx_args.mdpl;
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ch->ping_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
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ch->qtx = ossl_qtx_new(&qtx_args);
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if (ch->qtx == NULL)
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goto err;
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ch->txpim = ossl_quic_txpim_new();
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if (ch->txpim == NULL)
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goto err;
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ch->cfq = ossl_quic_cfq_new();
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if (ch->cfq == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_quic_txfc_init(&ch->conn_txfc, NULL))
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goto err;
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/*
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* Note: The TP we transmit governs what the peer can transmit and thus
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* applies to the RXFC.
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*/
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ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local = DEFAULT_INIT_STREAM_RXFC_WND;
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ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote = DEFAULT_INIT_STREAM_RXFC_WND;
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ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_uni = DEFAULT_INIT_STREAM_RXFC_WND;
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if (!ossl_quic_rxfc_init(&ch->conn_rxfc, NULL,
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DEFAULT_INIT_CONN_RXFC_WND,
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DEFAULT_CONN_RXFC_MAX_WND_MUL *
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DEFAULT_INIT_CONN_RXFC_WND,
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get_time, ch))
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goto err;
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for (pn_space = QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL; pn_space < QUIC_PN_SPACE_NUM; ++pn_space)
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if (!ossl_quic_rxfc_init_standalone(&ch->crypto_rxfc[pn_space],
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INIT_CRYPTO_RECV_BUF_LEN,
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get_time, ch))
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_quic_rxfc_init_standalone(&ch->max_streams_bidi_rxfc,
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DEFAULT_INIT_CONN_MAX_STREAMS,
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get_time, ch))
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_quic_rxfc_init_standalone(&ch->max_streams_uni_rxfc,
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DEFAULT_INIT_CONN_MAX_STREAMS,
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get_time, ch))
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_statm_init(&ch->statm))
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goto err;
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ch->have_statm = 1;
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ch->cc_method = &ossl_cc_newreno_method;
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if ((ch->cc_data = ch->cc_method->new(get_time, ch)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if ((ch->ackm = ossl_ackm_new(get_time, ch, &ch->statm,
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ch->cc_method, ch->cc_data)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_quic_stream_map_init(&ch->qsm, get_stream_limit, ch,
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&ch->max_streams_bidi_rxfc,
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&ch->max_streams_uni_rxfc,
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ch->is_server))
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goto err;
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ch->have_qsm = 1;
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if (!ch->is_server
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&& !ossl_quic_lcidm_generate_initial(ch->lcidm, ch, &txp_args.cur_scid))
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goto err;
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/* We use a zero-length SCID. */
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txp_args.cur_dcid = ch->init_dcid;
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txp_args.ack_delay_exponent = 3;
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txp_args.qtx = ch->qtx;
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txp_args.txpim = ch->txpim;
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txp_args.cfq = ch->cfq;
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txp_args.ackm = ch->ackm;
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txp_args.qsm = &ch->qsm;
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txp_args.conn_txfc = &ch->conn_txfc;
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txp_args.conn_rxfc = &ch->conn_rxfc;
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txp_args.max_streams_bidi_rxfc = &ch->max_streams_bidi_rxfc;
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txp_args.max_streams_uni_rxfc = &ch->max_streams_uni_rxfc;
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txp_args.cc_method = ch->cc_method;
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txp_args.cc_data = ch->cc_data;
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txp_args.now = get_time;
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txp_args.now_arg = ch;
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txp_args.qlog = ch_get_qlog(ch);
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for (pn_space = QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL; pn_space < QUIC_PN_SPACE_NUM; ++pn_space) {
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ch->crypto_send[pn_space] = ossl_quic_sstream_new(INIT_CRYPTO_SEND_BUF_LEN);
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if (ch->crypto_send[pn_space] == NULL)
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goto err;
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txp_args.crypto[pn_space] = ch->crypto_send[pn_space];
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}
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ch->txp = ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_new(&txp_args);
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if (ch->txp == NULL)
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goto err;
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ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_ack_tx_cb(ch->txp, ch_on_txp_ack_tx, ch);
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qrx_args.libctx = ch->port->engine->libctx;
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qrx_args.demux = ch->port->demux;
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qrx_args.short_conn_id_len = rx_short_dcid_len;
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qrx_args.max_deferred = 32;
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if ((ch->qrx = ossl_qrx_new(&qrx_args)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_qrx_set_late_validation_cb(ch->qrx,
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rx_late_validate,
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ch))
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goto err;
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if (!ossl_qrx_set_key_update_cb(ch->qrx,
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rxku_detected,
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ch))
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goto err;
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for (pn_space = QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL; pn_space < QUIC_PN_SPACE_NUM; ++pn_space) {
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ch->crypto_recv[pn_space] = ossl_quic_rstream_new(NULL, NULL, 0);
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if (ch->crypto_recv[pn_space] == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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/* Plug in the TLS handshake layer. */
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tls_args.s = ch->tls;
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tls_args.crypto_send_cb = ch_on_crypto_send;
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tls_args.crypto_send_cb_arg = ch;
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tls_args.crypto_recv_rcd_cb = ch_on_crypto_recv_record;
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tls_args.crypto_recv_rcd_cb_arg = ch;
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tls_args.crypto_release_rcd_cb = ch_on_crypto_release_record;
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tls_args.crypto_release_rcd_cb_arg = ch;
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tls_args.yield_secret_cb = ch_on_handshake_yield_secret;
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tls_args.yield_secret_cb_arg = ch;
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tls_args.got_transport_params_cb = ch_on_transport_params;
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tls_args.got_transport_params_cb_arg= ch;
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tls_args.handshake_complete_cb = ch_on_handshake_complete;
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tls_args.handshake_complete_cb_arg = ch;
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tls_args.alert_cb = ch_on_handshake_alert;
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tls_args.alert_cb_arg = ch;
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tls_args.is_server = ch->is_server;
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if ((ch->qtls = ossl_quic_tls_new(&tls_args)) == NULL)
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goto err;
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ch->tx_max_ack_delay = DEFAULT_MAX_ACK_DELAY;
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ch->rx_max_ack_delay = QUIC_DEFAULT_MAX_ACK_DELAY;
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ch->rx_ack_delay_exp = QUIC_DEFAULT_ACK_DELAY_EXP;
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ch->rx_active_conn_id_limit = QUIC_MIN_ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT;
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ch->max_idle_timeout = QUIC_DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT;
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ch->tx_enc_level = QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL;
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ch->rx_enc_level = QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL;
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ch->txku_threshold_override = UINT64_MAX;
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ossl_ackm_set_tx_max_ack_delay(ch->ackm, ossl_ms2time(ch->tx_max_ack_delay));
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ossl_ackm_set_rx_max_ack_delay(ch->ackm, ossl_ms2time(ch->rx_max_ack_delay));
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/*
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* Determine the QUIC Transport Parameters and serialize the transport
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* parameters block. (For servers, we do this later as we must defer
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* generation until we have received the client's transport parameters.)
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*/
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if (!ch->is_server && !ch_generate_transport_params(ch))
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goto err;
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ch_update_idle(ch);
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ossl_list_ch_insert_tail(&ch->port->channel_list, ch);
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ch->on_port_list = 1;
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return 1;
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err:
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ch_cleanup(ch);
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return 0;
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}
|
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|
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static void ch_cleanup(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
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{
|
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uint32_t pn_space;
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|
|
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if (ch->ackm != NULL)
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for (pn_space = QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL;
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pn_space < QUIC_PN_SPACE_NUM;
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++pn_space)
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ossl_ackm_on_pkt_space_discarded(ch->ackm, pn_space);
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|
|
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ossl_quic_lcidm_cull(ch->lcidm, ch);
|
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ossl_quic_srtm_cull(ch->srtm, ch);
|
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ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_free(ch->txp);
|
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ossl_quic_txpim_free(ch->txpim);
|
|
ossl_quic_cfq_free(ch->cfq);
|
|
ossl_qtx_free(ch->qtx);
|
|
if (ch->cc_data != NULL)
|
|
ch->cc_method->free(ch->cc_data);
|
|
if (ch->have_statm)
|
|
ossl_statm_destroy(&ch->statm);
|
|
ossl_ackm_free(ch->ackm);
|
|
|
|
if (ch->have_qsm)
|
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ossl_quic_stream_map_cleanup(&ch->qsm);
|
|
|
|
for (pn_space = QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL; pn_space < QUIC_PN_SPACE_NUM; ++pn_space) {
|
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ossl_quic_sstream_free(ch->crypto_send[pn_space]);
|
|
ossl_quic_rstream_free(ch->crypto_recv[pn_space]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ossl_qrx_pkt_release(ch->qrx_pkt);
|
|
ch->qrx_pkt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_tls_free(ch->qtls);
|
|
ossl_qrx_free(ch->qrx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ch->local_transport_params);
|
|
OPENSSL_free((char *)ch->terminate_cause.reason);
|
|
OSSL_ERR_STATE_free(ch->err_state);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ch->ack_range_scratch);
|
|
|
|
if (ch->on_port_list) {
|
|
ossl_list_ch_remove(&ch->port->channel_list, ch);
|
|
ch->on_port_list = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG
|
|
if (ch->qlog != NULL)
|
|
ossl_qlog_flush(ch->qlog); /* best effort */
|
|
|
|
ossl_qlog_free(ch->qlog);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ossl_quic_channel_new(const QUIC_CHANNEL_ARGS *args)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((ch = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ch))) == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
ch->port = args->port;
|
|
ch->is_server = args->is_server;
|
|
ch->tls = args->tls;
|
|
ch->lcidm = args->lcidm;
|
|
ch->srtm = args->srtm;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG
|
|
ch->use_qlog = args->use_qlog;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!ch_init(ch)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ch);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ch;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_free(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ch_cleanup(ch);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set mutator callbacks for test framework support */
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_set_mutator(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
ossl_mutate_packet_cb mutatecb,
|
|
ossl_finish_mutate_cb finishmutatecb,
|
|
void *mutatearg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch->qtx == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ossl_qtx_set_mutator(ch->qtx, mutatecb, finishmutatecb, mutatearg);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_get_peer_addr(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, BIO_ADDR *peer_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ch->addressed_mode)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
*peer_addr = ch->cur_peer_addr;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_set_peer_addr(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, const BIO_ADDR *peer_addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch->state != QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_IDLE)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (peer_addr == NULL || BIO_ADDR_family(peer_addr) == AF_UNSPEC) {
|
|
BIO_ADDR_clear(&ch->cur_peer_addr);
|
|
ch->addressed_mode = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->cur_peer_addr = *peer_addr;
|
|
ch->addressed_mode = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_REACTOR *ossl_quic_channel_get_reactor(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_port_get0_reactor(ch->port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_STREAM_MAP *ossl_quic_channel_get_qsm(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return &ch->qsm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OSSL_STATM *ossl_quic_channel_get_statm(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return &ch->statm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_STREAM *ossl_quic_channel_get_stream_by_id(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
uint64_t stream_id)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_stream_map_get_by_id(&ch->qsm, stream_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_active(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch != NULL && ch->state == QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_ACTIVE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_closing(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->state == QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_CLOSING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ossl_quic_channel_is_draining(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->state == QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_DRAINING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ossl_quic_channel_is_terminating(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_channel_is_closing(ch)
|
|
|| ossl_quic_channel_is_draining(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_terminated(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->state == QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_term_any(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_channel_is_terminating(ch)
|
|
|| ossl_quic_channel_is_terminated(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE *
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_get_terminate_cause(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_channel_is_term_any(ch) ? &ch->terminate_cause : NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_handshake_complete(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->handshake_complete;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_handshake_confirmed(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->handshake_confirmed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_DEMUX *ossl_quic_channel_get0_demux(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->port->demux;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_PORT *ossl_quic_channel_get0_port(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_ENGINE *ossl_quic_channel_get0_engine(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_port_get0_engine(ch->port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX *ossl_quic_channel_get_mutex(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_port_get0_mutex(ch->port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_has_pending(const QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_quic_demux_has_pending(ch->port->demux)
|
|
|| ossl_qrx_processed_read_pending(ch->qrx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* QUIC Channel: Callbacks from Miscellaneous Subsidiary Components
|
|
* ================================================================
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Used by various components. */
|
|
static OSSL_TIME get_time(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
return ossl_quic_port_get_time(ch->port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Used by QSM. */
|
|
static uint64_t get_stream_limit(int uni, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
return uni ? ch->max_local_streams_uni : ch->max_local_streams_bidi;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called by QRX to determine if a packet is potentially invalid before trying
|
|
* to decrypt it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rx_late_validate(QUIC_PN pn, int pn_space, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
/* Potential duplicates should not be processed. */
|
|
if (!ossl_ackm_is_rx_pn_processable(ch->ackm, pn, pn_space))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Triggers a TXKU (whether spontaneous or solicited). Does not check whether
|
|
* spontaneous TXKU is currently allowed.
|
|
*/
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static void ch_trigger_txku(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t next_pn
|
|
= ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_get_next_pn(ch->txp, QUIC_PN_SPACE_APP);
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_pn_valid(next_pn)
|
|
|| !ossl_qtx_trigger_key_update(ch->qtx)) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0,
|
|
"key update");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->txku_in_progress = 1;
|
|
ch->txku_pn = next_pn;
|
|
ch->rxku_expected = ch->ku_locally_initiated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static int txku_in_progress(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch->txku_in_progress
|
|
&& ossl_ackm_get_largest_acked(ch->ackm, QUIC_PN_SPACE_APP) >= ch->txku_pn) {
|
|
OSSL_TIME pto = ossl_ackm_get_pto_duration(ch->ackm);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 6.5: Endpoints SHOULD wait three times the PTO before
|
|
* initiating a key update after receiving an acknowledgment that
|
|
* confirms that the previous key update was received.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that by the above wording, this period starts from when we get
|
|
* the ack for a TXKU-triggering packet, not when the TXKU is initiated.
|
|
* So we defer TXKU cooldown deadline calculation to this point.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->txku_in_progress = 0;
|
|
ch->txku_cooldown_deadline = ossl_time_add(get_time(ch),
|
|
ossl_time_multiply(pto, 3));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ch->txku_in_progress;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static int txku_allowed(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->tx_enc_level == QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_1RTT /* Sanity check. */
|
|
/* Strict RFC 9001 criterion for TXKU. */
|
|
&& ch->handshake_confirmed
|
|
&& !txku_in_progress(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static int txku_recommendable(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!txku_allowed(ch))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
/* Recommended RFC 9001 criterion for TXKU. */
|
|
ossl_time_compare(get_time(ch), ch->txku_cooldown_deadline) >= 0
|
|
/* Some additional sensible criteria. */
|
|
&& !ch->rxku_in_progress
|
|
&& !ch->rxku_pending_confirm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static int txku_desirable(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t cur_pkt_count, max_pkt_count, thresh_pkt_count;
|
|
const uint32_t enc_level = QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_1RTT;
|
|
|
|
/* Check AEAD limit to determine if we should perform a spontaneous TXKU. */
|
|
cur_pkt_count = ossl_qtx_get_cur_epoch_pkt_count(ch->qtx, enc_level);
|
|
max_pkt_count = ossl_qtx_get_max_epoch_pkt_count(ch->qtx, enc_level);
|
|
|
|
thresh_pkt_count = max_pkt_count / 2;
|
|
if (ch->txku_threshold_override != UINT64_MAX)
|
|
thresh_pkt_count = ch->txku_threshold_override;
|
|
|
|
return cur_pkt_count >= thresh_pkt_count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static void ch_maybe_trigger_spontaneous_txku(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!txku_recommendable(ch) || !txku_desirable(ch))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ch->ku_locally_initiated = 1;
|
|
ch_trigger_txku(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static int rxku_allowed(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 6.1: An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a key update prior to
|
|
* having confirmed the handshake (Section 4.1.2).
|
|
*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 6.1: An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a subsequent key update
|
|
* unless it has received an acknowledgment for a packet that was sent
|
|
* protected with keys from the current key phase.
|
|
*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 6.2: If an endpoint detects a second update before it has
|
|
* sent any packets with updated keys containing an acknowledgment for the
|
|
* packet that initiated the key update, it indicates that its peer has
|
|
* updated keys twice without awaiting confirmation. An endpoint MAY treat
|
|
* such consecutive key updates as a connection error of type
|
|
* KEY_UPDATE_ERROR.
|
|
*/
|
|
return ch->handshake_confirmed && !ch->rxku_pending_confirm;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called when the QRX detects a new RX key update event.
|
|
*/
|
|
enum rxku_decision {
|
|
DECISION_RXKU_ONLY,
|
|
DECISION_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
DECISION_SOLICITED_TXKU
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Called when the QRX detects a key update has occurred. */
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static void rxku_detected(QUIC_PN pn, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
enum rxku_decision decision;
|
|
OSSL_TIME pto;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: rxku_in_progress is always 0 here as an RXKU cannot be detected
|
|
* when we are still in UPDATING or COOLDOWN (see quic_record_rx.h).
|
|
*/
|
|
assert(!ch->rxku_in_progress);
|
|
|
|
if (!rxku_allowed(ch))
|
|
/* Is RXKU even allowed at this time? */
|
|
decision = DECISION_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION;
|
|
|
|
else if (ch->ku_locally_initiated)
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this key update was locally initiated (meaning that this detected
|
|
* RXKU event is a result of our own spontaneous TXKU), we do not
|
|
* trigger another TXKU; after all, to do so would result in an infinite
|
|
* ping-pong of key updates. We still process it as an RXKU.
|
|
*/
|
|
decision = DECISION_RXKU_ONLY;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
/*
|
|
* Otherwise, a peer triggering a KU means we have to trigger a KU also.
|
|
*/
|
|
decision = DECISION_SOLICITED_TXKU;
|
|
|
|
if (decision == DECISION_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_KEY_UPDATE_ERROR,
|
|
0, "RX key update again too soon");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pto = ossl_ackm_get_pto_duration(ch->ackm);
|
|
|
|
ch->ku_locally_initiated = 0;
|
|
ch->rxku_in_progress = 1;
|
|
ch->rxku_pending_confirm = 1;
|
|
ch->rxku_trigger_pn = pn;
|
|
ch->rxku_update_end_deadline = ossl_time_add(get_time(ch), pto);
|
|
ch->rxku_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (decision == DECISION_SOLICITED_TXKU)
|
|
/* NOT gated by usual txku_allowed() */
|
|
ch_trigger_txku(ch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ordinarily, we only generate ACK when some ACK-eliciting frame has been
|
|
* received. In some cases, this may not occur for a long time, for example
|
|
* if transmission of application data is going in only one direction and
|
|
* nothing else is happening with the connection. However, since the peer
|
|
* cannot initiate a subsequent (spontaneous) TXKU until its prior
|
|
* (spontaneous or solicited) TXKU has completed - meaning that prior
|
|
* TXKU's trigger packet (or subsequent packet) has been acknowledged, this
|
|
* can lead to very long times before a TXKU is considered 'completed'.
|
|
* Optimise this by forcing ACK generation after triggering TXKU.
|
|
* (Basically, we consider a RXKU event something that is 'ACK-eliciting',
|
|
* which it more or less should be; it is necessarily separate from ordinary
|
|
* processing of ACK-eliciting frames as key update is not indicated via a
|
|
* frame.)
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_schedule_ack(ch->txp, QUIC_PN_SPACE_APP);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called per tick to handle RXKU timer events. */
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static void ch_rxku_tick(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ch->rxku_in_progress
|
|
|| ossl_time_compare(get_time(ch), ch->rxku_update_end_deadline) < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ch->rxku_update_end_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
ch->rxku_in_progress = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_qrx_key_update_timeout(ch->qrx, /*normal=*/1))
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0,
|
|
"RXKU cooldown internal error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_NEEDS_LOCK
|
|
static void ch_on_txp_ack_tx(const OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_ACK *ack, uint32_t pn_space,
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
if (pn_space != QUIC_PN_SPACE_APP || !ch->rxku_pending_confirm
|
|
|| !ossl_quic_frame_ack_contains_pn(ack, ch->rxku_trigger_pn))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Defer clearing rxku_pending_confirm until TXP generate call returns
|
|
* successfully.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->rxku_pending_confirm_done = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* QUIC Channel: Handshake Layer Event Handling
|
|
* ============================================
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ch_on_crypto_send(const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len,
|
|
size_t *consumed, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
uint32_t enc_level = ch->tx_enc_level;
|
|
uint32_t pn_space = ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(enc_level);
|
|
QUIC_SSTREAM *sstream = ch->crypto_send[pn_space];
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(sstream != NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = ossl_quic_sstream_append(sstream, buf, buf_len, consumed);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypto_ensure_empty(QUIC_RSTREAM *rstream)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t avail = 0;
|
|
int is_fin = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (rstream == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_rstream_available(rstream, &avail, &is_fin))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return avail == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_on_crypto_recv_record(const unsigned char **buf,
|
|
size_t *bytes_read, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
QUIC_RSTREAM *rstream;
|
|
int is_fin = 0; /* crypto stream is never finished, so we don't use this */
|
|
uint32_t i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* After we move to a later EL we must not allow our peer to send any new
|
|
* bytes in the crypto stream on a previous EL. Retransmissions of old bytes
|
|
* are allowed.
|
|
*
|
|
* In practice we will only move to a new EL when we have consumed all bytes
|
|
* which should be sent on the crypto stream at a previous EL. For example,
|
|
* the Handshake EL should not be provisioned until we have completely
|
|
* consumed a TLS 1.3 ServerHello. Thus when we provision an EL the output
|
|
* of ossl_quic_rstream_available() should be 0 for all lower ELs. Thus if a
|
|
* given EL is available we simply ensure we have not received any further
|
|
* bytes at a lower EL.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL; i < ch->rx_enc_level; ++i)
|
|
if (i != QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_0RTT &&
|
|
!crypto_ensure_empty(ch->crypto_recv[ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(i)])) {
|
|
/* Protocol violation (RFC 9001 s. 4.1.3) */
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_CRYPTO,
|
|
"crypto stream data in wrong EL");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rstream = ch->crypto_recv[ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(ch->rx_enc_level)];
|
|
if (rstream == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return ossl_quic_rstream_get_record(rstream, buf, bytes_read,
|
|
&is_fin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_on_crypto_release_record(size_t bytes_read, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
QUIC_RSTREAM *rstream;
|
|
OSSL_RTT_INFO rtt_info;
|
|
uint32_t rx_pn_space = ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(ch->rx_enc_level);
|
|
|
|
rstream = ch->crypto_recv[rx_pn_space];
|
|
if (rstream == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ossl_statm_get_rtt_info(ossl_quic_channel_get_statm(ch), &rtt_info);
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_rxfc_on_retire(&ch->crypto_rxfc[rx_pn_space], bytes_read,
|
|
rtt_info.smoothed_rtt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return ossl_quic_rstream_release_record(rstream, bytes_read);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_on_handshake_yield_secret(uint32_t enc_level, int direction,
|
|
uint32_t suite_id, EVP_MD *md,
|
|
const unsigned char *secret,
|
|
size_t secret_len,
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
uint32_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (enc_level < QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE || enc_level >= QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_NUM)
|
|
/* Invalid EL. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (direction) {
|
|
/* TX */
|
|
if (enc_level <= ch->tx_enc_level)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does not make sense for us to try and provision an EL we have already
|
|
* attained.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_qtx_provide_secret(ch->qtx, enc_level,
|
|
suite_id, md,
|
|
secret, secret_len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ch->tx_enc_level = enc_level;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* RX */
|
|
if (enc_level <= ch->rx_enc_level)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does not make sense for us to try and provision an EL we have already
|
|
* attained.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure all crypto streams for previous ELs are now empty of available
|
|
* data.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL; i < enc_level; ++i)
|
|
if (!crypto_ensure_empty(ch->crypto_recv[ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(i)])) {
|
|
/* Protocol violation (RFC 9001 s. 4.1.3) */
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_CRYPTO,
|
|
"crypto stream data in wrong EL");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_qrx_provide_secret(ch->qrx, enc_level,
|
|
suite_id, md,
|
|
secret, secret_len))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ch->have_new_rx_secret = 1;
|
|
ch->rx_enc_level = enc_level;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_on_handshake_complete(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(!ch->handshake_complete))
|
|
return 0; /* this should not happen twice */
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(ch->tx_enc_level == QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_1RTT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->got_remote_transport_params) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Was not a valid QUIC handshake if we did not get valid transport
|
|
* params.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_CRYPTO_MISSING_EXT,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_CRYPTO,
|
|
"no transport parameters received");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Don't need transport parameters anymore. */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ch->local_transport_params);
|
|
ch->local_transport_params = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Tell the QRX it can now process 1-RTT packets. */
|
|
ossl_qrx_allow_1rtt_processing(ch->qrx);
|
|
|
|
/* Tell TXP the handshake is complete. */
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_notify_handshake_complete(ch->txp);
|
|
|
|
ch->handshake_complete = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* On the server, the handshake is confirmed as soon as it is complete.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_on_handshake_confirmed(ch);
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_schedule_handshake_done(ch->txp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, ch->state);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_on_handshake_alert(void *arg, unsigned char alert_code)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 4.4: More specifically, servers MUST NOT send post-handshake
|
|
* TLS CertificateRequest messages, and clients MUST treat receipt of such
|
|
* messages as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (alert_code == SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
|
|
&& ch->handshake_complete
|
|
&& ossl_quic_tls_is_cert_request(ch->qtls))
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
0,
|
|
"Post-handshake TLS "
|
|
"CertificateRequest received");
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 4.6.1: Servers MUST NOT send the early_data extension with a
|
|
* max_early_data_size field set to any value other than 0xffffffff. A
|
|
* client MUST treat receipt of a NewSessionTicket that contains an
|
|
* early_data extension with any other value as a connection error of type
|
|
* PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (alert_code == SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
|
|
&& ch->handshake_complete
|
|
&& ossl_quic_tls_has_bad_max_early_data(ch->qtls))
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
0,
|
|
"Bad max_early_data received");
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_CRYPTO_ERR_BEGIN
|
|
+ alert_code,
|
|
0, "handshake alert");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* QUIC Channel: Transport Parameter Handling
|
|
* ==========================================
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called by handshake layer when we receive QUIC Transport Parameters from the
|
|
* peer. Note that these are not authenticated until the handshake is marked
|
|
* as complete.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define TP_REASON_SERVER_ONLY(x) \
|
|
x " may not be sent by a client"
|
|
#define TP_REASON_DUP(x) \
|
|
x " appears multiple times"
|
|
#define TP_REASON_MALFORMED(x) \
|
|
x " is malformed"
|
|
#define TP_REASON_EXPECTED_VALUE(x) \
|
|
x " does not match expected value"
|
|
#define TP_REASON_NOT_RETRY(x) \
|
|
x " sent when not performing a retry"
|
|
#define TP_REASON_REQUIRED(x) \
|
|
x " was not sent but is required"
|
|
#define TP_REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR(x) \
|
|
x " encountered internal error"
|
|
|
|
static void txfc_bump_cwm_bidi(QUIC_STREAM *s, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_stream_is_bidi(s)
|
|
|| ossl_quic_stream_is_server_init(s))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_txfc_bump_cwm(&s->txfc, *(uint64_t *)arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void txfc_bump_cwm_uni(QUIC_STREAM *s, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ossl_quic_stream_is_bidi(s)
|
|
|| ossl_quic_stream_is_server_init(s))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_txfc_bump_cwm(&s->txfc, *(uint64_t *)arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void do_update(QUIC_STREAM *s, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_update_state(&ch->qsm, s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_on_transport_params(const unsigned char *params,
|
|
size_t params_len,
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_CHANNEL *ch = arg;
|
|
PACKET pkt;
|
|
uint64_t id, v;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
const unsigned char *body;
|
|
int got_orig_dcid = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_scid = 0;
|
|
int got_retry_scid = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_max_data = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_max_stream_data_uni = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_max_streams_bidi = 0;
|
|
int got_initial_max_streams_uni = 0;
|
|
int got_stateless_reset_token = 0;
|
|
int got_preferred_addr = 0;
|
|
int got_ack_delay_exp = 0;
|
|
int got_max_ack_delay = 0;
|
|
int got_max_udp_payload_size = 0;
|
|
int got_max_idle_timeout = 0;
|
|
int got_active_conn_id_limit = 0;
|
|
int got_disable_active_migration = 0;
|
|
QUIC_CONN_ID cid;
|
|
const char *reason = "bad transport parameter";
|
|
ossl_unused uint64_t rx_max_idle_timeout = 0;
|
|
ossl_unused const void *stateless_reset_token_p = NULL;
|
|
QUIC_PREFERRED_ADDR pfa;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->got_remote_transport_params) {
|
|
reason = "multiple transport parameter extensions";
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, params, params_len)) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0,
|
|
"internal error (packet buf init)");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_peek_transport_param(&pkt, &id))
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
|
|
switch (id) {
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_ORIG_DCID:
|
|
if (got_orig_dcid) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("ORIG_DCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_SERVER_ONLY("ORIG_DCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_cid(&pkt, NULL, &cid)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("ORIG_DCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
/* Must match our initial DCID. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_conn_id_eq(&ch->init_dcid, &cid)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_EXPECTED_VALUE("ORIG_DCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
got_orig_dcid = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_RETRY_SCID:
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_SERVER_ONLY("RETRY_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (got_retry_scid) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("RETRY_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->doing_retry) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_NOT_RETRY("RETRY_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_cid(&pkt, NULL, &cid)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("RETRY_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Must match Retry packet SCID. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_conn_id_eq(&ch->retry_scid, &cid)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_EXPECTED_VALUE("RETRY_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
got_retry_scid = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_SCID:
|
|
if (got_initial_scid) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_cid(&pkt, NULL, &cid)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Must match SCID of first Initial packet from server. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_conn_id_eq(&ch->init_scid, &cid)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_EXPECTED_VALUE("INITIAL_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
got_initial_scid = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_DATA:
|
|
if (got_initial_max_data) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_MAX_DATA");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_MAX_DATA");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_txfc_bump_cwm(&ch->conn_txfc, v);
|
|
got_initial_max_data = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL:
|
|
if (got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is correct; the BIDI_LOCAL TP governs streams created by
|
|
* the endpoint which sends the TP, i.e., our peer.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote = v;
|
|
got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE:
|
|
if (got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is correct; the BIDI_REMOTE TP governs streams created
|
|
* by the endpoint which receives the TP, i.e., us.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local = v;
|
|
|
|
/* Apply to all existing streams. */
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_visit(&ch->qsm, txfc_bump_cwm_bidi, &v);
|
|
got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI:
|
|
if (got_initial_max_stream_data_uni) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_uni = v;
|
|
|
|
/* Apply to all existing streams. */
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_visit(&ch->qsm, txfc_bump_cwm_uni, &v);
|
|
got_initial_max_stream_data_uni = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_ACK_DELAY_EXP:
|
|
if (got_ack_delay_exp) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("ACK_DELAY_EXP");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)
|
|
|| v > QUIC_MAX_ACK_DELAY_EXP) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("ACK_DELAY_EXP");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->rx_ack_delay_exp = (unsigned char)v;
|
|
got_ack_delay_exp = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_MAX_ACK_DELAY:
|
|
if (got_max_ack_delay) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("MAX_ACK_DELAY");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)
|
|
|| v >= (((uint64_t)1) << 14)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("MAX_ACK_DELAY");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->rx_max_ack_delay = v;
|
|
ossl_ackm_set_rx_max_ack_delay(ch->ackm,
|
|
ossl_ms2time(ch->rx_max_ack_delay));
|
|
|
|
got_max_ack_delay = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_BIDI:
|
|
if (got_initial_max_streams_bidi) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_BIDI");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)
|
|
|| v > (((uint64_t)1) << 60)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_BIDI");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(ch->max_local_streams_bidi == 0);
|
|
ch->max_local_streams_bidi = v;
|
|
got_initial_max_streams_bidi = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_UNI:
|
|
if (got_initial_max_streams_uni) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_UNI");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)
|
|
|| v > (((uint64_t)1) << 60)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_UNI");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(ch->max_local_streams_uni == 0);
|
|
ch->max_local_streams_uni = v;
|
|
got_initial_max_streams_uni = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT:
|
|
if (got_max_idle_timeout) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (v > 0 && v < ch->max_idle_timeout)
|
|
ch->max_idle_timeout = v;
|
|
|
|
ch_update_idle(ch);
|
|
got_max_idle_timeout = 1;
|
|
rx_max_idle_timeout = v;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE:
|
|
if (got_max_udp_payload_size) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)
|
|
|| v < QUIC_MIN_INITIAL_DGRAM_LEN) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->rx_max_udp_payload_size = v;
|
|
got_max_udp_payload_size = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT:
|
|
if (got_active_conn_id_limit) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_int(&pkt, &id, &v)
|
|
|| v < QUIC_MIN_ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->rx_active_conn_id_limit = v;
|
|
got_active_conn_id_limit = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN:
|
|
if (got_stateless_reset_token) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must ensure a client doesn't send them because we don't have
|
|
* processing for them.
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO(QUIC SERVER): remove this restriction
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_SERVER_ONLY("STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
body = ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_bytes(&pkt, &id, &len);
|
|
if (body == NULL || len != QUIC_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN_LEN) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_srtm_add(ch->srtm, ch, ch->cur_remote_seq_num,
|
|
(const QUIC_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN *)body)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR("STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stateless_reset_token_p = body;
|
|
got_stateless_reset_token = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_PREFERRED_ADDR:
|
|
{
|
|
/* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Handle preferred address. */
|
|
if (got_preferred_addr) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("PREFERRED_ADDR");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 18.2: "A server that chooses a zero-length
|
|
* connection ID MUST NOT provide a preferred address.
|
|
* Similarly, a server MUST NOT include a zero-length connection
|
|
* ID in this transport parameter. A client MUST treat a
|
|
* violation of these requirements as a connection error of type
|
|
* TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_SERVER_ONLY("PREFERRED_ADDR");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ch->cur_remote_dcid.id_len == 0) {
|
|
reason = "PREFERRED_ADDR provided for zero-length CID";
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_preferred_addr(&pkt, &pfa)) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("PREFERRED_ADDR");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pfa.cid.id_len == 0) {
|
|
reason = "zero-length CID in PREFERRED_ADDR";
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
got_preferred_addr = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_TPARAM_DISABLE_ACTIVE_MIGRATION:
|
|
/* We do not currently handle migration, so nothing to do. */
|
|
if (got_disable_active_migration) {
|
|
/* must not appear more than once */
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_DUP("DISABLE_ACTIVE_MIGRATION");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
body = ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_bytes(&pkt, &id, &len);
|
|
if (body == NULL || len > 0) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_MALFORMED("DISABLE_ACTIVE_MIGRATION");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
got_disable_active_migration = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip over and ignore.
|
|
*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 7.4: We SHOULD treat duplicated transport parameters
|
|
* as a connection error, but we are not required to. Currently,
|
|
* handle this programmatically by checking for duplicates in the
|
|
* parameters that we recognise, as above, but don't bother
|
|
* maintaining a list of duplicates for anything we don't recognise.
|
|
*/
|
|
body = ossl_quic_wire_decode_transport_param_bytes(&pkt, &id,
|
|
&len);
|
|
if (body == NULL)
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!got_initial_scid) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_REQUIRED("INITIAL_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->is_server) {
|
|
if (!got_orig_dcid) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_REQUIRED("ORIG_DCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ch->doing_retry && !got_retry_scid) {
|
|
reason = TP_REASON_REQUIRED("RETRY_SCID");
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->got_remote_transport_params = 1;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG
|
|
QLOG_EVENT_BEGIN(ch_get_qlog(ch), transport, parameters_set)
|
|
QLOG_STR("owner", "remote");
|
|
|
|
if (got_orig_dcid)
|
|
QLOG_CID("original_destination_connection_id",
|
|
&ch->init_dcid);
|
|
if (got_initial_scid)
|
|
QLOG_CID("original_source_connection_id",
|
|
&ch->init_dcid);
|
|
if (got_retry_scid)
|
|
QLOG_CID("retry_source_connection_id",
|
|
&ch->retry_scid);
|
|
if (got_initial_max_data)
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_data",
|
|
ossl_quic_txfc_get_cwm(&ch->conn_txfc));
|
|
if (got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local)
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local",
|
|
ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local);
|
|
if (got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote)
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote",
|
|
ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote);
|
|
if (got_initial_max_stream_data_uni)
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_stream_data_uni",
|
|
ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_uni);
|
|
if (got_initial_max_streams_bidi)
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_streams_bidi",
|
|
ch->max_local_streams_bidi);
|
|
if (got_initial_max_streams_uni)
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_streams_uni",
|
|
ch->max_local_streams_uni);
|
|
if (got_ack_delay_exp)
|
|
QLOG_U64("ack_delay_exponent", ch->rx_ack_delay_exp);
|
|
if (got_max_ack_delay)
|
|
QLOG_U64("max_ack_delay", ch->rx_max_ack_delay);
|
|
if (got_max_udp_payload_size)
|
|
QLOG_U64("max_udp_payload_size", ch->rx_max_udp_payload_size);
|
|
if (got_max_idle_timeout)
|
|
QLOG_U64("max_idle_timeout", rx_max_idle_timeout);
|
|
if (got_active_conn_id_limit)
|
|
QLOG_U64("active_connection_id_limit", ch->rx_active_conn_id_limit);
|
|
if (got_stateless_reset_token)
|
|
QLOG_BIN("stateless_reset_token", stateless_reset_token_p,
|
|
QUIC_STATELESS_RESET_TOKEN_LEN);
|
|
if (got_preferred_addr) {
|
|
QLOG_BEGIN("preferred_addr")
|
|
QLOG_U64("port_v4", pfa.ipv4_port);
|
|
QLOG_U64("port_v6", pfa.ipv6_port);
|
|
QLOG_BIN("ip_v4", pfa.ipv4, sizeof(pfa.ipv4));
|
|
QLOG_BIN("ip_v6", pfa.ipv6, sizeof(pfa.ipv6));
|
|
QLOG_BIN("stateless_reset_token", pfa.stateless_reset.token,
|
|
sizeof(pfa.stateless_reset.token));
|
|
QLOG_CID("connection_id", &pfa.cid);
|
|
QLOG_END()
|
|
}
|
|
QLOG_BOOL("disable_active_migration", got_disable_active_migration);
|
|
QLOG_EVENT_END()
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (got_initial_max_data || got_initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote
|
|
|| got_initial_max_streams_bidi || got_initial_max_streams_uni)
|
|
/*
|
|
* If FC credit was bumped, we may now be able to send. Update all
|
|
* streams.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_visit(&ch->qsm, do_update, ch);
|
|
|
|
/* If we are a server, we now generate our own transport parameters. */
|
|
if (ch->is_server && !ch_generate_transport_params(ch)) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0,
|
|
"internal error");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
malformed:
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR,
|
|
0, reason);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called when we want to generate transport parameters. This is called
|
|
* immediately at instantiation time for a client and after we receive the
|
|
* client's transport parameters for a server.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ch_generate_transport_params(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf_mem = NULL;
|
|
WPACKET wpkt;
|
|
int wpkt_valid = 0;
|
|
size_t buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->local_transport_params != NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if ((buf_mem = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_init(&wpkt, buf_mem))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
wpkt_valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_bytes(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_DISABLE_ACTIVE_MIGRATION,
|
|
NULL, 0) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_cid(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_ORIG_DCID,
|
|
&ch->init_dcid))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_cid(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_SCID,
|
|
&ch->cur_local_cid))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Client always uses an empty SCID. */
|
|
if (ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_bytes(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_SCID,
|
|
NULL, 0) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT,
|
|
ch->max_idle_timeout))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
|
|
QUIC_MIN_INITIAL_DGRAM_LEN))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT,
|
|
QUIC_MIN_ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->tx_max_ack_delay != QUIC_DEFAULT_MAX_ACK_DELAY
|
|
&& !ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_MAX_ACK_DELAY,
|
|
ch->tx_max_ack_delay))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_DATA,
|
|
ossl_quic_rxfc_get_cwm(&ch->conn_rxfc)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Send the default CWM for a new RXFC. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_LOCAL,
|
|
ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_BIDI_REMOTE,
|
|
ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAM_DATA_UNI,
|
|
ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_uni))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_BIDI,
|
|
ossl_quic_rxfc_get_cwm(&ch->max_streams_bidi_rxfc)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_transport_param_int(&wpkt, QUIC_TPARAM_INITIAL_MAX_STREAMS_UNI,
|
|
ossl_quic_rxfc_get_cwm(&ch->max_streams_uni_rxfc)))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_finish(&wpkt))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
wpkt_valid = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &buf_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
ch->local_transport_params = (unsigned char *)buf_mem->data;
|
|
buf_mem->data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tls_set_transport_params(ch->qtls, ch->local_transport_params,
|
|
buf_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_QLOG
|
|
QLOG_EVENT_BEGIN(ch_get_qlog(ch), transport, parameters_set)
|
|
QLOG_STR("owner", "local");
|
|
QLOG_BOOL("disable_active_migration", 1);
|
|
if (ch->is_server) {
|
|
QLOG_CID("original_destination_connection_id", &ch->init_dcid);
|
|
QLOG_CID("initial_source_connection_id", &ch->cur_local_cid);
|
|
} else {
|
|
QLOG_STR("initial_source_connection_id", "");
|
|
}
|
|
QLOG_U64("max_idle_timeout", ch->max_idle_timeout);
|
|
QLOG_U64("max_udp_payload_size", QUIC_MIN_INITIAL_DGRAM_LEN);
|
|
QLOG_U64("active_connection_id_limit", QUIC_MIN_ACTIVE_CONN_ID_LIMIT);
|
|
QLOG_U64("max_ack_delay", ch->tx_max_ack_delay);
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_data", ossl_quic_rxfc_get_cwm(&ch->conn_rxfc));
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local",
|
|
ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local);
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote",
|
|
ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote);
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_stream_data_uni",
|
|
ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_uni);
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_streams_bidi",
|
|
ossl_quic_rxfc_get_cwm(&ch->max_streams_bidi_rxfc));
|
|
QLOG_U64("initial_max_streams_uni",
|
|
ossl_quic_rxfc_get_cwm(&ch->max_streams_uni_rxfc));
|
|
QLOG_EVENT_END()
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (wpkt_valid)
|
|
WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf_mem);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* QUIC Channel: Ticker-Mutator
|
|
* ============================
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The central ticker function called by the reactor. This does everything, or
|
|
* at least everything network I/O related. Best effort - not allowed to fail
|
|
* "loudly".
|
|
*/
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_subtick(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, QUIC_TICK_RESULT *res,
|
|
uint32_t flags)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_TIME now, deadline;
|
|
int channel_only = (flags & QUIC_REACTOR_TICK_FLAG_CHANNEL_ONLY) != 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When we tick the QUIC connection, we do everything we need to do
|
|
* periodically. Network I/O handling will already have been performed
|
|
* as necessary by the QUIC port. Thus, in order, we:
|
|
*
|
|
* - handle any packets the DEMUX has queued up for us;
|
|
* - handle any timer events which are due to fire (ACKM, etc.);
|
|
* - generate any packets which need to be sent;
|
|
* - determine the time at which we should next be ticked.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* If we are in the TERMINATED state, there is nothing to do. */
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_terminated(ch)) {
|
|
res->net_read_desired = 0;
|
|
res->net_write_desired = 0;
|
|
res->tick_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are in the TERMINATING state, check if the terminating timer has
|
|
* expired.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_terminating(ch)) {
|
|
now = get_time(ch);
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_time_compare(now, ch->terminate_deadline) >= 0) {
|
|
ch_on_terminating_timeout(ch);
|
|
res->net_read_desired = 0;
|
|
res->net_write_desired = 0;
|
|
res->tick_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
return; /* abort normal processing, nothing to do */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->port->engine->inhibit_tick) {
|
|
/* Handle RXKU timeouts. */
|
|
ch_rxku_tick(ch);
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
/* Process queued incoming packets. */
|
|
ch->did_tls_tick = 0;
|
|
ch->have_new_rx_secret = 0;
|
|
ch_rx(ch, channel_only);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow the handshake layer to check for any new incoming data and
|
|
* generate new outgoing data.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ch->did_tls_tick)
|
|
ch_tick_tls(ch, channel_only);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the handshake layer gave us a new secret, we need to do RX
|
|
* again because packets that were not previously processable and
|
|
* were deferred might now be processable.
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Consider handling this in the yield_secret callback.
|
|
*/
|
|
} while (ch->have_new_rx_secret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle any timer events which are due to fire; namely, the loss
|
|
* detection deadline and the idle timeout.
|
|
*
|
|
* ACKM ACK generation deadline is polled by TXP, so we don't need to
|
|
* handle it here.
|
|
*/
|
|
now = get_time(ch);
|
|
if (ossl_time_compare(now, ch->idle_deadline) >= 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Idle timeout differs from normal protocol violation because we do
|
|
* not send a CONN_CLOSE frame; go straight to TERMINATED.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ch->port->engine->inhibit_tick)
|
|
ch_on_idle_timeout(ch);
|
|
|
|
res->net_read_desired = 0;
|
|
res->net_write_desired = 0;
|
|
res->tick_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->port->engine->inhibit_tick) {
|
|
deadline = ossl_ackm_get_loss_detection_deadline(ch->ackm);
|
|
if (!ossl_time_is_zero(deadline)
|
|
&& ossl_time_compare(now, deadline) >= 0)
|
|
ossl_ackm_on_timeout(ch->ackm);
|
|
|
|
/* If a ping is due, inform TXP. */
|
|
if (ossl_time_compare(now, ch->ping_deadline) >= 0) {
|
|
int pn_space = ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(ch->tx_enc_level);
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_schedule_ack_eliciting(ch->txp, pn_space);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have no CC budget at this time we cannot process the above
|
|
* PING request immediately. In any case we have scheduled the
|
|
* request so bump the ping deadline. If we don't do this we will
|
|
* busy-loop endlessly as the above deadline comparison condition
|
|
* will still be met.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch_update_ping_deadline(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Queue any data to be sent for transmission. */
|
|
ch_tx(ch);
|
|
|
|
/* Do stream GC. */
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_gc(&ch->qsm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Determine the time at which we should next be ticked. */
|
|
res->tick_deadline = ch_determine_next_tick_deadline(ch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always process network input unless we are now terminated. Although we
|
|
* had not terminated at the beginning of this tick, network errors in
|
|
* ch_tx() may have caused us to transition to the Terminated state.
|
|
*/
|
|
res->net_read_desired = !ossl_quic_channel_is_terminated(ch);
|
|
|
|
/* We want to write to the network if we have any data in our TX queue. */
|
|
res->net_write_desired
|
|
= (!ossl_quic_channel_is_terminated(ch)
|
|
&& ossl_qtx_get_queue_len_datagrams(ch->qtx) > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_tick_tls(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int channel_only)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t error_code;
|
|
const char *error_msg;
|
|
ERR_STATE *error_state = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (channel_only)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
ch->did_tls_tick = 1;
|
|
ossl_quic_tls_tick(ch->qtls);
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_tls_get_error(ch->qtls, &error_code, &error_msg,
|
|
&error_state)) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error_state(ch, error_code, 0,
|
|
error_msg, error_state);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check incoming forged packet limit and terminate connection if needed. */
|
|
static void ch_rx_check_forged_pkt_limit(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t enc_level;
|
|
uint64_t limit = UINT64_MAX, l;
|
|
|
|
for (enc_level = QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL;
|
|
enc_level < QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_NUM;
|
|
++enc_level)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Different ELs can have different AEADs which can in turn impose
|
|
* different limits, so use the lowest value of any currently valid EL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ch->el_discarded & (1U << enc_level)) != 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (enc_level > ch->rx_enc_level)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
l = ossl_qrx_get_max_forged_pkt_count(ch->qrx, enc_level);
|
|
if (l < limit)
|
|
limit = l;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_qrx_get_cur_forged_pkt_count(ch->qrx) < limit)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED, 0,
|
|
"forgery limit");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Process queued incoming packets and handle frames, if any. */
|
|
static int ch_rx(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int channel_only)
|
|
{
|
|
int handled_any = 0;
|
|
const int closing = ossl_quic_channel_is_closing(ch);
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->is_server && !ch->have_sent_any_pkt)
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have not sent anything yet, therefore there is no need to check
|
|
* for incoming data.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
assert(ch->qrx_pkt == NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_qrx_read_pkt(ch->qrx, &ch->qrx_pkt))
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* Track the amount of data received while in the closing state */
|
|
if (closing)
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_record_received_closing_bytes(
|
|
ch->txp, ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->len);
|
|
|
|
if (!handled_any) {
|
|
ch_update_idle(ch);
|
|
ch_update_ping_deadline(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch_rx_handle_packet(ch, channel_only); /* best effort */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Regardless of the outcome of frame handling, unref the packet.
|
|
* This will free the packet unless something added another
|
|
* reference to it during frame processing.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_qrx_pkt_release(ch->qrx_pkt);
|
|
ch->qrx_pkt = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ch->have_sent_ack_eliciting_since_rx = 0;
|
|
handled_any = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch_rx_check_forged_pkt_limit(ch);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When in TERMINATING - CLOSING, generate a CONN_CLOSE frame whenever we
|
|
* process one or more incoming packets.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (handled_any && closing)
|
|
ch->conn_close_queued = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int bio_addr_eq(const BIO_ADDR *a, const BIO_ADDR *b)
|
|
{
|
|
if (BIO_ADDR_family(a) != BIO_ADDR_family(b))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (BIO_ADDR_family(a)) {
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
return !memcmp(&a->s_in.sin_addr,
|
|
&b->s_in.sin_addr,
|
|
sizeof(a->s_in.sin_addr))
|
|
&& a->s_in.sin_port == b->s_in.sin_port;
|
|
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
return !memcmp(&a->s_in6.sin6_addr,
|
|
&b->s_in6.sin6_addr,
|
|
sizeof(a->s_in6.sin6_addr))
|
|
&& a->s_in6.sin6_port == b->s_in6.sin6_port;
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0; /* not supported */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handles the packet currently in ch->qrx_pkt->hdr. */
|
|
static void ch_rx_handle_packet(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int channel_only)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t enc_level;
|
|
int old_have_processed_any_pkt = ch->have_processed_any_pkt;
|
|
|
|
assert(ch->qrx_pkt != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.2.1 Closing Connection State:
|
|
* An endpoint that is closing is not required to process any
|
|
* received frame.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_channel_is_active(ch))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_pkt_type_is_encrypted(ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type)) {
|
|
if (!ch->have_received_enc_pkt) {
|
|
ch->cur_remote_dcid = ch->init_scid = ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->src_conn_id;
|
|
ch->have_received_enc_pkt = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We change to using the SCID in the first Initial packet as the
|
|
* DCID.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_cur_dcid(ch->txp, &ch->init_scid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enc_level = ossl_quic_pkt_type_to_enc_level(ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type);
|
|
if ((ch->el_discarded & (1U << enc_level)) != 0)
|
|
/* Do not process packets from ELs we have already discarded. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 9.6: "If a client receives packets from a new server address
|
|
* when the client has not initiated a migration to that address, the client
|
|
* SHOULD discard these packets."
|
|
*
|
|
* We need to be a bit careful here as due to the BIO abstraction layer an
|
|
* application is liable to be weird and lie to us about peer addresses.
|
|
* Only apply this check if we actually are using a real AF_INET or AF_INET6
|
|
* address.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ch->is_server
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->peer != NULL
|
|
&& (
|
|
BIO_ADDR_family(&ch->cur_peer_addr) == AF_INET
|
|
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
|
|
|| BIO_ADDR_family(&ch->cur_peer_addr) == AF_INET6
|
|
#endif
|
|
)
|
|
&& !bio_addr_eq(ch->qrx_pkt->peer, &ch->cur_peer_addr))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->is_server
|
|
&& ch->have_received_enc_pkt
|
|
&& ossl_quic_pkt_type_has_scid(ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 7.2: "Once a client has received a valid Initial packet
|
|
* from the server, it MUST discard any subsequent packet it receives on
|
|
* that connection with a different SCID."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_conn_id_eq(&ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->src_conn_id,
|
|
&ch->init_scid))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_pkt_type_has_version(ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type)
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->version != QUIC_VERSION_1)
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 5.2.1: If a client receives a packet that uses a
|
|
* different version than it initially selected, it MUST discard the
|
|
* packet. We only ever use v1, so require it.
|
|
*/
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ch->have_processed_any_pkt = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 17.2: "An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a packet that has a
|
|
* non-zero value for [the reserved bits] after removing both packet and
|
|
* header protection as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ossl_quic_pkt_type_is_encrypted(ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type)
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->reserved != 0) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
0, "packet header reserved bits");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle incoming packet. */
|
|
switch (ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type) {
|
|
case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY:
|
|
if (ch->doing_retry || ch->is_server)
|
|
/*
|
|
* It is not allowed to ask a client to do a retry more than
|
|
* once. Clients may not send retries.
|
|
*/
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s 17.2.5.2: After the client has received and processed an
|
|
* Initial or Retry packet from the server, it MUST discard any
|
|
* subsequent Retry packets that it receives.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ch->have_received_enc_pkt)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->len <= QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN)
|
|
/* Packets with zero-length Retry Tokens are invalid. */
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Theoretically this should probably be in the QRX.
|
|
* However because validation is dependent on context (namely the
|
|
* client's initial DCID) we can't do this cleanly. In the future we
|
|
* should probably add a callback to the QRX to let it call us (via
|
|
* the DEMUX) and ask us about the correct original DCID, rather
|
|
* than allow the QRX to emit a potentially malformed packet to the
|
|
* upper layers. However, special casing this will do for now.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_validate_retry_integrity_tag(ch->port->engine->libctx,
|
|
ch->port->engine->propq,
|
|
ch->qrx_pkt->hdr,
|
|
&ch->init_dcid))
|
|
/* Malformed retry packet, ignore. */
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!ch_retry(ch, ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->data,
|
|
ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->len - QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN,
|
|
&ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->src_conn_id))
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
0, "handling retry packet");
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_0RTT:
|
|
if (!ch->is_server)
|
|
/* Clients should never receive 0-RTT packets. */
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(QUIC 0RTT): Implement 0-RTT on the server side. We currently
|
|
* do not need to implement this as a client can only do 0-RTT if we
|
|
* have given it permission to in a previous session.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL:
|
|
case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT:
|
|
if (ch->is_server && ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_HANDSHAKE)
|
|
/*
|
|
* We automatically drop INITIAL EL keys when first successfully
|
|
* decrypting a HANDSHAKE packet, as per the RFC.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch_discard_el(ch, QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL);
|
|
|
|
if (ch->rxku_in_progress
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->pn >= ch->rxku_trigger_pn
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->key_epoch < ossl_qrx_get_key_epoch(ch->qrx)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 6.4: Packets with higher packet numbers MUST be
|
|
* protected with either the same or newer packet protection keys
|
|
* than packets with lower packet numbers. An endpoint that
|
|
* successfully removes protection with old keys when newer keys
|
|
* were used for packets with lower packet numbers MUST treat this
|
|
* as a connection error of type KEY_UPDATE_ERROR.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_KEY_UPDATE_ERROR,
|
|
0, "new packet with old keys");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->is_server
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL
|
|
&& ch->qrx_pkt->hdr->token_len > 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 17.2.2: Clients that receive an Initial packet with a
|
|
* non-zero Token Length field MUST either discard the packet or
|
|
* generate a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): consider the implications of RFC 9000 s. 10.2.3
|
|
* Immediate Close during the Handshake:
|
|
* However, at the cost of reducing feedback about
|
|
* errors for legitimate peers, some forms of denial of
|
|
* service can be made more difficult for an attacker
|
|
* if endpoints discard illegal packets rather than
|
|
* terminating a connection with CONNECTION_CLOSE. For
|
|
* this reason, endpoints MAY discard packets rather
|
|
* than immediately close if errors are detected in
|
|
* packets that lack authentication.
|
|
* I.e. should we drop this packet instead of closing the connection?
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
0, "client received initial token");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This packet contains frames, pass to the RXDP. */
|
|
ossl_quic_handle_frames(ch, ch->qrx_pkt); /* best effort */
|
|
|
|
if (ch->did_crypto_frame)
|
|
ch_tick_tls(ch, channel_only);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_VERSION_NEG:
|
|
/*
|
|
* "A client MUST discard any Version Negotiation packet if it has
|
|
* received and successfully processed any other packet."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!old_have_processed_any_pkt)
|
|
ch_rx_handle_version_neg(ch, ch->qrx_pkt);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
assert(0);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ch_rx_handle_version_neg(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, OSSL_QRX_PKT *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* We do not support version negotiation at this time. As per RFC 9000 s.
|
|
* 6.2., we MUST abandon the connection attempt if we receive a Version
|
|
* Negotiation packet, unless we have already successfully processed another
|
|
* incoming packet, or the packet lists the QUIC version we want to use.
|
|
*/
|
|
PACKET vpkt;
|
|
unsigned long v;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&vpkt, pkt->hdr->data, pkt->hdr->len))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(&vpkt) > 0) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(&vpkt, &v))
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if ((uint32_t)v == QUIC_VERSION_1)
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* No match, this is a failure case. */
|
|
ch_raise_version_neg_failure(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ch_raise_version_neg_failure(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE tcause = {0};
|
|
|
|
tcause.error_code = QUIC_ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED;
|
|
tcause.reason = "version negotiation failure";
|
|
tcause.reason_len = strlen(tcause.reason);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip TERMINATING state; this is not considered a protocol error and we do
|
|
* not send CONNECTION_CLOSE.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch_start_terminating(ch, &tcause, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try to generate packets and if possible, flush them to the network. */
|
|
static int ch_tx(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TXP_STATUS status;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.2.2: Draining Connection State:
|
|
* While otherwise identical to the closing state, an endpoint
|
|
* in the draining state MUST NOT send any packets.
|
|
* and:
|
|
* An endpoint MUST NOT send further packets.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_draining(ch))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_closing(ch)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* While closing, only send CONN_CLOSE if we've received more traffic
|
|
* from the peer. Once we tell the TXP to generate CONN_CLOSE, all
|
|
* future calls to it generate CONN_CLOSE frames, so otherwise we would
|
|
* just constantly generate CONN_CLOSE frames.
|
|
*
|
|
* Confirming to RFC 9000 s. 10.2.1 Closing Connection State:
|
|
* An endpoint SHOULD limit the rate at which it generates
|
|
* packets in the closing state.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ch->conn_close_queued)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ch->conn_close_queued = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do TXKU if we need to. */
|
|
ch_maybe_trigger_spontaneous_txku(ch);
|
|
|
|
ch->rxku_pending_confirm_done = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Loop until we stop generating packets to send */
|
|
do {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send packet, if we need to. Best effort. The TXP consults the CC and
|
|
* applies any limitations imposed by it, so we don't need to do it here.
|
|
*
|
|
* Best effort. In particular if TXP fails for some reason we should
|
|
* still flush any queued packets which we already generated.
|
|
*/
|
|
res = ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_generate(ch->txp, &status);
|
|
if (status.sent_pkt > 0) {
|
|
ch->have_sent_any_pkt = 1; /* Packet(s) were sent */
|
|
ch->port->have_sent_any_pkt = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.1. 'An endpoint also restarts its idle timer when
|
|
* sending an ack-eliciting packet if no other ack-eliciting packets
|
|
* have been sent since last receiving and processing a packet.'
|
|
*/
|
|
if (status.sent_ack_eliciting
|
|
&& !ch->have_sent_ack_eliciting_since_rx) {
|
|
ch_update_idle(ch);
|
|
ch->have_sent_ack_eliciting_since_rx = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->is_server && status.sent_handshake)
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9001 s. 4.9.1: A client MUST discard Initial keys when it
|
|
* first sends a Handshake packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch_discard_el(ch, QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_INITIAL);
|
|
|
|
if (ch->rxku_pending_confirm_done)
|
|
ch->rxku_pending_confirm = 0;
|
|
|
|
ch_update_ping_deadline(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!res) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* One case where TXP can fail is if we reach a TX PN of 2**62 - 1.
|
|
* As per RFC 9000 s. 12.3, if this happens we MUST close the
|
|
* connection without sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. This is
|
|
* actually handled as an emergent consequence of our design, as the
|
|
* TX packetiser will never transmit another packet when the TX PN
|
|
* reaches the limit.
|
|
*
|
|
* Calling the below function terminates the connection; its attempt
|
|
* to schedule a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame will not actually cause a
|
|
* packet to be transmitted for this reason.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
0,
|
|
"internal error (txp generate)");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (status.sent_pkt > 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Flush packets to network. */
|
|
switch (ossl_qtx_flush_net(ch->qtx)) {
|
|
case QTX_FLUSH_NET_RES_OK:
|
|
case QTX_FLUSH_NET_RES_TRANSIENT_FAIL:
|
|
/* Best effort, done for now. */
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QTX_FLUSH_NET_RES_PERMANENT_FAIL:
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Permanent underlying network BIO, start terminating. */
|
|
ossl_quic_port_raise_net_error(ch->port, ch);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Determine next tick deadline. */
|
|
static OSSL_TIME ch_determine_next_tick_deadline(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_TIME deadline;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_terminated(ch))
|
|
return ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
|
|
deadline = ossl_ackm_get_loss_detection_deadline(ch->ackm);
|
|
if (ossl_time_is_zero(deadline))
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check the ack deadline for all enc_levels that are actually provisioned.
|
|
* ACKs aren't restricted by CC.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_NUM; i++) {
|
|
if (ossl_qtx_is_enc_level_provisioned(ch->qtx, i)) {
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_min(deadline,
|
|
ossl_ackm_get_ack_deadline(ch->ackm,
|
|
ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(i)));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When do we need to send an ACK-eliciting packet to reset the idle
|
|
* deadline timer for the peer?
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_time_is_infinite(ch->ping_deadline))
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_min(deadline, ch->ping_deadline);
|
|
|
|
/* Apply TXP wakeup deadline. */
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_min(deadline,
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_get_deadline(ch->txp));
|
|
|
|
/* Is the terminating timer armed? */
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_terminating(ch))
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_min(deadline,
|
|
ch->terminate_deadline);
|
|
else if (!ossl_time_is_infinite(ch->idle_deadline))
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_min(deadline,
|
|
ch->idle_deadline);
|
|
|
|
/* When does the RXKU process complete? */
|
|
if (ch->rxku_in_progress)
|
|
deadline = ossl_time_min(deadline, ch->rxku_update_end_deadline);
|
|
|
|
return deadline;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* QUIC Channel: Lifecycle Events
|
|
* ==============================
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Record a state transition. This is not necessarily a change to ch->state but
|
|
* also includes the handshake becoming complete or confirmed, etc.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ch_record_state_transition(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, uint32_t new_state)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t old_state = ch->state;
|
|
|
|
ch->state = new_state;
|
|
|
|
ossl_qlog_event_connectivity_connection_state_updated(ch_get_qlog(ch),
|
|
old_state,
|
|
new_state,
|
|
ch->handshake_complete,
|
|
ch->handshake_confirmed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_start(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch->is_server)
|
|
/*
|
|
* This is not used by the server. The server moves to active
|
|
* automatically on receiving an incoming connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->state != QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_IDLE)
|
|
/* Calls to connect are idempotent */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Inform QTX of peer address. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_peer(ch->txp, &ch->cur_peer_addr))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Plug in secrets for the Initial EL. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_provide_initial_secret(ch->port->engine->libctx,
|
|
ch->port->engine->propq,
|
|
&ch->init_dcid,
|
|
ch->is_server,
|
|
ch->qrx, ch->qtx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Change state. */
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_ACTIVE);
|
|
ch->doing_proactive_ver_neg = 0; /* not currently supported */
|
|
|
|
ossl_qlog_event_connectivity_connection_started(ch_get_qlog(ch),
|
|
&ch->init_dcid);
|
|
|
|
/* Handshake layer: start (e.g. send CH). */
|
|
if (!ch_tick_tls(ch, /*channel_only=*/0))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_reactor_tick(ossl_quic_port_get0_reactor(ch->port), 0); /* best effort */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Start a locally initiated connection shutdown. */
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_local_close(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, uint64_t app_error_code,
|
|
const char *app_reason)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE tcause = {0};
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_channel_is_term_any(ch))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
tcause.app = 1;
|
|
tcause.error_code = app_error_code;
|
|
tcause.reason = app_reason;
|
|
tcause.reason_len = app_reason != NULL ? strlen(app_reason) : 0;
|
|
ch_start_terminating(ch, &tcause, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void free_token(const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free((unsigned char *)buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called when a server asks us to do a retry. */
|
|
static int ch_retry(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
const unsigned char *retry_token,
|
|
size_t retry_token_len,
|
|
const QUIC_CONN_ID *retry_scid)
|
|
{
|
|
void *buf;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 17.2.5.1: "A client MUST discard a Retry packet that contains
|
|
* a SCID field that is identical to the DCID field of its initial packet."
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ossl_quic_conn_id_eq(&ch->init_dcid, retry_scid))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* We change to using the SCID in the Retry packet as the DCID. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_cur_dcid(ch->txp, retry_scid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now we retry. We will release the Retry packet immediately, so copy
|
|
* the token.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((buf = OPENSSL_memdup(retry_token, retry_token_len)) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_initial_token(ch->txp, buf,
|
|
retry_token_len,
|
|
free_token, NULL)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This may fail if the token we receive is too big for us to ever be
|
|
* able to transmit in an outgoing Initial packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_INVALID_TOKEN, 0,
|
|
"received oversize token");
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->retry_scid = *retry_scid;
|
|
ch->doing_retry = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to stimulate the Initial EL to generate the first CRYPTO frame
|
|
* again. We can do this most cleanly by simply forcing the ACKM to consider
|
|
* the first Initial packet as lost, which it effectively was as the server
|
|
* hasn't processed it. This also maintains the desired behaviour with e.g.
|
|
* PNs not resetting and so on.
|
|
*
|
|
* The PN we used initially is always zero, because QUIC does not allow
|
|
* repeated retries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_ackm_mark_packet_pseudo_lost(ch->ackm, QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL,
|
|
/*PN=*/0))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Plug in new secrets for the Initial EL. This is the only time we change
|
|
* the secrets for an EL after we already provisioned it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_provide_initial_secret(ch->port->engine->libctx,
|
|
ch->port->engine->propq,
|
|
&ch->retry_scid,
|
|
/*is_server=*/0,
|
|
ch->qrx, ch->qtx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called when an EL is to be discarded. */
|
|
static int ch_discard_el(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
uint32_t enc_level)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(enc_level < QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_1RTT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((ch->el_discarded & (1U << enc_level)) != 0)
|
|
/* Already done. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Best effort for all of these. */
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_discard_enc_level(ch->txp, enc_level);
|
|
ossl_qrx_discard_enc_level(ch->qrx, enc_level);
|
|
ossl_qtx_discard_enc_level(ch->qtx, enc_level);
|
|
|
|
if (enc_level != QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_0RTT) {
|
|
uint32_t pn_space = ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(enc_level);
|
|
|
|
ossl_ackm_on_pkt_space_discarded(ch->ackm, pn_space);
|
|
|
|
/* We should still have crypto streams at this point. */
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(ch->crypto_send[pn_space] != NULL)
|
|
|| !ossl_assert(ch->crypto_recv[pn_space] != NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Get rid of the crypto stream state for the EL. */
|
|
ossl_quic_sstream_free(ch->crypto_send[pn_space]);
|
|
ch->crypto_send[pn_space] = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_rstream_free(ch->crypto_recv[pn_space]);
|
|
ch->crypto_recv[pn_space] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch->el_discarded |= (1U << enc_level);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Intended to be called by the RXDP. */
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_on_handshake_confirmed(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch->handshake_confirmed)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!ch->handshake_complete) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does not make sense for handshake to be confirmed before it is
|
|
* completed.
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch, QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_HANDSHAKE_DONE,
|
|
"handshake cannot be confirmed "
|
|
"before it is completed");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch_discard_el(ch, QUIC_ENC_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
ch->handshake_confirmed = 1;
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, ch->state);
|
|
ossl_ackm_on_handshake_confirmed(ch->ackm);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Master function used when we want to start tearing down a connection:
|
|
*
|
|
* - If the connection is still IDLE we can go straight to TERMINATED;
|
|
*
|
|
* - If we are already TERMINATED this is a no-op.
|
|
*
|
|
* - If we are TERMINATING - CLOSING and we have now got a CONNECTION_CLOSE
|
|
* from the peer (tcause->remote == 1), we move to TERMINATING - DRAINING.
|
|
*
|
|
* - If we are TERMINATING - DRAINING, we remain here until the terminating
|
|
* timer expires.
|
|
*
|
|
* - Otherwise, we are in ACTIVE and move to TERMINATING - CLOSING.
|
|
* if we caused the termination (e.g. we have sent a CONNECTION_CLOSE). Note
|
|
* that we are considered to have caused a termination if we sent the first
|
|
* CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, even if it is caused by a peer protocol
|
|
* violation. If the peer sent the first CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, we move to
|
|
* TERMINATING - DRAINING.
|
|
*
|
|
* We record the termination cause structure passed on the first call only.
|
|
* Any successive calls have their termination cause data discarded;
|
|
* once we start sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, we don't change the details
|
|
* in it.
|
|
*
|
|
* This conforms to RFC 9000 s. 10.2.1: Closing Connection State:
|
|
* To minimize the state that an endpoint maintains for a closing
|
|
* connection, endpoints MAY send the exact same packet in response
|
|
* to any received packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* We don't drop any connection state (specifically packet protection keys)
|
|
* even though we are permitted to. This conforms to RFC 9000 s. 10.2.1:
|
|
* Closing Connection State:
|
|
* An endpoint MAY retain packet protection keys for incoming
|
|
* packets to allow it to read and process a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that we do not conform to these two from the same section:
|
|
* An endpoint's selected connection ID and the QUIC version
|
|
* are sufficient information to identify packets for a closing
|
|
* connection; the endpoint MAY discard all other connection state.
|
|
* and:
|
|
* An endpoint MAY drop packet protection keys when entering the
|
|
* closing state and send a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE
|
|
* frame in response to any UDP datagram that is received.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void copy_tcause(QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE *dst,
|
|
const QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE *src)
|
|
{
|
|
dst->error_code = src->error_code;
|
|
dst->frame_type = src->frame_type;
|
|
dst->app = src->app;
|
|
dst->remote = src->remote;
|
|
|
|
dst->reason = NULL;
|
|
dst->reason_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (src->reason != NULL && src->reason_len > 0) {
|
|
size_t l = src->reason_len;
|
|
char *r;
|
|
|
|
if (l >= SIZE_MAX)
|
|
--l;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this fails, dst->reason becomes NULL and we simply do not use a
|
|
* reason. This ensures termination is infallible.
|
|
*/
|
|
dst->reason = r = OPENSSL_memdup(src->reason, l + 1);
|
|
if (r == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
r[l] = '\0';
|
|
dst->reason_len = l;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ch_start_terminating(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
const QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE *tcause,
|
|
int force_immediate)
|
|
{
|
|
/* No point sending anything if we haven't sent anything yet. */
|
|
if (!ch->have_sent_any_pkt)
|
|
force_immediate = 1;
|
|
|
|
switch (ch->state) {
|
|
default:
|
|
case QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_IDLE:
|
|
copy_tcause(&ch->terminate_cause, tcause);
|
|
ch_on_terminating_timeout(ch);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_ACTIVE:
|
|
copy_tcause(&ch->terminate_cause, tcause);
|
|
|
|
ossl_qlog_event_connectivity_connection_closed(ch_get_qlog(ch), tcause);
|
|
|
|
if (!force_immediate) {
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, tcause->remote
|
|
? QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_DRAINING
|
|
: QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_CLOSING);
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.2 Immediate Close
|
|
* These states SHOULD persist for at least three times
|
|
* the current PTO interval as defined in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->terminate_deadline
|
|
= ossl_time_add(get_time(ch),
|
|
ossl_time_multiply(ossl_ackm_get_pto_duration(ch->ackm),
|
|
3));
|
|
|
|
if (!tcause->remote) {
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_CONN_CLOSE f = {0};
|
|
|
|
/* best effort */
|
|
f.error_code = ch->terminate_cause.error_code;
|
|
f.frame_type = ch->terminate_cause.frame_type;
|
|
f.is_app = ch->terminate_cause.app;
|
|
f.reason = (char *)ch->terminate_cause.reason;
|
|
f.reason_len = ch->terminate_cause.reason_len;
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_schedule_conn_close(ch->txp, &f);
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.2.2 Draining Connection State:
|
|
* An endpoint that receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame MAY
|
|
* send a single packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE
|
|
* frame before entering the draining state, using a
|
|
* NO_ERROR code if appropriate
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->conn_close_queued = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ch_on_terminating_timeout(ch);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_CLOSING:
|
|
if (force_immediate)
|
|
ch_on_terminating_timeout(ch);
|
|
else if (tcause->remote)
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.2.2 Draining Connection State:
|
|
* An endpoint MAY enter the draining state from the
|
|
* closing state if it receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame,
|
|
* which indicates that the peer is also closing or draining.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_DRAINING);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATING_DRAINING:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Other than in the force-immediate case, we remain here until the
|
|
* timeout expires.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (force_immediate)
|
|
ch_on_terminating_timeout(ch);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATED:
|
|
/* No-op. */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For RXDP use. */
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_on_remote_conn_close(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_CONN_CLOSE *f)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE tcause = {0};
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_channel_is_active(ch))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
tcause.remote = 1;
|
|
tcause.app = f->is_app;
|
|
tcause.error_code = f->error_code;
|
|
tcause.frame_type = f->frame_type;
|
|
tcause.reason = f->reason;
|
|
tcause.reason_len = f->reason_len;
|
|
ch_start_terminating(ch, &tcause, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void free_frame_data(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_enqueue_retire_conn_id(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, uint64_t seq_num)
|
|
{
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf_mem = NULL;
|
|
WPACKET wpkt;
|
|
size_t l;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_srtm_remove(ch->srtm, ch, seq_num);
|
|
|
|
if ((buf_mem = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_init(&wpkt, buf_mem))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_frame_retire_conn_id(&wpkt, seq_num)) {
|
|
WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WPACKET_finish(&wpkt);
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &l))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (ossl_quic_cfq_add_frame(ch->cfq, 1, QUIC_PN_SPACE_APP,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_RETIRE_CONN_ID, 0,
|
|
(unsigned char *)buf_mem->data, l,
|
|
free_frame_data, NULL) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
buf_mem->data = NULL;
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf_mem);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_NEW_CONN_ID,
|
|
"internal error enqueueing retire conn id");
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf_mem);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_on_new_conn_id(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_NEW_CONN_ID *f)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t new_remote_seq_num = ch->cur_remote_seq_num;
|
|
uint64_t new_retire_prior_to = ch->cur_retire_prior_to;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_channel_is_active(ch))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* We allow only two active connection ids; first check some constraints */
|
|
if (ch->cur_remote_dcid.id_len == 0) {
|
|
/* Changing from 0 length connection id is disallowed */
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_NEW_CONN_ID,
|
|
"zero length connection id in use");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (f->seq_num > new_remote_seq_num)
|
|
new_remote_seq_num = f->seq_num;
|
|
if (f->retire_prior_to > new_retire_prior_to)
|
|
new_retire_prior_to = f->retire_prior_to;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000-5.1.1: An endpoint MUST NOT provide more connection IDs
|
|
* than the peer's limit.
|
|
*
|
|
* After processing a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame and adding and retiring
|
|
* active connection IDs, if the number of active connection IDs exceeds
|
|
* the value advertised in its active_connection_id_limit transport
|
|
* parameter, an endpoint MUST close the connection with an error of
|
|
* type CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (new_remote_seq_num - new_retire_prior_to > 1) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_NEW_CONN_ID,
|
|
"active_connection_id limit violated");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000-5.1.1: An endpoint MAY send connection IDs that temporarily
|
|
* exceed a peer's limit if the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame also requires
|
|
* the retirement of any excess, by including a sufficiently large
|
|
* value in the Retire Prior To field.
|
|
*
|
|
* RFC 9000-5.1.2: An endpoint SHOULD allow for sending and tracking
|
|
* a number of RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames of at least twice the value
|
|
* of the active_connection_id_limit transport parameter. An endpoint
|
|
* MUST NOT forget a connection ID without retiring it, though it MAY
|
|
* choose to treat having connection IDs in need of retirement that
|
|
* exceed this limit as a connection error of type CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR.
|
|
*
|
|
* We are a little bit more liberal than the minimum mandated.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (new_retire_prior_to - ch->cur_retire_prior_to > 10) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(ch,
|
|
QUIC_ERR_CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_NEW_CONN_ID,
|
|
"retiring connection id limit violated");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (new_remote_seq_num > ch->cur_remote_seq_num) {
|
|
/* Add new stateless reset token */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_srtm_add(ch->srtm, ch, new_remote_seq_num,
|
|
&f->stateless_reset)) {
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error(
|
|
ch, QUIC_ERR_CONNECTION_ID_LIMIT_ERROR,
|
|
OSSL_QUIC_FRAME_TYPE_NEW_CONN_ID,
|
|
"unable to store stateless reset token");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
ch->cur_remote_seq_num = new_remote_seq_num;
|
|
ch->cur_remote_dcid = f->conn_id;
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_cur_dcid(ch->txp, &ch->cur_remote_dcid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000-5.1.2: Upon receipt of an increased Retire Prior To
|
|
* field, the peer MUST stop using the corresponding connection IDs
|
|
* and retire them with RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames before adding the
|
|
* newly provided connection ID to the set of active connection IDs.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: RFC 9000 s. 19.15 says:
|
|
* "An endpoint that receives a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame with a sequence
|
|
* number smaller than the Retire Prior To field of a previously received
|
|
* NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame MUST send a corresponding
|
|
* RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame that retires the newly received connection
|
|
* ID, unless it has already done so for that sequence number."
|
|
*
|
|
* Since we currently always queue RETIRE_CONN_ID frames based on the Retire
|
|
* Prior To field of a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame immediately upon receiving
|
|
* that NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame, by definition this will always be met.
|
|
* This may change in future when we change our CID handling.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (new_retire_prior_to > ch->cur_retire_prior_to) {
|
|
if (!ch_enqueue_retire_conn_id(ch, ch->cur_retire_prior_to))
|
|
break;
|
|
++ch->cur_retire_prior_to;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ch_save_err_state(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch->err_state == NULL)
|
|
ch->err_state = OSSL_ERR_STATE_new();
|
|
|
|
if (ch->err_state == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
OSSL_ERR_STATE_save(ch->err_state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_inject(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, QUIC_URXE *e)
|
|
{
|
|
ossl_qrx_inject_urxe(ch->qrx, e);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_on_stateless_reset(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE tcause = {0};
|
|
|
|
tcause.error_code = QUIC_ERR_NO_ERROR;
|
|
tcause.remote = 1;
|
|
ch_start_terminating(ch, &tcause, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_raise_net_error(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE tcause = {0};
|
|
|
|
if (ch->net_error)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ch->net_error = 1;
|
|
|
|
tcause.error_code = QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
tcause.reason = "network BIO I/O error";
|
|
tcause.reason_len = strlen(tcause.reason);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip Terminating state and go directly to Terminated, no point trying to
|
|
* send CONNECTION_CLOSE if we cannot communicate.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch_start_terminating(ch, &tcause, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_net_error(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->net_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_restore_err_state(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ch == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_port_is_running(ch->port))
|
|
ossl_quic_port_restore_err_state(ch->port);
|
|
else
|
|
OSSL_ERR_STATE_restore(ch->err_state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_raise_protocol_error_loc(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
uint64_t error_code,
|
|
uint64_t frame_type,
|
|
const char *reason,
|
|
ERR_STATE *err_state,
|
|
const char *src_file,
|
|
int src_line,
|
|
const char *src_func)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_TERMINATE_CAUSE tcause = {0};
|
|
int err_reason = error_code == QUIC_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR
|
|
? ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_R_QUIC_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
|
|
const char *err_str = ossl_quic_err_to_string(error_code);
|
|
const char *err_str_pfx = " (", *err_str_sfx = ")";
|
|
const char *ft_str = NULL;
|
|
const char *ft_str_pfx = " (", *ft_str_sfx = ")";
|
|
|
|
if (ch->protocol_error)
|
|
/* Only the first call to this function matters. */
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (err_str == NULL) {
|
|
err_str = "";
|
|
err_str_pfx = "";
|
|
err_str_sfx = "";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we were provided an underlying error state, restore it and then append
|
|
* our ERR on top as a "cover letter" error.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (err_state != NULL)
|
|
OSSL_ERR_STATE_restore(err_state);
|
|
|
|
if (frame_type != 0) {
|
|
ft_str = ossl_quic_frame_type_to_string(frame_type);
|
|
if (ft_str == NULL) {
|
|
ft_str = "";
|
|
ft_str_pfx = "";
|
|
ft_str_sfx = "";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, err_reason,
|
|
"QUIC error code: 0x%llx%s%s%s "
|
|
"(triggered by frame type: 0x%llx%s%s%s), reason: \"%s\"",
|
|
(unsigned long long) error_code,
|
|
err_str_pfx, err_str, err_str_sfx,
|
|
(unsigned long long) frame_type,
|
|
ft_str_pfx, ft_str, ft_str_sfx,
|
|
reason);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, err_reason,
|
|
"QUIC error code: 0x%llx%s%s%s, reason: \"%s\"",
|
|
(unsigned long long) error_code,
|
|
err_str_pfx, err_str, err_str_sfx,
|
|
reason);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (src_file != NULL)
|
|
ERR_set_debug(src_file, src_line, src_func);
|
|
|
|
ch_save_err_state(ch);
|
|
|
|
tcause.error_code = error_code;
|
|
tcause.frame_type = frame_type;
|
|
tcause.reason = reason;
|
|
tcause.reason_len = strlen(reason);
|
|
|
|
ch->protocol_error = 1;
|
|
ch_start_terminating(ch, &tcause, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called once the terminating timer expires, meaning we move from TERMINATING
|
|
* to TERMINATED.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ch_on_terminating_timeout(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determines the effective idle timeout duration. This is based on the idle
|
|
* timeout values that we and our peer signalled in transport parameters
|
|
* but have some limits applied.
|
|
*/
|
|
static OSSL_TIME ch_get_effective_idle_timeout_duration(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_TIME pto;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->max_idle_timeout == 0)
|
|
return ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 9000 s. 10.1: Idle Timeout
|
|
* To avoid excessively small idle timeout periods, endpoints
|
|
* MUST increase the idle timeout period to be at least three
|
|
* times the current Probe Timeout (PTO). This allows for
|
|
* multiple PTOs to expire, and therefore multiple probes to
|
|
* be sent and lost, prior to idle timeout.
|
|
*/
|
|
pto = ossl_ackm_get_pto_duration(ch->ackm);
|
|
return ossl_time_max(ossl_ms2time(ch->max_idle_timeout),
|
|
ossl_time_multiply(pto, 3));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Updates our idle deadline. Called when an event happens which should bump the
|
|
* idle timeout.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ch_update_idle(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
ch->idle_deadline = ossl_time_add(get_time(ch),
|
|
ch_get_effective_idle_timeout_duration(ch));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Updates our ping deadline, which determines when we next generate a ping if
|
|
* we don't have any other ACK-eliciting frames to send.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ch_update_ping_deadline(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL_TIME max_span, idle_duration;
|
|
|
|
idle_duration = ch_get_effective_idle_timeout_duration(ch);
|
|
if (ossl_time_is_infinite(idle_duration)) {
|
|
ch->ping_deadline = ossl_time_infinite();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Maximum amount of time without traffic before we send a PING to keep
|
|
* the connection open. Usually we use max_idle_timeout/2, but ensure
|
|
* the period never exceeds the assumed NAT interval to ensure NAT
|
|
* devices don't have their state time out (RFC 9000 s. 10.1.2).
|
|
*/
|
|
max_span = ossl_time_divide(idle_duration, 2);
|
|
max_span = ossl_time_min(max_span, MAX_NAT_INTERVAL);
|
|
ch->ping_deadline = ossl_time_add(get_time(ch), max_span);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called when the idle timeout expires. */
|
|
static void ch_on_idle_timeout(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Idle timeout does not have an error code associated with it because a
|
|
* CONN_CLOSE is never sent for it. We shouldn't use this data once we reach
|
|
* TERMINATED anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
ch->terminate_cause.app = 0;
|
|
ch->terminate_cause.error_code = UINT64_MAX;
|
|
ch->terminate_cause.frame_type = 0;
|
|
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_TERMINATED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Called when we, as a server, get a new incoming connection. */
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_on_new_conn(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, const BIO_ADDR *peer,
|
|
const QUIC_CONN_ID *peer_scid,
|
|
const QUIC_CONN_ID *peer_dcid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ossl_assert(ch->state == QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_IDLE && ch->is_server))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Generate an Initial LCID we will use for the connection. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_lcidm_generate_initial(ch->lcidm, ch, &ch->cur_local_cid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Note our newly learnt peer address and CIDs. */
|
|
ch->cur_peer_addr = *peer;
|
|
ch->init_dcid = *peer_dcid;
|
|
ch->cur_remote_dcid = *peer_scid;
|
|
|
|
/* Inform QTX of peer address. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_peer(ch->txp, &ch->cur_peer_addr))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Inform TXP of desired CIDs. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_cur_dcid(ch->txp, &ch->cur_remote_dcid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_cur_scid(ch->txp, &ch->cur_local_cid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Plug in secrets for the Initial EL. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_provide_initial_secret(ch->port->engine->libctx,
|
|
ch->port->engine->propq,
|
|
&ch->init_dcid,
|
|
/*is_server=*/1,
|
|
ch->qrx, ch->qtx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Register the peer ODCID in the LCIDM. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_lcidm_enrol_odcid(ch->lcidm, ch, &ch->init_dcid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Change state. */
|
|
ch_record_state_transition(ch, QUIC_CHANNEL_STATE_ACTIVE);
|
|
ch->doing_proactive_ver_neg = 0; /* not currently supported */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL *ossl_quic_channel_get0_ssl(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->tls;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ch_init_new_stream(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, QUIC_STREAM *qs,
|
|
int can_send, int can_recv)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t rxfc_wnd;
|
|
int server_init = ossl_quic_stream_is_server_init(qs);
|
|
int local_init = (ch->is_server == server_init);
|
|
int is_uni = !ossl_quic_stream_is_bidi(qs);
|
|
|
|
if (can_send)
|
|
if ((qs->sstream = ossl_quic_sstream_new(INIT_APP_BUF_LEN)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (can_recv)
|
|
if ((qs->rstream = ossl_quic_rstream_new(NULL, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* TXFC */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_txfc_init(&qs->txfc, &ch->conn_txfc))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->got_remote_transport_params) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we already got peer TPs we need to apply the initial CWM credit
|
|
* now. If we didn't already get peer TPs this will be done
|
|
* automatically for all extant streams when we do.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (can_send) {
|
|
uint64_t cwm;
|
|
|
|
if (is_uni)
|
|
cwm = ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_uni;
|
|
else if (local_init)
|
|
cwm = ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local;
|
|
else
|
|
cwm = ch->rx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_txfc_bump_cwm(&qs->txfc, cwm);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RXFC */
|
|
if (!can_recv)
|
|
rxfc_wnd = 0;
|
|
else if (is_uni)
|
|
rxfc_wnd = ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_uni;
|
|
else if (local_init)
|
|
rxfc_wnd = ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_local;
|
|
else
|
|
rxfc_wnd = ch->tx_init_max_stream_data_bidi_remote;
|
|
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_rxfc_init(&qs->rxfc, &ch->conn_rxfc,
|
|
rxfc_wnd,
|
|
DEFAULT_STREAM_RXFC_MAX_WND_MUL * rxfc_wnd,
|
|
get_time, ch))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_quic_sstream_free(qs->sstream);
|
|
qs->sstream = NULL;
|
|
ossl_quic_rstream_free(qs->rstream);
|
|
qs->rstream = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint64_t *ch_get_local_stream_next_ordinal_ptr(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
int is_uni)
|
|
{
|
|
return is_uni ? &ch->next_local_stream_ordinal_uni
|
|
: &ch->next_local_stream_ordinal_bidi;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_is_new_local_stream_admissible(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
int is_uni)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t *p_next_ordinal = ch_get_local_stream_next_ordinal_ptr(ch, is_uni);
|
|
|
|
return ossl_quic_stream_map_is_local_allowed_by_stream_limit(&ch->qsm,
|
|
*p_next_ordinal,
|
|
is_uni);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_STREAM *ossl_quic_channel_new_stream_local(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, int is_uni)
|
|
{
|
|
QUIC_STREAM *qs;
|
|
int type;
|
|
uint64_t stream_id, *p_next_ordinal;
|
|
|
|
type = ch->is_server ? QUIC_STREAM_INITIATOR_SERVER
|
|
: QUIC_STREAM_INITIATOR_CLIENT;
|
|
|
|
p_next_ordinal = ch_get_local_stream_next_ordinal_ptr(ch, is_uni);
|
|
|
|
if (is_uni)
|
|
type |= QUIC_STREAM_DIR_UNI;
|
|
else
|
|
type |= QUIC_STREAM_DIR_BIDI;
|
|
|
|
if (*p_next_ordinal >= ((uint64_t)1) << 62)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
stream_id = ((*p_next_ordinal) << 2) | type;
|
|
|
|
if ((qs = ossl_quic_stream_map_alloc(&ch->qsm, stream_id, type)) == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Locally-initiated stream, so we always want a send buffer. */
|
|
if (!ch_init_new_stream(ch, qs, /*can_send=*/1, /*can_recv=*/!is_uni))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
++*p_next_ordinal;
|
|
return qs;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_release(&ch->qsm, qs);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QUIC_STREAM *ossl_quic_channel_new_stream_remote(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
uint64_t stream_id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint64_t peer_role;
|
|
int is_uni;
|
|
QUIC_STREAM *qs;
|
|
|
|
peer_role = ch->is_server
|
|
? QUIC_STREAM_INITIATOR_CLIENT
|
|
: QUIC_STREAM_INITIATOR_SERVER;
|
|
|
|
if ((stream_id & QUIC_STREAM_INITIATOR_MASK) != peer_role)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
is_uni = ((stream_id & QUIC_STREAM_DIR_MASK) == QUIC_STREAM_DIR_UNI);
|
|
|
|
qs = ossl_quic_stream_map_alloc(&ch->qsm, stream_id,
|
|
stream_id & (QUIC_STREAM_INITIATOR_MASK
|
|
| QUIC_STREAM_DIR_MASK));
|
|
if (qs == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!ch_init_new_stream(ch, qs, /*can_send=*/!is_uni, /*can_recv=*/1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (ch->incoming_stream_auto_reject)
|
|
ossl_quic_channel_reject_stream(ch, qs);
|
|
else
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_push_accept_queue(&ch->qsm, qs);
|
|
|
|
return qs;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_release(&ch->qsm, qs);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_set_incoming_stream_auto_reject(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
int enable,
|
|
uint64_t aec)
|
|
{
|
|
ch->incoming_stream_auto_reject = (enable != 0);
|
|
ch->incoming_stream_auto_reject_aec = aec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_reject_stream(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, QUIC_STREAM *qs)
|
|
{
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_stop_sending_recv_part(&ch->qsm, qs,
|
|
ch->incoming_stream_auto_reject_aec);
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_reset_stream_send_part(&ch->qsm, qs,
|
|
ch->incoming_stream_auto_reject_aec);
|
|
qs->deleted = 1;
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_stream_map_update_state(&ch->qsm, qs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Replace local connection ID in TXP and DEMUX for testing purposes. */
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_replace_local_cid(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
const QUIC_CONN_ID *conn_id)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Remove the current LCID from the LCIDM. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_lcidm_debug_remove(ch->lcidm, &ch->cur_local_cid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ch->cur_local_cid = *conn_id;
|
|
/* Set in the TXP, used only for long header packets. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_cur_scid(ch->txp, &ch->cur_local_cid))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Add the new LCID to the LCIDM. */
|
|
if (!ossl_quic_lcidm_debug_add(ch->lcidm, ch, &ch->cur_local_cid,
|
|
100))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_set_msg_callback(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
ossl_msg_cb msg_callback,
|
|
SSL *msg_callback_ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
ch->msg_callback = msg_callback;
|
|
ch->msg_callback_ssl = msg_callback_ssl;
|
|
ossl_qtx_set_msg_callback(ch->qtx, msg_callback, msg_callback_ssl);
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_msg_callback(ch->txp, msg_callback,
|
|
msg_callback_ssl);
|
|
ossl_qrx_set_msg_callback(ch->qrx, msg_callback, msg_callback_ssl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_set_msg_callback_arg(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
void *msg_callback_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
ch->msg_callback_arg = msg_callback_arg;
|
|
ossl_qtx_set_msg_callback_arg(ch->qtx, msg_callback_arg);
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_set_msg_callback_arg(ch->txp, msg_callback_arg);
|
|
ossl_qrx_set_msg_callback_arg(ch->qrx, msg_callback_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_set_txku_threshold_override(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch,
|
|
uint64_t tx_pkt_threshold)
|
|
{
|
|
ch->txku_threshold_override = tx_pkt_threshold;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint64_t ossl_quic_channel_get_tx_key_epoch(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_qtx_get_key_epoch(ch->qtx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint64_t ossl_quic_channel_get_rx_key_epoch(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_qrx_get_key_epoch(ch->qrx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_trigger_txku(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!txku_allowed(ch))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ch->ku_locally_initiated = 1;
|
|
ch_trigger_txku(ch);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ossl_quic_channel_ping(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
int pn_space = ossl_quic_enc_level_to_pn_space(ch->tx_enc_level);
|
|
|
|
ossl_quic_tx_packetiser_schedule_ack_eliciting(ch->txp, pn_space);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t ossl_quic_channel_get_diag_num_rx_ack(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
|
|
{
|
|
return ch->diag_num_rx_ack;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ossl_quic_channel_get_diag_local_cid(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch, QUIC_CONN_ID *cid)
|
|
{
|
|
*cid = ch->cur_local_cid;
|
|
}
|